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Introduction
Dutch military operations in Iraq, 2003-2005
In March and April 2003, a military coalition led by the United States and 
United Kingdom toppled the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 
the space of just three weeks. Soon afterwards, on 6 June 2003, the Dutch 
government decided to contribute a battalion of Marines plus support units 
to the allied stabilisation effort in the wake of the invasion. That summer, 
Dutch forces relieved us troops in the Southern Iraqi province of Al Muthanna. 
However, the Dutch government repeatedly stressed that its forces did not form 
part of the original allied occupation army. Their task was only to contribute 
to security and stability in the province in order to enable the economic and 
political reconstruction of Iraq.1 In the Netherlands, the military deployment 
was given the name Stabilisation Force Iraq, abbreviated to sfir.
The	 Dutch	 armed	 forces	 deployed	 five	 successive	 reinforced	 and	
self-supporting combat battalions (known as battle groups) to Southern 
Iraq on four-monthly rotations between July 2003 and March 2005. 
During	the	first	two	rotations,	the	roughly	1,200-strong	tailor-made	units	
consisted of Marine battalions, while the subsequent three were made 
up of Army (mechanised, air assault or mixed) infantry battalions. The 
Royal Netherlands Air Force supported the ground forces with Chinook, 
Cougar and Apache helicopters and Royal Netherlands Marechaussee 
(gendarmerie and military police) personnel played an important role in 
training new Iraqi security forces.  
At the time, the Dutch military considered the deployment and 
operation in Iraq to be complicated and challenging. The sfir mission 




the formal umbrella term under which the Netherlands had conducted 
peacekeeping, peace support or humanitarian operations since the end of 
the Cold War in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans. After all, 
the 2003 Iraq operation was set up in the wake of a controversial invasion, 
followed by an equally controversial occupation, which subsequently met 
with increasing armed resistance. ‘sfir’ therefore was no standard peace 
operation in the sense that there was no peace agreement to uphold, and 
there were no warring parties to separate, disarm or control on behalf of a 
non-alligned international community.
Instead, the Dutch joined an ad hoc interventionist coalition. This 
raised the question, inside and outside the Dutch armed forces, what was 
actually entailed by such a deployment of a so-called ‘stabilisation force’ 
within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 occupation	 of	 a	 country	 by	 a	 warfighting	
alliance rather than within the framework (and with the mandate) of the 
Netherlands’ usual (and preferred) international structures like the United 
Nations (un) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (nato). What did 
this coalition force do to bring security to Iraq and in what respect was it 
or was it not an occupying force?
First the facts. Iraq, after the invasion in March and April 2003, was 
occupied by foreign troops, with a view to forming a new, democratic 
government for and by the Iraqis themselves. The regime of dictator 
Saddam Hussein had been removed. The us-uk civil occupation authority 
(Coalition Provisional Authority, cpa) and its multinational armed forces 
attempted to construct a new state. This ambitious project took place 
in a country that was at rock bottom due to years of war, destruction, 
international sanctions, disastrous economic policies, corruption and 
an internal reign of terror. Nevertheless, there was optimism and relief 
among many sections of the ‘liberated’ Iraqi population, which happily 
threw off the yoke of over forty years of totalitarian rule.
There were reasons for pessimism too, however. Parts of the old 
regime, previously organised into the all-powerful Baath (Renaissance) 
party, went underground and started a violent insurgency. They were 
joined	by	foreign	fighters	with	anti-American	intentions,	ostensibly	aided	
by (sympathisers from) neighbouring countries like Syria, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. Many other Iraqi nationalist or religious groups also took up 
arms. One tactic of these resistance movements was to cause disruption 
by inciting violence between the different groups within Iraqi society. 
Defeatists soon predicted the disintegration of the multi-ethnic and multi-
religious country, with ultimately civil war between Kurdish, Arab Sunni 
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and Arab Shiite groups as the worst-case scenario. For the time being, 
however, the foreign occupying powers and their allies – such as the 
Netherlands – were trying to set the country on its way to a peaceful and 
democratic future.
Controversy in the Netherlands
At the end of 2002 and in early 2003, the majority of the Dutch population 
opposed a military contribution to the invasion of Iraq. Even the Dutch 
government’s decision to back the war only politically, and not militarily, 
met with substantial resistance. The compromise, reached by the short-
lived, so-called Balkenende i government (2002-2003), which had already 
resigned by early 2003 and operated in the shadows of a national election, 
was seen as a typical example of Dutch ‘polder’ politics. It demonstrated 
how the political elite of a small country, when it comes to foreign policy, 
often has to come up with a compromise between public opinion, its own 
political reality (in this case an election campaign and the formation of 
a new government) and the desire to comply with the requirements and 
demands of an important and powerful ally.
Former Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok of the Dutch Labour Party (pvda) 
expressed the rather populist opinion of many when he claimed that under the 
leadership of his successor, Jan Peter Balkenende of the Christian-Democrats 
(cda), the Netherlands had apparently become the United States’ lapdog. For 
many years after 2003 there was a debate about why the government in The 
Hague had seemed so eager to please its powerful partner in Washington in 
this thorny matter.2 Was there some truth in the public perception that Dutch 
political support for the invasion of Iraq was related to the appointment, later 
in 2003, of Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (cda) to 
the post of Secretary-General of nato? Did Dutch support raise the stature of 
the Netherlands in international us-dominated fora or were trade interests 
perhaps involved, as in the case of Britain’s oil companies,3 and did support 
bring	with	it	the	promise	of	profitable	contracts	for	Dutch	businesses?	Or	was	
it simply a matter of (dogmatic) ‘Atlantic solidarity’ with the us and uk allies? 
The decision to back the war in Iraq remained a national conundrum for years 
to come.
In spite of the broad opposition to the invasion, national (media) 
attention and public appreciation for the Dutch troops in Iraq was almost 
exclusively positive. This is remarkable, given the fact that opinion polls 
regularly showed that the deployment in Iraq itself was consistently valued 
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less highly than other Dutch overseas crisis response operations in the 
past. With only 38 per cent in agreement with the deployment, 41 per cent 
against and 21 per cent without an opinion, the operation was arguably 
more controversial than the war waged against Indonesian nationalist 
forces during the decolonisation struggle in the former Dutch East Indies 
in the late 1940s. The operation in Iraq was even more unpopular than the 
failed Dutch un-deployment in the Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica in 1994-
1995, which – like the military operations in the former Asian colony – 
had occasionally been the subject of heated public debate, partly due to its 
dramatic ending.4 The operation in Iraq thus stood out in a very negative 
sense, irrespective of the appreciation for individual military personnel.
A Dutch success story?
What explains the positive appraisal of the Dutch troops on the ground 
in Iraq? The national media devoted a great deal of attention to sfir, 
perhaps even more than to previous overseas operations, and in spite of 
the controversial circumstances the general tone was positive. Dutch forces 
at the same time presented a positive image abroad. Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard, for instance, tried to reassure his fellow countrymen 
when Australian troops took over responsibility for Al Muthanna province 
in the spring of 2005 by referring to the Dutch who had preceded them. 
He emphasised their supposedly successful operations, which had been 
internationally praised after an article appeared in the New York Times 
on 24 October 2004. According to the paper, the Dutch had been open 
and friendly towards the Iraqi people, preferring to drive around in open 
vehicles rather than in armoured cars. The article quoted an inhabitant 
of the provincial capital As Samawah, who said that the Dutch had shown 
respect,	much	more	than	the	Americans.	The	head	of	police	confirmed	this	
view by saying that the Dutch had made a real effort to understand local 
traditions. He added that Iraqis viewed the Americans but not the Dutch as 
an occupying force.5
The	article	defined	what	the	Dutch	themselves	had	started	to	call	the	
‘Dutch approach’: a military presence that is friendly but robust when and 
where necessary, with good intentions and empathy for local customs and 
habits. An interesting and attractive viewpoint, but the ultimate question 
was of course whether the relative peace in Al Muthanna province during 
the years 2003-2005 could indeed be ascribed to this supposedly positive 
and effective ‘typically Dutch’ operational style, if in fact such a thing 
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existed at all. Or were the positive memories which the Netherlands came 
to cherish about this sfir operation mainly due to the canny choice for 
the safest area of deployment which Iraq had to offer? Al Muthanna was 
hardly a hotbed of the emerging insurgency. “The Dutch selected this 
area because it is peaceful,” one inhabitant of Al Muthanna insisted in 
December 2003. “It will remain peaceful after the Dutch have left.”6
The nature of sfir
So what was the true nature of sfir, a mission that the Dutch government 
primarily	defined	in	terms	of	what	 it	was	not? As far as the responsible 
Balkenende i (2002-2003) and Balkenende ii (2003-2006) governments 
were concerned, the idea that the Iraqis saw the Americans and British 
but not their Dutch allies as occupiers served as the foundation for the 
Netherlands’ participation in the occupation of Iraq. The Dutch politicians 
viewed the us and uk as sole occupying powers, with all the responsibilities 
that role entailed, while the Dutch pretended to contribute to a supposedly 
separate multinational peace operation. In the spring of 2003, a reassuring, 
fashionable	 term	 began	 to	 be	 used	 in	 official	 communications	 on	 the	
deployment to Iraq. The Netherlands was contributing to a ‘stabilisation 
force’, without it being clear exactly what this meant.
The	 phrase	 ‘stabilisation	 force’	 was	 just	 as	 undefined	 as	 other	
official	 umbrella	 terms	 like	 ‘crisis	 response	operation’.	One	 could	make	
it	 fit	 anything.	When	 combined	with	 the	 abbreviation	 sfir – only used 
by the Dutch – it particularly harked back to the Stabilisation Force in 
Bosnia (sfor), the nato operation in which the Netherlands participated 
intensively from 1996 to 2004. sfor	served	to	keep	conflicting	parties	apart	
using a robust display of military power. The force created a kind of safety 
cordon within which civilian actors, such as (international) governmental 
and non-governmental organisations, could work on reconstructing the 
country torn apart by war. Aspects such as public administration, police 
tasks and reconstruction were expressly not part of the military tasks of 
sfor in Bosnia. On paper, the 2003 Dutch sfir	operation	in	Iraq	was	defined	
in similar terms, although there was a completely different international, 
political ánd military framework within which it was conducted.7
In	 official	 documents	 on	 the	 Iraq	 operation,	 the	 Dutch	 Ministry	
of Defence never used the term ‘peace operation’. Yet in the country’s 
collective memory the mission became a deployment to be viewed in the 
tradition of Dutch contributions to international peace support missions, 
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and not, for example, in the tradition of the Dutch armed forces’ experiences 
in occupations, in imposing military rule, or in counter-insurgency and other 
types of irregular warfare (from the colonial past in particular). Did this 
mean that the Netherlands no longer saw any difference between occupation 
and peacekeeping? Had it become so popular to suppose that the Dutch 
armed forces were only deployed overseas out of a sense of altruism, that 
each deployment abroad, including Iraq, was automatically earmarked as 
a peace operation? Or did the media and public see through this fabricated 
narrative and was this the reason the operation was so unpopular?
In general, the extent to which operations by Dutch troops in Iraq 
tallied with the political message, or not was rarely accounted for or 
debated. As could be expected, an altogether different situation developed 
on	 the	 Iraqi	 battlefield.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	military	were	 increasingly	 torn	
between the reality of an occupation and their political mandate. In other 
words: the emphatic political wish not to be seen as an occupying force 
while participating in an occupation, and in doing so claiming a status 
different from that of the Americans and the British (and other allies), 
seemed operationally untenable.
Could military personnel therefore implement the political mandate 
in practice? What was the Dutch contribution to the multinational 
deployment in Iraq between 2003 and 2005, and under what conditions 
did Dutch forces conduct their tasks? What was the so-called ‘mission 
design’? How did the Dutch contribution to the occupation of Iraq come 
into	 being	 both	politically	 and	operationally	 and	which	 aspects	 typified	
this	mission	(and	the	preparations	for	it)	in	the	field?	What	was	the	state	
of the operational environment of Al Muthanna as encountered by the 
various Dutch sfir contingents (nlbgs), how did they operate in this battle 
space and in what condition was the province when they left?
A gentle occupation?
This book examines the operations of the Dutch battle groups deployed in 
Iraq between July 2003 and April 2005. Using mainly information from 
military	archives	(some	of	 it	classified)	and	from	interviews	with	military	
personnel, it focuses primarily on the tactical level. Operations are described 
within the international and domestic politico-strategic climate of the time. 
In the course of this, the abovementioned themes are elaborated with a 
view to classifying the mission and critically analysing the supposed causal 
link between the so-called ‘Dutch approach’ and the relative stability in the 
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appointed area of operations. To this end, this study dissects all aspects of 
sfir,	while	the	themes	of	its	chapters	reflect	the	shifting	emphasis	over	time.
Chapter 1 introduces the 2003 war against the Baath regime from an 
international perspective and shows how the Dutch government arrived at 
the decision to support the invasion politically in the period between 2002 
and 2003. It subsequently analyses how the decision to deploy sfir was 
made. In what way did the government present the military operation and 
how did it translate the difference between ‘occupier’ and ‘non-occupier’ 
in	the	military	assignment?	Chapter	2	deals	with	the	first	few	months	of	
the operation, during which the gap between the formal assignment – with 
all its limitations – and the unwieldy and rapidly evolving reality on the 
ground was revealed. How did the nlbg operate as part of the international 
force and how did the unit cope with the mandate and enforced restrictions, 
such as the ban on executive police tasks?
Chapter 3 discusses a similar friction between theory and practice, 
resulting from the caveat that prohibited the undertaking of any 
administrative tasks. What repercussions did this have on relations with 
the cpa (on all levels) and with the British divisional headquarters in 
Basra? What problems did the Dutch encounter and what emerged as the 
focal point of operations? Did they ever go as far as exercising any form of 
military government? These themes are elaborated on in Chapter 4, which 
emphasises the central role for the nlbg from the autumn of 2003: the 
resurrection and training of new Iraqi security organisations.
Chapter 5 focuses on the growing resistance to the Coalition Forces 
from the spring of 2004 onwards. How did the operational environment 
change as a result of the mounting insurgency and how did the nlbg and 
the Netherlands’ national Defence Staff respond to this development? The 
occupation	of	 Iraq	was	officially	 coming	 to	an	end,	but	did	 this	 cause	a	
shift towards a peace support-like stabilisation operation or was there a 
shift towards countering irregular warfare? Chapter 6 deals with civil-
military cooperation and reconstruction activities by the Dutch in relation 
to the security issues and with the continued development of Iraqi security 
forces up to the crucial national elections of January 2005. Not long after 
this milestone, the Netherlands completed its military operation in Al 
Muthanna. Chapter 7 opens with the withdrawal of Dutch forces from Iraq 
and subsequently answers the book’s key questions: was there a typical 
Dutch approach to the mission that can explain the relative stability in 





Mixed feelings: Dutch politics and Iraq
In October 2005, Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs Ben Bot (cda) 
caused political upheaval in the House of Representatives (known in the 
Netherlands as the Second Chamber) with a remarkably honest statement 
on the us-uk invasion of Iraq of March 2003: “Looking back at the overall 
process, it is legitimate to question whether it was sensible for the occupying 
powers to have invaded Iraq.”1 Bot said he wondered whether “with the 
knowledge we have now” – the knowledge that Iraq no longer possessed 
weapons of mass destruction at the time the war started – it would not have 
been more sensible to deal with the issue of Iraq’s disarmament “using 
other, diplomatic means” and whether “it would have been better to have 
conducted further investigations” rather than to intervene militarily so 
early. In making these remarks, the Minister both renounced two major 
allies in retrospect, and questioned the decision of the Balkenende i 
government – the ‘right-wing conservative’ coalition of the Christian-
Democratic cda, the populist Lijst Pim Fortuyn (lpf) and the conservative 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (vvd) – to support the attack on 
Iraq as wholeheartedly as it did in 2003.
The cda and vvd parties, which returned to power in the Balkenende 
ii government (on this occasion in a coalition with the small ‘left-wing 
liberal’ party Democraten ’66 – d66) promptly reacted, as daily newspaper 
de Volkskrant reported the next day, “as if they had been stung by a wasp. 
‘The minister is basically saying that the Netherlands’ political support 
[for the Iraq war] was incorrect,’ vvd Member of Parliament [Hans] van 





so that evening on national television. “As a Dutch government minister,” 
daily newspaper nrc Handelsblad wrote, “constitutionally obliged to 
defend the policy of his predecessors – in this case fellow cda member 
[Jaap] De Hoop Scheffer – Bot stated on television that if it were now 
2003 he ‘would have taken precisely the same decision’ as the cabinet 
had then.” Nevertheless, the paper reported, “the fact remains that since 
yesterday we know what the current Minister for Foreign Affairs [really] 
thinks about the invasion of Iraq: it was ill-judged.” In its leading article, 
the paper commented that the Minister should be applauded. “In view of 
the importance of overseas military operations in which the Netherlands 
is or will become directly or indirectly involved, his comments should 
give rise to serious debate on how and why a country goes to war, rather 
than to political bickering.”3
Yet, things needed to be smoothed out. On 6 October, Prime Minister 
Balkenende and Minister Bot told Parliament that the government’s 
position on the invasion of Iraq was unchanged. “The position was, is and 
will remain that the Netherlands provided political support to the military 
intervention in Iraq because Saddam Hussein refused to cooperate with 
the implementation of the un Security Council resolutions which called 
on the country to disarm. The crux of the matter is that Saddam Hussein 
did	not	cooperate	sufficiently	and	failed	to	provide	convincing	answers	
to	those	questions	identified	by	the	un,” Balkenende stated.4
The political upheaval of October 2005 served to emphasise that, 
nearly three years on, there was still a great difference of opinion in the 
Dutch political arena between supporters and opponents of the 2003 
intervention. Parties such as the pvda and also the ruling d66 believed that 
the us and uk had initiated the war against Iraq prematurely and under 
false pretences. They therefore thought that a parliamentary inquiry 
needed to be held into the Dutch government’s decision to support the 
invasion.
cda and vvd, which served in both the Balkenende i and ii 
governments, their former coalition partner lpf and some small 
Christian parties continued to believe that the support for the ad hoc 
alliance against Iraq was correct, even in retrospect. Saddam Hussein’s 
regime had been a threat to the world and his own people, had ignored 
numerous un	resolutions	and	had	finally	refused	to	cooperate	in	its	own	
disarmament; such was the view of this (small) parliamentary majority, 
which therefore succeeded in preventing an inquiry being set up. The 
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subsequent stalemate of opinions on Iraq persisted for years. No inquiry 
was held (until 2009) and the political crisis caused by Minister Bot’s 
comments abated. But it had once again become clear that autumn, over 
two and a half years after the war, that people in the Netherlands (as 
elsewhere in the world) looked back on the Iraq crisis with mixed feelings, 
to say the least. Even though the Dutch had never really gone to war over 
Iraq, the stance of the Dutch government was and remained a bone of 
contention.
Iraq as an international threat
Iraq had long been viewed, also by the Netherlands, as a security threat in 
a	region	of	significant	geostrategic	importance.	Dictator	Saddam	Hussein	
and his Baath party conducted a true reign of terror. In the 1970s, thanks 
to oil revenues and support from the Soviet Union, the country evolved 
into a heavily-armed military power which threatened its neighbours. 
In the 1980s, the West nevertheless embraced Iraq as a counterweight 
against the Islamic regime in Iran, which was considered to be much 
more dangerous. Throughout Saddam’s war against the revolution-
preaching ayatollahs in Teheran, Western countries supported him with 
arms supplies and intelligence. They ignored his use of chemical weapons 
and other human rights violations, just as they paid little attention to the 
reign of terror against his own people, including a genocide campaign 
against the Kurds. However, his invasion of the small neighbouring state 
of Kuwait in August 1990 put the Iraqi president on the wrong side of the 
international order in the eyes of the West. The occupation of this small, 
southerly neighbour was perceived as an aggressive violation of Kuwait’s 
sovereignty and giving Iraq potentially the control of too large a part of the 
oil production capability in the Persian Gulf region.
In the autumn of 1990 a large us-led international force gathered in 
Saudi Arabia on Iraq’s border. “This will not stand,” us President George 
H.W. Bush said in response to the Iraqi occupation of the emirate.5 At 
the end of 1990, the un Security Council authorised the multinational 
force in the Arabian Desert to liberate Kuwait, using force if necessary. As 
Saddam Hussein refused to budge, this occurred after a steady build-up of 
military resources in January and February 1991. The combined air and 
land operation (a lengthy bombing campaign, followed by a short, rapid 
land war) went down in history as Operation Desert Storm. The Iraqi army 
was utterly defeated and driven out of Kuwait.6
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As part of the peace agreement imposed by the international community 
in resolution 687 and adopted one month after the war on 3 April 1991, the 
un Security Council determined that Iraq would in the future be subject to 
severe restrictions governing the possession and development of weapons of 
mass destruction and long-range missiles. It was beyond doubt that Iraq had 
possessed such weapons and continued to develop them. The Security Council 
demanded that the Iraqi regime destroy its remaining nbc weapon systems, 
including all means of delivery with a range greater than 150 kilometres. 
Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) and a United 
Nations Special Commission (unscom) were to supervise compliance.
The international community thus placed Iraq under legal restraint. 
unscom and iaea commenced their detailed inspections of the Iraqi arms 
industry and armed forces. As long as the country did not meet the 
disarmament criteria, the economic sanctions which had been imposed 
the previous year remained in force. These included an export ban on 
oil, Iraq’s main source of revenue. An arms embargo also remained in 
place.	The	five	permanent	Security	Council	members	held	widely	differing	
opinions on the interpretation of these sanctions, however. France, the 
Soviet Union (subsequently the Russian Federation) and China saw them 
as	a	means	to	influence	the	Iraqi	government	and	to	obtain	cooperation	
for the planned disarmament. The United States and the United Kingdom 
saw them as a possible catalyst for regime change, a means with which 
they hoped to stage a coup against Saddam Hussein in the long term.7
The dictator and his cronies, however, held a tighter grip on power 
than these countries realised. Shortly after the Gulf War, for instance, the 
Baath regime succeeded in crushing two major domestic uprisings, in the 
south	by	the	Shiites	and	in	the	north	by	the	Kurds.	The	subsequent	flood	




became an allied instrument for further restricting the Iraqi government’s 
military freedom of movement.
Inspections and confrontations
In the meantime, the inspections relating to the disarmament of Iraq 
became a game of cat and mouse. The un inspectors attempted to get to the 
bottom of things, while the Iraqis did all they could to keep their weapons 
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development programmes hidden from the outside world.8 unscom was 
constantly negotiating with the Iraqi regime on access to locations and 
archives, and in general on the freedom of movement of the inspection 
teams. These teams, comprising specialists from a group of willing and 
able un member states, conducted searches throughout Iraq. They 
frequently encountered obstacles and were fed incomplete or misleading 
information. Twenty countries, including the Netherlands, participated in 
the international inspections. In total, between June 1991 and November 
1998, fourteen Dutch specialists in nuclear, biological or chemical warfare 
contributed to the operation.9
In 1995, it became clear that Iraq had spent the previous years 
successfully hiding large sections of its nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons development programmes.10 The Swedish chair of unscom, Rolf 
Ekéus (who held the position until 1997), and his Australian successor 
Richard Butler (1997-1999) repeatedly reported that Iraq continued to 
sabotage the disarmament process. In early 1998, the situation escalated 
into a major international crisis. Iraq denied the inspectors access to 
specific	suspect	locations.	The	us and uk amassed troops in the Gulf region. 
However, the hard line they took was no longer supported by France, the 
Russian Federation and China. These three countries sought to resume 
trade with Iraq and pleaded for a phased relaxation of the sanctions 
and the normalisation of relations. This division in the Security Council 
encouraged the Iraqi regime to continue calling the international sanctions 
into question and obstructing unscom. In October 1998, Iraq withdrew 
all cooperation from unscom. When head of unscom Butler reported in 
December 1998 that his personnel were no longer able to carry out their 
tasks properly due to Iraq’s conduct, the us and the uk chose the military 
option.11
Operation Desert Fox was a four-day bombing campaign against Iraq’s 
weapons development programme and defence and security apparatus. 
Targets included suspected weapons factories, defence sites, so-called 
‘presidential buildings’ that unscom had been forbidden from entering, air 
defence facilities, command & control and communications centres, and 
barracks of the Republican Guard, the military pillar of the Baath regime. 
It was a spectacular climax to the many years of inspections, but failed to 
break	 the	deadlock.	The	bombings	were	also	not	 confined	 to	 these	 four	
days	 alone.	 The	military	 option	was	 continued.	 In	 the	first	 few	months	
of 1999, the allied air forces attacked Iraqi military installations daily. 





The chief consequence of this armed confrontation was the end of 
unscom. Iraq did not permit the un commission to resume its work. Still, 
nearly eight years after the end of the Gulf War, it was unclear whether the 
sanctions, inspections and bombings had led to the full disarmament of the 
Iraqi	rogue	state.	While	Saddam	Hussein	retained	a	firm	grip	on	power,	
the Security Council became even more divided. The us and uk continued 
to pursue their path of military confrontation, against ever-louder appeals 
from	France,	Russia	and	China	to	give	Iraq	the	benefit	of	the	doubt.	The	
latter three nations’ argument in favour of the removal of the economic 
embargo and the creation of a new international inspection mechanism 
was aided by growing media coverage of a suffering Iraqi population.13
Military intervention?
Thus the question whether the containment policy on Iraq had failed or 
not, and which options were still open, was becoming ever more pressing. 
By the end of the decade the us was increasingly talking about the 
possibility of a more robust military approach. Many politicians, experts 
and commentators thought that what the international coalition had failed 
to do in 1991 should be done now: the removal of Saddam Hussein and his 
followers by means of force. Even before Operation Desert Fox, in October 
1998, us Congress had adopted a law which released funds for arming 
Iraqi opposition groups. Earlier still, in 1996, the us Central Intelligence 
Agency (cia) had attempted to organise a coup via the Iraqi army. The plot 
had been foiled by the Iraqi secret service. Hundreds were killed.14 The 
administration of President Bill Clinton (1993-2001) held the view that 
the most radical option of military intervention using ground troops was 
unnecessary though. In its view, the Iraq issue was a relatively limited 
security threat which, following the departure of the un inspectors, could 
be kept under control using air power.
Everything changed with the arrival of a new us government headed 
by George W. Bush in January 2001 and with the terrorist attacks of 
11 September of that year in New York and Washington. The Bush 
administration (2001-2009) contained many hardliners. Secretary of 
Defense	Donald	Rumsfeld,	Deputy	Secretary	of	Defense	Paul	Wolfowitz,	
Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, National Security Council staff 
Director Elliott Abrams, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and 
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Undersecretary of State John Bolton were all advocates of a regime change 
in Baghdad. In 1998, they had called on President Clinton in an open letter 
to disarm Iraq by military means.15 They now had the ear of Vice-President 
Dick	Cheney,	 obviously	 a	man	of	 great	 influence	 in	 the	 administration.	
Over the years, Cheney, who had been Secretary of Defense under Bush 
Senior during the 1991 Gulf War, had also become convinced that the 
coalition	from	the	first	war	should	have	removed	the	Baghdad	dictator.16
In the days following the events of 9/11, these foreign policy ‘hawks’ 
placed tackling Iraq high on the agenda. The hunt was initially on for the 
perpetrators directly responsible for the attacks on the Pentagon and the 
New York World Trade Center. Within a few weeks, Washington started 
a military campaign (Operation Enduring Freedom) against the Al-Qaeda 
terrorist network headed by Saudi extremist Osama bin Laden and against 
the Islamic-fundamentalist Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In the longer 
term however, the Bush administration opted to widen the scope of the 
conflict,	which	it	called	the	‘Global	War	on	Terror’.	Sights	were	set	not	just	
on terrorist organisations, but also on those countries which sponsored 
them and on countries which, according to the Americans, were developing 
weapons of mass destruction which could potentially fall into the hands of 
terrorists. The question was not whether, but rather when, Iraq would be 
included in the new world-wide war.
The decision to attack Iraq was taken at the end of 2001. In early 2002, 
Washington even considered the option of a rapid attack in the summer of 
that year.17 Ultimately, the wish to operate within an international alliance 
prevented this. From the spring of 2002, President Bush indicated in a 
number of speeches that he viewed the possibility of Iraqi weapons of 
mass destruction (and the risk of these falling into the wrong hands) as too 
great a threat to his country in the wake of 9/11. Slowly but surely, a war 
plan was drawn up in meetings between the White House, the Department 
of Defense and the military headquarters centcom (Central Command, 
responsible for the Middle East). The emphasis was on decapitating the 
Iraqi dictatorship by means of a rapid march on Baghdad. Little thought 
was given to what should happen afterwards.18
In the meantime, the Iraqi regime chose to be deliberately vague 
about	its	weapons	of	mass	destruction.	It	was	playing	a	bluffing	game.	By	
sowing doubt about whether it had chemical and biological weapons, and 
about the possible development programme for an atomic bomb, Saddam 
Hussein and his followers hoped to deter their regional arch-enemy Iran 
and prevent any domestic uprisings such as those in 1991. However, the 
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Baath regime made an error of judgement in pursuing this deterrence-
by-doubt strategy by misinterpreting the changed geostrategic situation 
since 9/11. It did not recognise the reversal in thinking that these shocking 
events had caused in Washington. It was precisely the smokescreen it 
put up around the development and possible possession of weapons of 
mass destruction, aimed at keeping its non-us enemies at bay, which now 
worked like a red rag to the us bull.19
The Bush administration was very open about its intention to remove 
the Iraqi regime by means of a “pre-emptive strike”. Three months after 
11 September 2001 and while the military operation in Afghanistan was 
still well underway, Vice-President Cheney dropped hints on the Fox News 
media channel about a possible next round in the global war on terrorism: 
“If I were Saddam Hussein, I’d be thinking very carefully about the future, 
and I would be looking very closely to see what happened to the Taliban in 
Afghanistan,” he said.20 In his State of the Union address on 29 January 
2002, President Bush clustered together the (security) threat of terrorism 
with the regimes in Iraq, Iran and North Korea in an “Axis of Evil”. He 
said he believed that the war on terror had only just begun and told his 
audience	that	they	were	in	for	a	long	fight.	In	Bush’s	view,	the	us should 
be “steadfast” in its pursuit of two objectives: to combat terrorism and 
prevent terrorists or regimes from threatening the us and the world with 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.21 Of all the countries in the “Axis 
of Evil”, Iraq should be the most worried, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
confirmed	a	week	later	during	a	hearing	in	the	us Senate. The Secretary 
reported that the White House was studying “a variety of options” for 
removing Saddam Hussein’s regime.22
Senior us	 officials	 continued	 to	 make	 these	 kinds	 of	 statements	
throughout the spring and summer of 2002. In April, when Bush invited 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair to his ranch in Crawford (Texas), a 
British television reporter asked the us President about Iraq. “I made up 
my mind that Saddam needs to go,” the American Commander-in-Chief 
said. “The worst thing that could happen would be to allow a nation like 
Iraq, run by Saddam Hussein, to develop weapons of mass destruction, 
and then team up with terrorist organisations so they can blackmail the 
world. I’m not going to let that happen.”23 In August, his National Security 
Advisor,	Condoleezza	Rice,	told	the	bbc that the West had to stop Saddam 
Hussein before he “wreak[s] havoc again on his own population, his 
neighbours and, if he gets weapons of mass destruction and the means to 
deliver them, on all of us”.24 At the end of August, Vice-President Cheney 
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gave the strongest indication yet during a speech to war veterans: “Simply 
stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass 
destruction [and t]here is no doubt he is amassing them to use against 
our friends, against our allies, and against us.”25 For this reason, Cheney 
asserted, “The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action”.26
Over the course of 2002, everything possible was done to convince 
the American people and the rest of the world of the threat posed by the 
Iraqi regime, and of the need to oust it. In doing so, the us government 
exaggerated intelligence data. It made the supposed possession of weapons 
of mass destruction by the Iraqi dictator the casus belli of a premeditated 
war, in spite of a severe lack of hard evidence. The decision-making process 
was dominated by wishful thinking and manipulation. The us intelligence 
services, especially the cia, were under great pressure from the White House 
and the Pentagon to produce the required information.27 Their often dubious 
and	 inflated	 intelligence	estimates	were	put	 to	use	 in	an	extensive	media	
campaign.28 The us even elevated improbable suspicions about supposed 
connections between the Iraqi regime and Al-Qaeda into facts.29
Parallel to the operational planning phase, us forces started preparing 
the	 future	 battlefield.	 Under	 the	 guise	 of	 conducting	 international	
supervision	 in	 the	 southern	 no-fly	 zone,	 pressure	was	 increased	 on	 the	
Iraqi	 armed	 forces.	 Instead	 of	 eliminating	 specific	 enemy	 installations	
when attacked, as had been the case in previous years, patrol aircraft 
started taking out a more comprehensive set of targets. This meant that 
the us ground down the Iraqi command, control and communications 
networks which would support the defensive effort in the event of an 
invasion. The British refused to participate because they believed that the 
applicable un	resolutions	did	not	sufficiently	justify	the	bombings.	The	air	
campaign, which took place largely out of sight, was dubbed Operation 
Southern Focus and meant that the war against Iraq in fact began with a 
series of air strikes as early as in 2002.30
The us State Department in Washington around this time started to 
point out a large hiatus in the military blueprints: the post-war phase. This 
aspect was mostly brushed aside with the assumption that the existing 
Iraqi administrative system, including army and police, would keep the 
country running under us	control	in	the	weeks	following	a	ceasefire.	The	
Department of Defense foresaw a brief transitional period. They were not 
so certain of this at the State Department however. The United States 
would occupy Iraq and would therefore have to run it, Secretary of State 
Powell argued. How did the us intend to do so? Toppling Saddam Hussein’s 
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regime automatically created responsibility for building a secure Iraq in 
the long term. International support and assistance needed to be sought. 
Together with their British ally, the State Department pressed for a formal 
approach to the Iraq question via the United Nations.31
Renewed inspections
Although the decision to remove Saddam Hussein and his dictatorship had 
already been taken, the United States turned to the un for international 
support. In November 2002, at the initiative of the us and the uk and 
following long negotiations with the French in particular, the Security 
Council unanimously adopted resolution 1441. The declaration stated that 
Iraq had failed to comply with earlier international demands. The country 
was given one last chance to destroy its weapons of mass destruction 
and related development programmes. The Security Council compelled 
Iraq to give weapons inspectors from the United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification	 and	 Inspection	 Commission	 (unmovic) – the successor to 
unscom – unconditional access and demanded that it allow them to do their 
work unhindered. The resolution also stated that the Iraqi government 
itself had to provide full disclosure about its arms programmes within thirty 
days. The next major milestone would be a progress report by unmovic, sixty 
days after the arrival of the inspectors in Iraq.32 The inspections were led by 
Swedish diplomat and former Minister for Foreign Affairs Hans Blix, head 
of unmovic, and by Mohammed El Baradei, the Egyptian director of the iaea.
After an absence of four years, un inspectors returned to Iraqi soil at the 
end of November 2002. In early December, Iraq reported as required on its 
weapons programmes. The twelve-thousand page declaration was in fact a 
denial	that	the	country	had	any	remaining	programme	of	any	significance.	
The us immediately saw this as a sign that the Iraqi government was trying 
to avoid full disclosure. The American view was that Saddam Hussein and 
his clique were continuing their old tricks of sabotage and deception. As far 
as Washington was concerned, Iraq had had its last chance.33 The us was also 
very	dissatisfied	with	the	way	the	un inspectors set to work. It thought that 
unmovic and the iaea were too hesitant and did not persevere long enough. 
The Bush administration was afraid of becoming bogged down in a never-
ending process of inspections and diplomacy. However, it was alone in this 
opinion. Few other countries at this point shared the conclusion that war 
was inevitable. This did not prevent Washington from making concrete war 
preparations together with its British ally. Large numbers of American and 
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British troops and military material were already on their way to Kuwait, the 
starting point for the future invasion.
In December 2002, Generals Tommy Franks – commander of centcom – 
and David McKiernan – commander of the land forces for the planned 
invasion	 –	 brought	 about	 a	 late,	 significant	 change	 to	 the	 us plan of 
attack. They decided that the air and land campaigns would be conducted 
simultaneous. This time there would be no prior bombing campaign 
lasting several weeks, as had been the case in the 1991 Gulf War, but an 
immediate march on Baghdad. The Pentagon, especially Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld, hoped to keep the invasion force as small as possible, 
but General McKiernan requested and was ultimately given more units. 
He considered these troops necessary for both the sustainability of his 
force	and	the	occupation	phase	once	the	fighting	was	over.
The plan brought no end to the controversy surrounding the post-war 
phase, however. Rumsfeld continued to press for a minimum number of 
troops and for dismantling the invasion force as quickly as possible after 
combat operations ended. This contrasted with the assessments made 
by the military planners at centcom and elsewhere, who foresaw a lack 
of	manpower	 for	preserving	public	order	and	 security	after	 the	fighting	
phase. McKiernan and his colleagues therefore had to count on the rapid 
deployment	of	military	units	supplied	by	allies	to	fill	the	gap	after	the	fall	of	
Baghdad. Moreover, they expected the Iraqi security apparatus to remain 
intact and to continue to be able to provide support.34
In the meantime the diplomatic search for international support for a 
war, via the un, was not going as the us and uk had hoped. The diplomatic 
debate turned into a tug-of-war between the allies and the other permanent 
Security Council member states. It was clear that the un weapons 
inspectors	in	the	field	were	not	receiving	the	cooperation	from	Iraq	which	
they required.35 At the end of January and early February 2003, this led 
to the question being raised whether the inspections should be continued. 
The international community was divided. On the one hand, the us and uk 
thought the time had come for military action. Powerful countries such 
as Russia, France and Germany opposed a war and argued in favour of 
continuing the work. They believed Iraq could be disarmed properly by the 
weapons inspectors, i.e. in a peaceful manner.
On 5 February, us Secretary of State Powell addressed the Security Council 
in an attempt to bring it round to the us-uk position. Iraq was deceiving the 
international community, the former general claimed, and clearly concealing 
its armament programmes. Powell presented a list of supposed evidence 
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to support this view. The only possible conclusion for the international 
community was that the regime in Baghdad had wasted its last chance, he 
stated. The Security Council had to pave the way for military action.
The war coalition, which included countries such as Spain, Italy, 
Poland and Australia, attempted to obtain formal approval for an attack on 
Iraq. Yet when the faction led by France, Russia and Germany – countries 
which were in favour of longer and more intensive inspections – indicated 
that it would block such a resolution and in doing so form a majority in 
the un against the us standpoint, the ‘coalition of the willing’ around the 
United States decided to push ahead without un approval. Most countries 
in this Coalition, such as the Netherlands, supported the invasion merely 
politically or indirectly. The United Kingdom, Poland and Australia were 
the only ones providing ground troops.
As war became inevitable at this stage, the planning for the occupation 
of	 Iraq	 became	 more	 definite.	 It	 was	 decided	 in	 Washington	 that	 the	
Department of Defense would take on this task. General McKiernan and 
his staff drew up plans for their units to support an allied occupation 
authority in the post-war situation, via either a civilian administration or 
a specially created military headquarters which would work together with 
an Iraqi interim government.36 For this so-called ‘stabilisation phase’, a 
Post	War	Planning	Office	was	set	up.	It	was	headed	by	former	general	Jay	
Garner, who was tasked with forming an occupation authority. His agenda 
contained a wide range of civilian tasks: maintaining public utilities, 
paying Iraqi civil servants and security troops, providing humanitarian 
aid, protecting essential infrastructure, creating new political institutions 
and numerous occupation tasks that tended towards state-building.37 
The us thus recognised the reality of having to create a new Iraq, but had 
only general plans while providing few resources. In March 2003 Garner 
arrived	in	Kuwait	with	a	small	team	(his	office	was	now	called	the	Office	
for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance – orha) to await the 
moment at which Iraq would be a country occupied by Coalition troops.38
War in Iraq
Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced on the night of 19 March 2003 with 
an air raid on the suspected location of Saddam Hussein to the south of 
Baghdad. The bombs missed the dictator, but were the opening salvo for 
what President Bush called “military operations to disarm Iraq, to free 
its people and to defend the world from grave danger”.39 After the failed 
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attempt to remove the head of the Baath regime, a rapid attack on the heart 
of the dictatorship followed. A devastating bombing campaign by allied 
air forces – dubbed ‘shock and awe’ by Coalition war propaganda – and 
a simultaneous advance by a fast manoeuvring ground force led to Iraqi 
resistance collapsing in just under three weeks.40
While the spearheads of the us ground forces – one army and one 
Marine division – raced northwards through the basin of the Euphrates 
and Tigris rivers, a large part of the Iraqi army evaporated. Many forces 
deserted their posts and quietly headed for home. The greatest resistance 
came from irregular Baath loyalists, known as Saddam Fedayeen, and 
from	 foreign	–	mostly	Arab	–	fighters	 and,	 closer	 to	Baghdad,	 the	 elite	
troops of the Republican Guard. These armed pillars of the dictatorship 
were, however, comprehensively defeated by the Coalition Forces in an 
unequal battle. On 9 April, the Coalition Forces conquered Baghdad. One 
day earlier, the southern Iraqi city of Basra fell to the British following 
a two-week siege. Subsequently, Coalition troops fanned out across the 
country	to	eliminate	the	final	pockets	of	resistance	and	to	occupy	Iraq.
The only Dutch military unit present in the region at this point was a 
detachment of air defence batteries in Turkey, which borders Iraq to the 
north.	Remembering	 the	Iraqi	missiles	fired	on	Israel	and	Saudi	Arabia	
in 1991, in early February nato member Turkey had requested three units 
equipped with Patriot air defence missiles. The Dutch government agreed 
to this deployment on a bilateral basis. Two Patriot batteries were deployed 
to the southern Turkish air base at Diyarbakir, a third was positioned close 
to the town of Batman. The detachment, from the Royal Netherlands Air 
Force’s Guided Missile Group, had at its disposal two types of missile: 
its own pac-2 and a more modern version, which was made available by 
Germany for the duration of the operation.41 The Dutch units, totalling 
370 military personnel, were operational as of the start of March 2003. 
They saw no action during the war as Turkey did not come under attack. 
The deployment ended on 16 April. The majority of the military personnel 
returned to the Netherlands on 1 May.42
On that same date, us President Bush declared an end to major combat 
operations in Iraq. The Baath regime had been deposed and its leaders and 
frontmen	were	either	dead,	imprisoned	or	had	fled.	The	us now planned to 
withdraw from Iraq as quickly as possible. The Bush administration had a 
well-known aversion to peacekeeping and nation-building and planned to 
leave the occupation and stabilisation of Iraq to troops from other foreign 
powers: in the south led by the British, in the centre by the Poles, and around 
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Baghdad and in the north by a force comprising Arab allies from the Persian 
Gulf region. A new Iraqi government was to be set up within thirty to sixty 
days. In September, the us occupying force could then be reduced to about 
30,000 men. Until that time, the idea was to restrict the deployment of us 
units for the stabilisation of the country to a minimum.43
This plan quickly proved to be a fantasy however, as there was very 
little outside help. Few Western allies sent forces and most Arab countries 
remained on the sidelines. The us and uk clearly paid the price for their 
unilateral behaviour prior to the war. In May and June, the occupying 
forces were spread thinly across the vast operational area while combat 
operations and weeks of lawlessness and plunder left the Iraqi state 
apparatus in ruins. Coalition troops – insofar as they were able – did not 
sufficiently	fill	 the	power	vacuum	that	emerged	 in	 the	wake	of	battle	 in	
most parts of Iraq. Moreover, the invasion force was confronted with the 
first	stirrings	of	a	resistance	movement	organised	by	the	Baathists,	who	
had gone underground, and by groups of foreign Muslim extremists. 
As the occupying authorities in Iraq, the Americans and the British 
inherited a bankrupt and impoverished country. They were now 
confronted with their inadequate planning. The general chaos and anarchy 
quickly turned the mood. Former general Garner and his orha were out 
of	touch	with	the	situation	during	the	first	chaotic	weeks,	as	were	the	us 
and British ground troops. The Coalition was forced to change its policy. 
The us sidelined Garner and appointed diplomat L. Paul (‘Jerry’) Bremer 
as the highest administrator in Iraq, at the head of what the us and the 
uk now called the Coalition Provisional Authority (cpa). In his capacity 
as custodian of the country, Bremer’s task was, in short, to employ state-
building methods to help post-war Iraq become a viable state again.
The Netherlands: political rather than military support
One of the allies eligible to give a helping hand in this critical phase was 
the Netherlands. Since the start of the Iraq crisis in 2002, the Dutch 
government had pursued a policy similar to that of the British, but 
without a concrete military contribution. The Dutch position was that 
Saddam Hussein’s regime needed to be tackled, preferably via the un, 
but if necessary without it. In adopting this policy, the Dutch government 
positioned itself squarely behind the Coalition.
When the issue became pressing in September 2002, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Jaap de Hoop Scheffer explained to Parliament that the 
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Dutch government shared the view that Saddam Hussein posed “a life-
sized	 threat	 to	 the	 region	 and	 beyond”.44 The Minister argued that the 
“legitimacy	 for	 action	 [lay]	 ...	 firmly	 embedded	 in	 the	 issue	of	weapons	
of mass destruction”. He stressed that the required disarmament of Iraq 
should preferably be conducted through the un Security Council. At the 
same time, he believed that the international community could not afford 
to be dependent on the veto of one or more uncooperative permanent 
Security Council members. He therefore advanced what he called the 
“formal legal argument” that intervention was possible on the basis of 
existing, older Security Council resolutions. New resolutions would be 
welcome, but were not essential.45 De Hoop Scheffer emphatically repeated 
this viewpoint during the debate on 19 November 2002, in which the by 
now outgoing Minister and the Dutch Parliament discussed resolution 
1441,	which	gave	Iraq	a	final	chance	to	provide	disclosure.46 
That same month, the us approached the Netherlands with a request 
for support. This entailed making available Patriot air defence systems and 
assistance in transporting military material to the Middle East via Dutch 
territory. The appeal also included the request to the Dutch to make “an active 
contribution of some kind if action was taken against Iraq”, Minister Henk 
Kamp – caretaker vvd minister of Defence in the outgoing government47 
– told Parliament some weeks later.48 The request from the us embassy, 
dated 15 November and subsequently reiterated by us Deputy Secretary of 
State Marc Grossman during a visit to The Hague on 5 December, in fact 
encompassed a very concrete list of Dutch military assets for possible combat 
operations on Iraqi territory.49 The wish list included military resources such 
as air assault and mechanised infantry combat units, f-16	fighter	jets	with	
precision guided weapons, frigates, minesweepers, submarines, maritime 
patrol aircraft, Apache attack helicopters and transport aircraft.50
The Dutch government granted the us	 an	 overflight	 permit	 and	
permission for the transit of us army material and personnel via Dutch 
territory.51 It did not comply with the request for a contribution to any 
combat operation, however. An appeal from the British to send the Dutch 
First Marine Battalion and the amphibious transport ship hnlms Rotterdam 
to the region as part of the uk/nl Amphibious Force was also rejected.52 
This	was	due	to	a	strategic	analysis	by	officials	at	the	Ministries	of	Defence	
and Foreign Affairs having concluded that planning the participation of 
Dutch units in potential offensive operations against Iraq was not – yet – 
expedient for the Netherlands as long as uncertainty remained about the 
legitimacy and timing of the Coalition’s invasion.53
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This rather non-committal policy was the result of the complex and rapid 
evolution	of	international	events,	as	well	as	the	specific	political	situation	in	
the Netherlands that winter. The government had resigned in October 2002 
as a result of squabbles within one of the governing parties, the political 
newcomer lpf. General elections were held in January 2003. From February 
onwards, the largest government party, cda (44 of the 150 seats), held talks 
on forming a new government with the biggest winner of the elections, 
opposition party pvda (42 seats). The Labour party was very critical of the 
us and uk policy on Iraq and thought that un inspectors should be given 
sufficient	time	to	do	their	jobs.	It	considered un Security Council approval 
not just desirable for further (military) action, but essential.54
In spite of the changed political relations, the caretaker coalition 
government of the cda, lpf and vvd parties meanwhile continued to pursue 
the Anglo-American policy line, as war without the explicit mandate of 
the un Security Council became increasingly more likely. For instance, 
the Dutch government took the data from the presentation by Secretary 
of State Powell on 5 February 2003 in the Security Council “exceedingly 
seriously,” as cda Minister De Hoop Scheffer wrote in a letter to the Second 
Chamber. Because “much of what Powell has revealed has been known in 
intelligence circles for some time and is in line with what Dutch intelligence 
sources have shown”.55 
The Minister claimed that he could not go into detail about the nature 
and origin of this intelligence, suggesting that Dutch ministers possessed 
independent information via their own services (the Military Intelligence 
and Security Service, mivd, and the General Intelligence and Security 
Service, aivd)	 confirming	 the	 us-uk allegations against Iraq. However, 
an	 official	 inquiry	 would	 later	 show	 that	 the	 Netherlands	 was	 guided	
almost completely by (biased) us and British intelligence on this matter. 
According to a 2010 inquiry report, Dutch ministers also used the analyses 
provided by the aivd and mivd selectively to serve their political goal of 
loyalty to the us and the uk. For instance, the Dutch cabinet neglected to 
inform	Parliament	about	specific	“misgivings	which	quickly	arose	about	
the reliability of the evidence presented by Powell”. Information from 
reports by unmovic was used selectively as well.56
At this stage, on the eve of battle, the Dutch government did not 
rule out participation “in some form or other” in a possible military 
action against Iraq either. Defence Minister Kamp told the Second 
Chamber on 19 February 2003 that he and his colleagues would make 
an “independent assessment” if the weapons of mass destruction, which 
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Kamp was convinced existed, were not “handed over” and the threat posed 
by Saddam’s regime was not “eliminated”.57 The government kept open 
the option of sending emergency response forces. It also considered the 
possible ‘relabelling’ of military forces which were already deployed to the 
region as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), such as a 
frigate and a submarine.58 While Security Council members spent February 
and March wrangling over a new resolution on the use of force, the Dutch 
government concluded on the basis of reports by unmovic and the iaea that 
it remained doubtfull whether “Saddam Hussein [was] willing to do what 
the global community demanded of him”.59 Minister for Foreign Affairs De 
Hoop Scheffer asserted on 18 March, the day before the war began, that 
the lack of consensus in the un Security Council should not result in the 
Iraqi regime being left in peace. The Netherlands therefore supported the 
us and the uk when they took unilateral action.60
This	cabinet	decision	immediately	caused	a	crisis	in	the	already	difficult	
talks between the cda and pvda on forming a new government. The cda and 
both other governing parties vvd and lpf supported the imminent invasion; 
the opposition did not. Wouter Bos, leader of intended government 
participant pvda, was critical of the way in which the un Security Council 
was being sidelined. In the view of Bos and the Labour party, this was 
“the wrong decision at the wrong time”.61 Nevertheless, a compromise was 
eventually reached. The Dutch government would not make “an active 
military contribution” due to the lack of support in the Netherlands in 
general and as a concession to the opposition and in particular the pvda.62
The caretaker Balkenende i government was now free to communicate 
resolutely about the desired hard line on Iraq. In doing so, however, 
government ministers did have to conceal some doubts. In particular with 
respect to the legitimacy of the war, opinions were not as solid as they 
appeared to the outside world.63 On 28 January 2003, for instance, the 
Ministry of Defence’s Directorate of Legal Affairs reported to Minister 
Kamp that a new un resolution containing a mandate from the Security 
Council was required to make an attack on Iraq legal. The reasoning 
propagated	by	the	government	that	existing	resolutions	were	sufficiently	
legitimate did not stand up to scrutiny, the Defence ministry’s lawyers 
concluded. They reported that careful reading of the resolutions showed 
that only the un Security Council itself, and therefore not just one or two of 
its members, was authorised to establish a violation and to determine any 
consequences. Fellow lawyers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also failed 
to see a valid mandate for the intended use of force in existing resolutions.64 
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Nevertheless, the Dutch government decided to keep up appearances and 
supported us-uk unilateralism.65
On 18 March, Prime Minister Balkenende again explained the 
reasoning during a heated debate in Parliament about the imminent war. 
In his opinion, the authorisation to use force could indeed be found in the 
‘old’ resolutions 678 of 1990 (the legal basis for the liberation of Kuwait), 
687	of	1991	(the	conditional	ceasefire	after	the	First	Gulf	War)	and	1441	of	
2002 (the ‘last chance’ resolution on disarmament). As it had since become 
clear, Balkenende claimed, “that Iraq [had] not cooperated actively as 
obliged by resolution 1441 and the Security Council had failed to reach a 
consensus on a [new] resolution, the way was open for un member states 
to take the necessary measures [by themselves] to enforce compliance 
on the basis of resolution 678”.66 The Prime Minister also referred to the 
fact that the previous Dutch government had supported the Desert Fox 
bombing campaign in 1998 using the same arguments. He regretted the 
fact that a unilateral ‘reactivation’ of old un resolutions had to lead to war, 
but in his view “the essence” was “the disarmament of an aggressor which 
possesses weapons of mass destruction”.67
Into the desert 
When announcing Dutch support for the invasion, Minister De Hoop Scheffer 
at the same time expressed the intention that the Netherlands would focus 
on the post-combat phase of operations, and not just politically. “In this 
respect, the desirability of a military contribution is also being considered,” 
he wrote.68 Prime Minister Balkenende added in his statement to Parliament 
that as far as he was concerned the Netherlands would actively participate in 
winning the peace. “The Netherlands is fully prepared to contribute under 
the	flag	of	 the	United	Nations,”	 the	Prime	Minister	 said.	At	 that	 time,	 the	
Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs were already busy considering 
Dutch participation.69 According to the head of the Defence Staff’s Operations 
Division it was clear that participation would be challenging, due to the 
complex relationship with the occupying powers, the fact that the cpa was not 
yet established, the unclarity on the nature of Iraqi government structures 
and the lack of un involvement. The Dutch contribution would be embedded 
in the British division that deployed in the south of Iraq.70 The Chief of the 
Defence Staff (cds), Lieutenant Admiral Luuk Kroon, decided on the basis of 
availability that the core of the Dutch contribution would consist of an infantry 
battalion of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps.71
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On Friday 11 April, just two days after the fall of the Iraqi capital Baghdad, 
daily newspaper de Volkskrant reported that the government wanted to 
make available “about six hundred military personnel for an international 
‘stabilisation force’ in Iraq”.72 The article stressed that Minister Kamp had 
not said a word about the intended Dutch contribution to what de Volkskrant 
called a ‘peacekeeping force’ during a debate in the Second Chamber on the 
previous day. It added that Minister for Foreign Affairs De Hoop Scheffer had 
expressed a preference for the deployment of military forces with a sound un 
mandate, or possibly within a nato operation, and noted: “Parliament has so 
far not been averse to a Dutch military contribution after the war ends. In 
the opinion of the government and Parliament, the un will [have to] play a 
key role in the post-Saddam Hussein era.”73
The Ministers informed Parliament by letter that same day that the 
government had decided “to investigate the desirability and possibility 
of a Dutch military contribution to a stabilisation force in Iraq”.74 To 
this end, among other things, the Defence Staff conducted a “strategic 
reconnaissance”. From 8-12 May, an inventory team, led by the Head of 
the Operational Planning Division, travelled through the south of Iraq 
to review the potential deployment options for the Dutch Marine battle 
group in the British division sector. Lieutenant Colonel Dick Swijgman, 
commander of the First Marine Battalion, the unit which was to be 
deployed	first,	was	a	member	of	this	team.
At this stage, there were several options on the table. One was 
deployment under the command of a British brigade, either in Maysan 
province near the Iranian border or at As Zubayah to the south of the city 
of Basra. Another option was deployment to Al Muthanna province, with 
two variants: either under the command of a Spanish brigade, or as an 
independent battle group with a direct line of command to British division 
headquarters.75 If the latter option were chosen, the Dutch operation 
would start on 1 August, the date on which a us Marine battalion in Al 
Muthanna was due to leave. The province would then be part of the area of 
operations of the newly-created, uk-led Multinational Division South-East 
(mnd South-East) of the Coalition Forces.
The Dutch reconnaissance team visited the British division staff near 
the city of Basra, the us Marines in Al Muthanna and the British Duke 
of Wellington’s Regiment in As Zubayah. The team was told that the 
population in the south of Iraq at that time generally had a positive or 
neutral attitude towards the occupation. It was noted, however, that this 
could change if food or fuel supplies were to come to a halt or the restoration 
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of public utilities were delayed. Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman reported 
that the allied forces devoted a great deal of time to “static security tasks” 
(relating to buildings, infrastructure, supply lines, as well as mass graves 
and locations which might be connected to weapons of mass destruction) 
and patrols.76
The Dutch inventory team compared the two most likely deployment 
options: one in Basra province and the other in Al Muthanna. In the 
opinion	of	the	team,	the	benefit	of	deployment	under	a	British	brigade	in	
As Zubayah near Basra was that the Dutch unit would receive logistical 
support from the British and would therefore require fewer personnel for 
this	itself.	Other	benefits	included	proximity	to	a	British	military	hospital,	
short supply lines from the sea and airports to the deployment area, and 
the small requirement for engineer support as the unit could immediately 
move into a camp constructed by the British. The Al Muthanna option was 
in fact tougher with respect to logistics and personnel. The reconnaissance 
team did, however, estimate the security threat to be higher in Basra than 
in sparsely populated Al Muthanna. The advantage of the latter option 
would also be that the Netherlands could independently oversee its ‘own 
province’,	and	by	doing	so	would	conduct	a	higher	profile	operation.	Yet,	
as Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman wrote, his preference on the basis of the 
comparison was for the, in military terms, more challenging option of As 
Zubayah. He advised his superiors accordingly.77
In The Hague the responsible policy makers nevertheless came to 
prefer the option of an independent Dutch operation in Al Muthanna. 
First, the British had urged the Al Muthanna option at a coordination 
meeting in London on 30 April.78 Second, the idea appealed to many in 
The Hague because, as mentioned above, an independent operation 
would make the Dutch effort internationally much more visible. The more 
autonomous and visible the operation the better. The enthusiasm for 
the Al Muthanna option was so great that within the Defence Staff the 
inventory	mission	 of	May	was	 generally	 perceived	 as	 chiefly	 serving	 to	
investigate this scenario.79 Third, a security analysis backed the choice of 
Al	Muthanna.	In	Basra	and	its	surroundings,	a	Dutch	unit	could	find	itself	
in a complex urban environment with all the risks that that entailed. The 
Basra region was also strategically more important (and therefore more 
vulnerable)	due	to	the	oil	and	gas	fields	and	corresponding	installations,	
its access to the Persian Gulf and its proximity to neighbouring Iran. The 
Defence Staff therefore recommended opting for deployment in the less 
complicated environment of Al Muthanna. Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman 
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and his men were told to prepare “on the basis of the risk analysis and 
political	profile”	 for	an	operation	as	an	 independent	battle	group	 in	 the	
remote desert province.80
In order to study the details of this type of deployment, groups of 
military specialists conducted tactical and technical reconnaissance in late 
May and early June. In the meantime, Minister Kamp told Parliament on 
20 May that the Dutch government, “in view of its caretaker status, the 
progress of government formation talks and the fact that the desirability 
and feasibility study has not yet been completed,” had decided “to leave 
decision-making on the stabilisation force in Iraq to the next government”. 
This administration, which became known as the Balkenende ii 
government, was sworn in on 27 May 2003. On 6 June, it approved the 
military deployment to Iraq, in spite of the fact that it had since become 
clear that the un would play only a minor role.
Ministers Kamp and De Hoop Scheffer – who both returned to 
their former posts – informed Parliament that the Dutch contribution 
to the Coalition was to comprise “a battalion of Marines and associated 
support units”.81 The government announced that the Dutch unit would 
be stationed in Al Muthanna province “at the request of the British”. As 
this region came under the responsibility of British-led mnd South-East, 
the “operational line of command [would] ... [run] via the British division 
headquarters and subsequently via us headquarters in Baghdad to the us 
Central Command (centcom), which coordinates military direction”. The 
Netherlands based its participation, in line with the previously formulated 
objective of desired un authorisation, on Security Council Resolution 1483, 
which had been adopted a few weeks earlier on 22 May. In this resolution, 
the Council welcomed the willingness of member states to contribute 
“personnel, equipment and other resources” to “stability and security in 
Iraq”. The Council also appealed to member states and organisations to 
assist the people of Iraq in reconstructing their country.82
Although the resolution did not mention the creation and status of a 
multinational force, as the Netherlands would have liked and as is common 
in these cases, the Dutch government’s view was that the text contained a 
sufficient	“political	and	legal	basis	for	participation	in	the	stabilisation	force”	
that was created under the guidance of the occupying powers in Iraq.83
The Dutch government furthermore stated that its contribution would 
focus on “assisting in the reconstruction of Iraq by creating a secure and 
stable	environment”	as	well	as	the	support	of	“specific	tasks	for	which	the	
administrative responsibility” would lie with the cpa, such as humanitarian 
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actions, reconstruction and the provision of security for other Coalition 
partners.84 Although Dutch military personnel would be full members 
of the occupying force’s military organisation, the Dutch government 
emphasised the explicit reservation in un resolution 1483 determining 
“that countries which provide this type of contribution are [themselves] 
not	defined	as	occupying	powers”.85 In doing so, the Netherlands distanced 
itself from its major allies. The politically-desired status of ‘non-occupier’ 
was translated into two distinct caveats, laid down in a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the uk: under no circumstances would Dutch military 
personnel be allowed to conduct administrative tasks (as was common 
elsewhere	in	the	country	due	to	the	lack	of	sufficient	cpa personnel), nor 
would they be allowed to take the lead with respect to law enforcement. 
The Dutch battle groups therefore conducted no executive police tasks and 
were for instance prohibited from interning people.
The	Netherlands’	 desire	 to	profile	 its	military	 contribution	 as	being	
separate from that of the Coalition which fought against Iraq was also 
expressed by the distinctive, individual Dutch name for the operation. As 
the uk and the us had used the same code name for the occupation phase 
as they did for the spring offensive (Operation Iraqi Freedom for the us 
and Operation Telic for the uk), cds Kroon decided that this was unsuitable 
for the Dutch. A solution was found in the informal terms ‘stabilisation 
operation’ and ‘stabilisation force’. In the legal agreements with the 
British, the name Stabilisation Force Iraq, at times abbreviated to sfor, 
was	increasingly	used	in	an	official	sense.	As	there	was	obvious	potential	
confusion with the nato operation in Bosnia of the same name, the Dutch 
Defence Staff introduced the acronym sfir.86
The government’s letter to Parliament did not explain in any further 
detail how the separate status in Iraq stressed by the Netherlands related 
to the formal command structure, either in the military line of command 
of the allied force or with respect to the cpa. The government did state, 
however, that a Committee of Contributors would be set up for the British 
sector, which was aimed at enabling “those countries which provided 
troops	to	be	sufficiently	involved	in	determining	general	politico-military	
policy ... and the exchange of information”.87 The “stabilisation force” 
in which the Netherlands was to participate, “should play an essential 
support role”. The idea was to conduct the operation in such a way as to 
enable a rapid handover of responsibilities to the Iraqis.88
The government’s interpretation of the new military operation in Iraq 
was not readily accepted by everyone. During a number of hearings in 
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Parliament on 19 June, for instance, Professor of International Law Nico 
Schrijver	stated	that	he	regarded	Resolution	1483	as	sufficient	legitimation	
for the planned multinational stabilisation force and the Dutch participation 
in	it,	but	pointed	out	that	the	text	contained	no	specific	appointment	or	
mandate for such a force. His interpretation of the situation therefore was 
that it was not the un Security Council but the British and Americans who 
would determine the rules (including instructions on the use of force) for 
the Dutch deployment. The principle for the Dutch contribution therefore 
did not lie in explicit authorisation by the un Security Council for this 
specific	operation,	but	in	fact	in	the	recognition by the Council of the us-uk 
occupation of Iraq as a fait accompli.89
Military expert Frank van Kappen, a retired Marine Corps Major 
General, also called sfir a mission that differed sharply “from the usual 
spectrum”. He called it “unprecedented, whereby in my opinion the key 
point is that operations will be conducted under the command of two 
occupying	 powers	 which	 have	 been	 formally	 identified	 as	 such	 by	 the	
Security Council”. Van Kappen implied that the decision on the deployment 
failed to comply with the government’s previous objective of a ‘key role’ for 
the un. The sfir mission was therefore certainly not a peace operation in the 
classic sense – whereby peace support troops adopt an impartial role on 
behalf of the international community. The general referred to the risks to 
Dutch forces who, whichever way one looked at it, would be “the only visible 
component” and “visible representatives” of the occupying authorities in 
their area of operations. He asserted that if the cpa were to function poorly, it 
would be military personnel, including the Dutch, who would pay the price. 
Local Iraqis “would not give a damn that military personnel bore no direct 
responsibility for this”.90
Ultimately, these complications, which would strongly determine the 
nature of the Dutch operation, made little difference to Parliament. Only 
two small left-wing parties voted against participation in the Coalition’s 
stabilisation force. In spite of harbouring major doubts, opposition party 
pvda largely shared the idea that a new reconstruction phase had started 
in Iraq. The sharp distinction created in the un Security Council resolution 
and stressed by the Dutch government between the occupying and non-
occupying	 powers	 within	 the	 Coalition	 –	 a	 first	 in	 international	 law	 –	
was accepted as political reality by all those who voted in favour. On 26 
June 2003, a majority in the Second Chamber approved the government 
decision to deploy a battle group to Al Muthanna in Iraq.
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Party to the conflict
In the summer of 2003, the Netherlands discovered a new, fashionable 




conveniently left open for all parties whether this deployment was a peace 
operation (in the sense of a classical, impartial peace support deployment), 
a more robust and not necessarily neutral peace enforcement operation, 
perhaps	 a	 post-conflict	 peacebuilding	 operation,	 or	 participation	 in	 or	
support for an occupation.
The Netherlands therefore did not really know how to view its own 
contribution to the multinational campaign in Iraq. In spite of minimal 
commitment from the un, the Dutch government, the Ministry of Defence 
and – displaying remarkably little criticism – the media constantly classed 
the	new	operation	as	a	‘normal’	crisis	response	operation.	This	classification	
was misleading, however, and ignored the fact that the stabilisation force 
for Iraq had been created and led by the countries which had invaded and 
occupied it in March – without there being any agreed un mandate to do 
so.	Moreover,	there	was	also	the	question	whether	the	armed	conflict	in	
Iraq was indeed over. Many predicted an armed uprising and civil war.
The crisis in Iraq certainly did not result in an international follow-up 
operation led by the un (as the Netherlands and others had hoped and 
argued	 for).	This	placed	 the	Netherlands	–	which	specifically	wanted	 to	
participate – in a dilemma. How could a Dutch military contingent join 
the alliance formed by the us and the uk to occupy Iraq and yet adopt the 
desired role of a non-occupying peacekeeping force? Actually, this was 
impossible, even though the government tried to ignore the problem by 
coming up with a rather contrived interpretation of un resolution 1483. 
The government in its letter to Parliament on sfir, however, could not 
conceal the fact that the Netherlands was participating in the occupation 
phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Experts made that perfectly obvious 
in the parliamentary hearings. It would therefore have been clearer if the 
Netherlands had adopted an open stance and admitted that – just like 




‘ A sandpit under  
Dutch control’
The Americans hand over command
On the morning of Thursday 31 July 2003, a modest change of command 
ceremony was held at a disused Iraqi railway workshop on the edge of the 
city of As Samawah, where the town meets the desert. For the occasion the 
building to the south of Al Muthanna’s capital had been decorated with Iraqi, 
Dutch and us	flags,	and	with	the	regimental	colours	of	the	2nd	Battalion	of	
the 5th Regiment of the us Marine Corps. For the past three months, the run-
down building had been the headquarters of this Marine unit, which had 
served in the most forward lines of the advance on Baghdad in March and 
April and had subsequently been sent south to maintain law and order in 
the vast and sparsely populated desert region. Now, the commander of ‘2/5 
Marines’, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel O’Donahue, handed over responsibility 
for Al Muthanna to the commander of the Dutch First Marine Corps Battalion, 
Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman. In the presence of many Iraqi and foreign 
dignitaries, the usual praise was expressed by all sides. Lieutenant Colonel 
Swijgman opened his speech with a couple of sentences in Arabic, a gesture 
rewarded by the Iraqis with a round of applause and given much attention 
by the local television station Samawah tv.	The	formalities	lasted	forty-five	
minutes. It was half past nine in the morning and the height of summer in 
Iraq. Soon thereafter the temperature would rise to 50 degrees Celsius.
Immediately	after	the	ceremony,	O’Donahue	had	a	final	meeting	with	
Sheikh Sami, the Iraqi interim governor with whom the American – in 
his capacity as occupying authority – had done most of his business. The 
42
A Gentle Occupation
Marine commander was displeased. After the invasion, in April, Sami 
Azara	Al	Majun	 of	 the	 Al	Ghanim	 tribe	 had	 returned	 to	 Southern	 Iraq	
from a twelve-year exile in London. He had been appointed by the us, 
but had higher ambitions than administering the peripheral province of 
Al Muthanna. Sami hoped to become a government minister in Baghdad. 
As a result, he increasingly left the administration of Al Muthanna to his 
younger brother, Khaled. Sheikh Khaled was known to be highly corrupt 
and behaved like a gangster.1 A few months earlier, with a view to pleasing 
Sami, the us Marines had issued the brother with a large number of gun 
permits, something which O’Donahue had soon come to regret. Khaled 
had even moved into the governor’s residence without the commander’s 
permission and was increasingly in charge of affairs in the province.
The farewell meeting between O’Donahue and Sami was about Khaled’s 
behaviour. Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman and his political adviser, diplomat 
Michel Rentenaar, were also present. Rentenaar had worked in several 
embassies	 in	 the	Middle	East	and	spoke	fluent	Arabic.	His	 linguistic	and	
cultural knowledge of the Arab world would soon prove to be invaluable to 
the Dutch mission. He had already spent over a week working intensively 
with the Americans and had witnessed the relationship between the 
occupiers	and	their	Iraqi	frontman	deteriorate.	The	final	meeting	escalated	
into	a	 tough	confrontation	and	further	worsened	the	difficult	 relations	of	
the previous weeks. The domineering way in which O’Donahue threw his 
weight around spoke volumes about his power as a military representative 
of	the	occupation	authority	and	his	power	to	appoint	and	dismiss	officials.	
The	Lieutenant	Colonel’s	demeanour	made	the	Dutch	reflect	on	how	they	
themselves could or should carry out their assignment – with a different 
status and a more restricted mandate – to create a safe and stable 
environment in Al Muthanna over the next few months.
In a pointed monologue, O’Donahue told Sheikh Sami that his brother 
Khaled	had	to	relinquish	his	unofficial	post	 immediately	and	vacate	 the	
governor’s residence. Sami reacted evasively, dismissing most of his 
brother’s alleged misdeeds as lies while blaming some of his wrongdoings 
on inexperience. According to Rentenaar this meant that Sami was either 
ignorant or unreliable, but most likely the latter. The us commander 
continued to press for Khaled’s departure, thereby making the situation 
very uncomfortable for the Dutch. They also wanted the corrupt brother 
to leave, but Swijgman and Rentenaar did not want a confrontation with 
Sami at this stage. The old Sheikh was the most important point of contact 
in the local administration for the time being, all the more important given 
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the fact that the Dutch sought to avoid responsibility for administrative 
tasks. Moreover, Swijgman and Rentenaar did not wish to start their tour 
with	a	 row	with	 the	 interim	governor	or	with	 the	arrest	of	his	malafide	
brother, an option which O’Donahue appeared to be seriously considering. 
When the American threatened Sami with dismissal halfway through 
the conversation, his Dutch successor wanted to oppose this openly. 
O’Donahue’s threats were, however, so poorly translated into Arabic, 
Rentenaar noted, that the Sheikh – who later proved to have a reasonable 
command of the English language – decided to misunderstand what he 
did not wish to hear.2
The interim governor eventually agreed to 10 August as the latest date 
on which his brother should leave. This was the day on which the last of 
O’Donahue’s Marines would leave Al Muthanna. The Dutch did not expect 
Khaled to comply with the ultimatum, but for the time being they still had 
Sheikh Sami as their point of contact. “Next Monday evening we are again 
invited for sheep’s head,” Rentenaar reported to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in The Hague. By then, an interim representative of the cpa, British 
Colonel	Maurice	 Bulmer,	 was	 finally	 to	 have	 arrived.	 Together	 with	 this	
Colonel – without the Americans – “the umpteenth attempt would be 
made to get Sheikh Sami to understand the job description of democratic 
governorship”.3
The area of operations
At over 50,000 square kilometres, Al Muthanna was one of the largest 
provinces in Iraq, and bigger than the Netherlands. With about half a 
million inhabitants living in relatively small concentrations, it was also 
the country’s most sparsely populated province. At the time of the 2003 
invasion, the provincial capital As Samawah had no more than 130,000 
inhabitants. The second town, Ar Rumaytha in the north, had about 
75,000 inhabitants, and about 60,000 Iraqis lived in the third town, Al 
Khidr in the east. The south of the province consisted entirely of desert 
and was largely uninhabited, with the exception of the settlements of As 
Salman and Al Bussayah and some nomadic tribes. 
Years of neglect and subordination by the Baath regime had resulted 
in a high level of poverty in Al Muthanna, as in most other Shiite areas of 
(southern) Iraq. The feared humanitarian crisis in the wake of the us-uk 
invasion did not materialise, however. Clean drinking water was a scarce 




in and around As Samawah. From 30 March, a brigade from the us 82nd 
Airborne	Division	fought	for	five	days	to	secure	what	the	Coalition	Forces	
called ‘Main Supply Route Jackson’, the crucial south-north highway 
connecting Kuwait to Baghdad which runs right through the city.4 During 
the	fighting,	several	buildings	had	been	destroyed	or	damaged,	including	
the cement factory which formed the town’s main industry and employed 
three thousand people. The battered factory had subsequently been looted.
As elsewhere in Iraq, weeks of plunder and destruction had resulted 
in widespread damage to the administrative and economic infrastructure, 
even more than had been caused by the war. The Republican Guard 
and	 paramilitary	 Fedayeen	 fighters	 had	 been	 annihilated,	 had	 fled	 or	
had mingled with the local population. The Baath regime collapsed and 
the army, police forces and other security organisations had ceased to 
function. But it was not so much Baath party adherents or Fedayeen who 
destabilised the area. The main challenges to stability were the faulty 
infrastructure, poor public facilities, high unemployment and, above 
all,	unbridled	criminal	activities.	Looting,	trafficking	in	arms	and	drugs,	
hostage-taking and armed assaults were common. The American Marines 
who briefed the Dutch reconnaissance team in May admitted that they had 
little control over the situation, especially at night.5
The British had warned the same team that the neutral to friendly 
attitude of the locals could undergo a rapid reversal if progress was not 
made in restoring law and order and improving water, fuel and electricity 
supplies.6 While Al Muthanna remained calm for the time being, the 
situation escalated in Basra in early August. In temperatures of over 50 
degrees Celsius, the electricity supply failed and water services largely 
dried up due to the failure of the electric pumps. Shortages of petrol, 
diesel	 and	 propane	 for	 cooking	 worsened	 as	 the	 refineries	 repeatedly	
stopped operating due to the lack of power. Widespread riots broke out, 
with the people’s anger directed at the cpa building and the foreign troops 
in	 the	 city.	There	were	 even	 fatalities.	A	British	officer	was	killed	when	
his military ambulance was hit by a rocket propelled grenade (rpg) – a 
commonly used antitank weapon. “Stones, rpgs and bullets are the price 
we are paying” was the sober comment by Major General Graeme Lamb, 
the commander of mnd South-East in the second half of 2003. “It is what 
we are here for and it’s the trade we are in.”7
Dutch military personnel working in Basra at the divisional 
headquarters or in support units in the surrounding area were confronted 
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by the riots. “We cannot go into the town any more as it is too dangerous,” 
a young Marine reported. “Buses carrying military personnel are being shot 
at ... . Locals have announced that foreigners – so that includes us – are 
not welcome in their country.”8 Major Albert Kortenhoeven, who served 
as	liaison	officer	at	the	cpa in Basra, wrote:
“Tensions have risen in the town, oil distribution and power supplies 
are still inadequate after four months of ‘occupation’ by the coalition 
forces. The Iraqis have had enough and have taken to the streets. 
And as in any Arab country, that does not happen without violence. 
Many car tyres have been set alight in ad hoc roadblocks. There is the 
constant sound in the town of ak-47	 rifles	being	fired.	Most	are	fired	
into the air, but some shots have hit the mark, unfortunately leading to 
three British Royal Military Police colleagues having been killed. The 
mood in and around Basra is now truly hostile, civilian cpa employees 
are being evacuated to Kuwait.”9
When Kortenhoeven, a veteran of previous missions in Cambodia (1992-
1993) and Haiti (1994-1996), drove his Land Rover to the cpa building a 
rioter	threw	a	fist-sized	stone	through	his	windscreen.	Once	he	had	arrived	
and washed the shards and splinters of glass from his face and hands, he 
went to the aid of a severely wounded compound security guard who had 
stumbled through the gate just behind him. The Nepalese private security 
employee	had	been	seriously	injured	during	an	exchange	of	fire	outside	the	
compound. He died a few minutes later. Although the security situation in 
Basra improved following these riots, the events were an initial warning to 
all international troops in the south, including the Dutch in Al Muthanna.
Boots on the ground
The newly-arrived Dutch Marine battalion in Al Muthanna did not share 
its government’s urge to distance itself from the us-uk occupation force. 
The Dutch enthusiastically adopted the 2/5 Marines’ motto, “no better 
friend, no worse enemy”. According to Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman it 
instilled the right basic attitude into the troops under his command.10 The 
battalion commander asserted that “not all aspects of the [Americans’] 
sometimes very robust action would be adopted”, but the Dutch Marines 
were overall impressed by their predecessors’ methods. They regarded the 
joint patrols at the start of the deployment as highly useful and “a sound 
46
A Gentle Occupation
example for future operations”.11 As a friendly gesture, the Dutch named 
their newly-constructed camp outside As Samawah Camp Smitty, just like 
the American base at the railway emplacement, after Sergeant Edward 
Smith, who had been the us	battalion’s	first	fatal	casualty	of	the	war,	killed	
in action during the march up to Bagdad.
The abbreviation sfir for Stabilisation Force Iraq, introduced in 
political and civil service circles in the Netherlands to distinguish the 
Dutch contingent from the two Coalition occupying powers, was not used 
by the Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman and his personnel preferred 
to	refer	to	themselves	as	“the	first	Dutch	detachment	in	Iraq”,	abbreviated	
to 1 (nl) Det Iraq or 1 (nl) Battle Group, shortened to 1 nlbg. They saw 
themselves as an integral part of the Coalition Forces.12 At the same time, 
the detachment was told by the Defence Staff to pursue an expressly 
Dutch	profile.	Vehicles	were	marked	with	the	words	‘The	Netherlands’	in	
English and Arabic, and right at the start of the deployment the Marines 
distributed	leaflets	in	the	colours	of	the	Dutch	flag	to	announce	the	arrival	
of the new military unit and to distinguish themselves from their American 
predecessors. “We deliberately want to be recognisable as a Dutch unit,” 
Swijgman told journalists travelling with them. “The local people will 
be able to see a clear difference between the troops from the different 
countries.”13
Soon after the change of command, 1 nlbg started patrolling 
independently in As Samawah and Ar Rumaythah, the only two locations 
to which the unit had deployed at that time. Initial impressions of As 
Samawah were not entirely positive. “It looked like a big rubbish dump,” 
according	to	a	young	Marine	who	was	on	his	first	overseas	deployment.14 It 
was obvious to all that the area was overwhelmingly poor. Yet apart from 
the large impoverished residential districts with open sewers, the Dutch 
also saw large villas in and around the town. Daily life was mostly played 
out on the streets. In the town centre, a market was held each working 




The	 first	 patrols	 conducted	 by	 the	 Dutch	 took	 place	 without	 any	
notable incidents. However, Iraqis approached the Marines right from 
the start to tell them that they needed to display a greater physical 
presence.16 Before, the Americans had been more visible than the Dutch. 
Their presence had promoted a sense of security among the inhabitants 
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of the two towns. Commander Swijgman took the complaint to heart, as 
he believed it struck to the core of his operation. In his orders, he had 
emphasised the importance of a seamless transition between 2/5 Marines 
and 1 nlbg. Yet a gap had apparently arisen.17 This was due to the smaller 
size	of	his	contingent	and	the	difference	in	mandate.
The	influence	of	2/5	Marines	had	been	confined	to	As	Samawah	–	where	
the American presence had comprised two infantry companies and a company 
of military police (mp) – and Ar Rumaythah, where an infantry company had 
set up a temporary base in the local football stadium. The Dutch adopted 
this set-up and established a third company location near the town of Al 
Khidr. They therefore did more with fewer personnel. Shortly after the 
change of command, 1 nlbg had fewer than 800 military personnel, while 
the us reinforced battalion had had almost double that, at 1,500.18 Even 
when the unit was complete, Dutch infantry capacity was rather small.19 
A full Dutch Marine battalion could deploy only twelve platoons for 
operations. A standard Marine platoon comprised 27 infantrymen, and 
four of these platoons were permanently tasked with guarding the camps. 
In addition, 1 nlbg kept two platoons ready as a Quick Reaction Force 
(qrf) in order to provide support in case of emergencies anywhere in the 
province at any time. This meant that under normal circumstances there 
were only six platoons containing just over 160 Marines for daily patrols.
There was also a considerable difference in capacity among the 
support units, and in resources and authorities. One good example was 
the 25-strong Marechaussee (military police) platoon, which relieved a 
complete company of 158 us mps. The tasks of the Dutch military police 
unit were also different from those of their us colleagues, who in addition 
to patrols with the Iraqi police often took the lead in investigations and 
arrests. To his regret, Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman could only use his 
mps for training, monitoring and supervising the local Iraqi police force.20 
In this purely supportive role, the much smaller Dutch mp unit was far 
from carrying out arrests or house searches, as he would have liked. 
Nevertheless, they regularly assisted the Iraqi police during operations. 
Thanks to this operational task, they were known as the ‘green mps’. The 
unit therefore had an entirely different task from the regular detachment 
of ‘blue mps’ – comprising thirteen members – which conducted regular 
military police tasks inside the nlbg.
The total Dutch deployment in Al Muthanna ultimately comprised 
about 1,100 military personnel, from all parts of the armed forces. The 
battle group was built up around the First Marine Battalion and was headed 
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by a reinforced battalion staff. It comprised three Marine companies (11, 
12 and 13 Infantry Company), a staff and combat service support company 
(10 Combat Service Support Company) and a combat support company 
(14 Support Company), which consisted of a reconnaissance platoon, 
an anti-tank platoon, a mortar platoon and an engineer reconnaissance 
platoon.21 The infantry and support companies formed the operational 
core of the nlbg.
The logistical effort during the initial build-up, executed mainly by 
a National Support Element (nse) from Shaiba logistics base near Basra, 
amounted	 to	 “a	 logistical	 blitzkrieg”	 according	 to	 the	 Marines.	 About	
522	 prefabs	 for	 accommodation	 and	 office	 space	 and	 700	 containers	
containing material and equipment were delivered in a short space of 
time.22 In addition to the Marine batallion’s standard light-infantry 
equipment, such as small arms, anti-tank weapons, mortars and Land 
Rovers with mounted machine-guns, 1 nlbg also had armoured wheeled 
Patria vehicles. The Royal Netherlands Navy provided the battle group 
with	a	field	hospital	(Field	Dressing	Station)	and	additional	intelligence-
gathering capacity in the shape of two Field Liaison Teams. These flts 
comprised a total of sixteen personnel from the Special Intervention Unit 
of the Marine Corps, who were Special Forces troops who had been trained 
in counter-terrorism operations. The formal task of the flts was to gather 
human intelligence (humint), but they were also to arrest suspects. Like 
the battalion’s reconnaissance platoon, the teams were directed by the 
intelligence	officer,	a	us Marine Corps Captain who had been assigned to 
the battalion since 2002 as part of an exchange programme.
Apart from the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, the Royal 
Netherlands Army provided a substantial contribution of 230 troops. 
The greater part was made up of an engineer construction company that 
built the new camps in As Samawah, Ar Rumaythah and Al Khidr, plus the 
accommodation for the helicopter detachment on Tallil Airbase (close to the 
town of Nasiriyah in the neighbouring province of Dhi Qar) and the one for the 
transit detachment and Contingent Command at the large allied army camp 
near Shaibah. Contingent Command was a small detachment which operated 
separately from 1 nlbg and acted as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the Netherlands 
Defence Staff. The army’s contribution also included a communications and 
information systems detachment and many logistics and technical specialists 
for the nse. The Royal Netherlands Air Force supported the battle group with 
three heavy ch-47 Chinook transport helicopters for logistical support, troop 
transport, air reconnaissance and airmobile operations. 
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The Dutch battle group in Al Muthanna was unable to deploy its infantry 
capacity	 to	 the	 full	 during	 the	 first	 weeks	 for	 various	 reasons.	 Convoy	
protection absorbed a great deal of combat power, as did the need to 
deploy Marines in shifts for the construction of the new camps. On top of 
that, 12 Infantry Company arrived in Kuwait only on 4 August and still had 
to adapt before it could be fully operational. 
And	finally	there	was	the	searing	heat.	“When	you	arrive,	sit	still,	drink	
lots of water and feel sorry for yourself,” was the advice of the British. 
In spite of all the warnings and the acclimatisation week in Kuwait, the 
extreme climatic conditions came as a surprise, particularly for troops 
patrolling in full body armour. Al Muthanna proved to be a red-hot sandpit, 
where conditions were tough. The fact that even the Iraqis thought it an 
extreme summer was little consolation.23
Outside the wire
The security situation in Al Muthanna was calm when compared with the 
rest	of	Iraq.	There	were	only	a	few	incidents	of	unknown	assailants	firing	
directly at patrols, convoys or watchtowers. Any other threat usually came 
from	 exchanges	 of	 fire	 between	 criminals	 or	 from	 arguments	 between	
neighbours and tribal disputes. Dutch Marines occasionally intervened, as 
happened	during	an	exchange	of	fire	on	4	August	between	two	sub-clans	of	
the large Albu Hassan tribe on either side of an irrigation channel near Ar 
Rumaythah.	By	driving	Patria	vehicles	between	the	two	conflicting	parties	
as a kind of buffer, the qrf	of	13	Infantry	Company	brought	the	fighting	to	
an end. The parties did not shoot at the Dutch. The cause of the argument 
proved	to	be	dissatisfaction	with	the	functioning	of	the	irrigation	office’s	
manager, who was accused of corruption. In a Coalition project to clean 
the irrigation channels initiated three months previously, the highly-
prized	jobs	had	been	handed	out	unfairly	and	far	fewer	people	had	been	
employed than had been promised.24
According to Major Jos Schooneman, commander of 13 Infantry 
Company in Ar Rumaythah, the intervention was a test in the eyes of 
the locals. Like his battle group commander, the Major stressed the 
importance of the perception of the Iraqi population, which in the view of 
both	officers	was	the	centre	of	gravity	for	their	operation.25 They believed 
that	 Iraqi	 citizens	had	 to	be	 convinced	of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Dutch	 could	
bring security. A second test for 13 Infantry Company in Schooneman’s 




The infantry company conducted a raid together with the then still present 
us military police. Schooneman stressed the signal function: “we take no 
nonsense and we can strike anywhere we like”.26 The result was somewhat 
disappointing,	 however:	 only	 five	 firearms	 and	 some	 ammunition	were	
seized	and	one	arrest	was	made.
A	few	days	later,	the	first	gunfight	took	place	in	As	Samawah	at	night	
when the reconnaissance platoon stumbled upon some looters on the site 
of the destroyed cement factory. The complex had been a popular target for 
thieves for months due to the copper piping and other valuable materials 
to be found there. The next night, the commander of 11 Infantry Company, 
Major Kees Schellens, sent a patrol of seventeen Marines in four Land Rovers 




No-one	was	hit.	The	Dutch	returned	fire	on	three	occasions.27 The intensity 
of	 this	first	firefight	would	not	have	 impressed	us forces engaged in ever 
more violent actions elsewhere in Iraq. However, for the Dutch military, it 
was	the	fiercest	hostile	exchange	of	small	arms	fire	since	un operations in 
Cambodia	and	Bosnia	in	the	first	half	of	the	1990s.
While the Marines of 11 and 13 Infantry Companies grew accustomed 
to their roles by conducting intensive patrols and minor operations, there 
was dissatisfaction accumulating in 12 Infantry Company, as reported by 
its commander Major Mark van den Berg. In mid-August, in anticipation 
of the move to the new camp near Al Khidr, his unit was still operating 
from the old (American) Camp Smitty, where personnel spent most of 
their time undertaking guard duties.28 The mood improved after the move 
on 22 August to the unit’s own new compound in Al Khidr, which had 
been named Al Aser Al-jadid (the new era). The infantry company now 
commanded its own sector. Another boost to morale came from the news 
that	the	Marines	were	to	be	the	first	in	the	battle	group	to	be	accommodated	
in prefabs, robust accommodation with air conditioning.29
The express wish of the men of 12 Infantry Company to see more action 
was	fulfilled	at	the	end	of	that	month.	Major	Van	den	Berg	first	focussed	
on the illegal distribution of water in his area of operations, a cause of 
much	conflict	around	Al	Khidr.	To	this	end,	the	company	conducted	joint	
patrols with the Iraqi police along the main water pipeline. Their brief 
experience in Iraq had already taught them that working together with 
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local cops often meant an end to any secrecy surrounding an operation. 
The company therefore also conducted so-called “unannounced checks” 
– without the Iraqi police. Soon, the Dutch Marines caught four truck 
drivers red-handed, illegally tapping water from the pipeline. The suspects 
were detained on site, but in order not to overwhelm the still fragile legal 
system the Marines decided to send them home with a warning.30
The nlbg’s day-to-day operations were known as normal framework 
operations. These comprised patrols, intelligence gathering, securing 
convoys and static objects, and preserving law and order, sometimes in 
conjunction with the Iraqi authorities. An example of the regular battle 
rhythm was the work schedule of 13 Infantry Company in Ar Rumaythah. 
This	unit	 rotated	 its	 three	 infantry	platoons	over	 three	 task	fields	every	
four	days.	One	platoon,	 comprising	 three	 rifle	 sections	of	nine	Marines	
and one staff section, was kept completely free for guard duties at Sun City, 
the company’s new camp outside town. The second platoon could then 
concentrate fully on patrols in and around Ar Rumaythah. These Marines 
conducted both motorised and foot patrols and set up checkpoints to search 
vehicles	 for	weapons,	drugs	 and	other	 trafficked	goods.31 In addition to 
presence patrols and reconnaissance, they also conducted ‘social’ patrols 
aimed at making contact with the locals and, for instance, distributing 
questionnaires in order to gather information. Apart from intelligence on 
criminals or any hostile parties the Dutch inquired about problems the 
Iraqis faced and about their attitude to the Coalition. The third platoon was 
assigned	to	a	combination	of	convoy	protection,	providing	a	rifle	section	as	
Quick Reaction Force and, especially in the early stage, providing a work 
section of extra hands in constructing the new compound.32 The infantry 
companies in As Samawah and Al Khidr worked more or less in the same 
way. All three were reinforced in their tasks by a section from the anti-tank 
platoon, while 11 Infantry Company was also permanently reinforced by 
personnel from the mortar platoon in an infantry role.33
During the early weeks, public security tasks emerged as the main 
challenge for the infantrymen operating ‘outside the wire’. The Marines 
frequently	had	to	maintain	order	around	petrol	stations,	where	fights	broke	
out in the long queues for the pumps. They sometimes arrested illegal fuel 
traders. The structural fuel shortage was mainly the result of poor distribution 
and activities by armed gangs, who supplied the market by operating illegal 
petrol stations in the desert close to points where they illegally tapped oil 
from the pipelines. This was harmful to the infrastructure, the local economy 
and public safety, and forced 1 nlbg to take ever more radical measures. 
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In order to improve supplies, Dutch military personnel accompanied fuel 
convoys	from	the	refinery	in	Shaibah	to	the	petrol	pumps	in	Al	Muthanna,	
initially every other day and later twice a week. This made heavy demands 
on manpower. 1 nlbg even deployed helicopters to accompany these 
convoys, because drivers regularly drove their tankers into the desert to 
sell them and their contents to criminal tribes. In September, these efforts 
improved petrol supplies temporarily, but distribution and the high price 
of propane remained a persistent problem.34
Murder, theft and looting as well as trade in stolen goods such as 
water, fuel and copper wire remained the greatest security problem in the 
impoverished province. Carjackings were another scourge.35 Criminals 
placed obstacles on roads to make cars and trucks stop, after which the 
occupants were forced out at gunpoint. The thieves often left victims 
blindfolded and handcuffed in the desert. Vehicle owners frequently ended 
up dead as a result of these assaults. The Dutch Marines responded to the 
different kinds of crime in a policing role, as was the case on 12 August 
after an attack on a security van carrying money for the children’s hospital 
in As Samawah, during which 32,000 dollars was stolen. The qrf of 11 
Infantry Company reacted, but when it arrived at the location, the four 
perpetrators, who had shot the vehicle’s windows to pieces, had already 
escaped. They were thought to have been members of the infamous Al 
Zuwaid tribe, notorious for its criminal activities.36
Almost	all	 crimes	 involved	firearms,	of	which	 there	were	plenty	 in	
Iraq. Former military personnel often still possessed their personal 
weapons and Iraqi army depots were looted after the fall of the Baath 
regime,	 which	 triggered	 a	 lively	 trade	 in	 firearms.	 Tribal	militias	 and	
political parties were often the proud owners of heavier material, such as 
rpgs, machine guns and even mortars. According to British intelligence 
officers,	some	tribes	in	the	south	owned	weapons	arsenals	which	rivalled	
those of regular Coalition infantry units.37 The cpa therefore gave military 
commanders	the	right	to	confiscate	weapons	which	they	saw	as	a	threat	
to the security of their troops and the local population. Each household 
or business was permitted one weapon, as long as it was not taken off the 
premises.	Only	those	who	held	firearms	licences	were	permitted	to	carry	
a weapon in public.38 The Dutch did not conduct large-scale searches for 
arms, but did act against those who openly carried weapons.
The Dutch government’s initial aim of having its troops operate in 
the background in Iraq and of conducting patrols and checkpoints as little 
as possible was in contrast to the wishes of most Iraqis with whom the 
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Dutch Marines came into contact.39 Right from the start, local politicians 
and administrators asked the Dutch troops to display a robust presence 
in the towns and villages in order to promote a sense of security. They 
also pressed for consistent action against the types of crime which the 
Iraqi	police	did	not	dare	to	fight,	such	as	the	widespread	trafficking	in	fuel,	
water, arms and livestock (mainly sheep).40 The high prices paid for these 
goods	in	Saudi	Arabia	meant	that	it	was	profitable	to	smuggle	these	over	
the poorly guarded border. The retail price of lamb in Al Muthanna had 
consequently doubled, which made it unaffordable for many people.
It was one example of many which showed how military security 
tasks were bound up with the local economy, public security, the barely-
functioning government and problems relating to public facilities. The 
illegal sheep trade made criminal organisations wealthy and led to 
inflation	and	social	unrest.	But	did	this	mean	that	Dutch	forces	had	to	
assist the Iraqi police and the Iraqi Public Prosecutor in As Samawah 
in intercepting clandestine transports?41 Such operations did not match 
their assignment, since the Dutch government held the cpa formally 
responsible for tackling these kinds of administrative problems. For 1 
nlbg in Al Muthanna, however, the express assignment of keeping tasks 
separate was not as simple as had been put down on paper in The Hague 
a few months before.
The proconsul of Al Muthanna
Only the bare bones of the civil occupying authority on which the Dutch 
government had pinned its hopes for separating military and civil-
administrative tasks were present at the provincial level in Al Muthanna. 
cpa chief Paul Bremer had arrived in Baghdad in mid-May 2003 with 
a view to conducting a robust occupation policy, but had so far only 
translated this intention into big ambitions at the national level relating 
to the transformation of Iraq according to a liberal-democratic model. In 
the meantime, the cpa had a poor grip on the day-to-day administration 
of the country. In June, the service appointed four regional coordinators, 
including one in Basra for the southern provinces (including Al Muthanna).
cpa personnel were few and far between. The central administrative 
apparatus in Baghdad was largely run by junior diplomats and, in the 
case of the us, young political appointees of the governing Republican 
Party, who often arrived without relevant expertise or experience and 
who tended to depart after only a few months of service.42 They lived and 
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worked in the heavily-guarded Green Zone, an area of central Baghdad 
around one of Saddam Hussein’s pompous palaces, and rarely left this 
isolated	location	due	to	the	increasingly	hazardous	security	situation.	An	
often-heard comment in military circles was that the cpa lacked a realistic 
picture of the country. It became known amongst military personnel as 
Can’t Produce Anything.43
In the provinces, Bremer’s apparatus, formally separate from the 
military	 line	 of	 command,	was	 kept	 afloat	mainly	 by	 detached	military	
personnel and military logistical support. Throughout the spring and 
summer of 2003, Lieutenant Colonel O’Donahue was therefore acting as 
a proconsul on behalf of the cpa in Al Muthanna. He was both military 
commander and interim representative of the occupation administration 
and embodied both military and civil power. All over Iraq, us and British 
military commanders took on occupying tasks at the provincial level. The 
last time us forces had taken on governance on such a scale had been during 
and after the Second World War in Europe and Asia. A crucial difference 
between the occupation then and the occupation of Iraq now was that after 
World War ii the role of military personnel had been foreseen, prepared 
for and deemed essential by political and military leaders.44 In spite of 
all the far-reaching ambitions for the democratisation of Iraq, the 2003 
occupation was almost entirely improvised.
In order to be able to conduct his task as civil-military commander in 
Al Muthanna, O’Donahue possessed the required institutional powers. He 
was	authorised	to	appoint	and	dismiss	government	officials	and	always	had	
the	final	say	in	local	political	decision-making.	He	took	most	decisions	on	his	
own initiative, although he usually pushed interim governor Sheikh Sami to 
the fore to put an Iraqi face on the administration. In July, O’Donahue set 
up a town council of twelve administrators for As Samawah in order to get 
the Iraqis more actively involved. They were selected for their professional 
expertise by an electorate of forty leading personages, known as a caucus. 
This procedure was not particularly democratic, but Major Matt Fellinger, 
the	Civil	Affairs	officer	in	the	us Marine battalion, did his utmost to make 
the caucus as representative as possible. Once the provincial capital’s 
administrative council had been installed, the staff of 2/5 Marines in 
Al Muthanna went a step further than their colleagues in the other Iraqi 
provinces. They also drew up a Charter in order to create a system of checks 
and balances. This stipulated that the executive, technocratic town council 
would be supervised by an advisery council comprising forty seats, in 
which the main tribes and political parties were to be represented.45
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Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman praised his American predecessor for his 
dealings with the Iraqis, in particular the council members in As Samawah. 
His political adviser Rentenaar also generally praised the American 
achievements in administrative terms. However, the diplomat did believe 
that the us Marines had displayed their power too forcefully. Lieutenant 
Colonel O’Donahue obviously took decisions independently and did not 
seem to understand the art of making the Iraqis feel as if they themselves 
had come up with the solution.46 The Dutch would do things differently, 
if only because they were forced to do so by the restrictions their national 
mandate placed upon them.
So to what extent were the Dutch prepared for the administrative 
chaos in Iraq? In May, the reconnaissance team had not failed to notice 
that the us-uk occupying force had taken on extensive responsibilities 
regarding administration and maintaining public order. According to the 
international Law of Occupation, these are responsibilities connected to 
the status of an occupying power. The team and political adviser Rentenaar 
both had suggested that the Netherlands should also take on the tasks of 
such an authority. The British divisional commander let it be known that 
he expected them to do so.47	However,	the	Dutch	government	specifically	
did not want to operate and be viewed as an occupying power in Iraq. In 
The Hague, the news that O’Donahue appointed and dismissed government 
officials	was	received	with	dismay.48 The consensus was that Dutch military 
personnel should distance themselves from such practices, due to the 
controversy surrounding the Iraq war prior to the operation. Moreover, 
in the Netherlands ‘occupation’ was widely associated with ‘oppression’ – 
hardly surprising in a country where the term is commonly equated with 
the experiences under German occupation during the Second World War. 
The Netherlands government translated this sentiment rather forcedly into 
a	limited	mandate	that	proved	extremely	difficult	to	work	with.
In international law, the term occupation has a completely different, 
non-emotional and concretely descriptive meaning, however. According to 
the international Law of Occupation, as laid down in the Hague Conference 
Laws & Customs of War on Land of 1907 and the Fourth Treaty of Geneva 
of 1949, the status of occupying power mainly entails obligations towards 
the	 population	 in	 addition	 to	 specific	 entitlements.	 To	 the	 best	 of	 its	
ability, the occupier is obliged to ensure public order and security, medical 
care and food supplies and to safeguard public facilities. These extensive 
responsibilities in themselves were just as much a cause for concern in 
The Hague as the negative associations with the occupation status.49 
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Recent experiences in peace support operations had demonstrated that 
the maintenance of public order by military personnel, including arrests 
and	detention,	was	a	legal	and	political	minefield.	The	nato operation in 
Kosovo in 1999, in which Dutch forces had been de facto occupiers and 
exercised military rule, had for this reason caused the then Minister for 
Defence many a headache.50
In order to be able to contribute to the stabilisation phase in Iraq, 
without taking on the status of occupying power, the Dutch government 
pinned its hopes on un Security Council Resolution 1483. Without a 
mandate under international law, Dutch military personnel could after 
all only be present in Iraq at the invitation of the occupying powers. The 
Netherlands would then also possess an occupying status.51 This was 
obviously not the intention and the Netherlands therefore worked hard 
to have the distinction between occupier and non-occupier stressed in the 
un resolution. The resolution issued on 22 May 2003 nevertheless was a 
disappointment in this respect. The distinction between the occupying 
powers and their non-occupying Coalition partners, a new concept in 
international law, was referred to only in the preamble.52 Resolution 1483 
also contained no explicit authorisation for a separate international force 
in addition to or as a replacement for the us-uk army of occupation. Only 
in the autumn, with the adoption of Resolution 1511 on 16 October 2003, 
when 1 nlbg had already been deployed for three months, was this lack of 
proper authority repaired.53
Perhaps precisely because of the weak basis for the deployment, the 
Netherlands government emphasised the supposed difference between 
the us-uk occupying force and its own troops in Al Muthanna to the 
extreme. It did so more than the other participating countries, such as 
Italy, Poland, Spain and Denmark.54 No other Coalition partner used 
the name Stabilisation Force Iraq as the Netherlands did, and although 
the Dutch Minister for Defence acted as if all non-occupying powers in 
Iraq served within an ‘sfir alliance’, the abbreviation was used only 
in the Netherlands.55 The word ‘sfir’ could also only be seen on Dutch 
military vehicles from early 2004. The Danes and Italians, partners in 
the multinational division in the south, did not make such an effort to 
distinguish themselves. They saw themselves simply as belonging to the 
Coalition Forces and at the request of the British happily provided civil 
personnel for the cpa.56
In spite of several warnings about both the irrelevance and 
impracticality of a strict demarcation of the role of the nlbg with respect 
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to administration and law enforcement, the Netherlands continued to 
press the United Kingdom to segregate the two domains. To this end, in 
consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence 
drew up caveats.57 The British were aware of Dutch sensitivities, but were 
hoping for a pragmatic attitude, similar to that of the Danish and Italians. 
They regretted the fact that the Netherlands did not wish to take on a 
number of cpa tasks temporarily.58 Plagued by personnel shortages and 
eager to demonstrate the multinational character of the occupation, they 
continued to try to involve the Netherlands in governance, for instance by 
asking it to provide the cpa governor for Al Muthanna. This request was 
refused, as was a similar appeal for civil support personnel for the cpa in 
August.59
Irritation about the Dutch stance came to light a month later during a 
visit to Iraq by Minister for Defence Henk Kamp. The Dutch Minister gave 
the British regional coordinator of the cpa in Basra, Sir Hilary Synnott, 
what Synnott himself described as a “schoolmasterly lecture about Dutch 
political attitudes” and requested the coordinator to tell the Iraqis that the 
Dutch would distance themselves from civil-administrative matters. The 
British diplomat responded to this rather brusquely:
“that I could personally assure the Minister that Iraqis ‘would not give 
a damn’ about Dutch sensitivities; they just wanted to see progress on 
the ground. But if the Minister wished us to publicise the limitations 
of Dutch engagement in assisting Iraq, we would of course be ready 
to oblige him. The minister switched to conciliatory mode and the 
instruction was dropped.”60
The desired distinction between the Dutch stabilisation force and 
the occupying powers was formally laid down in a Memorandum of 
Understanding (mou). Of the nine countries within the British-led 
multinational division which concluded this memorandum with the 
British Ministry of Defence, the Netherlands added by far the longest list 
of national limitations.61 The two main caveats were that the Netherlands 
would not undertake any civil-administrative tasks and would not 
participate in executive law enforcement. In a province of an occupied 
country rife with crime this seemed rather odd. For the credibility of the 
Dutch government in creating its own ‘special status’ in occupied Iraq, the 





could not escape having to enforce public order. After all, how did 1 nlbg 
expect to create “a secure and stable environment” without being allowed 
to	fight	crime	in	a	province	where	crime	was	the	main	security	problem?	
Pressure from local dignitaries and the Iraqi people rapidly demonstrated 
that the Dutch politicians’ desire to keep the military presence as 
much in the background as possible was impractical and unrealistic.62 
Dutch credibility was consequently being tested. A rapid transfer of 
responsibilities to Iraqi security bodies was the obvious aim, but proved 
to be premature.
As in the rest of Iraq, the police force in Al Muthanna was extremely 
weak. Members were poorly trained, mostly corrupt and unreliable due 
to their loyalty to tribal and political groups. The Dutch military police 
had to conduct criminal investigations into activities of Iraqi policemen 
far more frequently than expected.63 The technical skills of the police 
were also poor. They were not trained to collect evidence and had little 
knowledge of arrest techniques. A carefully prepared joint raid by Dutch 
mps	and	Iraqi	police	failed	completely	because	the	policemen	opened	fire	
immediately	on	arrival.	“We	got	out	of	the	car	and	bullets	started	flying	all	
around” Captain Dennis Klein, who led the mp platoon, said. According to 
a	colleague,	it	was	quite	common	among	the	Iraqis	to	fire	first	into	the	air	
“to let people know they are here” and only then to knock on doors.64
The Dutch wish to leave executive police tasks to the Iraqis was further 
hampered by the strategy of division commander Lamb, who had made 
combating crime one of his priorities. In early September, on the orders of 
the commander of all the Coalition troops, us Lieutenant General Ricardo 
Sanchez,	 Operation	 Longstreet	 was	 launched	 to	 destroy	 “destabilising	
elements” in those parts of Iraq where the Coalition had so far hardly 
made its presence felt. Major General Lamb’s chief concern was organised 
crime and he translated the assignment in the southern sector into tackling 
hostile and criminal groups. In Al Muthanna he mainly wanted to improve 
insight into illegal activities along the long border with Saudi Arabia. The 
Coalition’s information gathering was poor in this area, because divisional 
headquarters and the cpa initially allocated a much higher priority to 
guarding the border with Iran.65 The vast, sparsely-populated desert area 
of Al Muthanna was crossed by smuggling routes which had also been well 
used under the Baath regime. The Coalition suspected that radical Islamic 
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fighters	were	mingling	with	the	nomads	who	regularly	crossed	the	border,	
although there was still little concrete evidence for this.
The nlbg contributed to Operation Longstreet by setting up mobile 
checkpoints to obtain an overview of these smuggling operations. Dutch 
troops stopped and searched vehicles.66 Helicopters were used to drop 
off forces over distances of hundreds of kilometres on the desert roads. 
During the one week long operation the Dutch Marines caught only a few 
people	trafficking	goods.	They	found	no	evidence	of	terrorist	infiltration.	
However,	they	did	confiscate	dozens	of	firearms.	Despite	some	irritation	
over the security checks, they received a surprisingly positive response. 
In particular, Iraqi travellers found the road between As Salman and As 
Samawah (Route Milwaukee) to be safer.67
A	larger-scale	crime	fighting	operation	was	Operation	Sweeney,	held	
from 6 to 26 October 2003. The assignment was to “disrupt the threats of 
smuggling and organised large-scale crime”. The focus of this mnd South-
East operation lay in the ‘British’ provinces of Basra and Maysan. Operation 
Sweeney was part of a broad campaign focused on restoring essential 
public services. The division also intended to provide assistance to the cpa 
in building administrative capacities and stimulating the local economy. 
Codenamed Big October, it was an ambitious plan, mainly intended by 
the	headquarters	 in	Basra	to	 influence	public	opinion.	The	uk especially 
wanted the operation to provide a counterweight to the extremely negative 
picture of the occupation of Iraq being painted back home.68
At the end of September, Major General Lamb announced that 
Operation Sweeney took absolute priority.69 He asserted that crime posed 
a threat to the mission as a whole and had strategic consequences for 
the reconstruction of Iraq. He therefore ordered sub-units such as the 
Dutch battle group to counter large-scale organised crime by gathering 
information,	arresting	key	criminal	figures,	identifying	trafficking	routes,	
intercepting vehicles and supporting police and border control activities. 
According to Lamb, the success of the operation would not be measured by 
the number of arrested criminals and the quantity of smuggled goods, but 
instead by the perception of it among locals.70
Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman considered the visible presence of 
Coalition	 troops	on	 the	streets	 the	key	 to	 influencing	public	perception.	
Organised crime, as Swijgman explained in his operation concept, had 
to be disrupted and deterred. 1 nlbg focused mainly on the arms and 
stolen cars trade, carjackings and police corruption.71 A major additional 
consideration for the Dutch battle group commander was the destabilising 
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conduct of political and religious parties, who tended to use armed militia 
to demand a role in preserving law and order. Although these actions were 
as yet limited, these groups were becoming increasingly vocal.
Within the framework of Operation Sweeney, Dutch Marines 
conducted joint patrols with the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (icdc), a 
paramilitary organisation set up by the Americans to maintain law and 
order and ultimately to form the basis for a new Iraqi army. As part of 
the Big October campaign, mnd South-East aimed to train and equip an 
icdc battalion in each of the four southern provinces. For the time being 
Al Muthanna had to make do with a company. Locals responded very 
positively to the presence of the Dutch-trained Iraqi auxiliary troops.72 
In the opinion of Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman, Operation Sweeney 
did not result in much more. When it came to the actual reduction of 
crime, there were merely indications that criminal organisations had 
been temporarily disrupted in their activities and that 1 nlbg’s intelligence 
section had gained better insight into their modus operandi. The Dutch 
were especially bewildered by the degree to which the Iraqi security 
services	 themselves	 proved	 to	 have	 been	 infiltrated	 and	 corrupted	 by	
criminals. Evidence gathered by the Dutch mp platoon showed that 
services	 such	 as	 the	 Iraqi	 police	 and	 the	 Coalition-financed	 Facility	
Protection Service (fps) – an armed guard service for government 
buildings and essential public complexes – were not just turning a blind 
eye, but were in some cases also themselves actively involved in criminal 
activities.73
The theft of vehicles and looting of cargo on the highways (including 
military Coalition convoys) created a great deal of unrest throughout the 
southern region, including Al Muthanna. In September and October, 1 nlbg 
devoted much attention to tracing and returning stolen vehicles.74 The 
Marines occasionally caught criminals in the act and reacted robustly. On 12 
October,	for	instance,	a	patrol	saw	a	truck	being	hijacked	and	opened	fire	on	
the attackers’ vehicle as there seemed to be acute danger for the occupants 
of the truck.75 Dutch forces thus did not shirk executive police tasks. Such 
tasks were important to the credibility of the Dutch military in Iraq.
Targeting operations
In order to increase its operational effectiveness, the nlbg conducted 
targeting operations in addition to normal framework operations. It 
did so both on its own initiative and on orders from mnd South-East. 
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Targeting operations were aimed at arresting suspects or meeting 
specific	intelligence	requirements.	Information-gathering	was	done	for	
instance by setting up observation posts. Reconnaissance teams used 
this	method	 to	 observe	 the	 office	 of	 a	 political	 party	 and	 the	firearms	
trade in the centre of As Samawah. Operations to apprehend suspects 
targeted organised crime on the one hand, such as the aforementioned 
raids on members of the criminal Al Zuwaid tribe and attempts to arrest 
the looters at the cement factory. On the other, 1 nlbg concentrated on 
apprehending	 officials	 of	 the	 former	 Baath	 regime	 or	 insurgents	 who	
might pose a threat to the Coalition.76
Operation	Pocket	Search	was	the	first	major	operation	in	the	second	
category. During this operation, on 10 September, the Dutch battle group 
attempted to round up number 62 on the blacklist of suspects sought by 
the Coalition. Intelligence had shown that General Abdul Wahid Shinan 
Ribat, the former Chief of Staff of the Iraqi army, regularly stayed with 
family in and around As Samawah. However, the information obtained 
from local sources by the intelligence section on this High-Value Target 
(hvt) was rather vague. As a result, a simultaneous raid on four possible 
locations was required. The operation also aimed to contribute to the 
positive image of 1 nlbg among local Iraqis. Al Muthanna’s overwhelmingly 
Shiite population, which had suffered so severely under the Baath regime, 
increasingly complained about the lack of robust action by the Coalition. 
Officials	 from	 the	 former	 regime	 were	 apparently	 still	 walking	 around	
freely,	 even	 though	 citizens	 regularly	 provided	 information	 on	 the	
whereabouts of such people. 1 nlbg prepared Operation Pocket Search 
in the utmost secrecy, but decided to publicise it widely afterwards. The 
intended message was that the Dutch “were actively looking for” senior 
officials	from	the	former	dictatorship.77
In order to guarantee an element of surprise, the Dutch Marines 
did not inform the Iraqi police of the imminent operation and only 
commenced their training the evening before. During the intelligence 
briefing	 that	 evening,	 the	 intelligence	 chief	 estimated	 that	 a	 few	 armed	
guards posed no great threat and closed with the words: “Be professional, 
not trigger-happy”.78 The Marines acted at dawn. Task groups raided the 
four targets simultaneously. They were accompanied by interpreters, and 
also by female military personnel to search rooms containing women and 
children. At Camp Smitty, a qrf and a Chinook helicopter with its rotors 
turning were ready to provide assistance. The targets were the homes of 
the general’s son and brother in the city and two residential complexes 
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in the countryside. The operation went according to plan, but the Dutch 
failed	to	find	the	former	Iraqi	Chief	of	Staff	at	any	of	the	locations.79
According to commander Swijgman, the attempt to arrest the Iraqi 
former General made an impression on the residents of Al Muthanna 
thanks to the scale and manner of the operation.80	The	operation’s	specific	
message	–	the	Dutch	are	actively	seeking	important	Baath	officials	–	was	
contrary to the national mandate, however. This stated that Dutch military 
personnel would not deliberately seek war criminals and former regime 
officials.81	 But	 there	 was	 some	 flexibility	 in	 interpretation.	 The	 nlbg was 
permitted to “act against occasional targets on the basis of intelligence” 
and also had ample powers to undertake action against people who posed 
a threat to the Coalition.82 The latter provision in particular implied that 
Operation Pocket Search ostensibly fell within the mandate, as did other 
nlbg operations to apprehend suspects. “The search for hvts” continued in 
Al Muthanna, the intelligence section reported enthusiastically to British 
divisional headquarters.83
Detention and interrogation
Yet what if an attempt to apprehend a suspect succeeded?84 At the time 
of Operation Pocket Search, most rules and procedures on dealing with 
detainees had not yet been drawn up. Thanks to its status as a non-occupying 
power, the Netherlands was in principle not authorised to apprehend and 
hold in custody residents of occupied Iraq.85 The Dutch government hoped 
to	avoid	this	responsibility	by	keeping	crimefighting	and	the	search	for	war	
criminals out of the nlbg’s tasks by means of caveats.86 Moreover, Dutch 
military personnel were not permitted to interrogate anyone. Yet during 
the	 first	 year	 of	 the	 operation	 in	Al	Muthanna	 they	 apprehended	more	
people than during any previous crisis response operation since 1989. 
Furthermore, the Dutch did subject suspects to questioning. In a legal 
sense,	 there	 proved	 to	 be	 flexibility	 between	 terms	 such	 as	 ‘apprehend’	
and ‘arrest’, ‘detain’ and ‘intern’, ‘interview’ and ‘interrogation’. Even for 
the legal advisers in the Dutch contingent and at the Defence (Staff) Crisis 
Management Centre (dcbc) in The Hague, there was initially no clarity on 
this – as with the other national caveats.
The distinction between internees and detainees caused particular 
confusion. On the basis of the Law of Occupation as laid down in the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, the British in Southern Iraq were entitled to 
apprehend	and	intern	citizens	for	crimes	and	other	security	reasons.	The	
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Rules of Engagement (roe) applied by mnd South-East also stipulated that 
units in the uk-led division – i.e. including Dutch military forces – could 
arrest people, but in the case of the nlbg these always had to be termed 
‘detainees’. The Memorandum of Understanding between the Netherlands 
and the uk stated that Dutch military personnel were permitted to detain 
but not to intern people.87 On 27 July, the commander of 1 nlbg had 
translated these stipulations into a fragmented order, in which he sketched 
the general framework for apprehending suspects in both planned and 
reactive operations. According to this order, “questioning” by the battle 
group’s intelligence section or anyone else appointed by the commander 
was possible.88
Swijgman’s	legal	adviser,	Major	Misha	Geeratz,	claimed	that	if	suspects	
had “actually been in our power”, they then were ‘Dutch’ detainees.89 For the 
process following apprehension, the distinction between those suspected 
of ‘ordinary’ crimes and those who posed a threat to the Coalition was 
crucial. Those suspected of crimes – often caught in the act and brought 
in by regular infantry patrols – were classed as criminal detainees and 
handed over almost immediately to the Iraqi police. Those people brought 
in because they posed a threat to the Coalition had to be handed over to 
the British. These were classed as security detainees and became internees 
from the moment they were handed over.90
mnd South-East incarcerated Iraqis in the Theatre Internment Facility 
(tif) in Umm Qasr.91 The transfer had to take place as soon as possible, but 
certainly within four days. Due to the distance between Al Muthanna and 
Umm Qasr and for security reasons, transport was mostly carried out by 
helicopter.	The	first	time	this	happened	was	on	6	September	2003	with	a	
former Captain from the Iraqi army who had been arrested the day before 
in As Samawah for distributing pamphlets calling for violent action to be 
taken against foreign troops.92
On the basis of international law, the British could detain people 
without any form of trial. A Detention Review Committee reviewed each 
case on the suspect’s arrival, and subsequently conducted regular repeat 
reviews, in order to advise the divisional commander on either extension 
or release. The Geneva Convention expressly prohibits the use of physical or 
mental force in obtaining intelligence. The Americans’ tarnished reputation 
with respect to human rights in the Global War on Terror (mainly due 
to their controversial treatment of so-called ‘unlawful combatants’ in 
Guantánamo Bay in Cuba and Bagram in Afghanistan) had contributed to 
the provision that former ‘Dutch’ detainees were not to be handed over to 
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the us after they had been surrendered to the uk – unless the Netherlands 
gave the uk explicit permission to do so.93 However, it was still unclear who 
was supposed to give this kind of permission on behalf of the Netherlands 
during Operation Pocket Search.94 It had been established that, if former 
General Ribat were to be arrested, the British would hand him over to the 
United States. In order not to delay the operation, Swijgman decided to 
accept this.95
Red Cross employees had unrestricted access to the internees in the 
American	 and	British	prisons	 in	 Iraq	 and	 identified	problems	 early	 on.	
For instance, there was an incident concerning the violent apprehension 
of nine people in Basra and their mistreatment in temporary custody 
on 15 September 2003, in which one person died. The suspect probably 
suffocated in the hood placed over his head by British forces. The practice 
of ‘hooding’ was frequently used to disorientate detainees, as well as to 
prevent recognition of military personnel, interrogators and interpreters. 
According to the Red Cross, us military personnel sometimes used 
hooding	to	exert	physical	pressure	by	making	it	difficult	for	the	detainee	
to breathe.96
Shortly after the Basra incident, divisional commander Lamb 
tightened the rules.97 He expressly reiterated the existing regulations for 
humane treatment (no torture, physical punishment or humiliation) and 
prohibited the use of hoods and bags on heads. As almost all examples 
of maltreatment by British military personnel occurred during the 
apprehension, transport or temporary internment phase by sub-units, 
Lamb also accelerated transfers to the division’s internment facility. 
Separation of detainees and internees now had to be completed within 
eight hours, so that from 30 September on the handover to Iraqi police or 
to the British internment authorities could take place within twelve and 
fourteen hours respectively.98
The	 new	 guidelines	 clarified	 procedures,	 but	 for	 Dutch	 military	
personnel a grey area remained in the hours between apprehension and 
handover to the British.99 During this period, detainees were held in three 
cells in an auxiliary building at the cpa complex in As Samawah, where the 
battle group’s Field Liaison Teams were also housed. Here, among other 
things, it was determined whether a suspect could be released or handed 
over – and to whom. Questioning and interrogation were prohibited, 
but Dutch military personnel held ‘interviews’ with the detainees for the 
benefit	of	the	selection	procedure.	Detainees	had	to	be	treated	as	prisoners	
of war in the sense of the Third Geneva Convention. Lieutenant Colonel 
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Swijgman requested his military intelligence service Counter Intelligence and 
Security (civ) team to conduct these interviews, as its personnel – although 
not	trained	in	tactical	questioning	–	were	at	least	qualified	to	screen	people.	
However,	Swijgman	insisted	that	his	legal	adviser	Geeratz	be	present	during	
the questioning, in the same way as the ‘Legad’ sat in on interviews conducted 
with detained Iraqis by the flt.100
The civ team comprised a Lieutenant Colonel and two ncos and its task 
was to gather intelligence on potential threats to the Dutch detachment. 
Military intelligence (mivd) personnel screened Iraqi employees who 
worked on the bases as well as locally recruited interpreters. They also 
independently sought information sources, but this proved tricky. The 
team therefore enthusiastically took the opportunity to talk to all detainees. 
The interviews were not allowed to delay the handover to the British and 
intelligence personnel were eager to obtain the maximum amount of 
information within the limited time available. The interviews therefore 
had all the hallmarks of interrogations.101 The civ team was not encouraged 
to do it this way. The British Joint Forward Interrogation Team in Umm 
Qasr in fact indicated that it preferred to have detainees delivered ‘raw’. 
The main motive for mivd personnel to question the prisoners anyway was 
to improve their own poor intelligence position.
The mivd detachment was expressly not under the command of the 
battle group, but took its orders directly from The Hague. Arguing that they 
wanted to keep their interview methods secret, the mivd personnel objected 
to	 the	presence	of	Major	Geeratz	as	a	 legal	supervisor.	The	Defence	Staff	
accepted the argument that the military intelligence service had to be able 
to	guarantee	confidentiality,	and	in	early	September	confirmed	that	the	civ 
team was authorised to determine who could be present at the interviews. A 
“ten-point list” of instructions on the process for the detention and handover 
of	 suspects	 sent	 by	 The	 Hague	 on	 1	 October	 confirmed	 this	 directive.	
Nevertheless, the commander of 1 nlbg	 was	 emphatically	 given	 final	
responsibility in this process. Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman subsequently 
sent a letter of protest, in which he refused to take responsibility for detainees 
questioned without his legal adviser being present.102
The civ team commander was responsible for the interviews, but 
he only worked at Camp Smitty and was never actually present in the 
As Samawah compound. The result was that the two ncos in his team 
conducted the interviews on their own and unsupervised, although they 
were not trained to do so.103 The Dutch Ministry of Defence’s focus on 
detention and questioning in Iraq increased as the autumn continued. On 
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15 October, the Defence Staff asked for a list of persons who had so far 
been handed over to the British division on suspicion of activities against 
the Coalition. The list contained ten names, eight of whom had been 
interviewed by the civ team. Several had initially been arrested by the Iraqi 
police. The charges varied from suspected interest in Coalition troops to 
suspicion of planning attacks.104
Exactly a week later, on 22 October, Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman 
received a disturbing report via the highest Dutch representative at 
divisional headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Ruud Hardenbol. Following 
his handover to the British, a Saudi national of Iraqi origin had complained 
about his treatment by the Dutch. The man had been arrested by Iraqi 
police on Saturday 4 October and subsequently given to the Dutch flt. 
The civ team had spent that evening and night questioning him. They 
suspected him of preparing an attack in As Samawah and setting up a local 
Al Qaeda network. He claimed to have had water thrown over him during 
three interviews and to have been been subjected to sleep deprivation by 
so-called white noise from a radio. He also claimed to have had a hood 
placed over his head.105
Swijgman asked the flt and civ team for an explanation. He also 
consulted	 Major	 Geeratz,	 who	 had	 received	 similar	 information	 from	
a fellow legal expert at mnd South-East that same evening.106 Following 
consultation with his ncos, the head of the civ team admitted that his 
personnel had used water to keep the detainee awake during the interviews 
but denied using a hood. They had used blackened dust goggles. The flt 
commander admitted to Swijgman that the flt did indeed use white noise 
in the corridors of the cell complex to prevent eavesdropping on interviews 
and communications between prisoners.107
The Saudi national made two further serious allegations, but these 
were initially not included in the reports.108 The man said that the Dutch 
had beaten him and attached electrodes to his body. Captain Anna Mobbs, 
commander of the Joint Forward Interrogation Team in Umm Qasr, did 
not really believe the latter. Yet she asked about it when the civ team, an 
interpreter and a flt member came to Umm Qasr at her request on Monday 
20 October to explain in more detail the interview methods used in As 
Samawah. The Dutch declared that white noise was indeed used in the 
cell complex to render communication between detainees impossible and 
admitted using cold water to keep detainees awake during the occasionally 
very lengthy nocturnal interviews. They stated that the allegations about 
the use of hoods and physical violence were false. They further claimed 
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that the story about the electrodes had been made up. The British tactical 
questioners accepted this explanation, but did wonder whether the mivd 
personnel knew what they were doing. In the opinion of Captain Mobbs, 
their level of expertise was “pretty low”.109
In the meantime, battle group commander Swijgman received more 
information from Basra which appeared to contradict earlier statements 
made by the civ team. Partly on the insistence of his legal adviser, he was 
inclined to report the incident to the military police. Yet because he had 
little faith in the capability of the mps in Iraq and feared that the incident 
would	be	leaked	to	the	media,	on	25	October	he	decided	first	to	call	Air	
Commodore Pieter Cobelens, who headed the Defence (Staff) Crisis 
Management Centre in his capacity as Director of Operations. Swijgman 
informed Cobelens of the allegations and his dilemma.110 After completing 
his report by phone, the battle group commander wrote a memo on the 
alleged misconduct. Consultations were subsequently held in The Hague 
between the Defence Staff, the mivd and the Directorate of Legal Affairs, 
during which Cobelens’ advice due to a possible outcry in the media was 
to “sweep it under the carpet and have the mivd take measures.” However, 
the Deputy Director of Legal Affairs wanted “to remove all doubts about 
[a] cover-up”, and together with his superior pressed for the incident to 
be	officially	reported.	Once	Minister	Kamp	had	been	informed	by	Chief	of	
Defence Staff Kroon, Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman was therefore ordered 
to report the incident on 4 November. The military police initiated an 
investigation.111
The British released the Saudi Arabian national on 18 November 
2003. There was no evidence of membership of Al Qaida or of any 
plans for attacks against Coalition targets.112 The mps completed their 
investigation two days later. The Public Prosecutor’s recommendation 
was that no criminal prosecution be pursued. However, the military 
police did lament the fact that the legal adviser had been prevented from 
attending interviews and that “some form of force” had been used during 
a number of interviews which could have been perceived as threatening by 
detainees. The investigation concluded that water had been thrown only at 
times when detainees threatened to fall asleep, hoods had never been used 
and white noise was only used against eavesdropping and communication 
between detainees.113 
It therefore seemed as if the case was closed, until it came to light 
three years later. On 17 November 2006, Dutch daily newspaper de 
Volkskrant reported in large letters on its front page: “Dutch tortured 
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Iraqis”. Six months later, an inquiry set up by the government in response 
to this allegation concluded that there had been no tormenting, torture or 
humiliating treatment in contravention of Dutch or international law. The 
inquiry report did, however, have one criticism: “In a single case, during 
the questioning of a Saudi detainee, the lines were crossed. His treatment, 
when viewed as a whole, could be classed as humiliating.” In a general 
sense, the inquiry concluded that the mivd had interpreted its authority too 
broadly. In the opinion of the inquiry commission, the responsibility for 
this lay with an inadequate political mandate.
The limits of the mandate
Meanwhile, the initiatives for maintaining public order in Al Muthanna 
no longer went unnoticed at the Ministry of Defence in The Hague. At 
the end of August, following reports of operations against criminals, 
the Contingent Command’s legal adviser had to reassure the Defence 
Ministry’s lawyers that the Dutch caveats were not being breached.114 
Contingent commander Colonel Fred Hoogeland had thus far defended 
1 nlbg’s	modus	operandi	 as	 justified	 for	maintaining	 a	 “safe	 and	 secure	
environment”, as laid down in the assignment. “We are, however, very well 
aware that we may be operating at the edge of the mandate,” he stated. 
Although there was a risk of “mission creep” – the gradual expansion of 
tasks beyond the limits of what was permitted – he assured the Ministry 
that was not yet the case.115 The Ministry’s Directorate of Legal Affairs had 
its doubts and issued a general warning.116
October’s Operation Sweeney created a new situation. Even before 
the campaign had begun, the Defence Staff wondered whether intended 
activities	such	as	identifying	trafficking	routes	and	apprehending	suspects	
and vehicles were within the Dutch mandate. The Chief of Defence Staff, 
who in his operational instructions had determined – in line with the 
political guidelines – that the nlbg would not conduct executive police 
tasks on its own initiative, began to feel uncomfortable.117 In response, 
the Contingent Command argued that Operation Sweeney came within 
the mandate as the operation was aimed at contributing to the general 
objective of a safe and secure environment.118 Legal experts in The Hague, 
however, let it be known that they viewed things differently. In their 
opinion,	Operation	 Sweeney	was	 indeed	 a	 form	of	 crime	fighting.	 Such	
support for the Iraqi police was possible within the limits of the national 
mandate only if it could be demonstrated that the initiative lay with the 
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Iraqi authorities. Without the Iraqi police in the front lines, the legal 
branch	argued,	planned	operations	to	fight	crime	could	be	undertaken	at	
the initiative of the Dutch only if the criminal activity in question posed a 
threat to Coalition troops.119
By making this connection to force protection, the lawyers effectively 
created	 the	 justification	 for	 operations	 such	 as	 Sweeney.	 After	 all,	
criminals	 who	 possessed	 Kalashnikov	 rifles	 and	 other	 firearms	 could	
easily be classed as a threat to Dutch troops. However, the Ministry of 
Defence’s legal advice to justify operations was issued two weeks after 
Sweeney started. Preparations had already been underway for some time. 
1 nlbg	called	it	Operation	Greenfield,	and	the	aim	was	to	tackle	the	main	
source	 of	 firearms	 in	 the	 province:	 the	 illegal	 arms	 trade	 at	 the	 sheep	
market in As Samawah.120 Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman agreed to set up 
an inconspicuous observation post in an abandoned hotel close to the 
market	 in	order	 to	 collect	 sufficient	 evidence.	His	main	motive	was	 the	
request from many Iraqis to do something about this trade. In the Dutch 
commander’s view, the operation was clearly not about the security of his 
own troops, but that of the Iraqi people.121
On the basis of a reasonable amount of photographic and video evidence, 
Swijgman	 decided	 to	 initiate	 Operation	 Greenfield	 on	 21	 October.	 The	
objective	was	to	detain	thirty	identified	traders	and	their	henchmen	and	
to	confiscate	their	goods.	Major	Schellens	of	11	Infantry	Company	led	the	
operation	and	had	fifteen	‘green’	mps under his command in support. The 
Dutch military policemen were to supervise the reception and transport 
of any suspects arrested by the Iraqi police to the local police stations, 
where they would monitor the investigations and interrogations. The 
role	of	the	Iraqi	police	was	restricted	because	a	number	of	police	officers	
were themselves regularly sighted at the arms market. 1 nlbg informed the 
local	police	officers	of	the	operation	just	prior	to	its	commencement	and	
immediately picked them up from the police stations so there was no time 
to blow the operation’s cover.
Previous attempts to approach the arms markets in Ar Rumaythah 
and As Samawah during patrols or in operations had taught 1 nlbg that the 
traders used a network of children to alert them. In order to sidestep this 
system and retain the full element of surprise, the Dutch Marines ordered 
taxis in Al Khidr. 11 Infantry Company used these to approach the market 
unnoticed	from	three	sides.	As	additional	civilian	camouflage,	the	Marines	
wore Arab shamags on their heads while in the taxis. When they got out 




crowd	was	 forced	 back.	 The	Marines	 fired	 a	 single	 warning	 shot	 when	
armed	suspects	ran	away.	Those	fleeing	dropped	their	weapons	but	still	
managed to escape.122
Once the market site had been sealed off, about three hundred people 
were trapped. Search and arrest teams set to work, watched by a large 
audience drawn to the spectacle. The Iraqi police kept the crowd at a 
distance. A search of market customers led to 85 arrests being made using 
photographs.123 Among	those	arrested	were	two	police	officers	video	footage	
of whom later proved their involvement in arms trading. All in all, the Dutch 




Some of the mps later criticised the “cowboy-style” operation. 
Furthermore, a number of them thought that the unexpectedly large 
number of suspects had led to detainees being treated sloppily and 
poorly.125 They did not, however, note any irregularities. The Marines were 
proud of the operation. The fact that the limits of the political mandate 
had been stretched did not diminish that.
Separation of powers?
By now it was clear that the caveat on executive police tasks often proved 
untenable in practice. The other main caveat, which stipulated that the 
Dutch in Al Muthanna would take on no administrative tasks, was also 
subject to a tough practical test. Immediately after arrival, the Dutch 
Marines attempted to convey the message that the ‘civil domain’ and the 
‘military domain’ were to be separated following the departure of the 
Americans. Political adviser Rentenaar described this objective as follows:
“On the one hand, there is the Dutch battalion which is contributing 
to security in Al Muthanna within the framework of the stabilisation 
force. On the other, there is the cpa and for the time being this 
[authority] is responsible for everything else. Anyone with questions, 
complaints or tips on villains, rogues and/or other subversives can 
turn to the Dutch troops. However, if the questions, complaints or tips 
concern	the	inadequate	utilities,	financial	arrears,	the	reorganisation	
of the corrupt and incompetent government apparatus, the form and 
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content	of	the	new	public	administration	etc.,	 then	the	first	point	of	
contact is the cpa.”
The Dutch repeated the message that the nlbg bore responsibility for security 
only and the cpa for everything else several times a day on local television, in the 
local paper and in individual conversations. They stressed the role of British 
Colonel Maurice Bulmer in his capacity as temporary cpa administrator. 
With a view to emphasising the civilian nature of the cpa, the Briton was 
not introduced as a Colonel, but as Mister Bulmer. The Royal Engineer had 
exchanged his uniform for chinos and a shirt after a quick visit to the American 
px store in Kuwait. In the meantime, Rentenaar noted a sense of resignation 
among Iraqi administrators for someone they considered to be yet another 
new and probably temporary face. Rentenaar hoped that this would change 
when	 Paul	 Bremer’s	 definitive	 representative	 arrived	 in	 As	 Samawah.126 
us diplomat Dick Andrews would take up his post in early September.
The apparently straightforward separation of civil administrative and 
military tasks on which the Dutch placed so much emphasis proved not to 
exist in practice however in Al Muthanna province. This clearly showed 
from the organisational model, which was presented as a pie chart cut into 
four slices. In the middle of the pie was cpa representative Bulmer (later 
Andrews).	Formally	this	official,	the	cpa Governorate Coordinator, played 
the central role of shadow governor.127	The	first	slice	of	the	administrative	
apparatus pie under his command was the representative’s Governorate 
Team (gt),	 at	 this	 point	 still	 a	modest	 staff	 of	 two	British	 officers	who,	
like their boss, had changed into civilian clothing and occupied themselves 
with the most crucial administrative issues, such as paying the salaries 
of civil servants. The gt was of course far too small. In a study in July 
2003, a team of us	specialists	in	post-conflict	reconstruction	informed	the	
cpa	 that	twenty	to	thirty	officials	were	required	per province in order to 
conduct local administration properly.128 This recommended number was 
not achieved anywhere. The three-strong cpa team in Al Muthanna was far 
below requirements even for this sparsely populated and remote province. 
The	void	could	only	partly	be	filled	by	the	other	three	‘slices	of	pie’.
The second component of the administrative diagram was the team 
of the Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council (irdc). Its three 
members	were	Iraqis	who	had	fled	Iraq	following	the	uprising	in	1991	and	
had since resided in the us and Canada. They had returned from exile and 
been contracted by the us Department of Defense. Having no formal job 
description, they were the eyes and ears of the Governorate Coordinator 
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and cpa in Al Muthanna. Without the irdc, British shadow governor 
Bulmer would have been virtually blind and deaf to the needs of the local 
population. Yet in spite of their appointment and generous salaries paid by 
the Pentagon, the trio did not view the local cpa chief as their boss.129
This also applied to the international consultants of the Research 
Triangle Institute (rti), the third ‘slice of pie’. rti had been contracted by 
the us Agency for International Development (usaid) to tackle setting up 
administration in the provinces.130 As the executive development arm of 
the us State Department, usaid played a major role in Iraq, but because 
the cpa was accountable to the Defense Department rather than the State 
Department, the relationship between the Governorate Coordinator and the 
rti was unclear. The rti consultants stressed their semi-independent status 
by moving into their own location in As Samawah on the other side of the 
Euphrates river at the end of 2003, away from the cpa compound. “In short” 
the Dutch political adviser Rentenaar wrote, “we have been confronted with 
a minor ‘pie revolt’. Slices of the ‘pie’ do not accept the authority of the ‘pie 
boss’ and the pie consequently appears to be crumbling.”131
Bulmer and his successor Andrews were thus fortunate that the 
personnel	in	the	final	‘slice	of	pie’	at	least	adopted	a	more	helpful	attitude.	
This ‘administrative branch’ of the cpa was formed by the Dutch battle 
group’s cimic team, which took over many tasks from the us military 
Government Support Team (gst) of 2/5 Marines. cimic meant ‘civil-military 
cooperation’, a function which is explained within the nato alliance 
as cooperation between military personnel, the civilian population, 
administrative authorities and international governmental and non-
governmental organisations, all in support of the military mission. During 
previous overseas operations by the Dutch armed forces, cimic personnel 
confined	 themselves	 almost	 exclusively	 to	 liaison	 tasks	 and	 conducting	
small-scale aid projects. The main objective was to win the local people’s 
support for the military presence, or at least make them view it in a 
favourable light.
cimic practices in Iraq were completely different, however. “During our 
acclimatisation period in Kuwait, it quickly became clear that we were going 
to have to do more than just cimic” one of the section members reported. 
The reason was that there was need for a team which could support the 
cpa. “From that time on, we have been no longer known as cimic, but as a 
Government Support Team” – like the us team before.132 The cpa did not 
formally run the Dutch cimic team as a full gst,	but	commanding	officer	
Swijgman did not restrict his people in any way. A broad interpretation of 
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tasks proved unavoidable when the American gst departed on 15 August, 
earlier than agreed upon, to support the understaffed Polish division in 
tumultuous Central Iraq.133 The nlbg commander thus again came up 
against the limits of his mandate, but was covered in a formal sense when 
the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs decided to permit Dutch 
‘military advisers’ to work with the cpa.134 Still,	official	cimic policy imposed 
restrictions. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence formally 
barred administrative activities, as well as structural reconstruction of 
infrastructure and public services.135
The Dutch cimic team cooperated smoothly with cpa administrator 
Bulmer, especially after the arrival of Major Stefan Nommensen as the 
new leader of the Dutch gst in mid-August. The team initially comprised 
only	 eight	members	 and	 could	 do	 little	more	 than	 put	 out	 fires.	 It	was	
therefore enlarged by four forward air controllers, who obviously did not 
have a full-time job in guiding laser-guided missiles onto enemy targets 
in Al Muthanna and were therefore assigned cimic as an additional task.136 
The legal adviser also supported the team. Along with Major Nommensen, 
another	four	officers	arrived	from	the	Netherlands	to	provide	temporary	
manpower. The Dutch gst, now comprising eighteen members, was based 
in the cpa building in As Samawah, where the political adviser, the flt 
and a Marine infantry platoon tasked with security were also stationed. 
Nommensen consulted with the cpa representative on a daily basis and 
accepted that his gst was there mainly to support the cpa.137
In addition, the nlbg commander and his political adviser also played 
crucial	roles	in	local	government	that	were	not	identified	in	the	administrative	
‘pie chart’. The amount of time Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman spent on political 
and administrative problems in his area of operations was considerable. He 
concentrated on topics which related to the security situation, and wherever 
possible left governance-building and reforms to others. He visited the many 
sheikhs in the province very regularly in order, among other things, to take 
stock of their wishes concerning future governmental and political relations.138 
Where he deemed it necessary, he also encouraged the cpa	to	appoint	officials	
in the government and legal system.139
All in all, in spite of the Dutch caveats, the provincial cpa coordinator 
in Al Muthanna could not complain about the support provided by the 
nlbg.	He	was	in	fact	confronted	by	a	military	commander	with	very	firm	
ideas. These did not necessarily match his own, as noted in particular by 
American cpa Governorate Coordinator Dick Andrews. One major bone of 
contention between the two authorities was the differing importance they 
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attached to relations with the local sheikhs and the role of tribal leaders. 
The sheikhs were the traditional elite. In conservative Al Muthanna, their 
tribes continued to play a major role. Andrews ignored them, however, as 
they were not compatible with his idea of a modern Iraq. In mid-September, 
Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman, who held a different view, visited the leaders 
of the eighteen largest tribes in order to make their acquaintance and to 
explain the objective of the Dutch presence.140 By mapping the various tribes, 
their	interests	and	wishes,	he	hoped	to	fill	part	of	the	intelligence	gap	he	had	
identified	in	this	area.141
Political and administrative matters also demanded a great deal of 
the attention of Swijgman’s company commanders, who, occasionally 
with political adviser Rentenaar at their side, had to steer a course, 
like diplomats, between the local sheikhs, political parties, clerics and 
other	 Iraqi	 officials.	 According	 to	 Swijgman,	 his	 subcommanders	 were	
occasionally not afraid to play at “power politics”.142 While he himself 
deliberately left visits to council meetings at his level to Rentenaar, the 
company commanders could often be found at similar gatherings in their 
sectors. In an area of responsibility where security tasks were closely 
bound up with political and social problems, these meetings were a critical 
source of information. 
De facto occupation
The Dutch worked according to the operational concept of the uk-led 
division, known as the Master Plan. The British distinguished between four 
lines of operation: security, essential services, economy and administration, 
aimed at reaching the ultimate objective of “a free, stable and democratic 
Iraq, which is capable of defending itself, but which no longer poses a 
threat to international security”.143 Seemingly, this British plan and the 
Dutch political mandate were incompatible. If the Dutch battle group 
under British command had interpreted its national assignment strictly, 
it would have taken responsibility only for the security line of operation, 
without	having	to	engage	in	crimefighting	and	administration.	Moreover,	
its cimic team would only have conducted small-scale hearts-and-minds 
projects with a view to improving the battle group’s own security.
In reality, an entirely different situation arose after 1 August 2003. In 
addition to its responsibility for security, 1 nlbg in Al Muthanna assumed the 
role of the main executor of the lines of operation for essential services and 
economic reconstruction.144 Almost all the province’s small and medium-
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sized	projects	in	these	fields	were	identified,	assessed	and	implemented	by	
Dutch cimic personnel and largely paid for by funds which the nlbg had at 
his disposal. These development funds from the Coalition Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program (cerp) had been made available by the cpa 
several months earlier as an emergency measure. The Dutch Government 
Support Team was therefore able to spend many hundreds of thousands 
of dollars each month on projects, and in doing so equalled the generosity 
of its us predecessor. In fact, according to Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman, 
the Iraqis would have been severely disappointed in the Dutch if they had 
only spent their own budget of 50,000 euros for Quick Impact Projects.
In the autumn of 2003, millions of dollars extra became available 
via cpa channels. And those with money to spend wielded power. 
Circumstances dictated that – for the time being – this meant mainly the 
Dutch battle group. Other players in Al Muthanna, such as local parties 
and	town	councils,	had	no	or	few	financial	resources	themselves.	The	cpa 
provincial coordinator had access to considerable funds from Baghdad, 
but	 could	 do	 little	 with	 them	 due	 to	 complicated	 financial	 procedures	
and	understaffing.	Responsibility	for	development	and	reconstruction	in	
Al Muthanna therefore rested squarely on the shoulders of the nlbg. The 
almost total lack of international governmental and non-governmental 
organisations (igos and ngos) also gave the Dutch a monopoly in this 
respect. In Al Muthanna, there was only one ngo active in this period.144
Of the four lines of operation in the British Master Plan, the cpa was left 
with civil administration. And there, too, the Dutch were heavily involved. 
The	military	 influence	 on	 governmental	 issues	was	mostly	 indirect,	 but	
the	Dutch	share	was	significant	as	a	result	of	the	prominent	role	played	by	
political	adviser	Michel	Rentenaar.	According	to	his	official	job	description,	
the diplomat was only to provide political advice to commander Swijgman 
and report back to The Hague. In practice, 90 per cent of his time was 
taken up with forming a new Iraqi local government: setting up town and 
provincial councils, electing and determining the role of the governor and 
involving in this process the political parties, tribes, religious leaders and 
other interested parties. In addition to being political adviser to the Dutch 
battle	group,	Rentenaar	was	also	unofficial	adviser	to	the	cpa Governorate 
Coordinator.145	 In	 fact,	 he	 shared	 an	 office	 in	 the	 cpa building in As 
Samawah	with	first	Bulmer,	and	later	Andrews,	with	a	sign	on	the	door	
which read “Coalition Provisional Authority – Al Muthanna”.146
In practice, the Dutch political adviser was fully integrated into the 
occupational	authority	and	wielded	great	influence	on	the	policies	pursued	
by the local cpa. As he also built up excellent working relations with the 
Dutch Marines, the military and civil-administrative efforts in Al Muthanna 
were closely integrated. The highest cpa representatives stayed too short a 
time in the province to be able to make their mark on developments and 
therefore relied heavily on Rentenaar. Bulmer spent only one month as 
shadow governor and Andrews would last only three months because, in 
the end, the American diplomat made himself impossible to deal with and 
was ultimately replaced.
In the eyes of the Al Muthanna people, powerbrokers and 
administrators, the Dutch duo of Swijgman-Rentenaar – “the Commander 
and Mr Michel” – therefore was in charge of the province, just as Lieutenant 
Colonel O’Donahue had been in the period prior to their arrival. The fact 
that the Iraqis saw Swijgman, just like his us predecessor, as the true 
holder of power was made clear when, to his discomfort, he saw Iraqi 
boys on the street carrying his portrait. These were photos they had cut 
out	of	 the	flyers	distributed	to	 locals	by	Dutch	military	personnel	at	 the	
time of the change of command. In a society in which it was common to 
display and use portraits of the head of state or of those in positions of 
power, Swijgman’s picture was apparently cherished.147 It was an innocent 
illustration of the fact that the situation in Al Muthanna in the summer 
and autumn of 2003 was similar to military rule. This changed only when 
a new cpa	 representative	 took	up	office	about	 the	 time	of	 the	 change	of	
command from 1 nlbg to 2 nlbg. The election of a new Iraqi governor in 
October would also lessen the Dutch administrative role. However, with 
Sheikh	Sami	still	in	office	and	no	local	democratic	tradition	whatsoever,	
for the time being this would prove a challenging process. 
3 
Governing in the  
midst of chaos
Uprising in Al Khidr
During	their	first	patrols	in	Al	Khidr	in	August	2003	the	Dutch	Marines	
noticed that trouble was brewing in Al Muthanna’s third largest town. Local 
tribes fought over access to drinking water, the police force was very weak 
and there was a great deal of violence on the streets. Of all the problems, 
the totally corrupt local government was the biggest source of unrest. As 
early as on 3 August, a 1 nlbg patrol came across a large demonstration in 
front of the town council’s building, where a number of Al Khidr residents 
were demanding the resignation of the council members due to unpaid 
bills for services rendered.1 The ferocity of the protest led commander 
Van den Berg of 12 Infantry Company to deploy his Quick Reaction Force 
to keep the situation under control. After Dutch military personnel had 
talked to representatives, the demonstrators dispersed peacefully.
The us predecessors of the Dutch military in Al Muthanna had hardly 
showed themselves in Al Khidr. Shortly after the us invasion force had 
passed through the town in March 2003, a group of twelve men led by a 
certain Said Malik – “an unsavoury and unreliable individual” according 
to political adviser Rentenaar – installed themselves as the town council.2 
The Americans did not formally recognise this council, but they did 
legitimise it by occasionally attending its meetings. As long as it was little 
more than a talking shop, without direct power and resources, the locals 
were not bothered. The problems began when at the end of July, just 




dinar (about 220,000 us dollars) to the council’s self-appointed public 
works branch. It was common at this time for interim us or British military 
rulers to donate large sums of money without issuing any instructions 
on their use or agreeing on accountability.3 The nonchalance with which 
the military used cpa funds was partly due to the origins of the money: 
confiscated	funds	from	the	deposed	Baath	party.
In the provincial capital As Samawah, where a us-installed town 
council was somewhat representative and functioned relatively well, 
such	donations	did	not	pose	any	difficulty.	The	‘town	council’	of	Al	Khidr,	
however, managed to dispose without a trace of one third of the budget 
(117 million dinar) in a short space of time. Enraged Al Khidr residents 
subsequently paid frequent visits to the temporary British Governorate 
Coordinator Maurice Bulmer and his Dutch political adviser Michel 
Rentenaar in the cpa building. They accused all twelve council members 
of lining their own pockets and claimed that seven of them had been 
members of the Baath party.4 The people wanted a new council.
The revolt in Al Khidr was a good excuse for the cpa and the Dutch 
to replace the corrupt town council. The question was how to form a body 
which was representative of the local population. Although democracy 
was an objective of the occupying authorities, the cpa	forbade	fully-fledged	
local elections for the time being. Experiences in the Balkans with so-called 
nation-building had taught that rushed elections were anything but a recipe 
for democratic success, and could even help ‘undesirable’ (i.e. radical 
nationalist, or in the case of Iraq, religious anti-democratic) leaders into 
positions of power. In both As Samawah and Ar Rumaythah, the Americans 
therefore applied an alternative and more manageable system, which would 
be used by Bulmer and Rentenaar in improved form in Al Khidr.
The us Government Support Team had experimented in As Samawah 
and Ar Rumaythah with an electoral group, known as a caucus. In the 
provincial	capital,	a	group	of	forty	influential	figures	had	been	appointed	
undemocratically by the us battalion commander. In Ar Rumaythah, the 
system was more representative. Here, in the second week of August, as 
one of the American gst’s	 final	 jobs,	 a	 new	 town	 council	 was	 installed	
following consultation with the local population. The old council in tribal 
and conservative Ar Rumaythah had appointed itself in May under the 
leadership of the fundamentalist Sheikh Fadhil Ashaara and, just as in Al 
Khidr, had subsequently been accepted temporarily by the Americans for 
lack of an alternative.5 Just before command of the province was handed 
over to the Dutch, Lieutenant Colonel O’Donahue disbanded this council on 
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the grounds of “fundamentalist views and conduct”.6 With a view to forming 
a new town council, posters were displayed containing the question: 
“Who do you think would be the best person to represent your city?” This 
consultation yielded a list of seventy names. A hand-picked committee of 
eight prominent locals selected twelve council members from this list. The 
technocratic	suitability	of	the	candidates	for	specific	portfolios	was	decisive	
in this selection procedure, which lasted several hours.7
The general idea was that a caucus would select a new council in Al 
Khidr also. The composition had been structurally improved by Bulmer 
and Rentenaar. In this case, the 96-strong caucus was created following 
extensive consultation with the major political parties, tribes and religious 
groups. It then formulated portfolios, such as public security, electricity, 
agriculture and irrigation, and subsequently drew up a list of twelve people 
most suited to holding these administrative posts. It remained “(s)election”, 
as Rentenaar described it. Yet it did display improved insight and formed 
an acceptable alternative to direct elections, which the cpa still prohibited.
Unfortunately, partly due to the heightened tensions in the town, 
implementation in Al Khidr did not go entirely according to plan. Neither 
Bulmer and Rentenaar nor the Iraqis in the irdc had thought to take the 
list	of	the	96	electors	to	the	first	caucus	meeting	at	the	town’s	school	on	the	
evening	of	Thursday	14	August.	Hundreds	of	excited	locals	flooded	onto	
the premises from all directions when the vehicles containing the interim 
administrators and their Marine escort arrived. Without the list, no-one 
could check whether those present did indeed belong to the carefully 
selected caucus. Cancelling the meeting did not seem to be a feasible option. 
That would create even greater unrest. Emotions were already running 
high. Some of the crowd pushed and shoved their way into the school and 
started demanding unpaid wages. Someone else informed Colonel Bulmer 
in no uncertain terms that he was the head of a ten-thousand-strong tribe 
and that he would take it as a personal insult if the meeting did not go 
ahead. Continuing the election, however, also brought with it the risk of 
the	new	town	council	lacking	sufficient	support.
The foreign administrators were able to make themselves heard by 
banging loudly on the table. They proposed postponing the caucus meeting 
for three days until the next Saturday evening. This was accepted, but only 
on the condition that the old council was immediately removed from the 
town council building.8 A loud cheer went up when Bulmer accepted. The 
crowd	immediately	departed	for	 the	town	council	building.	For	 the	first	
time, political adviser Rentenaar was glad of the fuel shortage. He wrote:
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“As our vehicles did have petrol, we arrived at the town council 
building ahead of the crowd (who were on foot). On arrival we were 
able to secure the building, with the much-appreciated support of the 
Dutch battalion’s 12th Company. After some time, the chairman of 
the old town council appeared and cpa administrator Bulmer ordered 
him to resign. Bulmer was wise enough not to mention the large 
amount of proof of corruption against the chairman. In his ‘dismissal 
speech’, Bulmer focused purely on the fact that the Al Khidr residents 
obviously wanted a new town council. After making some threats 
about subsequent tribal unrest in the town, the city council chair (Said 
Malik) accepted his dismissal and left the building.”9
However, this minor ‘coup’ in the service of the fragile democratisation 
process was not yet consolidated. Three days later, on the Saturday 
evening of the postponed elections, two hundred angry demonstrators 
assembled at the gates of the same school. It was evident that Said Malik 
had gathered the mob. Yet this time things were better coordinated and 
company commander Major Van den Berg and his Marines had positioned 
themselves	discreetly	but	firmly	in	front	of	the	school	entrance.	Following	
checks, they allowed those on the list of 96 electors to enter one by one. 
Political adviser Rentenaar could not entirely shake off an uneasy sense 
of “democracy at gunpoint”, but Malik’s henchmen eventually backed off.
That Saturday evening in Al Khidr an almost childlike excitement 
could	be	felt	in	the	stifling	classroom.	The	town	council’s	portfolios	were	
written on a blackboard: fuel, water and sanitation, electricity, public 
order and police, agriculture and irrigation, public works, healthcare, 
education, administration and book-keeping. The electors wrote the name 
of their favourite candidate on a piece of paper. As there were too few pens 
available, they did so using very short pencils which a Dutch Marine had 
broken into pieces shortly before and – cursing – sharpened with his knife. 
“The	little	things	democracy	depends	on,”	the	political	adviser	reflected.
The Iraqis elected one person to each post, greeted each time by loud 
applause. The end result was a town council comprising engineers, doctors, 
teachers and other well-educated individuals. In spite of the threats from 
the deposed Said Malik and his followers, the transition was peaceful. The 
experiment in Al Khidr seemed a success for the time being. Nevertheless, 
over the coming months, the town council would continue to come under 
pressure from the group around Malik and from other groups who had 
missed out on the positions of power.10 
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The ‘Al Muthanna model’
Responsibility for the administration of Iraq by the short-staffed provincial 
cpa	 offices	 was	 gigantic	 and	 complex,	 chiefly	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 clear	
guidelines from Baghdad and the many changes of policy. Prior to the 
invasion, Washington and London had given little thought to political 
and administrative reconstruction. In the spring of 2003, this meant 
that the appointment and auditing of provincial administrators were left 
to	 the	military	 commanders	 in	 the	field.	 In	Al	Muthanna,	 this	 led	 to	 the	
appointment of individuals such as Sheikh Sami, whose rise to power was 
in line with the American aim of a rapid transfer of sovereignty to a new 
Iraqi government. Pro-Western exiles were allocated a dominant role. Yet 
the arrival of Paul Bremer as the viceroy of Iraq heralded a new Coalition 
strategy. The cpa prepared itself for long-term occupation and pulled strings 
with a view to achieving the ideal of a modern, liberal-democratic Iraq.11
Of	the	fifteen	provinces	outside	the	Kurdish	region,	in	the	late	summer	
of 2003 Al Muthanna was leading the way with respect to the administrative 
build-up.12 Yet the improvised town councils with their own authorities 
such as the ‘Dutch’ province now possessed did not match the new national 
policy. cpa South therefore tried to rein in Bulmer’s team using unambiguous 
language. “I think there is rather too much gung-ho enthusiasm from the 
governorate level going on at the moment,” deputy head Janet Rogan told 
the interim administration in As Samawah. The British diplomat warned 
that personnel who exceeded their mandates would be removed from their 
posts.13 There was even talk of disbanding those councils already installed. 
In the opinion of Bulmer, Rentenaar and Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman, 
however, the interference from cpa South had come too late. The real holders 
of power in Al Muthanna did not view it as an option to undo a situation 
which had already been evolving for the past two months.14
Both the cpa and the temporary national Iraqi Governing Council, 
set up by the Americans in Baghdad in July, displayed this type of 
centralist and disruptive tendency. Iraqi Governing Council members, 
for instance, insisted that their ministries should be given powers via 
local representatives and that they themselves should be able to appoint 
governors without the involvement of the population. Such a scenario 
would	 certainly	 not	 benefit	 Al	 Muthanna.	 Sheikh	 Sami’s	 lobbying	 in	
Baghdad had won him a post as Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, 
which certainly increased the likelihood of his corrupt brother Khaled 
receiving a centrally appointed governorship. Incidentally, Khaled had 
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still not vacated the governor’s residence, and immediately after Sami 
had	become	minister	officials	started	receiving	 letters	signed	by	 ‘Sheikh	
Khaled, The Governor’.15
After Dick Andrews succeeded Bulmer in early September as cpa 
Governorate Coordinator, Rentenaar regularly accompanied the American 
to Baghdad. Both diplomats tried in vain to obtain clarity on the selection 
procedures to be followed for provincial councils and governors and on the 
powers they were to have. Partly as a result of these visits Rentenaar’s faith 
in the central cpa organisation dissipated rapidly. The creation of democracy 
in Iraq appeared to be far beyond the ability of the cpa. Pessimism and 
cynicism rapidly took hold among the international staff in the cordoned-
off Green Zone in the city’s centre, where the Authority was based.16 The 
administration department did produce a draft text on the responsibilities 
of local administrative bodies, but the document went unsigned for months. 
The interim administrators in Al Muthanna could not wait for this. The draft 
version seen by Rentenaar also contained bad news for local administrators, 
because it mainly listed what they were not allowed to do. For example, they 
were prohibited from dismissing civil servants or levying taxes.
When negotiations between the cpa and the Iraqi Governing Council on 
the new constitution and the path to Iraqi independence ground to a complete 
halt in September 2003, Baghdad gave a freer rein to local administrative 
initiatives. This measure was not so much the fruit of new policy as the 
result of not having any at all. “At cpa Central, it was openly admitted that 
no policy would be formulated for the time being relating to the authorities 
of the provincial administrators and advisory bodies,” Lieutenant Colonel 
Swijgman reported to The Hague.17 He and Rentenaar pressed Andrews to 
take up this carte blanche quickly. The Dutch were feeling pressure from 
the political parties and tribes to set up a provincial administrative body.18 
Rentenaar saw the ‘window of opportunity’ for creative solutions at the local 
level closing rapidly. “The Iraqis [otherwise] will revert to the old, familiar 
but tough, centralist and poorly-functioning patterns” he claimed.19 
In the meantime, the problem of the governor remained unresolved. 
Andrews, Swijgman and Rentenaar all agreed on the shortcomings of Sheikh 
Sami	 and	 the	 disruptive	 role	 of	 his	 maffioso	 brother	 Khaled,	 but	 not	 on	
how to tackle the problem. Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman argued in favour 
of keeping Sami for the time being for reasons of stability. Andrews, on the 
other hand, insisted on the immediate dismissal of the interim governor. As a 
middle way, Rentenaar proposed that a caucus select a deputy governor, who 
would enable Sami to leave the post without loss of face, using his duties as 
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a minister in Baghdad as an excuse. Andrews nevertheless pushed through 
Sami’s immediate dismissal.20 According to Swijgman the American cpa 
administrator thereby ignored local customs such as maintaining respect, 
patience and harmony. In the view of the battle group commander, Andrews’ 
lack of cultural sensitivity even made him a security threat.21
A	conflict	with	the	newly-appointed	Governorate	Coordinator	seemed	
inevitable. Cooperation between him and the Dutch commander, the 
Dutch political adviser, the gst, the rti and even the British and Iraqi 
personnel in his own support staff reached a low already at the end of 
September 2003. Andrews left the cpa building less and less often and, 
in contrast to his predecessor, rarely attended town council meetings. On 
most occasions, his Dutch political adviser went instead.22 Andrews’ poor 
performance was recognised in the higher cpa echelons, but it took until 
November for them to replace him.23
However, the rather blunt actions of the us administrator regarding 
Sheikh Sami meant that, in addition to the election of a new provincial 
council, the path was open to select a new governor too.24 Direct elections 
were still not an option, so an alternative selection procedure had to be 
worked out. Alongside Rentenaar, British rti	official	Alistair	Blunt	became	
the most important architect of the subsequent improvised model. Like 
Rentenaar, Blunt spoke Arabic. He had recently gained experience in the 
rti Local Governance Programme in Baghdad. The Briton also feared a 
return to a centrally-governed Iraq.25 In his view, the cpa appeared to be 
pinning all its hopes blindly on the Iraqi Governing Council, while that 
body	–	filled	with	exiles	–	enjoyed	very	little	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	most	
Iraqis. cpa chief Bremer still possessed the power to appoint governors, but 
sooner or later this might be claimed by the Governing Council. Rentenaar 
and Blunt felt they needed to act fast.
On paper, the diplomats had already made substantial progress in 
working out a Governate Council which was as representative as possible. 
They planned for a body of forty councillors, a number which was laid 
down in the Iraqi constitution. Within this institution, twelve seats were 
created for representatives of the tribes, twelve for political parties, twelve 
for technocrats, two for religious representatives and two for women. 
Thus, the structure complied with the wishes of the tribes and political 
parties to play an advisery role in the new system.
Deciding on the distribution of seats was a highly complex process and 
led to heated debate. There were 24 tribes in Al Muthanna, which ultimately 




In their eyes, the tribes embodied a return of the country to the old ways. In 
their turn, the tribes thought that although the technocrats were educated 
and	experts	in	their	fields,	they	represented	no	one	in	rural	Al	Muthanna.	
Of the twelve political parties, each of which would have one seat, the two 
largest were suspect too, as their leaders had spent a long time as refugees in 
Iran. These were the highly religious Al Majlis ala lil Thawra al Islamiyah 
fil al Iraq (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq – abbreviated 
to sciri) and Al Dawa al Islamiyah (Dawa).
Political adviser Rentenaar also had to do his utmost to get a Sunni 
cleric accepted next to a Shiite leader in the two religious council seats. He 
ultimately succeeded thanks to the support of the charismatic and erudite 
local Shiite imam Ali Mahdi. Despite widespread disagreement amongst 
all the male representatives, they at least agreed on one issue: two seats for 
women	out	of	forty	were	far	too	many,	and	the	foreigners’	fixed	demand	
for giving women a role in the council exhibited crude cultural insensitivity 
and Western arrogance.26
The	Al	Muthanna	Governate	Council	met	for	the	first	time	on	3	October	
2003.	Its	official	inauguration	took	place	at	the	cpa building, in front of the 
cameras of the local and popular television station Samawah tv. The carte 
blanche with respect to setting up administrative bodies had thus been 
applied in a daring, rapid and creative manner. The term ‘Al Muthanna 
model’ was born, although it would be several months before it became 
well-known.	The	election	of	the	new	governor	was	to	be	the	first	major	test	
for the new provincial council. There were twenty candidates. This number 
was	reduced	 to	 six	after	 the	first	ballot.	The	second	ballot	on	14	October	
was preceded by a campaign which focused on the council itself, but also 
on the population of Al Muthanna, via television and posters. Although the 
inhabitants of Al Muthanna could not vote themselves, the campaign and 
the candidates’ qualities were daily topics of conversation in the teahouses. 
Mild election fever and a positive ambience were said to be palpable.
On the day of the election, the organisers did all they could to emphasise 
the transparency of the process. Two judges from As Samawah, who 
were present to monitor the proceedings, helped ‘Master of Ceremonies’ 
Rentenaar hold up the ballot box at each round to show those present and 
the television cameras that the box was empty. The council members cast 
their votes in an enclosed voting booth and then placed their ballot papers 
in the large box, a painted wastepaper basket bearing the text: The Voice 
of Al Muthanna. When casting their votes, some council members posed 
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at length for the cameras as if they were presidential candidates.27 Of the 
six	 candidates	 remaining	 after	 the	 first	 ballot,	 Mohammed	 Ali	 Hassan	
Abbas al Hassani was the frontrunner. As he did not receive the required 
majority of 21 votes (but only 20) of the 40 votes in the second ballot, a 
third	ballot	was	required.	Al	Hassani	won	the	final	ballot	convincingly	over	
his	rival	Hakem	Khazal	Hashaan,	leader	of	the	tribal	Union	of	the	Middle	
Euphrates party, who shortly before had returned to his birth country 
after 23 years in exile in Germany.28 
The new governor, a member of the Albu Hassan tribe, had been 
assistant to the court in his home town of Ar Rumaythah in the 1970s. He 
had deserted from the Iraqi army during the Iran-Iraq war, after which he 
had joined the sciri resistance in Iran. He had worked his way up to regional 
commander in the Faylaq al Badr (Badr Brigades), the armed section of the 
sciri. At the time of the us invasion in 2003, Al Hassani was leader of the 
paramilitary organisation in the Middle Euphrates region and until June he 
had held a seat in the temporary town council in Ar Rumaythah.29 In what, by 
Iraqi standards, had been a fairly democratic selection procedure, Hassani’s 
close	ties	with	a	large	number	of	tribes	and	his	status	as	a	resistance	fighter	
had probably been decisive factors in his victory.
On Saturday 18 October, the governor was inaugurated by cpa 
Governorate Coordinator Andrews. Dressed in an Iranian-style suit, Al 
Hassani did not attempt to hide the close ties between that country and 
his sciri party. He would not prove to be a convinced democrat, but neither 
was he a blunt autocrat. In Rentenaar’s opinion, he was above all a sly 
politician who was open to suggestions for change and improvement.30 
Al	Hassani	 spoke	 softly	 and	with	 great	 self-confidence.	He	 thanked	 the	
people of Al Muthanna and praised the cpa for the properly-conducted 
election process. Andrews received this compliment with some pride, but 
he also referred to the central role played by his Dutch political adviser, 
who incidentally was absent on leave.31
Another Dutch political adviser was present, however. Rentenaar’s 
colleague Marcel de Vink had travelled to As Samawah from Basra for the 
occasion. In his capacity as deputy political adviser to the British division 
commander, this Dutch diplomat had quickly gained a prominent position 
in Major General Lamb’s team. In Basra, where tensions were rising rapidly 
between the Shiite parties and their militias, De Vink was heavily involved in 
political and governmental matters.32 His turbulent experiences caused him 





he was deeply religious and therefore representative of conservative Al 
Muthanna, yet was viewed as a progressive as he was willing to work with 
the Coalition, but above all he was known to be a ‘strong man’. De Vink 
thought that troublemakers would think twice before making mischief 
against this former resistance commander.33 Al Hassani might be the kind 
of man needed, as there were turbulent times ahead.
Visitors from The Hague
In late October 2003, the Permanent Parliamentary Committees for 
Foreign Affairs and Defence and Chief of Defense Staff Admiral Kroon 
paid	their	first	visit	to	the	Dutch	military	units	in	Iraq.	The	end	of	1 nlbg’s 
operation was approaching and 2 nlbg was about to begin its tour. With the 
onset of winter, the weather was also starting to turn.34 The hot summer was 
over. During the three-day visit, temperatures did not exceed 28 degrees 
Celsius and it was very cloudy, windy and dusty. At night, temperatures 
plummeted, and instead of the air conditioning the heating was switched 
on in the prefabs on the Dutch camps.
The appointment of the provincial Governate Council and the 
selection of a new governor were major political success stories. The ad 
hoc administrative model still had to prove itself in practice, but the shaky 
foundations which the Dutch had encountered at the end of July had been 
well shored up. Al Muthanna had government structures which possessed 
some measure of legitimacy and was therefore ahead of all the other 
provinces	 in	 Iraq.	 In	spite	of	 the	difficult	 relations	with	cpa coordinator 
Andrews, the Dutch generally worked well with his Governorate Team 
and	 affiliated	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 rti and the irdc. The problems 
involving former governor Sami and his brother Khaled had been solved. 
The	 province	 could	 still	 justifiably	 be	 called	 the	 safest	 in	 Iraq	 south	 of	
Kurdish territory. Moreover, the Dutch military had already spent nearly 
three million us dollars on reconstruction projects.35
The level of stability and security in the province could be partly 
ascribed to the administrative build-up, but the ‘Al Muthanna model’ 
could not be presented to the visiting mps as a Dutch success. After all, 
the government had stipulated that the Dutch contingent could not be 
responsible for politico-administrative matters. The real role the Dutch 
had played in Al Muthanna therefore had to remain hidden. Prior to the 
visit by the Parliamentary Committees and the cds to the cpa building in 
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As Samawah, Rentenaar agreed with Andrews that the latter would take 
all	the	credit.	Shortly	before	the	arrival	of	the	politicians,	however,	a	fierce	
argument broke out between the Governorate Coordinator and Lieutenant 
Colonel Swijgman, which apparently caused the cpa administrator 
expressly to mention Rentenaar’s initiatives on behalf of the cpa seven 
times	during	his	five-minute	presentation	and	to	praise	the	Dutch	adviser	
lavishly for the administrative build-up in the province.36
The	 actual	 influence	 on	 the	 local	 government	 of	 Rentenaar’s	 military	
boss did not go unnoticed either. Member of Parliament for the Labour 
Party Frans Timmermans was impressed with the way Lieutenant Colonel 
Swijgman	was	seen	to	deal	with	local	influential	figures.	During	a	lavish	meal	
of rice and lamb in a large bedouin tent, hosted by a very hospitable Sheikh 
Sami, Timmermans witnessed the commander negotiating about access to 
water for local farmers. After visiting both the British headquarters and the 
Dutch troops, it became clear to him “that it is hard to draw a line between the 
occupying power and the military forces who are there to provide stability”. 
The Iraqis saw all foreign military personnel – including the Dutch – as the 
new power holders. “It had all sounded so simple in The Hague,” Timmermans 
recounted in his weblog. “The Netherlands is not an occupying force and the 
military personnel are there to bring stability.” The reality was quite different, 
he concluded. Although his party had been critical of Dutch participation 
in the allied operation, he did not disapprove of this development. He was 
impressed by the “highly-motivated, professional Dutch personnel”:
“They do their best in all kinds of ways to help the Iraqis to set up 
civil administration. Thus it is logical that they become involved in 
administration, which again just goes to show that it is almost impossible to 
distinguish between us and the so-called occupying force in practice. This 
was also demonstrated during our meeting with the local administrators, 
who had been helped to power via a system of indirect elections invented 
by the Americans [sic]. Their questions for us were as honest as they were 
direct: what exactly is the Netherlands going to do to help us? They expect 
a kind of interim administration because, as they themselves admit, they 
cannot yet run [the province] themselves.”37
The pvda mp	also	wrote	admiringly	of	Operation	Greenfield,	the	Marines’	
operation against the illegal arms trade at the sheep market in As Samawah. 
This	crimefighting	operation,	which	1 nlbg conducted entirely on its own 
initiative, had taken place one week prior to the parliamentarian’s visit 
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and a video recording made for the court in As Samawah was shown to the 
visitors by Swijgman and his staff.38
On their return to the Netherlands, the members of the Permanent 
Parliamentary Committees posed no critical questions about the delicate 
theme of occupation and the administrative and police roles assumed 
by the nlbg in spite of the caveats. This was remarkable as this topic had 
been highly sensitive a few months earlier during the political decision-
making	 process.	 The	Members	 of	 Parliament	 were	 apparently	 satisfied	
with Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman’s explanation that he was very aware of 
the fact that some aspects of Dutch operations were very close to the limits 
of the mandate or that some even temporarily exceeded it.39
Now that the operation was up and running properly, the Members 
of Parliament turned their attention to a completely different issue: troop 
safety.	 In	Basra,	 they	had	gathered	 from	a	briefing	by	 the	Chief	of	Staff	
mnd South-East, Colonel Richard Barrons, that there was a suspicion that 
foreign	 fighters	 were	 entering	 Iraq	 via	 the	 Dutch	 sector,	 among	 other	
areas. The British Colonel could not go into great detail as mnd South-
East possessed little intelligence on the matter. Nevertheless, the enemy 
combatants were represented in his presentation by a large red arrow from 
Saudi Arabia via Al Muthanna to central Iraq.40 There was also a persistent 
rumour	 that	 these	 infiltrators	 might	 be	 using	 the	 desert	 province	 as	 a	
staging area. As monitoring was virtually impossible in the vast desert 
region,	 it	could	not	be	ruled	out	that	foreign	fighters	had	for	some	time	
been moving among the regular, often nomadic travellers.
The Dutch Members of Parliament were also concerned about the 
complaint heard during the visit that the British and Americans shared 
insufficient	 intelligence	 with	 the	 Dutch,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 these	
infiltrations.	On	4	November,	mps Geert Wilders (vvd), Camiel Eurlings 
(cda) and Bert Koenders (pvda) put a number of critical questions on this 
matter to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence.41 The issue recieved 
wide attention in The Hague as the decision to extend the Dutch operation 
by six months, until the summer of 2004, was imminent. The politicians’ 
visit to Al Muthanna had given them a generally positive impression, 
but Parliament was particularly concerned about the increasing armed 
resistance against the Coalition and growing violence in Iraq in general. 
Around the time of the visit by the Parliamentary Committees, Dutch 
forces	 in	 Al	 Muthanna	 had	 encountered	 the	 first	 mass	 expression	 of	
civil	discontent.	 In	 the	early	morning	of	29	October,	a	surprisingly	fierce	
demonstration had taken place in front of the cpa building. About 250 angry 
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young men blocked the road and expressed their dissatisfaction by throwing 
stones at the building and at the Marines of 11 Infantry Company protecting 
the	site.	The	reason	for	the	protest	were	unfulfilled	promises	in	the	first	cpa-
led aid project in the province – a major employment programme. As cpa 
personnel were absent at that moment, Major Nommensen of the Dutch 
Government Support Team faced the spokesmen of the crowd. He managed 
to calm them, after which the demonstrators dispersed.
The next morning, however, the protesters gathered once again. To 
make matters worse, at the same time a large us Army convoy tried to force 
its way through along the main road past the cpa building (Route Jackson). 
This was a recipe for escalation, as Al Muthanna residents had started to 
take severe umbrage at the many military convoys which aggressively 
thundered through their city. There were regular injuries and even deaths 
among the civilian population as a result of the tactical posture of these 
convoys. The crowd soon turned on the Americans and threw stones at 
them. The us troops	responded	by	firing	several	warning	shots.	One	bullet	
hit a demonstrator in the leg.42
The incident pointed to dissatisfaction among the locals which exceeded 
the level of understandable anger at the rude way in which the convoys 
were conducted. This was most tangible in and around Al Muthanna’s 
second	 town,	Ar	Rumaythah.	During	 an	 earlier	 briefing	 for	 the	 visiting	
politicians, the commander of 13 Infantry Company, Major Schooneman, 
bluntly related that “something was brewing”. He reported that the locals 
generally greeted the Marines in a friendly fashion during patrols. Yet in 
some villages along the road to Basra his men had been pelted with stones 
and occasionally confronted with a universally recognised gesture: moving 
the	 index	finger	 from	 left	 to	 right	 across	 the	 throat.43 The strained and 
aggressive conduct of us military personnel in supply convoys was partly 
to blame for this, according to Schooneman. But there was more to it. At a 
roundabout in Al Warka, a settlement near Ar Rumaythah, Marines came 
across a banner in English and Arabic bearing the text: “All laws made by 
the Coalition Forces are unacceptable, refuse them totally.”44 Al Muthanna 
was starting to exhibit the hallmarks of a national problem. The legitimacy of 
the occupation and the new Iraqi authorities was openly being questioned.
Parties and militias
In the second half of 2003, the Iraqis increasingly turned against the 
Coalition.	 The	 Shiite	 south	witnessed	 the	 rise	 of	 self-confident	 political	
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parties, a hardening internal power struggle and an increasingly violent 
rebellion by a radical group that opposed any type of cooperation with 
the occupying powers. Forces were being unleashed which the cpa and the 
Coalition troops could not control. People were increasingly negative about 
the	foreigners	and	their	vacillating	and	inefficient	policies.	The	percentage	
of Iraqis in the south who viewed the Coalition Forces as occupiers in a 
negative sense was already high at 47 per cent in August 2003. A majority 
of 61 per cent thought that the international troops should leave the 
country as quickly as possible. In the months that followed, this number 
of	dissatisfied	citizens	would	rise	to	over	80	per	cent	of	the	population.45
This development had not been foreseen. Almost all of the political 
groups of Shiite background had after all – in line with expectations – 
shown themselves willing to cooperate with the occupying forces, to whom 
they were grateful for having deposed the cruel Baath regime, ending 
decades	 of	 oppression.	 The	 Shiites	 knew	 they	 would	 benefit	 from	 the	
regime change.46 The solution therefore appeared to be to wait patiently 
and gain power peacefully. They nevertheless had a totally different 
agenda from the us- and uk-led occupying authorities. While the cpa and 
the Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad were busy laying the foundations 
for a secular democracy, most Shiites were looking to their spiritual 
leaders. This Marji’iyya, a group of prominent Islamic scholars, had 
long been politically oriented and had played a leading role in the 1920 
rebellion against the British. In the 1950s and 60s, they were also involved 
in the founding of organised political Islam, which was a reaction to the 
advent of ‘foreign’ political ideologies such as nationalism, socialism and 
communism. During the (socialist-nationalist) Baath dictatorship, some, 
such as Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Bakir al Sadr in the 1970s and his 
nephew, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al Sadr, in the 1990s, had 
opposed Saddam Hussein. They were murdered by Saddam’s security 
troops in 1980 and 1999 respectively, as were thousands of their followers.
The main leaders in the Marji’iyya hierarchy were Grand Ayatollah 
Abu al-Qasim al Khoei and, after his death in 1992, Grand Ayatollah Ali 
al Husseini al Sistani. In 2003, Sistani was the most important religious 
authority for the Shiites and a political power factor which the cpa had to 
take into account. The Americans and British initially neglected to do so 
when they set up the interim Iraqi Governing Council and announced that 
they wanted to draw up a new constitution prior to a general election in 
the summer of 2003. Sistani opposed this move. The allies had by then 
already lost their main potential ally among the ayatollahs. The son of 
91
Governing in the midst of chaos
former Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al Khoei, the moderate cleric Abdul-
Majid al Khoei, had returned to the holy city of Najaf with us support in 
April. His assassination by order of the young radical populist Muqtada 
al Sadr in Najaf on 10 April signalled the start of a violent internal power 
struggle among the Shiites.47
Al Sadr did not shy away from confrontation with the traditional 
authorities in the Shiite community. Shortly after Al Khoei’s murder, he had 
Sistani’s house in Najaf besieged by armed followers. Neighbouring tribes 
went to the aid of the Grand Ayatollah and drove away the Al Sadriyyun, 
the ‘Sadrists’. Muqtada had made his point, however. He was only thirty 
years	old	and	had	had	no	religious	education	of	any	significance.	He	could	
nevertheless rely on great popularity among the supporters of his murdered 
father and great-uncle. His religious-nationalist agenda, which was based on 
his irreconcilable resistance to the foreign invaders, struck a note among the 
impoverished Shiite lower classes, especially in the cities. Al Sadr’s party also 
had an armed section, which he called Jeish al Mahdi (the Mahdi Army).
Many important religious leaders were attached to organised political 
movements such as the Dawa party, the Fadhila party and the sciri. 
Influential	ayatollah	Mohammed	Baqir	al	Hakim	was	the	spiritual	leader	
of sciri, the largest of these parties. He spent years in exile in Iran before 
returning to Iraq in 2003. On 29 August, he was assassinated in a suicide 
car bombing outside the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, a holy Shiite site, in 
an attack killing about one hundred people.48
The majority of the Shiite political players had in common that they 
accorded Islam a central role in society, laws and legislation and public 
administration. As a result, they had numerous clashes with the cpa during 
the 2003-2004 year of occupation, mostly about the new Iraqi constitution 
and the way in which sovereignty should be transferred to the Iraqis. The 
Americans, determined not to allow an Iranian-style theocracy to develop 
in Iraq, were wary of the growing dominance of religiously motivated 
parties which all received some form of support from the large neighbour 
to the east.49 The ‘democratisation’ of Southern Iraq was therefore 
not happening in the way preferred by the us and uk. Yet although the 
occupying authorities and the Shiite parties clashed continuously, they 
conducted	their	conflicts	peacefully.	This	type	of	working	relationship	did	
not develop between the Coalition and the Sadrists however. Muqtada al 
Sadr opted for violent resistance from an early stage.
The fast-growing armed branch of the radical Sadrists, the Mahdi 




sought armed confrontation in the Sadr City district in Baghdad, as well 
as in the cities of Basra and Karbala. In the last, the militia also fought the 
armed guards of Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani in an attempt to conquer the 
all-important Imam Ali Mosque. Bulgarian Coalition troops intervened. 
The Mahdi Army was eventually stopped.50 
In the meantime, cpa chief Paul Bremer decided that Al Sadr should be 
arrested, formally on suspicion of involvement in the murder of Al Khoei. But 
Bremer was thwarted. Firstly, Washington stepped on the brakes, out of fear 
of instability in the short term. Secondly, the Polish, Spanish and British allies 
were afraid of an uprising among the Shiites too. Thirdly, Grand Ayatollah 
Al Sistani, who, like his fellow clerics, did not take Al Sadr at all seriously as 
a religious leader, let it be known that an arrest would simply unnecessarily 
boost the stature of the young upstart.51 What all these parties had in common 
was	that	they	underestimated	the	influence	of	the	young	leader.	At	the	same	
time, they were afraid of the consequences of an armed confrontation.52
The Dutch battle group initially paid little attention to the Sadr 
movement.	The	organisation	was	still	rather	insignificant	in	Al	Muthanna.	
Interest in Al Sadr was only temporarily increased in both August and 
October when British divisional headquarters requested information on 
the movement’s position in the province for the purposes of planning. On 
the basis of the information of their us predecessors, Dutch intelligence 
officers	came	up	with	the	names	of	people	who	had	possible	links	with	Al	
Sadr. One was Fadhil Ashaara, the chair of the temporary town council 
in Ar Rumaythah which had appointed itself in May and been deposed 
by the Americans in July. Ashaara had subsequently left for an unknown 
destination. It later turned out that he had sought contact with the Sadr 
movement in Najaf and returned to Ar Rumaythah in November 2003 to 
open	a	Sadr	party	office	and	to	start	the	construction	of	a	religious	school.53 
As of yet, there was little support for the Sadr movement in Al Muthanna. 
In late October 2003, 1 nlbg	did	identify	the	first	recruitment	posters	for	the	
Mahdi Army in the Ar Rumaythah area. Yet the problems caused by Al Sadr 
and his militia were at that time felt only in the surrounding provinces.54
Mounting threats
At that stage of the occupation, the most immediate threat seemed to be from 
Sunnis. The Dutch battle group saw the so-called ‘Former Regime Elements’ 
of the Baath party as the greatest danger, albeit not necessarily a very severe 
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one.	There	was	also	the	entry	and	onward	travel	of	foreign	fighters	who	joined	
the jihad against the Coalition in Central Iraq. The violence perpetrated 
against allied troops by such groups was very real. On 12 November 2003, 
a large car bomb destroyed the headquarters of the Italian Carabinieri 
(gendarmerie force) in the town of Nasiriyah, in the neighbouring province 
of Dhi Qar. It killed eighteen Italians and eight Iraqis. A Sunni group claimed 
responsibility. A similar attack was carried out on a convoy of Spaniards in 
the	town	of	Latifiyah	in	the	centre	of	the	country	in	November.	Seven	people	
were killed. The murder of two Japanese diplomats that same month was 
generally viewed as an attempt to stop Japan from pushing ahead with its 
plans to deploy six hundred military personnel for reconstruction works in Al 
Muthanna. The two Japanese were well known to the Dutch thanks to their 
reconnaissance operation in As Samawah earlier on.55
The ‘Balkanisation’ of Iraq led to greater assertiveness by the now 
established Shiite political parties, of which Dawa and sciri were the 
most important. At all levels in Iraq the Coalition had daily dealings with 
these groups, which as former rebels against the Baath regime possessed 
substantial armed militias. Since the summer, these parties had been 
pressing for a greater role for their paramilitaries in maintaining public 
order and safety. In their eyes, the deadly attack on sciri leader Al Hakim 
on 29 August proved that Coalition troops were incapable of guaranteeing 
security. Armed followers of Dawa and sciri therefore started conducting 
patrols in several towns in southern Iraq. Also Al Sadr militia were 
seen wearing Mahdi Army badges in early September. In Al Muthanna, 
too, armed militia members were increasingly visible on the streets, as 
security	guards	at	political	party	offices	or	acting	as	guards	to	clerics	or	
worshippers. In As Samawah, they even set up vehicle checkpoints for 
a while.56 The Dutch battle group acted wherever possible. The Marines 
confiscated	weapons	 if	 they	came	across	armed	militia	members	during	
patrols.	They	also	observed	the	Dawa	party	office	 for	a	 few	days	 from	a	
concealed position on the hospital roof.57 
Although the Dutch were operating at full capacity, there were 
ever-louder calls for a stronger military presence.58 According to ex-cpa 
administrator Bulmer, such complaints could largely be explained by the 
highly physical perception of security among Iraqis. “Oddly, after so many 
years of totalitarian rule, they took comfort in roadblocks, searches and static 
security guards. We preferred our security operations to be less visible and 





intelligence to be able to conduct this type of operational concept properly.
The additional policing activities of sciri’s Badr Brigades threatened 
the state’s monopoly on the use of force as much as Dawa’s militia patrols. 
However, the latter organisation received more negative attention. The 
leadership of sciri succeeded in transforming its resistance movement 
into a political party much better than the Dawa leaders, who continued to 
communicate	via	inflammatory	proclamations.60 Signs of political maturity 
and tact were much appreciated by the Coalition and resulted in greater 
support, whether deserved or not. In order to meet the political parties’ long-
held wish for a greater role in security issues, Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman 
decided to set up a Provincial Security Committee for Al Muthanna.61 In 
addition to the Dutch commander, this body contained the three main Shiite 
parties (sciri, Dawa and a new party called 15 Shaban), two tribal chiefs, the 
provincial police commissioner and the province’s director of security. The 
last	official	was	a	representative	of	the	Iraqi	Ministry	of	the	Interior.
On	 8	October,	 Swijgman	 chaired	 the	 first	 of	 the	 weekly	 committee	
meetings at Camp Smitty, during which, after some discussion, he 
permitted	the	parties	up	to	district	level	to	keep	four	rifles	and	a	pistol	in	
their party buildings. Party leaders were also permitted to carry a pistol, 
but	on	condition	that	they	always	carried	an	official	permit.	The	parties	
also promised to cease playing an active role in maintaining order and 
security and to refrain completely from patrols and setting up roadblocks. 
Similar consultation bodies were set up in the towns of Ar Rumaythah and 
Al Khidr, chaired by the Dutch company commanders.62
The security committee meetings often got bogged down in a catalogue 
of complaints. There were two dominant themes here: the right of the 
parties and their militias to be able to bear (more) arms and the total 
‘de-Baathification’	of	 the	authorities,	 in	particular	 the	police.	The	Shiite	
political parties all wanted a dominant role in the state apparatus, and 
as long as they did not possess that, they tried to weaken the existing 
organisation by pressing at each meeting for the dismissal of anyone 
suspected of having connections with the former regime. Although these 
accusations	 were	 occasionally	 justified,	 they	 were	 usually	 employed	 as	
a gambit in the power struggle. One moot point, for instance, was the 
persistent rumour of Baath membership of the provincial police chief, 
Colonel Faddil Abbas Ali. This story probably originated at sciri, the party 
which was trying to obtain control over the police organisation via the new 
governor, Al Hassani.63
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In spite of the power struggle and the many complaints, Lieutenant Colonel 
Swijgman thought the security committee operated reasonably well after 
a while. The new governor ultimately took over as chair. Swijgman was 
pleased at this development, as he generally thought that Al Hassani acted 
decisively	and	it	fitted	in	with	his	objective	to	take	a	step	back	and	give	the	
local civilian administrators more space and responsiblity.64 Moreover, the 
committee had a useful function as a consultation forum, precisely because of 
the	wrangling	for	power	and	influence.	The	lines	of	communication	between	
the various groups remained open, and this gave the Dutch a reasonable 
picture	of	the	–	shifting	–	balance	of	power	between	parties	and	officials.	An	
example	was	the	conflict	between	Colonel	Faddil	and	governor	Al	Hassani.	
In December, the provincial police chief was forced to step down due to Al 
Hassani’s machinations.65 The sciri governor subsequently promoted the 
organisation’s number two, Lieutenant Colonel Kareem Halaibet Menaher 
al Zayadi (a former member of the Republican Guard with a Special Forces 
background), to the top post and made him interim police chief.66
The creation of the Provincial Security Committee meant that Al 
Muthanna was again ahead of its neighbouring provinces in an administrative 
sense. In mid-September, the British divisional headquarters launched a 
similar plan for all four of the southern sectors. Yet in Basra and Maysan 
the	influence	of	the	militia	of	the	Dawa	party,	the	Badr	Brigades	of	sciri and 
the	 Iraqi	 Hezbollah	movement	 had	 become	 significantly	 greater	 than	 in	
Al Muthanna. As a result, Major General Lamb had to make far-reaching 
concessions and partially legalised the armed groups. He acted in line with 
cpa Central, which also accepted that it was impossible to prohibit militias 
in view of the small footprint of Coalition troops and largely ineffectual 
Iraqi security forces. Instead, militias were ‘temporarily’ institutionalised 
as auxiliary troops, ‘Local Security Forces’, a decision which later proved 
difficult	to	reverse.67
Change of command and mission extension
On Thursday 13 November 2003, the change-of-command ceremony 
took place between 1 nlbg and 2 nlbg. The second Dutch detachment for 
Iraq, built around the Second Marine Battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel 
Richard Oppelaar, had already started its tour on 5 November. The 
composition of the second contingent was almost identical to that of the 
first.	Of	the	three	regular	infantry	companies,	21	Infantry	Company	moved	
into the camp in Ar Rumaythah, 22 Infantry Company operated from the 
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main base near As Samawah and 23 Infantry Company established itself 
at the compound near Al Khidr.
The newcomers’ starting position was quite different from that of 
1 nlbg in July 2003, in both a positive and a negative sense. Oppelaar and 
his	 troops	benefited	 from	 the	firm	 foundations	 laid	by	 the	First	Marine	
Battalion in the construction of the three bases, as well as the intensive 
patrols, which were increasingly being conducted jointly with the Iraqi 
police and the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps. The information position of the 
second detachment was consequently better. During their pre-deployment 
preparation	 period,	 the	 commander,	 staff	 officials	 and	 subordinate	
commanders had access to extensive background information comprising 
reports and intelligence summaries sent to the Netherlands by 1 nlbg. 
Oppelaar was impressed by the ‘intelligence picture’ they obtained in this 
manner.68 2 nlbg’s operational pace was high from the start partly due to 
the cooler weather which facilitated more intense patrolling. There were 
also positive developments on the civil side. In addition to the promise 
of millions of additional us dollars in construction funds from Coalition 
resources and continuity in administrative terms thanks to the presence of 
political adviser Rentenaar, the Dutch were able to cooperate well with the 
new cpa coordinator, the us diplomat James (Jim) Soriano.69 
The downside faced by 2 nlbg was the increased threat. In November, 
no fewer than 110 Coalition troops were killed, while an average of 30 to 40 
had lost their lives in previous months.70 Immediately after the car bomb 
in Nasiriyah, the number of reports of suspected suicide bombers and cars 
allegedly packed with explosives shot up in Al Muthanna, although most 
of	 these	 reports	 proved	 to	 be	 false.	One	 of	 the	first	measures	 following	
the attack in Nasiriyah was improved protection for the Coalition’s most 
vulnerable soft target, the cpa headquarters in As Samawah centre. Fears 
of a similar attack led to Oppelaar’s decision that his Government Support 
Team, the political adviser and cpa personnel would sleep at Camp Smitty 
and only work in the cpa	building	during	office	hours.71 One lane of the 
main road immediately behind the building was cordoned off using 
shipping containers. Access to the location was severely restricted and the 
Marines on guard duty were issued with anti-tank weapons.72
The deterioration in the security situation came at a very bad time for 
the Dutch government and placed a lot of political pressure on the Dutch 
contingent. With the possible extension of the operation beyond January 
2004 now on the agenda, the political debate became dominated by the 
security issue. The attack in Nasiriyah on 12 November received extensive 
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media coverage and Minister of Defence Kamp had appeared on the Dutch 
television programme nova that evening to calm fears. All this happened 
shortly after the Dutch Members of Parliament Wilders, Eurlings and 
Koenders tabled their critical questions on the intelligence position of the 
Dutch on 4 November.
In the second half of November, in response to rumours of possible 
infiltrations	by	foreign	fighters,	2 nlbg deployed its reconnaissance platoon 
together with ninety Iraqi border police (ibp) to obtain a better picture of 
the southern border area.73 In the same period, the new contingent drew 
up plans for setting up two Forward Operating Bases (fobs) in order to 
establish a more permanent presence in the desert to intercept and 
discourage	 traffickers	 and	 infiltrators.	 In	 the	 first	 week	 of	 December,	
23 Infantry Company built camp Amalia (named after the newly-born 
Dutch princess) near Al Bussayah. 22 Infantry Company set up camp 
Victoria near As Salman.74 Around the two platoon locations, the Marines 
regularly set up roadblocks to search cars heading for the border. Units 
also conducted patrols along Route Milwaukee, the only and seemingly 
endless road through the desert to the border, and helicopters occasionally 
dropped Marines at various locations.75
Despite these measures, implemented under the code name Operation 
Desert Eagle, the critical Members of Parliament in the Netherlands 
pushed for additional resources. The question became politically linked 
to cuts to the Defence budget announced in June 2003, which resulted 
in a bureaucratic struggle between the Air Force, Navy and Army.76 
Proof of the operational usefulness of resources in Iraq was viewed as 
one way of preventing cuts. In late August, 1 nlbg had already reported 
on a general shortage within mnd South-East of istar (Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) resources, such as 
manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and satellites. Solutions 
were discussed with the Defence Staff. Director for Operations Cobelens 
proposed the use of Apache combat helicopters in a reconnaissance role. 
nlbg	commander	Swijgman	on	the	other	hand	thought	the	flying	time	of	
these helicopters to be too restricted and their appearance too aggressive. 
He	 defined	 a	 requirement	 which	 only	 the	 Naval	 Air	 Arm’s	 p3-c Orion 
patrol	aircraft	could	fulfill,	without	explicitly	requesting	that	aircraft.	The	
Orions, originally submarine hunters, had recently been modernised and 
their infrared cameras had proved their usefulness over land in recent 
operations in Afghanistan.77 However, since June all the Orions had been 
on the list of Defence material to be disposed of.
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The political debate on the extension of the Dutch operation and the attack on 
the Italians in Nasiriyah led to the matter being prioritised in November. At 
the Dutch Ministry of Defence, a wide range of possibilities were investigated 
with a view to reinforcing 2 nlbg. On 21 November, Lieutenant Colonel 
Oppelaar was informed by telephone of the deployment options. Just like 
Swijgman, he expressed a preference for the deployment of Orion patrol 
aircraft, but knew this option was politically sensitive due to the budget cuts. 
Already two months earlier, the Chief of the Defence Staff had warned that he 
did not want to hear the ‘O word’ again.78 Oppelaar expressed his misgivings 
about the two other options: Apaches, as previously suggested by Cobelens; or 
the deployment of a company of the Royal Netherlands Army Special Forces 
Regiment (kct)	fulfilling	the	role	of	long-distance	reconnaissance	unit.
Four days later, the commander of 2 nlbg was ordered to prepare for 
the arrival of the Commando Corps company, comprising a staff, two 
platoons of three teams each, and support.79 The unit of about 75 ‘Green 
Berets’ and an extra Chinook transport helicopter were deployed for six 
weeks in order to contribute to the situational awareness of 2 nlbg in the 
southern part of the province. The battle group raised objections that went 
beyond the collective ego of the Marine Corps, which had obviously been 
dented due to headlines such as “Commandos to protect Marines” and 
“Marines need additional protection”.80 Various media, basing themselves 
on what had been communicated by the Defence organisation, suggested 
that Lieutenant Colonel Oppelaar had himself requested Special Forces 
support, while in fact, Oppelaar had expressly aired his doubts about the 
feasibility of the planned deployment.81
In Oppelaar’s opinion, the ‘upper deck’ was micro-managing his 
operation. What also bothered him was the fact that he had not even been 
instructed by his division commander, Major General Lamb, to guard 
the border more closely. A month previously, the British general had 
said during a visit to As Samawah that it was pointless to try keeping 
the border water-tight.82 This was therefore an all-Dutch initiative. If 
there really was a requirement for this operation, Oppelaar insisted it 
would	 be	 a	 great	 deal	more	 efficient	 to	 conduct	 stand-off	 surveillance	
from the air. The new Contingent Commander in Shaiba, Colonel Karel 
van	 Gijtenbeek,	 also	 expressed	 his	 amazement	 at	 the	 course	 of	 action	
being taken. Arrangements had just been made with the British on the 
extra deployment of the division’s istar resources. Following a telephone 
conversation, the Colonel concluded that the deployment of the Special 
Forces company had to be a political manoeuvre.83 The support of the 
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Dutch Parliament for an extension to the Iraq mission as a whole hinged 
on the measure.84
Six commando teams were involved in Operation Close Watch, which 
started on 18 December. The mission was conducted in parallel to Operation 
Desert Eagle. It was terminated after four weeks. During that period, the 
commandos observed border posts and actively sought out potential terrorists 
in the Muthanna desert. They were unable, however, to report on anything 
particularly threatening, other than the fact that there were signs of intensive 
trafficking,	mainly	 in	drugs.	No-one	 in	The	Hague	 suggested	an	extension	
to the desert reconnaissance operation after one month. Public and political 
attention to the deployment of the Special Forces and to the ‘intelligence 
problem’ had vanished almost entirely by then. Fifteen commandos remained 
in As Samawah to support the Marines in training the Iraqi Civil Defence 
Corps, the paramilitary organisation for internal security. This and other 
Security Sector Reform efforts had become the Coalition Forces’ top priority 
in Iraq as a result of serious policy changes in Washington dc. 
Accelerated transfer of sovereignty
cpa chief Paul Bremer’s ambitious programme for the long-term occupation 
of Iraq was thwarted that winter by the all-out Sunni uprising in Central 
Iraq and by the increasingly insecure situation in the south. President Bush 
was facing elections and the administration realised that the occupation of 
Iraq was fuelling both the Sunni and the emerging Shiite insurgencies.85 
Since 1 May 2003, when he announced the end of ‘major combat operations’ 
on board the aircraft carrier uss Abraham Lincoln, more American troops 
had been killed than during the advance on Baghdad. There was growing 
pressure on Bush to bring the troops home. The Iraqis would have to take 
on responsibility for governance and security as soon as possible. The war 
–	the	term	was	again	being	used	–	had	to	be	‘Iraqified’.
Eight months after the fall of Baghdad, the Coalition thus changed its 
occupation policy for a second time. Late in October 2003, the White House took 
closer	control	of	the	matter	by	giving	National	Security	Advisor	Condoleezza	
Rice rather than Defense Secretary Rumsfeld chief responsibility for Iraq 
policy. On 15 November, Paul Bremer reached an agreement with the Iraqi 
Governing Council which determined that the transfer of sovereignty to an 
Iraqi government would take place on 30 June 2004.86 The cpa administrators 
who had taken up posts in the provinces that autumn therefore had to alter 
their plans and accelerate the transfer of authority.87
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The new Iraq policy was in fact an accelerated exit strategy or, as the director 
of operations at the cpa dubbed it, “a rather sophisticated evacuation plan”. 
The emphasis was clearly on the time schedule and not on actual results. In 
addition to Security Sector Reform (preparing the Iraqi security organisations 
to function without international assistance), the strategy was based on two 
pillars:	 a	 large	 injection	of	finance,	which	 also	 temporarily	 freed	up	many	
millions of us dollars for projects by the Dutch military in Al Muthanna; and 
‘refreshment’ of the provincial level of the administrative structures that 
had largely been set up in the previous year.88 It was no coincidence that the 
order from Baghdad – “to revalidate the provincial councils and have them 
revalidate the governors” by means of a caucus election procedure – was 
similar to the model already used in Al Muthanna. Bremer had been informed 
of and impressed by the reforms in the ‘Dutch’ province. As an alternative 
to direct elections, the Muthanna model, born out of restrictions which he 
himself had imposed, now proved handy when speed was of the essence. Each 
province had to install a Governate Council by 15 January 2004, which in turn 
had to elect a new governor or revalidate the incumbent one by 15 February.89 
The eighteen new councils would then select a representative for the national 
interim parliament on 31 May 2004 and the new national interim government 
would	take	office	one	month	later.90
As an ‘exemplary’ province, Al Muthanna did not need to conduct a 
refreshment procedure. The downside of this success was the low priority 
the province enjoyed in the allocation of personnel. In December, the 
cpa turned out to have redirected previously promised additional staff to 
other provinces. The arrival at the start of November of the new provincial 
coordinator Soriano had been a blessing in the eyes of Swijgman and 
Rentenaar, but the provincial cpa as a whole continued to perform poorly 
due to a lack of staff. Dutch military personnel managed almost all (re)
construction projects which really ought to have been handled by the cpa.
While in the rest of Iraq a start was made on setting up provincial 
Governate Councils, Soriano and Rentenaar continued to implement the 
model for setting up local government in Al Muthanna in December and 
January. In addition to a functioning Governate Council and the three 
existing town councils (qada councils) in the ‘large’ towns, they also 
created a fourth town council in December in the desert settlement of As 
Salman – “a robbers’ den”, according to Swijgman. After that, indirect 
caucus procedures followed for the seven municipalities (nahias). Since 
the creation of the councils in As Samawah and Ar Rumaythah and the 
improved	procedure	 in	Al	Khidr,	 the	 formula	 had	 been	 refined,	mainly	
101
Governing in the midst of chaos
by a phased procedure for producing the crucial representative electoral 
group of one hundred people. Yet in the municipalities, which were in fact 
villages, procedures were not always executed smoothly. In Ad Daraji, the 
former chair of the old self-appointed village council caused uproar at the 
election meeting by demanding a place on the list of candidates for himself 
for the agriculture portfolio, even though he did not meet the educational 
requirements. After some haggling, the cpa adjusted the condition 
downwards. The former chair’s lack of popularity clearly showed when he 
did not receive a single vote. After losing, he went out onto the street to stir 
up a crowd, but failed to get any reaction.91
On a sunny winter’s day in the village of El Sweir, the caucus members 
(10 per cent of whom were women) took their places at slightly cramped 
school desks in a local schoolyard, which led to some hilarity. There was 
also some excitement when a losing candidate shouted that he had been 
cheated as everyone had promised to vote for him. The fact that villagers 
immediately took it upon themselves to explain to him that that was not 
the way democracy worked gave political adviser Rentenaar a great deal 
of satisfaction. In the ultra-conservative desert village of Al Bussayah the 
elections were dependent on the deployment of the Chinook helicopters 
of 2 nlbg due to the great distances involved. The ballots took place in a 
walled square on sandy ground. A large number of children sat on a bullet 
hole-riddled wall and cheered like football fans at every ballot.
As Al Bussayah was the only village in the province inhabited by both 
Shiites and Sunnis, 2 nlbg took the possibility of sectarian troubles into 
account. As a result of extensive dialogue with the village leaders and 
proportional representation in the council, these fears did not materialise. 
The municipal council was formed by three Shiites and four Sunnis. One 
surprise was the vote for Saddam Hussein cast by one of the caucus members. 
“We	laughed	about	it	and	said	that	it	was	probably	the	first	election	Saddam	
Hussein had ever lost,” Rentenaar reported. In the strictly religious village, 
twelve women participated. They initially seemed rather scared of coming 
to	the	ballot	box	during	the	first	round	of	votes.	Later,	however,	the	fully-
veiled	ladies	walked	“with	proud,	firm	steps”.	In	the	village	of	An	Nedjmeh,	a	
woman even won a position in the municipal council “with a big grin on her 
veiled face”. She was way ahead of the seven male candidates. “She [was] the 
first	woman	to	be	elected	by	a	mixed	electorate	to	a	council	in	Al	Muthanna,”	
the Dutch political adviser wrote to his superiors.
On 11 January 2004, Rentenaar’s last working day in Al Muthanna, 
the	 final	 caucus	 election	 at	 municipal	 level	 was	 held	 in	 the	 village	 of	
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Hillal near Ar Rumaythah. One remarkable aspect was the somewhat 
long, but well-constructed speeches by the candidates. It was suspected 
that the presence of Samawah tv, which had covered a large number of 
the elections over the past few months, had something to do with this. 
Rentenaar	gave	a	final	interview	for	the	local	station,	in	which	he	noted	
that every town and village now had its own elected council. “The job was 
not yet done, however,” he reported to The Hague. “The centrifugal forces 
of a country which is about to regain its own sovereignty will continue 
to cause problems. What has become known here as the Al Muthannna 
model will undoubtedly have to be adjusted from time to time.”92
Rentenaar, who had combined his role as adviser to the nlbg with 
the crucial executive function for the cpa,	was	succeeded	by	two	officials.	
Robbert van Lanschot, a colleague from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs,	took	over	the	first	role	affiliated	to	nlbg. A us diplomat would take 
up his cpa	role.	The	departing	first	political	adviser	predicted	in	his	final	
report to the Netherlands that his two successors would have their hands 
full with politico-administrative developments. The changing of the guard 
brought an end to the key role played by the Dutch diplomat as linchpin 
between the military forces, the occupying authorities and the Iraqis.
The Al Muthanna model as an exit strategy
The relevance of the administrative model created by the Dutch in Al 
Muthanna to the accelerated transfer of sovereignty temporarily placed 
the spotlight on the remote province for a while. For instance, British 
Major General Lamb visited the elections in Al Majed and the ones held 
in Al Bussayah were broadcast by Basrah tv throughout Southern Iraq. In 
December 2003, the Al Muthanna model recieved modest international 
media	 attention	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 by	 the	us Christian Science Monitor 
and The Lebanon Post. While all worldwide media coverage on Iraq 
centred on the arrest on 13 December of former dictator Saddam 
Hussein,	the	first	genuine	success	story	according	to	experienced	Middle	
East correspondent Nicholas Blanford was happening in Al Muthanna. 
Blanford, an acquaintance of Rentenaar from his time in Lebanon and the 
Palestinian Territories, did, at the latter’s request, not mention the central 
role played by the Dutch diplomat. The Al Muthanna-style administrative 
model was not reported in the Dutch press. In Letters to Parliament and 
reports by the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, the administrative 
build-up was described as highly successful, and for political purposes 
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still consistently presented as a cpa achievement. Even the regional cpa 
coordinator, Hilary Synnott, would later incorrectly ascribe the election 
model to Jim Soriano.93
Governorate Coordinator Soriano himself openly ascribed all 
the honour to Rentenaar, however. The Dutch political adviser “took 
ownership of the caucus system” and according to the American was the 
“chief architect” of the model. He was the most important adviser to the 
local	councils.	“He	believed	in	his	work.	And	he	brought	the	Iraqi	citizens	
into believing in it with him.”94 In stressing Rentenaar’s role, Soriano 
may also unwittingly have touched on the weakness of the Al Muthanna 
model.	The	improvised	process	rested	chiefly	on	individual	initiative	and	
personal contacts, which had been made possible by Rentenaar’s linguistic 
and cultural knowledge and relatively long posting. As the cpa remained 
chaotic both in Baghdad and at the provincial level, Rentenaar, as well 
as the important rti adviser Alistair Blunt, having spent seven months 
in their posts, were viewed as essential constant factors. Through almost 
continuous consultation with the local parties, they were able to put 
out	brushfires	which	 could	otherwise	have	developed	 into	major	 crises.	
An eighteen-year-old Marine understood this perfectly when he said to 
Rentenaar: “Sir, if you do your best, I don’t have to wear my helmet.”95
But was Al Muthanna a suitable model for the rest of Iraq? More 
important to the cpa in Baghdad than an answer to that question were the 
simplicity and speed of the procedure. After several months of reforms 
under pressure from a tight schedule, in the spring of 2004 none of the 
other Governate Councils was like the one in Al Muthanna. Sloppy selection 
mechanisms and hasty implementation had often resulted in the councils 
being viewed as illegitimate by the local population. According to Grand 
Ayatollah Al Sistani – and many Shiites agreed with him – the only panacea 
for a stable Iraq was direct elections.96 Anything else was merely a stopgap.
Even the administrative system in Al Muthanna came under pressure 
in early 2004 – not long after Rentenaar’s departure. The cpa announced 
that the occupation’s model province did not need to undergo refreshment. 
Yet in both As Samawah and Ar Rumaythah there was increasing pressure 
to refresh the two town councils, which had been created in the summer 
of 2003 using rapid procedures under us authority. The people of Al 
Muthanna	were	 clearly	 dissatisfied	with	 their	 democratic	 quality.	 Once	
Soriano	had	agreed	to	‘refined’	caucus	procedures	in	order	to	meet	these	
demands, the political parties availed themselves of the opportunity to 
reject the electoral system as a whole. With a great deal of political theatre 
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and drama, they entered into discussions with the cpa administrator. They 
thus displayed much more assertiveness than six months earlier and made 
clear that their priorities were very different from those of the cpa.
The	departure	of	 the	experienced	 ‘brushfire	fighters’	Rentenaar	and	
Blunt undoubtedly played a role in this squabbling. Yet the tide was turned 
mainly by the prospect of genuine power, triggered by the accelerated end 
to	the	occupation	in	June	2004,	as	well	as	the	growing	self-confidence	of	
the Shiite parties. According to Mark Etherington, cpa coordinator in Al 
Kut, the agreement on the accelerated transfer of sovereignty undermined 
the legitimacy of the fragile new councils. The sudden announcement 
that	a	new	Iraqi	government	would	take	up	office	in	the	summer	of	2004	
intensified	 the	 power	 struggle.	 There	was	 no	 longer	 any	motivation	 for	
the factions to obey the laws and rules of the cpa now that it would not 
be around for much longer.97 The state of affairs in the largest towns in 
Al Muthanna was illustrative of the political awakening among Shiites. 
Ultimately, Soriano therefore agreed to hold fresh, even more extensive 
caucus procedures and elections, which would be held in As Samawah in 
April and in Ar Rumaythah in May.
The key question was whether the growing power struggle would lead 
to more violence. During a visit to As Samawah at the end of December 
2003, Sayyed Aamer Al Hakim, nephew of the sciri leader murdered the 
previous August, pointedly referred to the major role the Shiite leadership 
was playing in Iraq in preventing acts of resistance against the Coalition. 
He	 visited	 Al	Muthanna	 on	 behalf	 of	 his	 father,	 Abdul	 Aziz	 Al	Hakim,	
the new sciri leader and temporary chair of the Iraqi Governing Council 
in Baghdad. Aamer Al Hakim praised the administrative reforms in the 
model province at length, but claimed that Coalition troops did not realise 
sufficiently	well	that	if	the	Shiites	did	not	“obtain	their	full	rights”	in	Iraq,	
their leadership might well make less effort to preserve the peace. In a 
friendly but gently threatening speech, he reminded his audience that the 
1920 uprising against the previous British occupation had started in Al 
Muthanna, in fact in Ar Rumaythah.98 The tone was set for 2004.
4 
Creating a secure  
environment
A disorderly bunch
Serious rioting broke out in Al Muthanna a couple of weeks after the 
change of command from 1 nlbg to 2 nlbg.	Dissatisfied	citizens	congregated	
near government buildings to protest about unemployment, fuel shortages 
and frequent power cuts. One demonstration on 8 December 2003 in Ar 
Rumaythah escalated when an angry crowd of several hundred people 
besieged the police station. The tough response from local cops and their 
arrest of a few key persons antagonised the demonstrators. Unintimidated 
by multiple warning shots, the protestors drove the police back into the 
building under a hail of stones. The Dutch Marines of 21 Infantry Company, 
responsible for security in the town, intervened to rein in both the crowd 
ánd the police. They placed a cordon around the complex and locked the 
police in. In doing so, they took the sting out of the confrontation for the 
time being.
The incident temporarily affected the relationship between 21 Infantry 
Company and the Ar Rumaythah police department. The Dutch thought 
that	the	Iraqi	police	had	acted	too	provocatively	by	firing	indiscriminately	
into the air and beating protestors. Moreover, the Marines thought the 
police were generally “a disorderly bunch” and suspected them of criminal 
activities including looting and dealing in abandoned vehicles. For their 
part, the Iraqi police forces believed that the Dutch had undermined their 




security committee. The nlbg	was	blamed	for	failing	to	create	a	sufficiently	
secure environment near the highway, where the number of carjackings 
was high, especially at night.2
The	unrest	was	not	confined	to	the	town	of	Ar	Rumaythah.	The	next	
day, demonstrations also got out of hand outside the cpa building in As 
Samawah. Peaceful demonstrations had previously been held here, but 
this time the crowd was extremely aggressive. Close to the cpa complex, 
about three hundred young men blocked the route of a us convoy and 
pelted the army trucks with stones. The convoy security guards panicked 
and	 fired	 rifle	 rounds	 over	 the	 heads	 of	 the	 crowd.	 Unimpressed,	 the	
rioters attempted to loot a number of civilian trucks in the convoy. It was 
obvious that a handful of protestors was playing a crucial role in egging on 
the	crowd.	The	Iraqi	police	did	nothing.	A	rifle	section	of	Dutch	Marines	
which was guarding the cpa building therefore intervened. When the Dutch 
Quick Reaction Force arrived, it too was pelted with stones. Using batons, 
the Marines managed to force a path through and drive back the crowd. 
The previously passive police eventually also lent a hand and the situation 
was brought under control.
This incident again made it painfully clear that public order and 
security, economic and social problems and the legitimacy of government 
were inextricably bound up with one another. In As Samawah, the 
immediate cause of the riots was the temporary suspension of the cpa’s 
mismanaged job creation scheme. The people wanted jobs and progress 
and had pinned their hopes on the occupation service, which continued 
to function poorly with too few personnel. This temporarily rocked the 
social order in parts of the ‘Dutch’ province. It took less and less to spark 
an incident. The disappointing performance of the Iraqi security forces 
remained a matter for concern.
The Dutch battle group’s operations underwent a shift around this time. 
The new priority was the build-up of Iraqi security organisations, which 
had been functioning poorly until then. The nlbg set to work selecting, 
training, monitoring and mentoring Iraqi security personnel, now that 
there was a date for the Iraqis to take on these tasks independently and 
June 2004 was fast approaching. The number of trained security troops 
was given an increasingly prominent role in Coalition statistics which, 
in	defiance	of	the	growing	violence	and	criticism	of	the	occupation,	were	
aimed at demonstrating that there was indeed progress.3 Yet how effective 
was the build-up of the new Iraqi security sector? Was the objective to 
have Iraq stand on its own two feet in the summer of 2004 realistic, and 
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were Coalition intentions therefore more than just a numbers game? And 
with a focus on the Dutch: was ‘their’ relatively peaceful province ready 
for the intended substantial troop reductions when the year of occupation 
ended?4
Security Sector Reform
In its pre-war planning, the Coalition assumed a stable environment in 
which Iraqi police would remain at their posts and be able to maintain 
law and order. Until the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, the Americans 
and British had basically rejected the idea of a policing task for their own 
troops.5 The total anarchy which followed the fall of the Baath regime 
demonstrated the naivety of this assumption. In the spring and summer 
of 2003, us and British troops were therefore unprepared as they hastily 
started training large numbers of new Iraqi security personnel. The 
Coalition used the term ‘Security Sector Reform (ssr)’ for all these tasks, 
although in Iraq it was not so much about reforming as about rebuilding 
the police, army, legal system and prison service.
Over the preceding decade the Dutch armed forces had gained 
substantial experience of ssr during peace support operations. In Namibia 
in 1989, Cambodia in 1992-1993 and Bosnia from 1995 onwards it had 
generally been recognised that in addition to military peacekeepers the 
deployment of a civilian police force could be decisive to the mission’s 
success in the long term. In particular during the un-mandated de facto 
occupations of Kosovo (including a Dutch contribution) and East Timor 
(without a Dutch contribution), relevant lessons had been learned. 
Anarchy and widespread looting, an international civil police force 
which was slow to deploy, military personnel unready and unwilling to 
maintain law and order, a failing judicial system – in this respect the 
situation in Iraq in 2003 was nothing new.6
Within the ssr efforts as a whole, the build-up of the Iraqi police force 
was the Coalition’s initial priority. In contrast to the recently-disbanded 
secret police and security forces, the majority of the regular police – who 
under Saddam Hussein had been involved in little more than dealing 
with	 traffic	 offences	 and	 petty	 crime	 –	 had	 no	 Baath	 party	 affiliation.	
The force was therefore allowed to continue to exist after the invasion. 





been dismissed by the Coalition. In a centralistic society with a military-
hierarchical police force such as existed in Iraq, this resulted in a largely 
apathetic service.7 
For 2/5 Marines and the nlbg in Al Muthanna in the summer of 
2003 it was a challenge to get the cops to do their jobs. “The police had 
to leave their hide-outs,” as Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman phrased it, 
“but they were scared.” Or they were drunk, as alcohol abuse was a 
major problem. The population had little faith in the force, which they 
associated with the former regime.8 Pragmatic considerations by military 
interim	administrators	often	meant	that	key	figures	with	a	Baath	history	
sometimes remained in their jobs. This was the case with the provincial 
commander in Al Muthanna, Colonel Faddil. When governor Al Hassani 
dismissed him in December 2003, his successor Lieutenant Colonel 
Kareem also turned out to be a former Baath party member. 
In spite of the emphasis on police reforms and security sector 
development, the resources made available by Washington and London 
for this purpose in 2003 were limited. ssr funds were negligible in 
comparison to the astronomical cost of the military deployment as a 
whole. The management and implementation of the police programme 
was improvised and problematic. At the provincial level, there were very 
few	civilian	trainers	or	coaches	–	often	retired	police	officers	–	and	military	
personnel and mp units themselves mostly took on the recruitment, 
training and mentoring of the Iraqi police forces. Coalition personnel also 
dealt with the purchase and delivery of material and with the building and 
improvement of infrastructure.
In Al Muthanna, 2/5 Marines and its supporting mp company had raced 
about	800	police	officers	 through	a	five-day	 training	programme.	From	
August 2003 onwards, with far fewer personnel, the Dutch mp platoon 
initiated a programme of training, mentoring and monitoring this police 
force. The ‘green mps’ provided a basic training course for new personnel, 
conducted follow-up courses for existing forces and worked together with 
the	Iraqis	on	patrols	and	office	tasks.	The	basic	course	taught	Iraqi	police	
apprehension and investigation skills, and how to register a crime report 
using the Dutch method. The latter was sorely needed according to the 
chief public prosecutor in As Samawah, Abid Al Khidar. He regularly had 
to release suspects due to the many procedural errors in the investigation.9 
There was another cause for the low occupancy rate of As Samawah 
police station cells, however. As one prisoner explained, “those with money 
can buy their way out, those without money are stuck here”. According to 
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Major	Mischa	Geeratz,	the	teaching	of	legal	values	and	standards	needed	
to be a priority in the training course.10 The legal adviser of 1 nlbg reported 
that the police were corrupt, incompetent and prejudiced. The Iraqi cops 
also paid little attention to human rights. The use of force in interrogations 
in	order	to	obtain	specific	confessions	proved	to	be	a	major	problem.	The	
basic training course therefore included a lesson about ethics, with the 
worthy aim of discouraging such practices.11
At the start of the Dutch operation 1,050 police were employed, 
including	 about	 100	 officers.	 In	 two	months,	 the	Dutch	mps trained an 
additional 200 newcomers, which meant that numbers were back to pre-
war levels by October 2003. With respect to materials and accommodation, 
however, the Al Muthanna police were in very poor shape. As Samawah 
was home to the provincial headquarters, seven local stations and one 
prison. The buildings and cells were in extremely poor condition, as was 
the furniture. There were few computers and there was no archive storage 
capacity. The situation was even worse in Ar Rumaythah, Al Khidr and the 
outlying areas.12 In October, at the instigation of the nlbg the Netherlands 
therefore donated nearly 900,000 euros for purchasing materials.13 Most 
of this money was spent on a project to link the various security services 
to a Motorola communications network. The Dutch also purchased 
computers, furniture, uniforms, bullet-proof vests, vehicles and pistols.14
The task of the Al Muthanna police was easier to carry out than in 
the more rebellious areas of Iraq, where Coalition troops often deployed 
the local police as auxiliary troops in combat operations. In cities such as 
Baghdad and Basra, police stations and individual police were regularly 
the target of attacks and they hardly had time for public order tasks. In 
spite of the relatively favourable security conditions, the nlbg nevertheless 
experienced plenty of complications in building and reforming the police 
force in Al Muthanna. The Dutch in particular considered tribal ties to 
have a paralysing effect. There was always a risk of reprisals against police, 
their families or their tribe. It was also almost impossible for a policeman 
to arrest a suspect from his own tribe. No-one wanted to invoke the worst-
case scenario of a vendetta. This was one reason why the police forces 
appreciated the presence of the Dutch Marines or mp personnel during 
detention operations. They could then always blame the foreigners for the 
house search or arrest.15
Dutch priorities in building up the police force did not always 
correspond with those of the Iraqi leaders. Governor Al Hassani and 
interim police chief Kareem constantly pressed for more personnel and 
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heavier weapons, while the Dutch insisted on more training and more 
effective deployment. The wishes of the police commissioner were mainly 
derived from fears of being attacked by militias or criminal gangs, which 
possessed	 impressive	 weapons	 arsenals	 comprising	 rifles,	 rpgs and 
mortars. The governor requested more personnel because he wanted 
to provide his party and tribe members with jobs. By including his own 
people in the force he also increased the loyalty of the police to him 
personally.16 Job creation was a major motive in demanding the expansion 
of the other security services too. This was particularly true of the fps, the 
hotchpotch	of	security	officials	set	up	shortly	after	the	Coalition’s	invasion	
to prevent further looting of government facilities and industrial and 
economic infrastructure. The wages of the 1,000-plus fps guards in Al 
Muthanna were paid out of the Coalition’s cerp fund, which in fact made 
it a job creation scheme.17 Many armed fps guards had dual roles and also 
hired themselves out as foot soldiers to parties and tribes.
The international ssr effort comprised building up the traditional 
‘triangle’ of a police force, legal system and prison system. 2/5 Marines 
spent 90,000 us dollars on rebuilding three law courts. The Government 
Support Team of 1 nlbg conducted a follow-up project worth 130,000 
us dollars.18 In addition to this civil component of the ssr programme, 
there were the military and paramilitary components, which devoured 
an increasing proportion of nlbg’s money and training capacity. The new 
Iraqi army was to take on the task of defending Iraqi territory, but for 
the time being the priority was domestic security.19 There were no active 
army units in Al Muthanna. In mid-July 2003, the Coalition decided 
to set up the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps, the paramilitary organisation 
which could support both the local police and international troops in 
maintaining internal order and security. The violent resistance and advent 
of heavily-armed criminal organisations meant that Coalition troops had 
a growing need for this type of robust Iraqi auxiliary force. The occupiers 
also believed it was important for everyday security operations to have 
an ‘Iraqi face’.20 Formally, the Civil Defence Corps came under the Iraqi 
Ministry of the Interior, but recruitment, training and deployment were 
led by Coalition forces. Finance came from cerp funds, which meant that 
military commanders had direct control.21
The Coalition aimed to set up at least one Iraqi Civil Defence Corps 
battalion per province. The calm conditions in Al Muthanna meant that 
1 nlbg	was	initially	ordered	to	create	only	a	company-sized	unit.	In	December	
2003, 2 nlbg expanded this to a battalion, although at 500 strong this unit 
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was	substantially	smaller	than	the	usual	size	of	about	850.22 The Iraqis were 
largely trained on the job. They were deployed almost immediately under 
the command of Dutch Marines for patrols and manning checkpoints. 
They also supported the police, the fps and the border police.23 The Civil 
Defence Corps carried light weapons and its members’ level of expertise 
varied greatly. The auxiliary troops were appreciated by the locals in Al 
Muthanna.24 This did not alter the fact, however, that the Dutch regularly 
caught them looting vehicles and committing other crimes. The Marines 
were forced to continue monitoring the organisation closely.25 
The transition plan
Motivated by the desire to drastically reduce the number of troops in Iraq 
in 2004 and 2005, the Coalition started working on a transition plan for 
security tasks in October 2003.26 The agreement with the Iraqi Governing 
Council of 15 November 2003 on the 2004 transfer of sovereignty led to 
things shifting up a gear. The Coalition did not just step up the training 
of security personnel; the institutional build-up and reforms within 
ministries and police academies were also given greater attention. The aim 
was to achieve self-government and Iraqi responsibility for maintaining 
public order by the end of June 2004.27
The ssr plan had three phases: local control, regional control and 
strategic	overwatch.	In	the	first	phase,	the	Iraqi	security	forces	continued	
to operate under the direct control of Coalition troops. At this stage, 
international	 forces	 were	 merely	 to	 fulfil	 a	 qrf role while retaining 
responsibity for the outlying areas. The second phase, regional control, 
entailed	 the	 local	 security	 bodies	 being	 able	 to	 operate	 sufficiently	
effectively to be able to maintain law and order under the responsibility of 
the new local government. The international troops would then no longer 
lead but act as advisers or – in emergencies – operate independently at 
the request of the Iraqi provincial governments. The aim was to reach 
this phase before the transfer of sovereignty at the end of June 2004.28 
The phase of strategic overwatch meant that the Iraqis could guarantee 
their own internal security and that the security bodies could operate in 
an integrated manner. The foreign troops would then carry out only the 
defence of the national borders.
The three phases overlapped. This certainly had advantages when 
it came to applying deadlines, because the latest date the Coalition had 
set itself for local control proved to be over-ambitious. The original date 
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of 1 March 2004 was quickly changed to 1 April.29 In fact, this phase was 
only achieved within mnd South-East at the end of April. British divisional 
commander Lamb embraced the motto: “We have to do things Iraqi style, 
which means that adequate is good enough.” He was clearly inspired by T.E. 
Lawrence,	the	famous	British	army	officer	and	writer	who	fought	alongside	
Arab rebels against Ottoman rule during the First World War. “Do not try to 
do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you 
do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them,” 
‘Lawrence of Arabia’ wrote in his famous ‘Twenty-Seven Articles’, a summary 
of all the lessons he had learned as a military adviser in the Middle East. His 
words were taken as gospel among military forces and cpa personnel in Iraq.30
Major General Andrew Stewart succeeded Lamb as divisional 
commander on 28 December 2003 and formally made ssr the chief 
task of mnd South-East. The general described the end objective of the 
programme as: “a secure and stable environment maintained by credible, 
self	confident	and	capable	security	structures	under	Iraqi	governance”.31 
The shift of emphasis within the multinational division required some 
adjustments. To this end, in December a 14-strong ssr cell was set up in 
Basra.	 The	 headquarters	 also	 reorganised	 the	 five	 battle	 groups	 of	 the	
British brigade so that one could be completely freed up for training, 
mentoring and monitoring the Iraqis. The uk, Canada, Australia and 
Spain	would	provide	senior	police	officers	to	support,	coach	and	monitor	
provincial police chiefs. From April 2004, the Netherlands joined this 
initiative and deployed Marechaussee Colonel Robert Veltman as cpa 
police mentor alongside Al Muthanna police chief Kareem.
The British also initiated a number of new projects, including training 
a Police Support Unit (psu). This unit was to be trained for tougher police 
tasks and specialist duties such as crowd and riot control (crc) and 
complex arrest operations. Divisional headquarters also took the initiative 
to create Provincial Joint Coordination Centers (pjccs). In early December 
2003, the Dutch battle group set up the pjcc for Al Muthanna, which 
acted	as	a	command	post	for	directing	the	various	security	bodies,	the	fire	
brigade and ambulance service in the event of emergencies. In the long 
term, the pjcc would be placed under the control of the Provincial Security 
Committee. The nlbg	 provided	 fifteen	military	 personnel	 to	 assist	 Iraqi	
personnel at the emergency command centre.32
2 nlbg followed suit and reorganised itself so as to be able to carry 
out the adjusted assignment. Under its predecessors, responsibility for 
ssr had been spread across the mp platoon, the infantry companies and 
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the Government Support Team. Now the Dutch concentrated this task in 
the Operations staff section (s3). Several military forces were given a dual 
role.33 The anti-tank platoon took on the full-time task of training new 
personnel for the border police. The battle group initiated the required ssr 
projects,	some	of	which	were	financed	by	the	Netherlands.	Apart	from	the	
abovementioned purchase of police equipment, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs put half a million euros into an independent communications 
network for the pjcc	and	contributed	financially	to	the	construction	of	the	
regional police academy in As Zubayah. The Netherlands also paid for the 
rebuilding of the provincial prison and the nlbg began the construction of 
three small barracks for the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps.
Reorganisation	and	improvisation	were	insufficient	to	cope	with	the	
extreme demand for ssr, however. The battle group had long pressed 
The Hague for additional personnel to implement its new main task. On 
13 February 2004, the Dutch government agreed to expand the nlbg by 
108 troops. In addition to replacements for the commandos who had 
been training the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps, the additional personnel 
comprised sixteen instructors for the Iraqi police, twelve instructors for 
the border police, seven crc instructors for the Police Support Unit and six 
instructors for the police academy in As Zubayah. The Dutch armed forces 
also	provided	six	additional	officials	for	the	pjcc and ten for the permanent 
support of the Civil Defence Corps battalion staff. For crowd and riot 
control, the Royal Netherlands Army sent a specially trained 37-strong crc 
platoon to Iraq from February to June 2004.34 
The specialist crc	platoon	was	not	specifically	on	the	battle	group’s	wish-
list. The Marines thought that they could conduct this task very well with 
their current capacity, but the Ministry of Defence was less than enthusiastic 
about the Marines having to do crowd and riot control in Iraq. Nevertheless, 
the crc-trained artillery platoon left Iraq four months later without having 
been	deployed	to	conduct	its	specific	task.	Instead,	the	gunners	spent	their	
days doing guard duty. Demonstrations, riots and looting did continue, 
but 2 nlbg (and subsequently 3 nlbg) refrained from using the crc unit to 
counter these. According to the staff of 2 nlbg, the nature of the minor 
uprisings did not lend itself to the deployment of the platoon due to its 
relatively long reaction time. The riots were usually small-scale, occurred 
throughout	the	sizeable	operational	area,	flared	up	quickly	and	died	down	
again in no time. Use of the special crc platoon was also not encouraged by 




In the meantime, the security situation was a rather mixed picture. “Calm” 
was the most common description in the daily reports. Yet things went 
badly wrong in As Samawah on 3 January. Just as in early December, the 
cpa employment programme triggered severe rioting. The programme’s 
planning and information provision was still very poor, and so a crowd 
of about a thousand job-seekers congregated on a square, a few hundred 
metres from the cpa building, without anyone being prepared. Tensions 
quickly rose. The crowd looted a government building, and when 
troublemakers also started to throw stones at a neighbouring building 
belonging	to	a	political	party	shots	were	suddenly	fired.	One	person	was	
killed and several injured.36 The Quick Reaction Force of 2 nlbg, which 
had arrived at the square along with several mps, was verbally abused and 
pelted	with	stones.	The	Dutch	had	to	fire	several	warning	shots	to	keep	the	
angry crowd in check.37 Only after urging by the nlbg did the Iraqi police 
intervene,	 enter	 the	 building	 from	which	 the	 shots	 had	 been	 fired	 and	
apprehend the suspects. The result of the chaos: 2 dead, 5 wounded and 
62 arrests.38
As political adviser Rentenaar said one week prior to his departure, 
these events were a sign that “the praised stability in Al Muthanna” was 
fragile indeed. That	same	day,	Marines	fired	warning	shots	to	drive	away	
about one hundred looters from two stranded us Army trucks, and men 
bearing rpgs were seen on the streets of As Samawah that evening.39 A 
few	weeks	 later,	 the	province	was	confronted	 for	 the	first	 time	with	 the	
phenomenon of Improvised Explosive Devices (ieds), the roadside bombs 
which had become a veritable plague in other parts of Iraq and caused 
many deaths in Coalition ranks. Explosive ordnance personnel defused one 
ied on 24 January; another exploded early without causing any damage.40 
Two weeks later, early in the morning, two explosions occurred close to 
the main police station in the centre of As Samawah. The qrf discovered 
an improvised launching device for seven rockets with an alarm clock and 
batteries as a detonator. Two rockets were missing from the launch tubes. 
It never became clear whether the police station or the cpa compound had 
been the target, but the perpetrators were very likely from the Al Zuwaid 
clan, intelligence sources reported.41
In between such incidents many things were still going well, as could 
be seen from the governor’s announcement that, in addition to a ring road 
around As Samawah, a connecting motorway was to be built between the 
highways known as Jackson and Tampa. The construction of a new power 
station had also been started. The nlbg put a great deal of effort into these 
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projects. Further good news was that the Japanese government had decided 
to send a 600-strong humanitarian support battalion to Al Muthanna 





arrived on 20 January, accompanied by a large contingent of journalists 
and television crews.42	Clearly	lured	by	the	supposed	calm	in	this	specific	
area	of	deployment,	 the	Japanese	armed	 forces	 thus	 initiated	 their	first	
non-un overseas mission since the Second World War.
Troops in contact 
Ever more often, Dutch military personnel used their weapons that winter. 
From	December	2003,	apart	from	warning	shots	fired	during	riots	in	the	
towns, more and more shooting incidents occurred due to crime along the 
main roads and highways. Carjackings posed a constant threat to Iraqis 
and had caused the Dutch a great deal of work since the start of the mission 
in August 2003. The looting of stranded us vehicles along the Main Supply 
Routes had also been a problem for months. Two factors led to the convoy 
problems taking a new turn from December. Firstly, the us initiated the 
rotation of 250,000 of its military personnel, the largest war-time troop 
replacement in their armed forces since the Second World War. This was 
due to last until April 2004.43 
Secondly,	heavy	rainfall	transformed	fifty	kilometres	of	Route	Tampa’s	
dirt road into a quagmire. This meant that all the convoys heading north, 
often comprising hundreds of vehicles, had to take the alternative Route 
Jackson, which ran right through the town of As Samawah. The heavy 
rainfall	 and	 increased	 traffic	on	 the	main	 roads	also	often	 led	 to	 trucks	
breaking down, which meant that the Dutch Marines increasingly had to 
mobilise to save what they could. The surrounding muddy terrain imposed 
an additional complication, as broken-down trucks, which thieves had 
previously towed into the desert to strip at their leisure, under the current 
chaotic conditions were looted right at the side of the road.44
In the course of autumn 2003, this spontanious looting became 
organised robbery by criminals who were sometimes also armed. us 
mps were initially responsible for accompanying the convoys, but their 
restricted numbers were further being reduced. At the same time, the 
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blunt behaviour of us convoy guards deteriorated further with the arrival 
of inexperienced, and therefore nervous, new personnel. One day, 
Lieutenant Colonel Oppelaar was driving behind a us-guarded fuel convoy 
in As Samawah and witnessed for himself how some Americans behaved 
towards the local population.
“A	rifle	butt	was	used	several	times	to	hit	Iraqi	cars	to	make	way	for	the	
convoy and create room for manoeuvre for the us military personnel. 
This unnecessary action set me thinking. I continued driving northwards 
behind a civilian vehicle on msr Jackson towards Ar Rumaythah. 
Suddenly I was overtaken by a us hmmwv [army vehicle] which tried 
to force the civilian vehicle from the road and even visibly (directly) 
threatened the Iraqi using a pistol. I personally intervened and told 
the American in question that he was totally out of order. Intolerable 
behaviour! These Americans have a serious attitude problem.”45
us convoy security guards treated Iraqis roughly and had a low threshold 
when it came to using force, but the Dutch units also occasionally used their 
weapons	 in	 such	 circumstances.	 On	 2	December,	Marines	 fired	warning	
shots using .50 machine guns to disperse a group of several hundred looters 
from a stranded tractor-trailer combination. The Americans had set the 
vehicle alight and abandoned it. The container had been forced open and 
most of the contents had been removed.46 Setting light to trucks and their 
loads to prevent theft was a frequent occurrence and had a very negative 
effect. The Americans gradually ceased to do this, but only following urging 
by the Dutch battle group and the British divisional commanders, who 
believed that Coalition vehicles and goods ought to be recovered wherever 
possible, not destroyed. The nlbg used engineers under the protection of the 
qrf to recover trucks, containers, prefabs and other loads.
The immediate threat on the roads increased not just for Iraqi travellers 
and us convoys. The Dutch were also running ever-greater risks themselves. 
On 7 December 2003, a patrol conducted by 23 Infantry Company in four 
Land	Rovers	came	under	fire	 from	unknown	attackers	on	Route	Jackson	
between	As	Samawah	and	Al	Khidr.	The	Marines	thought	they	saw	muzzle	
flashes	 coming	 from	 a	 wrecked	 car	 about	 two	 hundred	 metres	 away.	
They	returned	fire	and	 thought	 they	had	wounded	one	of	 the	attackers.47 
Returning	fire	fitted	 in	with	 the	British	divisional	commander’s	stance	 in	
such situations, as was proved when military personnel from his own staff 
twice	came	under	fire	in	Basra	city.	In	both	cases,	there	were	Dutch	personnel	
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present in the vehicle. The response of the vigorous Scottish general during 
his	daily	briefing	at	headquarters	was	reportedly	“Kill	the	motherfuckers”.48
The Rules of Engagement, however, meant that this encouragement 
was	rather	problematic.	First,	enemy	gunmen	were	difficult	to	distinguish	
from	ordinary	citizens.	Secondly,	ambushers	were	not	always	the	enemy	
as such. A third shooting, which occurred that same day near Al Khidr, 
shortly after Lamb had expressed himself in such unambiguous terms, 
illustrated this and was a good example of the complications involved. 
The qrf of 23 Infantry Company encountered a group of eighty looting 
Iraqis around a broken-down truck abandoned by a us convoy along Route 
Jackson. When the crowd ignored the instructions issued by the Marines 
to	disperse,	the	Dutch	fired	warning	shots.	Two	answering	shots	were	fired	
from the crowd. In order to get a better view of the situation, the Marines 
let	off	a	few	flares,	but	the	gunmen	could	not	be	identified.	Opening	fire	
was not an option.49
On	 18	 January,	 near	 the	 village	 of	 Hamza,	 the	 difficulties	 of	
distinguishing between friend and foe when military troops came under 
fire	were	 again	made	 clear.	That	 evening,	 six	Marines	 from	21	 Infantry	
Company, accompanied by an interpreter and seventeen Iraqi policemen, 
conducted a patrol in an area infamous for its many carjackings and 
trafficking	activities.	After	a	brief	pursuit	of	a	suspicious	vehicle,	the	Dutch	
and Iraqi forces temporarily became separated. During a short stop near 
a	school	building,	the	Marines	suddenly	came	under	fire	from	three	sides.	
They found a number of unarmed civilians in the school. These urged the 
Marines	and	those	who	had	fired	at	them	to	cease	their	firing	immediately.	
Fifteen unarmed men then appeared from all directions, presumably 
having left their arms in the surrounding area. No-one had been hurt.
The civilian militia members had taken the Dutch for carjackers. They 
apologised and invited the Marines to drink tea with them the following 
day. Criminals had recently attempted to break into the school and 
car thieves were very active in this area, according to the locals. Major 
Olivier Loos, commander of 21 Infantry Company, was worried about 
the confusion and other such cases of mistaken identity. It was the third 
occasion within a short space of time on which a patrol from his unit had 
been	fired	upon	because	members	of	the	fps, ordinary policemen or armed 
Iraqi civilians had mistaken the Dutch Marines for criminals in the dark. 
It was perfectly possible for the Dutch to make the same mistake. Light 
signals were agreed with the security services, but such arrangements 
were clearly impossible with civilians.50
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The decision to use force in a given situation was taken by the commanders 
of the unit on the spot. They based their choice on the ‘Aide-mémoire for 
sfir commanders’, the Dutch instructions on the use of force derived from 
the Rules of Engagement (roe) of mnd South-East. These were summarised 
on	 a	 pocket-sized	 soldier’s	 card	 carried	 by	 all	 military	 personnel.51 In 
drawing	up	these	instructions,	the	Dutch	aimed	to	grant	flexible	authority	
for both self-protection and conducting operations.52 Like the British, they 
applied the principle that military personnel should use no more force 
than was strictly necessary (proportionality). It was up to the commander 
to	decide	whether	this	meant	firing	six	hundred	shots	as	on	9	December,	
the	twenty	rounds	fired	to	provide	cover	on	18	January,	just	a	few	warning	
shots or no force at all – as was most often the case. Individual servicemen 
of course made their own assessment of the situation in the thick of the 
action. Decisions were assessed in retrospect when reported. In the event 
of a suspected breach the ‘blue mps’ were called in, but not all shooting 
incidents needed to be reported.53
If	 Dutch	 forces	 came	 under	 fire,	 the	 decision	 to	 return	 fire	 usually	
involved split-second decision-making under pressure. But what if 
apparently innocent civilians were involved, who might well pose a threat 
to the Coalition troops, other persons or material? This was the main issue 
on	27	December	2003,	when	a	Dutch	Sergeant	Major	fired	a	warning	shot	
in order to secure supplies in a shipping container left behind on the side of 
the road by a us convoy travelling through Al Muthanna. The second shot, 
which the Sergeant Major said he had aimed at the ground, apparently 
ricocheted and wounded a person at approximately eighty metres from 
where the Marines were standing. The Iraqi man had been part of a 
group that was approaching the location with the intention of looting the 
container. The victim collapsed and died soon thereafter.54  
The Sergeant Major was apprehended by mp personnel, removed from 
Iraq and prosecuted in the Netherlands by the Dutch Public Prosecution 
Service (om) on suspicion of breaching the instructions on the use of force by, 
as	the	Public	Prosecutor	put	it,	firing	unnecessary	warning	shots	which	led	to	
the death of the Iraqi. The case became a matter of prestige and caused a big 
stir in Dutch society and in the armed forces. The so-called ‘Eric O. case’ dealt 
with the nature of the Dutch sfir operation, the operational circumstances 
in which Dutch troops were doing their jobs in Iraq, and which rules did or 
did not apply. The chairman of the Board of Prosecutors General defended 
prosecuting the Sergeant Major on televison by comparing the Marine’s work 
to	that	of	a	police	officer	on	the	beat	in	the	Netherlands.55
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The incident caused uproar in political circles in The Hague and in the 
Dutch media in relation to the instructions on the use of force for the nlbg. 
It was claimed they were unclear. A leaked letter from the Public Prosecutor 
dated 15 January 2004 gave the impression that Dutch military personnel 
were	not	allowed	to	use	force,	even	to	fire	warning	shots.56 This appeared 
to contradict statements by Minister of Defence Henk Kamp that “robust” 
force might be used where necessary. Members of Parliament from across 
the political spectrum tried to outdo each other in demanding explanations 
and focused their criticism mainly on the Public Prosecution Service. 
According to one Member of Parliament, it was as if the chairman of the 
Board of Prosecutors thought that Dutch military forces were “holidaying 
in Benidorm”.57 The Prosecution Service stressed in retrospect that the 
letter	specifically	referred	to	 the	 incident	on	27	December	2003,	during	
which	Sergeant	Major	O.	alledgedly	should	have	refrained	from	firing	any	
warning shots, either into the air or at the ground, as the situation was not 
sufficiently	threatening	to	warrant	his	decision.
In response to the uproar, Minister Kamp informed the Dutch 
Parliament that he considered the instructions on the use of force to be 
satisfactory. Senior military personnel in Iraq agreed with him that the 
roes offered “generous” scope for the use of force.58 The confusion proved 
mainly to be in the Netherlands and not only related to the roe, but also to 
the nature of the mission as a whole. For instance, the Public Prosecution 
Service emphasised that the Netherlands was not an occupying power in 
Iraq, which meant that in its opinion the Dutch instructions on the use 
of force should contain more restrictions than the British roe.59 In saying 
so, the Board of Prosecutors echoed the lack of clarity that had developed 
in the Netherlands on the nature of the sfir operation. After all, the 
government portrayed the mission as different and separate from that of 
the occupying powers and even from the Coalition effort in general.
Yet did the Dutch in Iraq have such a different assignment from the 
British, under whose command they were serving? Not really, at least not 
when it came to the use of force. The national caveats, which excluded 
executive police tasks and governmental tasks for Dutch military personnel, 
created the impression of different powers and a different set of tasks, but 
these	caveats	(unworkable	in	practice)	had	no	influence	on	the	instructions	
relevant to this case. Divisional commander Lamb had expressly ordered 
his troops to act against looters, and Dutch forces in Southern Iraq were 
generally allowed to act in the same way as their British or other allied 
colleagues. Moreover, their modus operandi was in practice very similar – 
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partly due to the close ties between the Dutch Marine Corps and the British 
armed forces.60 The task of retrieving Coalition property, such as stranded 
material along the Main Supply Routes, remained unchanged for the nlbg. 
“The	golden	rule,”	operations	officer	Major	Peter	Hengeveld	explained,	“is	
that we do not withdraw. If you do so, it’s game over.” In his opinion, there 
was no lack of clarity among the soldiers and ncos. “Until the Iraqis can 
take over, we are in command here. And this command simply does not 
tolerate such looting.”61
The Memorandum of Understanding between the uk and the 
Netherlands stipulated that the British roe list was the source document 
for the Dutch instructions on the use of force. This document permitted all 
types of warnings (including warning shots) for the protection of Coalition 
goods. It was up to the judge to decide whether the situation at the retrieval 
site	along	Route	Jackson	on	27	December	2003	warranted	the	shots	fired	
by Sergeant Major Eric O. and whether the Marine nco	had	actually	fired	
his	rifle	in	a	safe	enough	direction.	The	commotion	surrounding	the	case	
continued for months, but the court case ended in acquittal on 18 October 
2004. The judgment was upheld on appeal six months later. 
Knock Talk Search
The commotion caused by the Eric O. case demonstrated that the 
Netherlands had to come to terms with tougher conditions in crisis response 
operations. Following participation mainly in peacekeeping operations 
under the un	 flag,	 since	 the	 mid-1990s	 the	 Dutch	 had	 been	 primarily	
deployed on missions with a peace-enforcement mandate in the Balkans 
(Bosnia and Kosovo), as part of the nato alliance. After the us forcefully 
overthrew the regimes in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, the 
Dutch government decided in both cases to contribute to the stabilisation 
of	 these	 countries	 by	 joining	 the	 specifically	 created	 us-led coalitions. 
However, these missions did not comply with ‘traditional’ patterns. Iraq 
and Afghanistan were different. Violence against the Coalition and the 
internal struggle between population groups and factions grew rapidly in 
both cases, which substantially hindered reconstruction and made ‘peace 
support’	by	definition	difficult.
Nevertheless, the rather unrealistic image of the Dutch mission in Iraq 
as a ‘peace operation’ remained due to the relatively positive developments 
in Al Muthanna itself. cpa personnel who came to the province from 
Baghdad and Basra were surprised by the absence of violence and the ease 
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with which Dutch troops and they themselves were able to go out into the 
streets and make contact with the locals.62	The	 idea	of	a	 specific	 ‘Dutch	
approach’ therefore arose. The Dutch troops prided themselves on their 
open behaviour towards the Iraqis. They preferred not to wear sunglasses 
or helmets and conducted many patrols on foot and almost exclusively in 
open vehicles. The Dutch almost always carried their weapons pointing 
downwards. Respect for the locals, their culture and customs was given 
high priority. “It’s all about respect,” Lieutenant Colonel Oppelaar told 
British journalist Nicholas Blanford. “If you don’t grab the culture, you 
won’t grab the problem.”63
This	 self-image	 was	 confirmed	 by	 departing	 divisional	 commander	
Lamb,	who	was	full	of	praise	for	the	Dutch:	“My	right	flank	has	always	been	
secure thanks to the Dutch Battle Group. The situation in Al Muthanna is 
down to hard work, professional practice and a light touch.”64 Journalist 
Blanford talked subsequently of a subtle “Dutch touch”, which he contrasted 
with the often forceful approach of the Americans. What he called the Dutch 
“‘softly-softly’ approach” was also in stark contrast to the counterinsurgency 
measures	 elsewhere.	 Major	 General	 Mieczyslaw	 Bieniek,	 the	 Polish	
commander of Division Central-South, which was plagued by bomb attacks 
and operated in the sector north of Al Muthanna, was interested in Dutch 
experiences for this reason. In February 2004, he paid a visit to As Samawah 
to see the ‘Dutch approach’ and the ‘Muthanna model’ in practice.65
Yet that winter the so-called ‘Dutch approach’, which apparently was a 
topic of discussion even outside Al Muthanna, was accompanied by a more 
robust stance. On the one hand, the Dutch Marines had to respond to the 
growing number of minor disturbances and lootings in their capacity as 
upholders of law and order. They did so without hesitation. On the other 
hand, sections of the nlbg increasingly conducted targeting operations, 
both on their own initiative and on the orders of mnd South-East. The 
term 2 nlbg used for this type of operation was ‘Knock Talk Search’, or 
kts operations. The Marines searched homes for prohibited weapons 
or	 suspects.	Units	first	 surrounded	 the	area.	Next,	 the	occupants	of	 the	
compound were told that they had to leave the building under escort. The 
Marines subsequently searched it. If they suspected serious opposition, 
the Dutch would skip the knock on the door and the request for permission 
to enter and immediately force their way in.66 This often entailed breaking 
down the door. In military jargon, this was known as a ‘hard knock’.
The increase in the number of targeting operations – which went 
almost unnoticed in the Netherlands – could not be attributed to a 
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deliberately tougher approach by the Dutch. Lieutenant Colonel Oppelaar, 
a	military	officer	with	a	law	degree,	was	in	fact	known	within	the	Marine	
Corps as the ‘military diplomat’, while his predecessor Swijgman was 
better known as a more traditional Marine and warrior. Both styles proved 
their usefulness. The second battle group’s creed was to act respectfully 
towards the locals, but to use robust action where required.67 The Dutch 
campaign approach therefore remained largely unchanged. The second 
nlbg was able, however, to operate in an increasingly focused manner 
thanks to its improved intelligence position.68 More and more actionable 
information led to a growing number of arrests.
One	 of	 the	 first	 major	 targeting	 operations	 conducted	 by	 2 nlbg at 
the request of divisional command was Operation White River. On 26 
December 2003, 22 Infantry Company cordoned off an area on the river 
Euphrates thirteen kilometres west of As Samawah. Special Forces from 
the flt together with the reconnaissance platoon subsequently entered 
and searched a number of houses. Intelligence received from mnd South-
East indicated that this area was a possible gathering place for insurgents. 
The objective of the operation was described in rather vague terms as 
“identifying and disrupting anti-Coalition elements”. This referred to a 
planned arrest that went further than the friendly-sounding ‘Knock Talk 
Search’.	 During	 the	 operation,	 the	 Dutch	Marines	 confiscated	 fourteen	
weapons and a substantial amount of ammunition, but could not establish 
a concrete insurgent connection and therefore made no arrests. They 
reported afterwards that divisional intelligence on the suspected terror 
cell was “very thin”.69 The locals were surprisingly cooperative. No shots 
were	fired.	The	fact	that	one	of	the	properties	turned	out	to	be	a	brothel	
may have contributed to the mainly positive response from those living 
nearby.70
2 nlbg viewed Operation White River as a good dress rehearsal for 
subsequent operations.71	The	first	followed	quickly	when	a	new	clean-up	
of the sheep market in As Samawah proved necessary due to the return of 
arms traders. Another action was executed a few days later, on 19 January 
2004, when 22 Infantry Company together with the flt conducted a ‘soft-
knock’ operation to the south-east of Camp Smitty. Here, the Marines 
arrested four Iraqis suspected of smuggling arms and drugs from Saudi 
Arabia. Three of them were suspected of helping the resistance against the 
Coalition. The next day the nlbg handed them over to the British, who had 
moved their internment facility from Umm Qasr to Shaibah in December 
and renamed it the Division Temporary Detainment Facility (dtdf).72 In 
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addition	to	a	sizeable	arsenal	of	arms,	the	Marines	also	found	night-vision	
and satellite communications equipment.73
The Dutch military forces also regularly conducted operations on the 
basis of their own intelligence. The greater part of nlbg’s information, 
an estimated 80 per cent, was gathered using humint.74 In addition to 
active intelligence-gathering by the flts and the reconnaissance platoon, 
the nlbg received information via normal patrols, cimic activities and an 
information hot line. Civilians could anonymously telephone the flt at the 
cpa building with information on potential threats or suspect strangers. It 
only took a truck driver from the rebel stronghold of Fallujah to check into 
the local hotel and the telephone would start ringing.75 
Before the nlbg could act on the basis of intelligence, it had to be 
confirmed	by	 several	 sources.	 If	 the	Dutch	did	 act	 on	 a	 false	 tip-off	 or,	
as also happened, simply broke down the wrong door in the heat of the 
moment, a food parcel was delivered in compensation. Any damage was 
paid for or repairs were carried out by the nlbg’s engineers. According to 
political adviser Rentenaar, it was this ‘Dutch touch’ which often made the 
difference between anger and understanding.76 He did gain the impression, 
however,	that	the	flow	of	information	from	the	Al	Muthanna	community	
decreased as general dissatisfaction with the occupation grew during the 
winter of 2003-2004. The locals were more inclined to look the other way 
in the case of suspicious activities and informed the Dutch less frequently 
of the presence of suspicious strangers.77 The feelers put out into the local 
community by the nlbg had initially been a major success factor, but from 
early 2004 onwards produced less and less information.
For an arrest operation to be conducted within the Dutch battle group’s 
mandate	 there	had	 to	be	an	 identified	 threat	 to	 the	Coalition.	Prominent	
Baath	members	were	 by	 definition	 targets,	 and	 operations	 to	 apprehend	
them	fitted	the	assignment.	In	the	winter	of	2003-2004,	however,	there	was	
a shift from the violent acts perpetrated by these ‘Former Regime Elements’ 
to attacks by different types of insurgents, such as religious fundamentalists 
and nationalists.78 Anti Coalition Elements was the new, broader term which 
the Dutch also started to use to describe these enemies. If such groups posed 
a threat to the international troops or the cpa, the nlbg was allowed to act.79 
The rules for detaining suspects remained unchanged: apprehended 
suspects were handed over to the British if they formed any kind of threat 
to the Coalition and to the Iraqi police if they were ‘normal’ criminals. At 
the	same	time,	there	was	a	definite	overlap	between	insurgent	groups	and	




the infamous Al Zuwaid tribe mentioned earlier, which was concentrated 
to	 the	north	of	As	Samawah.	A	sizeable	part	of	 this	heavily-armed	tribe	
enriched itself by smuggling, carjackings and looting convoys. Indications 
were	rife	that	the	Zuwaidis	transported	arms	and	foreign	fighters	from	and	
to the Sunni rebel groups in Central Iraq.
At the end of January, Lieutenant Colonel Oppelaar decided that 
2 nlbg’s intelligence section possessed enough evidence to prove that 
the Zuwaid tribe’s activities posed a threat to stability and security in Al 
Muthanna.80 The Iraqi police were not informed, as a number of cops had 
close ties with the tribe. After four days of intensive preparation, the nlbg 
was ready. In the early morning of 31 January, Lieutenant Colonel Oppelaar 
gave Operation Thunderstruck the green light. The Marines carried out 
three	simultaneous	actions	at	five	different	locations	near	As	Samawah	in	
order	“to	neutralise”	senior	members	of	the	Al	Zuwaid	tribe	and	confiscate	
arms, explosives and ammunition.81 Afterwards, they searched another two 
locations. Almost the entire nlbg was involved in the operation in some way. 
The flt Special Forces and reconnaissance platoon conducted the main raid 
against the residence of the prime suspect, Sheikh Klaybich al Zuwaid. Like 
previous	actions,	Operation	Thunderstruck	was	classified	as	a	kts, although 
it explicitly focused on apprehending suspects and therefore entailed more 
than just knocking on doors, talking and searching.82 
In total, 2 nlbg	caught	22	men,	including	the	‘top	prize’,	Sheikh	Klaybich.	
This tribal leader stood accused of numerous crimes and was sought in 
connection with the As Samawah hospital robbery of August 2003. The 
Dutch found a total of 25 small arms, a rocket launcher with three anti-tank 
rockets	and	five	hand	grenades.	Klaybich	and	two	other	chief	suspects	were	
taken by helicopter to the mnd South-East temporary detention facility in 
Shaibah that same evening. Two Iraqis were immediately released for lack 
of evidence and the other seventeen were handed over to the Iraqi police. 
Eight were on an arrest list and appeared before a judge. The reputedly 
untouchable clan had been dealt a severe blow, and the Iraqi police resumed 
patrols in the tribe’s area the very next day.83
The	 Dutch	 battle	 group’s	 next	 arrest	 operation	 fitted	 the	 mandate	
more readily. It entailed the arrest of Iraqis suspected of involvement 
in	a	gunfight	 in	which	a	Spanish	Guardia Civil Major was killed. On 22 
January 2004, a Spanish military police patrol had driven into an ambush 
laid by the Nahi clan, which operated in both Al Qadisiyah province and 
the north-western part of Al Muthanna. This group was well-known for 
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its	large-scale	criminal	activities	and	had	fired	at	Coalition	troops	several	
times before. A complicating factor in the planning was the fact that the 
Spanish brigade was part of a different division. There were also some 
sensitive issues at stake for the Spanish side. With national elections 
imminent	and	with	Iraq	a	major	topic,	Prime	Minister	José	Maria	Aznar’s	
government could use a success. Several Spanish troops had been killed 
and the deployment had been extremely unpopular in Spain from the 
start. The Spanish applied a totally different operational concept from the 
Dutch. They had Iraqi police perform the actual arrests, while Spanish 
military personnel manned the outer ring for security. The Dutch in Al 
Muthanna	planned	to	do	the	arrest	of	five	suspects	themselves.	In	contrast	
to previous major arrest operations, this time the police and the Iraqi 
Civil Defence Corps were also involved, but they were only allocated a role 
in the outer cordon.84 Divisional headquarters provided 2 nlbg with an 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (uav).
Operation	 Gonzalo,	 named	 after	 the	 Spanish	 officer	 who	 had	 been	
killed,	kicked	off	in	two	phases	on	28	February.	The	first	phase	took	place	
at night and focused on two targets, each comprising several houses. The 
second phase was initiated at dawn and the Dutch again tackled two targets 
comprising several buildings. The Marines of 22 Infantry Company did 
not	find	the	first	three	suspects	at	the	expected	location,	but	21	Infantry	
Company	was	more	successful	and	apprehended	‘number	five’	on	the	list	
of suspects. 23 Infantry Company, which conducted a search and entry 
operation at a third location, also seemed to be out of luck when the search 
of a property showed that the suspect had departed. While the Marines 
prepared to withdraw, they received a report that the British uav had 
spotted an Iraqi attempting to escape by swimming across the Euphrates. 
When the man was plucked out of the river, he turned out to be the number 
four	suspect	on	the	list.	As	planned,	a	Dutch	Chinook	helicopter	flew	the	
two apprehended suspects to the British detention facility in Shaibah.85 
In contrast to previous and later operations by 2 nlbg, the Ministry 
of Defence in the Netherlands reported this cordon, search and arrest 
operation in detail in a press release.86 On this occasion, the suspects were 
clearly Anti Coalition Elements and the operation had been conducted 
jointly with the Iraqi security forces. Furthermore, the operation was 
in direct support of an ally. The Spanish colleagues’ operation was less 
successful though. The three suspects they had set their sights on proved 




ssr: the interim score
With a great deal of improvisation, the Dutch in Al Muthanna notched 
up some impressive achievements in building up Iraqi security forces 
and maintaining local security. They showed a great deal of creativity in 
designing their training and mentoring programmes and in the deployment 
of their own personnel. In doing so, they were granted additional support 
from the Netherlands. According to the Ministry of Defence, the results 
of the ssr effort made a mixed but predominantly positive picture. Up to 
March 2004, the nlbg had given 884 policemen a refresher training course 
and 400 new recruits had received basic police training. Over 100 extra 
border guards were also trained and 58 policemen followed a two-week 
management course based on study material provided by mnd South-
East.88 The completion in early March of the construction, training and 
accommodation of a 520-strong Iraqi Civil Defence Corps battalion was also 
no mean feat.89
Al Muthanna was more advanced in developing its police force, 
paramilitary forces and border guards than most of the neighbouring 
provinces. While the Al Muthanna authorities under Dutch supervision 
had evidently made the 1 April 2004 deadline for the handover of local 
control, elsewhere the Coalition had to push this date back. The transfer 
of regional control, whereby local security forces had to be able to operate 
independently at the provincial level, would now probably not take place 
before the end of 2004. The point at which the Iraqis would be able to take 
responsibility for security at the national level was therefore not likely to 
occur before mid-2005, according to the most optimistic estimates.
Lieutenant Colonel Oppelaar witnessed the extra ssr efforts in Al 
Muthanna starting to bear fruit as early as January 2004. In particular 
there was a greater police presence on the streets. “What they need now 
is	more	self-confidence	and	support	among	the	population,”	he	noted.90 
According to the nlbg commander, it was a case of two steps forward, one 
step back. Police lining their own pockets continued to be a major problem, 
and Oppelaar exercised severe pressure on governor Al Hassani to get 
rid of corrupt personnel.91 The many arrests of criminals and subversive 
elements by the Dutch also demonstrated that the Al Muthanna security 
apparatus was not yet able to operate fully independently.
Dutch Minister of Defence Kamp was therefore somewhat premature 
in	 informing	 Parliament	 in	 December	 2003	 that	 he	 was	 confident	 the	
Iraqi government would be capable of guaranteeing the security of its own 
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people in the spring of 2004. He expressed the hope that Dutch troops 
would be able to withdraw gradually from the towns and villages.92 This 
was still a long way off, however. When 2 nlbg’s operation ended in March 
2004, the signs in relation to ssr were nevertheless positive. In training 
and coaching the local security forces, the Dutch role shifted gradually to 
mentoring and monitoring, which meant that Dutch military personnel 
were less and less involved in actual law and order tasks. The Dutch also 
increasingly used trained Iraqi cadres to educate their new colleagues. 
This caused Minister Kamp to decide in mid-April 2004 that the number 
of extra personnel for ssr tasks could be substantially reduced.93
The fact that Al Muthanna was doing well compared to many other 
Iraqi provinces could largely be ascribed to the Dutch and Iraqis being able 
to conduct their operations unhindered by bombings or armed attacks by 
insurgent groups, which were rife elsewhere in Iraq.94 The real test of Iraqi 
security personnel was still to come, now that unrest was growing and 
there were signs of a power struggle evolving within the Shia community. 
Had the quantitative achievements, made under pressure due to the 
approaching deadline for Iraqi self-government, been at the expense of 
quality? The police reform programme in particular had been focussed on 
churning out large numbers of new recruits. It was becoming clear that the 
Al Muthanna police force’s main weaknesses were its failing leadership 
and defective management. The picture was similar in the other security 
services. How they would deal with a tougher scenario – an approaching 
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Al Muthanna was the birthplace of the notion of a relatively subtle and 
allegedly successful ‘Dutch approach’ to stabilisation operations. (Photo: mcd)
From a British base in Kuwait Dutch troops head for Southern Iraq, 19 July 2003. (Photo: mcd)
From a British base in Kuwait Dutch troops head for Southern Iraq, 19 July 2003. (Photo: mcd)
American troops hand over command to the Netherlands Battle Group (nlbg)  
in	the	presence	of	Iraqi	officials,	31	July	2003.	(Photo:	mcd)
‘Spot the difference’. 
Dutch policymakers 
emphasised the 
difference between the 
Dutch Stabilisation 
Force (sfir) and the us 
occupation force, but 
for Iraqis it may have 
been	difficult	to	tell	a	
us Marine (left) apart 
from his Dutch colleague 
(right), As Samawah 31 
July 2003. (Photo: mcd)
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At Tallil Airbase near Nasiriyah, the crew of a Royal Netherlands  
Air Force Chinook helicopter prepares for take-off. (Photo: mcd)
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Dutch forces raid the Al Khidr market in search  
of illegal weapons, September 2003. (Photo: mcd)
The lightly armoured wheeled Patria was the heaviest 
vehicle in the Dutch Battle group’s arsenal. (Photo: mcd)
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Iraqi informants recognise one of the persons listed as a suspect during 
Operation	Greenfield,	a	major	raid	on	the	As	Samawah	sheep	and	
weapons market, 21 October 2003. (Photo: mcd)
Two of the eighty Iraqis arrested during  
Operation	Greenfield,	21	October	2003.	(Photo:	mcd)
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Sunrise over Camp Smitty, the Netherlands Battle Group’s main base just 
outside As Samawah. During the Summer of 2003, temperatures would 
often surpass 50 degrees Celsius. (Photo: mcd)
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cpa Governorate Coordinator Dick Andrews installs governor Mohammed al Hassani, who 
had been elected during a provincial level caucus procedure that became known in cpa 
circles as the ‘Al Muthanna model’, 18 October 2003. (Photo: mcd)
British Army Colonel Maurice Bulmer addresses the municipal elections meeting 
in Al Khidr, 13 August 2003. As he is acting as the interim cpa Governorate Coor-
dinator, he is wearing civilian clothes. The Arab-speaking Dutch political adviser 
Michel Rentenaar is taking notes. (Photo: nlbg)
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Iraqi police and Dutch Marechaussees (Military Police) inspect 
fuel distribution at a petrol station in As Samawah. (Photo: mcd)
Voting in El Sweir, December 2003. (Photo: Nicholas Blanford)
A Dutch Marine and a recruit 
from the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps 
(icdc) on joint guard duty in As 
Samawah. (Photo: mcd)
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A Dutch Marechaussee instructs local policemen during an 
arrest and self-defence course. (Photo: mcd)
Dutch platoon base Victoria was created on the edge of the desert town of As Salman as part of an 
effort	to	intercept	possible	terrorist	infiltrations	from	Saudi	Arabia,	November	2003.	(Photo:	nimh)
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A Marechaussee inspects the As Samawah prison. (Photo: mcd) 
Iraqi policemen are instructed in the use of their new Dutch-supplied Glock pistols. (Photo: mcd)
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Several hours before the ‘Eric O. incident’ (see page 118) two Marines hold 
a crowd at bay around Route Jackson, 27 December 2003. (Photo: nmbg)
A us	soldier	fires	a	smoke	grenade	in	order	to	disperse	looters	looking	for	stranded	
supply-trucks around Route Jackson, November 2003. (Photo: mcd)  
A Dutch Marine handles an 
Iraqi detainee directly after 
Operation Thunderstruck,  
31 January 2003. (Photo: mcd) 
A	forced	entry	during	Operation	Gonzalo,	28	February	2004.	What	the	Dutch	 
battle group euphemistically called ‘Knock Talk Search’ operations were in fact often 
arrest operations, directly targeting criminal or insurgent groups. (Photo: mcd)  
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A Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (ied) detonated near a us convoy in As 
Samawah on 31 May 2004. ieds were a rare occurrence in Al Muthanna during 2003-2005. (Photo: mcd)  
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A Dutch-monitored patrol by the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps 
(icdc) in As Samawah, April 2004. (Photo: mcd)
A	patrol	in	a	Mercedes	Benz	all-terrain	vehicle	(mb) near As Samawah, July 2004. (Photo: mcd)
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During	the	first	Sadr	revolt,	Dutch	troops	intensified	their	weapons	searches	at	
mobile vehicle checkpoints such as these, 6 June 2004. (Photo: mcd)
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During a patrol,  
a Dutch infantryman 
shows Iraqi children his 
skills in riding a bicycle. 
(Photo: mcd)
The cpa-building, here at the left of the As Samawah water tower, offered a  
vulnerable target for a possible attack during the two Sadr risings of 2004. (Photo: mcd)
nlbg Special Forces snipers in action, 15 May 2004. They intimidated Sadrist 
fighters	with	.50	calibre	warning	shots	and	thus	helped	prevent	an	armed	 




who was guarding the main bridge over the Euphrates river died as a result of 
injuries sustained during an attack using hand grenades. (Photo: mcd)
Dutch troops guard two Iraqis whom they caught transporting 107mm 
rockets in the boot of their vehicle, 24 April 2004. (Photo: nlbg)
Two of the total of six Dutch Apache attack helicopters that the Netherlands sent 
to	Iraq	after	the	first	Sadr	revolt	hover	over	Camp	Smitty.	(Photo:	mcd)
A 120mm mortar in action in Camp Smitty, As Samawah. (Photo: mcd)
A local interpreter joins Dutch infantrymen on patrol in Ar Rumaythah, August 2004. (Photo: mcd)
cpa chief Paul Bremer sits next to governor Al Hassani during his 
visit to As Samawah on 17 June 2004. On the right is Commander 
3 nlbg Lieutenant Colonel Van Harskamp. (Photo: mcd)
On 14 August 2004, during the second Sadr revolt, the Dutch took their  




After their more aloof stance in the wake of the transfer of sovereignty and the  
second	Sadr	revolt,	 the	Dutch	intensified	their	urban	patrols	late	in	2004.	(Photo:	mcd)
Iraqis during the celebrations for the start of construction of the  





A Dutch patrol from 5 nlbg passes personnel from the tsu Emergency 
Battalion in As Samawah, January 2005. (Photo: mcd)
Dutch Defence Minister Henk Kamp meets Provincial 
Chief of Police Kareem, January 2005. (Photo: mcd)
A Gentle Occupation
An	Iraqi	police	officer	searches	those	waiting	in	line	to	cast	their	votes,	  
As Samawah, 30 January 2005. (Photo: mcd)
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On patrol in Ar Rumaythah, January 2005. (Photo: mcd)
5 
Caught between a power 
struggle and an uprising
Operation Swatter
In the early hours of Thursday 1 April 2004, at precisely 2am local time, the 
inhabitants of four residential complexes near As Samawah received unexpected 
visitors. Dutch and British forces burst into their houses and detained all 21 men 
found there. The homes were searched; all weapons, ammunition, computers, 
id	 and	money	were	 confiscated.	The	Coalition	 troops	 subsequently	 took	 the	
men outside, where us liaison	officers	officially	arrested	them.	Ninety	minutes	
after the start of the operation, the Americans and their detainees left for Tallil 
air base in a British Chinook helicopter. There, the men were transferred to a 
c-130 Hercules transport aircraft and taken to Baghdad.1
Operation Swatter was a large-scale ‘Knock Talk Search’ operation 
in which Coalition troops acted as cordon, search and arrest teams. The 
operation set its sights on a group of suspected arms, drugs and human 
traffickers.	Military	forces	rounded	up	the	criminal	network	at	the	request	
of the Americans, as it supported the armed uprising in the Sunni regions 
of	Iraq	by	smuggling	arms	and	radical	Islamic	fighters	(including	suicide	
bombers) from Saudi Arabia to Iraq. The network was also connected to 
former Baath party members. The clan and family tie-based As Samawah 
criminal organisation was headed by Shirshab Tarish al Zayadi, who had 
long been sought by the authorities. Although the allies initially thought 
that Shirshab had been captured during the operation, it later turned out 
that he was not among the detainees. The operation nevertheless dealt a 




Operation	 Swatter’s	 commanding	 officer	 was	 the	 new	 commander	 of	
the Dutch battle group in Al Muthanna, Lieutenant Colonel Richard van 
Harskamp,	 an	 army	 officer	 who	 together	 with	 his	mechanised	 infantry	
battalion had taken over from 2 nlbg two weeks earlier. The new battle 
group, 3 nlbg, was built up around Van Harskamp’s 42 Armoured Infantry 
Battalion (Limburgse Jagers Regiment) and a company from 12 Air 
Assault Infantry Battalion (Van Heutsz Regiment). Almost all sub-units 
of the nlbg participated in the major kts operation, or were on standby 
as reserves or acted in a support capacity. For Operation Swatter, 
Lieutenant Colonel Van Harskamp had also been allocated the support 
of a British infantry company, Puma and Lynx helicopters, sniper teams, 
a Chinook helicopter to transport detainees, a Phoenix uav and a Nimrod 
reconnaissance aircraft to monitor targets and the operation from the air.3
The British infantry company (Delta Company from 2 Para Battalion, 
stationed at Shaibah Logbase) entered two nearby locations about one 
kilometre from the Dutch Camp Smitty. The objective of two Dutch 
companies from 3 nlbg was slightly further away, but also very close to As 
Samawah. A third company from the nlbg was on standby as airmobile 
reserve. The search locations had been given code names, in this case 
the makes of cars: Buick, Chrysler, Audi 1 and Audi 2. The Dutch – who 
surrounded and entered the Buick and Chrysler locations – opted to use 
commandos from the flt and reconnaissance personnel as the search and 
entry team. Regular armoured infantry personnel manned the cordon 
around the locations.4
Van Harskamp reported Operation Swatter to be a success. Not a single 
shot	was	 fired,	 there	were	 no	 casualties	 and,	with	 one	 exception,	 all	 the	
suspects had been arrested and handed over to the Americans. The new nlbg 
commander was disappointed, however, that such a large-scale operation 
by the Dutch contingent had passed unnoticed in the Dutch media, and 
therefore by the country in general. “At a time when there is much debate 
about whether to extend [the Dutch contribution after July 2004] and when 
the presence of terrorist groups [in the Dutch area of operations] is a topic 
of discussion, it seems to me that successes like this one should be exploited 
as much as possible,” the Lieutenant Colonel grumbled. In his opinion, the 
neglect also failed to do justice to the achievements of his personnel and “the 
(considerable) risks” they had run.5 
Van Harskamp was in fact arguing in favour of a more open media 
policy, in the conviction that this would contribute to broader support for 
the Iraq mission. The top echelons in The Hague did not seem convinced, 
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however. Operation Swatter did not properly match the image of the 
Dutch allied contribution as a mission in the tradition of peacekeeping, 
excluding executive police tasks or anti-terrorist operations. The Ministry 
of	Defence’s	official	press	release	stated	rather	evasively	that	Dutch	forces	
had merely provided “assistance” in the arrests (made by the British) 
and gave the impression that only the Dutch helicopter detachment had 
provided transport support.6
Operation Swatter was 3 nlbg’s	 baptism	 of	 fire	 in	 Iraq,	 and	 a	 good	
illustration of the state of affairs. It was a major cordon and search 
operation, similar to previous actions to improve public order and security 
conducted by the nlbg. In fact, it was a larger follow-up to a kts conducted 
by	 the	 Marines	 on	 19	 January	 against	 the	 same	 group	 of	 traffickers.	
Also, a couple of weeks previously, on 17 March, 3 nlbg had provided 
support – on a smaller scale – to a similar arrest operation by British 
Special Forces, which had been dubbed Operation Meatloaf. This type of 
operation against criminal organisations which supported the insurgency 
had become the norm over the past few months. It meant that the nlbg 
was	chiefly	acting	to	back	up	the	new	Iraqi	regime	as	it	increasingly	came	
under	attack	from	irregular	opponents.	The	action	against	the	trafficking	
mafia	 was	 intended	 as	 a	 counter-terrorism	measure,	 by	 striking	 at	 the	
logistics of the armed resistance. Operation Swatter demonstrated how 
the stabilisation operation was beginning to take on the characteristics of 
a counter-insurgency.
This was also evident from the guidelines issued by the British 
divisional headquarters to the Dutch battle group. For months, the 
divisional commander’s list of assignments, based partly on that of the us 
high command in Baghdad, included: defeat terrorism. This was followed 
by: neutralise ‘non-compliant forces’. The threat assessment spoke of a 
“major physical threat” from, among others, terrorists, militias, foreign 
fighters,	 religious	 extremists	 and	 criminal	 groups.	 Each	 for	 its	 own	
individual reasons, these enemies were attempting to derail the political, 
administrative and social transformation which was to lead to the transfer 
of sovereignty from the cpa to a new Iraqi government in June 2004.
Since the summer of 2003, us forces in the northern Sunni regions had 
been the primary target of the emerging insurgency, which concentrated 
in the urban areas. However, the Shiite south was not immune to these 
developments. Resistance movements started to target Coalition troops to 
sow doubt among the ranks and on the home front about the usefulness 
of participating in the occupation initiated by the us and the uk. Attacks 
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against the Italians, Spanish and Japanese were examples of this tactic.7 
At the end of January 2004, the Dutch embassy in Baghdad was targeted 
by	rocket	fire.8 The other feature of the violence in Southern Iraq was an 
evolving bitter and violent power struggle between the different Shiite 
factions. It was this development which caused the greatest concern.
The mismanagement of the occupation by the cpa and the inability 
of the occupying powers to respond effectively to the irregular military 
threats made the situation even more complex. us forces made matters 
worse by conducting intelligence (and interrogation) operations that had 
the opposite effect to what was intended and which – when the manner 
in which they were carried out became public – tarnished the image of 
the us leadership and of the entire Iraq operation. In March and April, 
the	first	stories	emerged	of	the	systematic	abuse	of	Iraqi	detainees	in	the	
Abu Ghraib prison complex to the west of Baghdad.9 These events could 
not be ignored in the southern region either – although it was a different 
operational environment from the Sunni areas, where there had been 
robust armed resistance for some time.10 
It	 was	 difficult	 for	 Coalition	members	 to	 distance	 themselves	 from	
such developments. The nlbg had conducted various cordon and search 
operations, such as Operation Swatter, at the request and in the presence 
of American and British troops. The detainees from these operations had 
in some cases been handed over to us military personnel. Certainly, the 
21 prisoners captured in Operation Swatter had been transported to Abu 
Ghraib.11 Moreover, in Iraqi eyes all foreign military personnel were part 
of the same Coalition. Why would detainees in British or Dutch hands 
be safeguarded from the kind of treatment dealt out to detainees by the 
Americans? The American misconduct affected the whole allied campaign.
For the time being, the gathering storm of the insurgency did not seem 
to hit Al Muthanna, at least. Examples of everyday occurrences during 
the	first	weeks	of	3 nlbg’s deployment included the arrest of a number of 
criminals; support for apprehensions by the Iraqi police; the recovery of 
stranded	vehicles	on	Routes	Tampa	and	Jackson;	and	the	confiscation	of	
weapons from people who could not produce a valid weapon permit. On 
27 March, explosive ordnance personnel cleared some grenades from a 
location in As Samawah. Two children had been killed that day when a 
high-explosive shell they were playing with exploded. Infantry personnel 
provided security for an operation by the nlbg’s engineers to raise and 
fortify a dyke near Al Khidr. It had been close to collapse after the water 
level of the Euphrates river had risen substantially over the previous 
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few days.12 Also, 3 nlbg’s Alpha Company conducted joint patrols in As 
Samawah with the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps. The daily reports by the 
various sub-units frequently contained statements such as “it is quiet”, 
“another hot day” and “no irregularities”.13
This image of relative calm tied in with the optimistic mood in which 
the Marines had handed over Al Muthanna to 3 nlbg. At the change 
of command ceremony Lieutenant Colonel Oppelaar, the departing 
commander, in the presence of local dignitaries such as governor Al 
Hassani, cpa administrator Soriano, British divisional commander Major 
General Stewart and the second most senior us general in Iraq, Lieutenant 
General	Thomas	Metz,	noted	 that	 the	province	he	 left	behind	could	“be	
considered as one of the most secure and stable areas in Iraq”. This did 
not stop the 2 nlbg commander, however, from issuing a warning: “there 
are still elements that seek instability. And this province is not an island 
in a great ocean.”14
Armed opposition: the Mahdi Army
Oppelaar had a point. Something had been brewing in Southern Iraq for a 
while, which could also have consequences for Al Muthanna. Basra and its 
surroundings were particularly turbulent, and opposing forces regularly 
attacked Iraqi security services and Coalition troops. Dutch military 
personnel at divisional headquarters and at Shaibah Logbase reported on 
this, even though they had so far been largely unaffected.15 At the Dutch 
battle group in Al Muthanna, it was initially the teams that conducted 
the ‘information operations’ which noticed a marked deterioration 
in the atmosphere. The Info Ops group (also known as PsyOps, from 
‘psychological operations’) ensured that the Iraqi people in the Dutch 
sector were informed about the intentions and activities of the nlbg. To 
this end, the battle group’s PsyOps Support Element (pse) teams were 
often	 to	 be	 found	out	 on	 the	 streets,	where	 they	handed	out	flyers	 and	
newsletters, kept local media informed, put up posters or played messages 
via loudspeakers. The pse functioned as one of the feelers put out in 3 nlbg’s 
area of operations.
On 1 April, in consultation with commander Van Harskamp, the head 
of the pse decided to halt a campaign that had been going on for a few 
days	and	was	aimed	specifically	at	the	tens	of	thousands	of	Shiite	pilgrims	
travelling northwards through the province to celebrate the religious 
Arba’een festival at sacred sites in the cities of Karbala and Najaf. The 
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reason for ending the campaign was “an increasingly aggressive response” 
to	Dutch	military	personnel	handing	out	flyers.	When	questioned,	a	local	
imam explained the conduct of the pilgrims by stating that anger at the 
Coalition and the poorly functioning cpa in general was now so deep-seated 
among some groups in Southern Iraq that they no longer distinguished 
between the different national contingents of the Coalition.16
In little over a year, the euphoria in the south of Iraq at the toppling 
of the Baath regime and the end of decades of repression had transformed 
into widespread antipathy towards Coalition Forces. The negative 
sentiment was growing. The majority of Shiites, however, still intended 
to wait patiently until the foreigners had left. This also applied in the 
quiet ‘Dutch’ province of Al Muthanna, where Lieutenant Colonel Van 
Harskamp reported that it was as if the locals “were happy to sit back and 
wait for 30 June [the date for the transfer of sovereignty] before pursuing 
their own agenda”.17 The view held by the majority of Shiites was that the 
international forces should depart as soon as possible after that date.18
Yet not everyone was that patient. The Sadr movement again began 
openly to cause trouble in March 2004, having slowly but surely expanded 
its	influence	in	the	Shiite	neighbourhoods	of	Baghdad	and	other	major	towns	
in the south over the previous months. It got support from those who were 
dissatisfied	with	the	chaos,	the	poor	governance	and	the	violence	in	large	
parts	of	 the	country.	 Iraqi	political	parties	 in	general,	but	 specifically	 the	
Sadrists, organised demonstrations against the high levels of unemployment, 
fuel shortages or poor utilities. Emotions ran high at these events. There was 
widespread incomprehension about the fact that the foreigners – perceived 
as rich and all-powerful – were apparently incapable of solving everyday 
problems and improving living standards. Muqtada al Sadr gained many 
supporters among the large group of poorly educated, unemployed young 
people in urban areas who were hardest hit by these problems.19
In Baghdad, Karbala and Najaf, the Mahdi Army was again seen 
carrying weapons on the streets in order to – as they themselves said – 
maintain	law	and	order	for	ordinary	citizens.	After	months	of	hesitation,	
the cpa took up the gauntlet. The occupation authority closed down Al 
Sadr’s Al Hawza newspaper on 28 March 2004; it was generally assumed 
that it did so in order to goad the populist leader into a response.20 The 
Shiites became furious when an associate of Al Sadr was arrested on 3 
April. Their anger was further fuelled by the announcement that an arrest 
warrant had been issued against the leader himself in relation to the 
murder in 2003 of Ayatollah Abdul-Majid al Khoei.
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Al Sadr escalated the crisis. He barricaded himself in a mosque in Kufa, and 
later in Najaf, and called on his followers to put up resistance. His Mahdi 
Army forcibly occupied government buildings and police stations in many 
southern	towns.	It	was	a	deliberate	attempt	to	seize	power	and	quickly	led	
to an armed confrontation with Coalition troops. The Spanish contingent’s 
camps	in	Najaf,	north	of	Al	Muthanna,	were	attacked	and	fire	fights	broke	out	
between the Mahdi Army and the Italians in Dhi Qar province. A Coalition 
compound was also attacked in Diwaniyah, close to Al Muthanna. us forces, 
which had been faced with a large-scale armed uprising in the Sunni areas 
for	 some	 time	 already,	 were	 now	 also	 fighting	 the	 Sadrists	 in	 Baghdad.	
The British, Ukrainian and Polish contingents fought for control over the 
towns of Amarah, Al Kut and Karbala respectively. It was noticeable during 
this widespread violence that the other Shiite parties and groups, and in 
particular sciri’s Badr Brigade militia, remained on the sidelines.
Province of peace?
In Al Muthanna, where over the previous days the Dutch troops had 
experienced hostility from the pilgrims travelling to Karbala and Najaf, the 
situation remained remarkably calm compared to the widespread violence 
in the surrounding provinces. It had long been known that the Sadr 
movement had no power base in the region and was poorly organised. On 
30 March, political adviser Robbert van Lanschot distributed an analysis 
explaining why he believed Al Muthanna would remain relatively immune 
to political violence or dominance by extremist groups. Van Lanschot’s 
evaluation proved to be quite accurate in relation to the sudden Sadr 
uprising a couple of days later.
The factors which had made and would keep Al Muthanna a “province 
of peace” were, in the diplomat’s view, the authoritarian governor Al 
Hassani, an admired former resistance leader with many of his own 
militia in the police forces; the widespread social control by the tribes, 
who	negotiated	 in	social	conflicts	and	closely	monitored	 the	arrival	and	
actions of outsiders; the lack of an urban proletariat (Sadr was mainly 
successful in recruiting poor, unemployed youngsters in impoverished 
neighbourhoods in the great cities) and the fact that the population was 
almost homogeneously Arab-Shia, which meant that sectarian violence 
could be ruled out.21
Nevertheless, the Sadrists also tried to gain a foothold in Al Muthanna. 
Their initial success in neighbouring provinces encouraged them to 
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attempt	 to	expand	their	 influence	 to	 include	 the	desert	 ‘oasis’	protected	
by the Dutch. They initially targeted Ar Rumaythah, where an armed 
crowd gathered in front of the Medina mosque on 5 April. The local Sadr 
movement leader and imam at the mosque, Fadhil Ashaara, gave the 
police an ultimatum: all cops should lay aside their uniforms and weapons, 
and the Mahdi Army would take over the local police station. The fps, the 
security service for government buildings which contained many Ashaara 
sympathisers, simply dissolved into thin air. However, the regular police 
refused to give in to the Sadrists’ demands. Police Commissioner Ali 
Mutheser Nejem and Mayor Abbas Mansur entered into consultations 
with Ashaara in order to prevent an armed confrontation. The Dutch Bravo 
Company responsible for the area was asked to act with restraint and kept 
out of the way. As a temporary compromise, six unarmed ‘observers’ from 
the Sadr group were allowed into the police station. Before long, however, 
a delegation of eminent tribal leaders visited Ashaara and warned him to 
stop causing trouble. The Sadrists subsequently departed quietly from the 
police station. The Sadr movement’s attempt to neutralise the police in 
Rumaythah and take over the town had failed.22
It was striking that governor Al Hassani rose to the occasion and 
manifested himself as a powerful leader after these events. That same 
evening, he summoned the province’s tribal and religious leaders to his 
office.	Above	all,	he	recognised	the	situation	as	one	from	which	he	could	
benefit	politically,	by	acting	as	the	true	wielder	of	power.23 The next day, 
he agreed with cpa administrator Soriano and nlbg commander Van 
Harskamp that the Iraqi security services in the province would play a 
leading role in curbing the uprising. The Dutch would monitor from a 
distance whether the Iraqis were capable of maintaining law and order by 
themselves. If not, the Dutch could act against the Mahdi Army anyway. 
In the meantime, 3 nlbg conducted patrols in order to display as great a 
presence as possible and to keep abreast of what was going on.24
In the evening of 6 April, on local television, governor Al Hassani called 
on the population to stay away from planned demonstrations against the 
Coalition and the cpa. The protests the next day in the province’s three 
towns attracted few participants and passed off peacefully. Only thirty 
people participated in As Samawah. The Iraqi police and the Civil Defence 
Corps were “accompanied from the sidelines” by Dutch forces and had 
the situation well under control. Reports reached the nlbg that the Sadr 
movement had been “substantially” intimidated by local leaders, security 
services	and	ordinary	citizens.	“This	mechanism	apparently	works	in	this	
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province,” Van Harskamp reported to the Dutch Defence Staff. The nlbg 
commander expressed his intention, however, of remaining alert, as he 
was not convinced that the situation would simply resolve itself.25
That, contrary to appearances, the Iraqi authorities still felt insecure 
was demonstrated by the fact that none of the Iraqi border police personnel 
in As Samawah reported for duty that day.26 Vigilance was required while 
the situation could at any moment erupt into urban warfare, the nlbg’s 
intelligence specialists expected, as it had in neighbouring Nasiriyah. In 
recent	days	that	town	had	seen	heavy	fighting	between	Italian	troops	and	
the Mahdi Army. It could be assumed that the Sadrists would attempt some 
kind of action in Al Muthanna too. This prediction was borne out. On the 
night of 7 April, half an hour before midnight, the Japanese battalion’s camp 
came	under	 indirect	fire.	Three	82mm	mortar	grenades	fired	from	inside	
As Samawah landed just north of the perimeter fence. Two exploded. 3 nlbg 
immediately dispatched patrols from the nearby Dutch camp to search for 
the	firing	location,	but	the	perpetrators	had	already	fled.
The next morning, Iraqi police found a number of rocket-propelled 
grenades close to the cpa compound. Other channels tipped the troops off that 
the	Mahdi	Army	had	set	its	sights	on	the	occupation	authority’s	office.	The	cpa 
buildings were indeed attacked at 10.30pm. A group of unknown individuals 
opened	 fire	 using	 automatic	weapons	 and	 rpgs. The Dutch forces present 
– including Special Forces snipers housed there – and Blackwater private 
security guards contracted by the cpa	 returned	fire,	 at	which	 the	 attackers	
fled.	Units	from	the	nlbg, the Iraqi police and the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps 
subsequently	 combed	 the	 city	 but	 failed	 to	 find	 the	 enemy	 combatants.	A	
Dutch	patrol	came	under	fire	from	rocket	grenades	during	this	search.27
The attack led cpa boss Jim Soriano to decide the next morning to 
evacuate his employees to the Dutch base camp outside town. Lieutenant 
Colonel Van Harskamp offered the cpa administrators accommodation, 
but also expressed his dissatisfaction at the move. He thought that the 
evacuation gave the “wrong signals” to the troublemakers.28 Governor 
Al Hassani also thought that the risk to local cpa staff should not be 
exaggerated and believed that the occupation authority should hold its 
ground. The governor blamed the attack on the compound the previous 
day on nothing more than a psychological need by Sadr followers to ‘do 
something’, while in fact they had largely been neutralised under pressure 
from the local power brokers.29 Once Soriano had been reassured by Van 




Around this time, 3 nlbg encountered more and more armed civilians in 
different parts of the province. Patrols reported that there were armed 
guards in the Dawa and sciri party buildings in As Samawah. Iraqis from 
all walks of life seemed to have decided it was better to arm themselves. 
There was a growing risk that groups would choose to ally themselves 
with the insurgency out of opportunism or self-preservation, intelligence 
officers	estimated.30 In the early hours of 10 April, a Bravo Company patrol 
stopped	a	red	Mazda	car	carrying	four	nervous-looking	men	just	outside	Ar	
Rumaythah.	In	the	boot	they	found	an	82mm	mortar,	five	mortar	grenades,	
guns and ammunition, and hand grenades. One of the men was carrying 
a Badr Brigade id card. The men were arrested for possessing prohibited 
weapons and were transported to the British dtdf prison complex in Shaibah 
via Camp Smitty.31 A day and a half later, on the morning of Sunday 11 April, 
a Charlie Company patrol intercepted a minibus carrying another four men. 
They were in possession of a rocket launcher and ten rockets. They were also 
apprehended and sent to the dtdf.32
At this stage of the uprising, the overall impression of the threat was 
rather vague. No-one knew exactly what roles the parties other than the 
Mahdi Army played. There were rumours that criminal organisations were 
involved. The sciri militia was also acting in a suspicious manner. The 
intercepted vehicles containing weapons could be linked to that group. 
The weapons could have been intended for self-defence, but the Dutch 
forces had to assume that sciri	might	 try	 to	 provoke	 an	 armed	 conflict	
between the nlbg	and	the	Mahdi	Army.	Sources	in	As	Samawah	confirmed	
that both the mortar attack on the Japanese camp and the attack on the cpa 
compound were indeed the work of the Sadr movement. Other information 
pointed to the continued threat posed by a handful of Baathists, and in one 
case	in	Ar	Rumaythah	the	two	threats	combined:	a	Major	and	influential	
member of the former ruling party was thought to be supporting (or to 
have joined) the Mahdi Army and to be preparing attacks on Coalition and 
Iraqi forces.33
It was certainly true that the armed opposition was seeking ways to 
affect and weaken the Iraqi security organisations. Rumour had it that 
the Mahdi Army also wanted to abduct a member of the international 
forces. For some time, elsewhere in Iraq, various resistance movements 
had successfully been using kidnappings of foreigners, military personnel 
or aid workers as scare tactics in their propaganda campaign (including 
shocking beheadings circulated on the internet) or to force concessions 
or ransoms. On 12 April, in response to this threat, Lieutenant Colonel 
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Van Harskamp discussed security measures for two high-ranking Dutch 
officials	in	his	area	of	operations:	political	adviser	Van	Lanschot	and	the	
newly-appointed police mentor at the cpa, Colonel Veltman. Both worked 
from the cpa compound in As Samawah and regularly travelled around 
the province. Colonel Veltman had one close-protection guard, a Sergeant 
from the Marechaussee’s Special Security Missions Brigade (bsb). Diplomat 
Van Lanschot had no close protection at all. He had an arrangement with 
Van Harskamp to have commando Special Forces and reconnaissance 
personnel from the nlbg assigned to him for personal protection.34
The battle group commander thought that the situation warranted 
improved security measures.35 For the time being, Veltman and Van 
Harskamp agreed to support from the nlbg “while awaiting [extra] close 
protection from the Special Security Missions Brigade”. The Defence Staff 
in The Hague also recognised the need for improved protection for the 
two Dutchmen who moved around a lot and were therefore vulnerable. A 
special protection team from the bsb was created, which arrived in the area 
of operations in mid-May. It brought two armoured vehicles with it. Several 
weeks later, another two armoured vehicles and three close-protection 
guards were added.36
Incidents and provocations
Regardless of the unrest, Lieutenant Colonel Van Harskamp reported 
that the Iraqis were eager to be in charge. He wrote that “this desire is 
very clear from various conversations between nlbg personnel and the 
tribes,	locals	and	public	administration	officials”.37 It therefore suited the 
main provincial players that the Dutch commander and his staff opted 
to continue their policy of giving the Iraqis the lead in countering the 
uprising. The idea was that as of June the nlbg would be able to adopt 
a new role of providing assistance only. The recent attacks did not alter 
this strategy. At the end of April – in the midst of the Sadr uprising – this 
approach	was	even	laid	down	in	an	official	operational	order.38
Although alert to escalation, the Dutch therefore kept their distance 
while maintaining a presence and standing ready. Intervention was not 
required,	however,	as	the	Iraqis	had	the	situation	firmly	under	control.39 A 
demonstration by about 150 Sadr followers on 14 April in As Samawah, for 
instance, was closely supervised. The governor had permitted the protest 
in advance. The police had the upper hand throughout and the march 
through town was resolutely ended when the demonstrators got too close 
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to the cpa compound. There was no violence or disturbance of any kind. 
The Dutch ‘green mps’, who were observing events, reported: “The I[raqi] 
P[olice]	had	the	demonstration	fully	under	control	from	start	to	finish.	…	
Each	major	junction	was	cordoned	off	and	traffic	was	subsequently	allowed	
to move again once the demonstrators had passed.” Once the police had 
broken up the demonstration, the assembly “dispersed into small groups 
and returned to the town”.40
The efforts by the Iraqi authorities to keep control of the situation did 
not altogether prevent attacks from occurring. Some contacts, however, 
appeared to be misunderstandings. On Saturday 17 April, an Alpha 
Company	patrol	was	involved	in	a	gunfight	in	As	Samawah.	Following	a	
tip-off, that evening Dutch troops headed for a junction close to the football 
stadium in the north of the town, where opposing forces were reportedly 
preparing an ambush. Alpha Company’s personnel set up a temporary 
observation post near the location and waited. After a while, two armed 
men	 approached	 the	 Dutch	 position	 and	 opened	 fire.	 The	 infantrymen	
shot and captured both. One of the attackers was seriously injured. His 




That same evening, an Iraqi Civil Defence Corps checkpoint near Ar 
Rumaythah	was	fired	on	from	a	car.	A	few	days	later,	on	the	night	of	20	
April, the attack was repeated. On that occasion, the Iraqi paramilitary 
forces	reported	that	the	occupants	of	a	white	Opel	had	fired	at	them	with	
a	rifle.	A	patrol	from	Bravo	Company	hurried	to	their	aid.	There	was	no	
sign of the gunmen when the Dutch infantry arrived at the checkpoint. 
The patrol commander was briefed by his Iraqi colleague and the two 
conducted a search. Shortly afterwards, a Mercedes coming from Ar 
Rumaythah drove at the Dutch and Iraqi troops at high speed. The Iraqis 
opened	fire.	A	Dutch	lieutenant	also	fired	at	the	vehicle,	which	by	now	had	
sped through the blockade and had come to a stop about one hundred 
metres further on. Of the two occupants, the passenger died of his wounds 
on the spot. No weapons were found.42 
Dutch forces were also involved in incidents outside Al Muthanna. In 
the early morning of Wednesday 21 April, there was a coordinated attack 
with	five	simultaneous	car	bombs	targeting	Iraqi	police	buildings	 in	the	
Basra area. It was the largest terrorist attack in Southern Iraq since the fall 
of	the	Baath	regime.	Dozens	were	killed.43	One	of	the	five	suicide	bombers	
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tried to drive onto the police academy site in As Zubayah. The explosion 
killed two Iraqi policemen, a relatively low number compared to the other 
attacks thanks to protective measures erected earlier, such as concrete 
obstacles near the gate. Dutch mp instructors were working “at a distance 
of about 75 metres from the blast” at the time, but were not hurt.44
Although the Sadr movement still did not pose a real threat to the 
international assistance force in Al Muthanna or stability in the province, 
the number of provocations increased. At about 2.50am on 22 April, another 
mortar attack took place in As Samawah. This time, the target was not the 
Japanese but the Dutch camp. Guards observed two explosions, after which 
the alarm was raised and all personnel took shelter in the bunkers. Alpha 
Company “left the base with as many units as possible” in order to track down 
the culprits. Back at the camp, it was discovered how lucky the Dutch had been. 
A dud mortar had hit an accommodation container while its occupants were 
still inside. 3 nlbg had “had a close call,” Lieutenant Colonel Van Harskamp 
reported to The Hague. If the mortar had exploded “I estimate there would 
have been two [to] six deaths and an unknown number of injured.”45
The mortar attack led to additional security measures in and around 
the	Dutch	camps.	In	order	to	be	able	to	 identify	the	source	of	enemy	fire	
more quickly in the future, 3 nlbg asked the Defence Staff for permission 
to deploy tracking radar. Three of these systems were brought to the area 
of operations from the Netherlands a few weeks later.46 This came too late 
for	the	next	indirect	fire	incident,	which	rebels	conducted	exactly	one	week	
later. Three mortars landed near the Japanese camp at about 2.15am on 
Thursday 29 April. The bunker alarm sounded at the nearby Dutch camp 
too.47 A day later it was the turn of Bravo Company in Ar Rumaythah. Also 
at about 2am two 82mm mortars landed in the base and one outside. There 
was only material damage.48 The mortar attacks received a great deal of 
attention	in	the	Dutch	media	because	of	the	sizeable	press	presence,	which	
happened to be in theatre to cover a visit to the nlbg by Minister of Defence 
Henk Kamp.
On	 30	 April,	 the	 Minister’s	 and	 his	 entourage’s	 final	 evening	 in	
Al Muthanna, 3 nlbg received a reliable tip that a smuggler with ties to 
the resistance who had evaded capture four weeks previously during 
Operation Swatter would be at his home in As Samawah. Jasim Musair 
Shauree was the right-hand man of the Zayadi gang leader Shirshab. 
The nlbg immediately planned a house search, which was conducted by 
commandos from the flt. The suspect was detained and handed over to 
the British.49 This was remarkable, in light of the recent Abu Ghraib prison 
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scandal. The procedure of handing detainees over to the British continued 
however.50 As far as the Dutch were concerned, responsibility for handling 
the prisoners correctly lay with the occupying powers.51
Trafficking	in	explosives	and	weapons,	and	the	public	use	of	arms	by	
unauthorised persons and militias continued, resulting in more incidents. 
On 24 April, a day on which the province suffered very heavy rainfall and 
strong	 winds,	 a	 Charlie	 Company	 patrol	 intercepted	 an	 arms	 trafficker	
with nine 107mm rockets in his car near Al Khidr. Under cover of the 
bad weather, the man was attempting to take the rockets from Basra to 
Karbala but encountered a temporary vehicle checkpoint, or vcp, manned 
by the Dutch infantry. He turned round and escaped, but was later caught 
making a detour. The smuggler and his passenger were arrested. The man 
claimed he was transporting the mortars for money on behalf of an armed 
group that wanted to use them against Coalition forces in Karbala. His 
passenger proved to be an innocent hitchhiker.52
A day later, on the evening of 25 April, an incident took place in the 
same area. At about 9.30pm, a car approached another Charlie Company 
vcp, stopped and turned round. The Dutch troops at the checkpoint warned 
a patrol nearby. Two military vehicles blocked the car’s possible escape 
route. The driver responded by accelerating and driving at the Dutch forces 
at	speed,	narrowly	missing	two	of	them.	The	Dutch	soldiers	opened	fire.	
The car crashed through the checkpoint and was pursued until it reached 
the town of Al Khidr. There the Dutch found it, containing one dead and 
two injured men. Four uninjured occupants were arrested. It later turned 
out to have been an unfortunate panic reaction by the driver, as the Iraqis 
in the vehicle thought they had encountered armed carjackers when they 
came across the checkpoint in the dark.53
On Tuesday 4 May, yet another Charlie Company patrol came across a 
pick-up truck carrying armed men near the hamlet of Al Warka. The patrol 




the village. Subsequent inquiries showed that the men had not been anti-
Coalition	fighters	but	armed	tribal	militia	members.	There	was	an	ongoing	
and heated dispute between two tribes in the area. The Dutch were urgently 
requested not to become involved. The company reserve arrived, searched a 
few houses and questioned villagers. No trace was found of the armed men.54
The volatility of the situation in Al Muthanna as a result of such 
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incidents led to commander Van Harskamp and his staff reporting that it 
was “impossible” to estimate the threat level. Intelligence was not always 
of	 sufficient	 quality.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 after	 a	 few	weeks	 of	 heightened	
tensions, there appeared to be a gradual normalisation of relations 
(certainly	 compared	 to	 the	 rest	of	 Iraq,	where	heavy	fighting	was	going	
on).	On	the	other	there	were	still	occasional	firefights,	mortar	attacks	and	
interceptions of armed individuals. But Lieutenant Colonel Van Harskamp 
reported optimistically that “the signals given out by the population and 
the tribes were ... unanimous: we want peace and no violence; anyone 
who turns against the Dutch is also turning against us.” Yet, the nlbg 
commander added, “For what it’s worth! We remain on guard.”55
The power struggle at its peak
One task for the nlbg in this period was the guarding or monitoring of 
important facilities, government buildings and main infrastructure works. 
Although permanent guard duties for the cpa premises had been handed 
over	 to	 the	 private	 security	 firm	 Blackwater	 in	mid-March,	 there	 were	
plenty of vulnerable sites which still needed monitoring. One of these 
was the bridge over the Euphrates in As Samawah, which was a major 
bottleneck in the Route Jackson north/south connection. In mid-April, 
the British divisional commander ordered 3 nlbg to provide a permanent 
guard, after a similar crossing had been blown up by insurgents on Main 
Supply Route Tampa in the more northern central division’s sector. 
There had also been a number of other unsuccessful attacks on bridges. 
The impression was that opposing forces were attempting to sever the 
Coalition’s main supply routes. The blocking of Route Tampa temporarily 
increased the importance of Route Jackson. Together with the Iraqi 
Civil Defence Corps, the nlbg took on guard duties at the bridge.56 Alpha 
Company was initially responsible for this task, while Charlie Company 
took over at the end of April.
Guard duties were conducted both on the bridge and in the 
surrounding area. 3 nlbg set up an observation post overlooking the bridge 
in the nearby Civil Defence Corps barracks. Alpha’s Quick Reaction Force 
was also stationed there, as was a medical evacuation team. Dutch infantry 
patrolled the bridge at varying times. Their Iraqi Civil Defence Corps 





target for attacks”.57 Guarding the bridge nevertheless made the soldiers 
vulnerable. At the end of April, the battalion received intelligence that 
opponents wanting to kidnap Dutch personnel were aiming to do so at 
that location.58
When Charlie Company took over the bridge from Alpha Company, the 
newly-responsible unit initiated a discussion on how to conduct its task. 
The company’s staff wanted to improve the protection of its own personnel 
by	setting	up	one	or	more	 fortified	positions.	Battalion	 staff	 and	company	
commanders discussed the proposal on Monday 10 May and rejected the idea. 
It was concluded that it would be better for personnel on the bridge to keep on 
the	move.	The	consideration	that	traffic	over	the	bridge	should	be	delayed	as	
little as possible also played a part in leaving the situation as it was.59
An attack took place that very same evening. At about 10pm, two 
men on a motorcycle threw two hand grenades towards patrolling Dutch 
forces. A Lance Corporal and a Sergeant First Class were injured. The 
Sergeant	died	from	his	wounds	a	couple	of	hours	later	in	the	military	field	
hospital at Camp Smitty.60	He	was	 the	first	 fatality	as	a	result	of	enemy	
action during an international operation by Dutch armed forces since 
1995, when two Privates were killed in Bosnia. The Iraqi police were able 
to quickly round up the attackers, who were initially detained at the Dutch 
camp and subsequently handed over to the British authorities.61 An almost 
simultaneous attack on a Bravo Company patrol in Ar Rumaythah, just 
after 10 pm, resulted in no casualties.62
At a staff meeting the day after the attack, Lieutenant Colonel Van 
Harskamp emphasised the need to stay calm. He asserted that a tougher 
attitude towards Iraqis in general or a retreat behind armour and the ‘walls’ 
of the base camps would only play into the hands of their opponents.63 “It is 
my intent,” the commander stated, “to keep the nature of nlbg’s operations 
largely unchanged”, in order to ensure that all “relationships, security and 
stability ... which have been built up over the past ten months” did not 
go to waste. However, Van Harskamp also expressed his aim to step up 
targeting operations against the leadership of the opposing forces.64
In	mid-May,	the	conflict	between	the	Coalition	and	the	Mahdi	Army	
intensified	throughout	Southern	Iraq.	us troops had initiated an offensive 
to the north of Al Muthanna, in Karbala and Najaf, and had laid siege to 
the	Mahdi	Army	in	a	number	of	towns.	Heavy	fighting	aimed	at	eliminating	
the	Sadrist	positions	was	also	taking	place	in	Baghdad,	in	the	British	zone	
near Basra and in Maysan province. The untrained militia was no match 
for	the	international	troops,	who	inflicted	great	losses	on	it.	It	was	typical,	
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however, that the Mahdi Army often managed to retreat underground as 
quickly as it had reared its head. This made for an elusive opponent who 
was	difficult	to	eliminate	entirely.65
The	Sadr	movement	made	another	attempt	to	seize	power	in	Al	Muthanna	
on 14 and 15 May. On the afternoon of 14 May, after Friday prayers, a group 
of	 armed	Al	 Sadr	 followers	 gathered	 at	 their	 party	 office	 in	As	 Samawah.	
The	group,	comprising	a	 few	dozen	men,	carried	ak-47s, rpg launchers and 
hand grenades and threatened to storm the Governor’s compound. The nlbg 
provided support for the Iraqi police. The battalion reserve and flt were 
deployed to protect government buildings. While Iraqi dignitaries and sheiks 
– led by the governor and the chief of police – attempted to negotiate and calm 
the situation, the Dutch prepared for an offensive action, just in case. The 
unrest continued throughout the evening. The Sadrists set up barricades. The 
gathering in the town dispersed only at nightfall, when small groups of armed 
men slipped off under the cover of darkness and fanned out over a wider area. 
Dutch	patrols	were	subsequently	and	repeatedly	fired	upon.	According	to	the	
nlbg, the Dutch found themselves in a situation “which was turning into a type 
of urban guerrilla warfare”.66
The next day, the Sadrists continued to provoke unrest. The Iraqi 
authorities therefore decided to act against the party’s headquarters. 
Governor Al Hassani requested assistance from the nlbg and the Dutch 
cordoned off what was known as the “Sadr House”. When militia members 
armed with Kalashnikovs threatened to use their guns against the Dutch 
soldiers, Special Forces snipers on nearby roofs countered the threat by 
firing	 their	 precision	 weapons	 at	 points	 close	 to	 the	 troublemakers	 to	
intimidate	 them.	The	Sadrists	 subsequently	fled.	The	men	succeeded	 in	
escaping because the Iraqi police let them pass. The cops were afraid to 
confront	the	Sadrists	in	a	fight	for	fear	of	revenge.67 Police forces occupied 
the Sadr movement’s building after the Dutch military had searched it. 
Fighting in the town continued for the next few hours between police and 
Sadr militia. Also, there was a failed attempt by the Sadrists to recapture 
their	party’s	offices,	in	which	at	least	one	of	them	was	killed.68
In spite of the fact that the Iraqi security services still had some failings, they 
were able to maintain control. They did not allow the situation in As Samawah 
to get out of hand as their colleagues had in the neighbouring province of Dhi 
Qar, where the Mahdi Army took temporary control of almost the whole of 
the city of Nasiriyah and most government buildings. The cpa there was forced 
to	evacuate	its	personnel	under	fire	to	Tallil	Airbase	outside	the	town.	Local	
administrators went into hiding and security services disintegrated. It took 
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the heavy guns from an ac-130	Spectre	flying	gunship	 to	 restore	control.	
The situation had, however, got so out of hand that things would never be 
the same again. The cpa and Coalition Forces (in this case the Italians) did 
not recover until the start of Iraqi self-administration at the end of June.69
There was no such escalation in Al Muthanna, although the situation 
was tense for several days after 15 May. Dutch military personnel, Iraqi 
police forces and the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps were repeatedly involved 
in shootings. One of the more serious incidents occurred in the early 
hours of 17 May. Insurgents attacked a Dutch military checkpoint on 
Route Jackson north of Ar Rumaythah, close to a small village near the 
provincial	 border.	 The	 roadblock	 was	 manned	 by	 a	 rifle	 section	 from	
Bravo	Company.	At	2am,	the	unit	suddenly	came	under	fire	from	behind	a	
railway embankment. According to the section commander the “surprise 
attack”	 was	 “very	 intense”.	 Bullets	 and	 rocket-propelled	 grenades	 flew	
about.	 Their	 rapid	 return	 fire	 and,	 as	 they	 themselves	 admitted,	 “poor	
marksmanship” on the part of the attackers, ensured that no-one was 
hurt.	The	enemy	fighters	broke	off	the	attack	very	quickly.	Together	with	
the Iraqi police a daylight search was later conducted of the houses in the 
neighbouring village. There the soldiers found grenades, ammunition and 
a plan of attack drawn in the sand.70 Two privates, both gunners on the 
patrol’s vehicles, were later awarded the Cross of Merit for their bravery in 
returning	fire	from	a	vulnerable	upright	position,	“in	the	midst	of	a	hail	of	
bullets”, and in doing so contributing to the repulsion of the attack.71
The ambush triggered a discussion among the Dutch on reinforcements 
in order to counter the threat which had evolved. The question was whether 
the 2003 decision to conduct the Iraq mission with light infantry and a 
‘vulnerable’	open	posture	could	still	be	justified.	In	consultation	with	the	
higher echelons in The Hague, the nlbg analysed the situation and put in a 
request for “extra armoured material” to provide better protection for the 
Dutch soldiers outside the camps, in particular against rpgs. “The material 
being used within nlbg	[Mercedes	Benz	jeeps	and	Patria	armoured	vehicles]	
is not quite resistant to these,” Lieutenant Colonel Van Harskamp wrote 
with a feeling for understatement. More heavily armoured personnel 
carriers had already prevented casualties among Coalition Forces in 
neighbouring provinces. The nlbg commander requested the Defence Staff 
to provide him with ypr	armoured	tracked	vehicles	(an	 infantry	fighting	
vehicle	with	25mm	rapid	fire	cannon,	which	at	that	time	was	allocated	to	
armoured infantry battalions such as his) and a number of Leopard tanks. 
His	unit	already	had	sufficient	numbers	of	trained	crews.72
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Over the next few days, the threat remained high, but the general feeling 
within the Dutch unit that they were on the eve of an armed uprising 
proved to be unfounded. The most frequent incidents were minor clashes 
between the Iraqi police and armed groups, including a drive-by shooting 
which targeted the Sadr House occupied by police forces. There were no 
further major assaults, although Tallil Airbase suffered a rocket attack 
on 20 May in which two projectiles hit the base. On 27 May, a mortar 
attack targeted the Governor’s compound in the centre of As Samawah. 
Of the three grenades two exploded, but no-one was hurt. The incident led 
Lieutenant Colonel Van Harskamp to refer in his daily report again to the 
“highly	unpredictable	nature”	of	the	situation.	He	classified	the	actions	by	
opposing forces as a “type of asymmetrical warfare”.73
On 21 May, the Dutch government announced that six ah-64 Apache 
combat helicopters would be deployed to Southern Iraq as soon as possible 
as reinforcements for the nlbg. A Ministry of Defence spokesperson told 
the media that the main reason was the “growing number of incidents”.74 
An analysis by the Defence Staff had reached a different conclusion from 
that of the nlbg staff, namely that the requested extra armoured vehicles 
could be seen by the local population as too aggressive. More armour would 
deviate too much from the Dutch ‘open approach’ doctrine. It was decided 
to stick to the original plan, which had sometimes even been referred to 
as a ‘Dutch approach’. The Defence Staff’s argument was that the use of 
armoured vehicles, even tanks, might be counter-productive. Thanks to 
“their mobility, sensor systems and reaction speed”, the Apaches would be 
better able to contribute “to assessing the security situation”, and would 
therefore be better suited for the role of observation tool and airborne 
Quick Reaction Force.75
“A highly welcome addition,” the nlbg reported.76 Additional facilities 
were set up at Tallil Airbase for the new weapons systems and their crews 
(about 100), like ‘parking bays’ for the aircraft, large maintenance tents and 
accommodation.	The	first	three	Apaches	arrived	on	27	May.	Together	with	
an accompanying Chinook (carrying technicians and security personnel), 
they made a remarkable four-day journey to Iraq hopping across Europe 
and	the	Middle	East.	The	flying	quartet	flew	from	the	Netherlands	to	Tallil	
under its own steam, with nine interim stops in seven countries.77 The 
other three Apaches arrived in Southern Iraq in June.
At about 9am on 31 May, a car bomb (or Vehicle-Borne Improvised 
Explosive Device / vbied in military jargon) exploded along Route Jackson 
in As Samawah, just as a us convoy was passing. The explosion caused no 
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damage or casualties among the Americans; one Iraqi civilian was injured. 
Dutch forces were dispatched to cordon off the site and investigate. The car 
in question, which contained the remains of dried-out, unexploded Iranian-
made explosives, proved to come from Baghdad.78	It	was	Al	Muthanna’s	first	
encounter with a phenomenon that was already common in the guerrilla 
war against the Coalition elsewhere in Iraq. It would not be the last. A month 
later, two Dutch soft-top vehicles were also targeted by a vbied on the same 
highway in neighbouring province Dhi Qar, not far from Tallil. The vehicles’ 
high speed and poor timing by the bomber, as well as the fact that not all the 
explosives ignited, prevented any damage or casualties.79 “Another guardian 
angel used up,” Lieutenant Colonel Van Harskamp commented in a report.80 
Although the threat from irregular warfare appeared to increase as a result 
of the ied attacks, the unrest in fact dissipated over the next few weeks. The 
reason for this was negotiations with the Sadr movement which culminated in 
a	nationwide	ceasefire.81 In Al Muthanna, 3 nlbg resumed its modus operandi 
from before the uprising. The month of June was dominated by the transfer 
of sovereignty to the Iraqis and the formal end of occupation. An interim 
government, led by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, was installed in anticipation 
of	general	elections	in	January	2005.	One	of	its	first	decisions,	now	that	it	was	
responsible for national security, was to ‘upgrade’ the paramilitary Iraqi Civil 
Defence Corps to form the Iraqi National Guard (ing).
At the request of the new interim government, the international 
troops	 remained	 active	 in	 Iraq	 and	 were	 officially	 renamed	 the	Multi-
National Force Iraq (mnf-i), or mnf. The force’s mandate was laid down in 
un Security Council Resolution 1546 of 8 June 2004. The old occupation 
army entered into a “security partnership” with the new Iraqi authorities. 
The precise agreements were contained in an exchange of letters between 
us Secretary of State Colin Powell and Prime Minister Allawi, included 
as an annex to the un resolution. This extended the authorisation for the 
existing international forces, as initially formulated in Resolution 1511 of 
October 2003. The mnf would continue to conduct operations to create 
a secure environment, would continue to assist reconstruction activities, 
and would continue to help build up effective Iraqi security services.
One shadow on the way to Iraqi self-government in Al Muthanna was the 
news that governor Al Hassani, doubts regarding whose integrity had circulated 
for	many	months,	was	officially	accused	of	corruption.	The	judicial	authorities	
in Baghdad had apparently started an investigation. 3 nlbg suspected that the 
inquiry was motivated by political rivalry. Plausibly, the accusations had been 
instigated	by	former	governor	Sheikh	Sami,	who	was	still	an	influential	figure	
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in the province and, having failed to obtain a ministerial post in the interim 
government, was now trying to create a political crisis that would enable him 
to return to Al Muthanna.82 The crisis passed, however. Al Hassani remained 
governor, and would hold that position until his violent death in a roadside 
bomb explosion in August 2007.83
The Dutch contingent was initially to remain in Al Muthanna until just 
after the transfer of sovereignty. On 11 June, however, the Dutch government 
announced that it wished to extend the mission by eight months, until after 
the crucial Iraqi national elections of January 2005. A fourth Dutch battle 
group took over the security task from 3 nlbg in July. By then, Iraqi self-
governance was already in place. cpa shadow governor Jim Soriano and his 
people stopped their work on 20 June and departed without much ado.84 On 
28 June, cpa	chief	Paul	Bremer	officially	transferred	sovereignty	to	the	Iraqi	
interim government. The unexpectedly early handover had been prepared 
in the utmost secrecy.85 The international force, including the Dutch battle 
group in Al Muthanna, was just as surprised as everyone else. 3 nlbg heard 
the news via the media.86 The transfer passed off peacefully though. The new 
Iraqi	President,	Ghazi	al	Yawar,	spoke	of	“a	historic	day,	a	happy	day,	a	day	
to which all Iraqis have looked forward”.87 But while the occupation of Iraq 
may have been over, this could not be said of the country’s many problems.
The second uprising
Following a brief ceremony on 14 July 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Van 
Harskamp handed over command of Dutch operations in Al Muthanna 
to Lieutenant Colonel Kees Matthijssen of 4 nlbg. Matthijssen was 
commander of 13 Air Assault Infantry Battalion (Stoottroepen Prins 
Bernhard Regiment), the battalion which formed the core of the new 
battle group. Like its predecessor, the fourth battle group had an Alpha 
Company in As Samawah, a Bravo Company in Ar Rumaythah and a 
Charlie Company in Al Khidr, all air assault infantry units. At Camp 
Smitty, there was also a ‘staff and heavy weapons company’ typical of air 
assault battalions. Alongside the regular battalion staff and combat service 
support elements, it encompassed a number of operational units for use 
by battalion command, such as reconnaissance teams and two anti-tank 
platoons. A mortar platoon had been added. In practice, in Al Muthanna 
the latter sub-units acted mainly as infantry forces, providing security at 
the base camp and for the logistic convoys, as well as battalion reserve.88
In	 the	 first	 few	 weeks,	 the	 new	 nlbg had every opportunity to become 
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accustomed to its so-called normal framework operations and, as the unit 
itself said, “to shake out their feathers”. The situation was calm and local 
support for the Dutch military presence seemed to be as strong as ever. On 
22 July, Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen gathered his staff and subordinate 
commanders to “establish the direction of the operation”. The main focus, 
he reported, “is security assistance, which I see as being twofold, i.e. on the 
one hand assisting upon request and on the other the further improvement 
and professionalisation of the Iraqi security services”. In this sense, the 
unit planned to operate in the same way as 3 nlbg. Now that the Iraqis were 
officially	in	charge,	it	was	up	to	them.	In	line	with	the	guidelines	laid	down	
by the higher mnf headquarters, the Dutch operated in the background 
and as much as possible outside urban areas.89
The Apache attack helicopters, known as Copperheads, conducted 
reconnaissance	flights	(including	along	the	border	area	with	Saudi	Arabia)	
and were on standby as an airborne Quick Reaction Force. From Tallil, a 
section of two Apaches could be in the Dutch sector in about 30 minutes, 
depending on where they needed to provide aid or bare their teeth.90 The 
pilots regularly practised close combat attack procedures with the infantry 
companies’ forward air controllers. 4 nlbg also deployed the Apaches at 
night to observe roads or the environs of the base camps and around 
temporary	checkpoints.	Escorting	convoys	and	transport	helicopter	flights	
was among their tasks as well.
The new phase of Iraqi self-governance meant that 4 nlbg operated 
in an essentially different environment from its three predecessors. Of 
course there was a downside. There was a strong impression that the new 
Dutch contingent had less situational awareness from the start. After a 
few weeks in the area, nlbg commander Matthijssen reported that his 
unit’s information position had changed. He initially attributed this to the 
reduced presence of his infantry in the towns, which meant less contact 
with locals and therefore also less intelligence. “The return of the cimic 
Support Element and the flt detachment to Camp Smitty, following the 
closure of the cpa building” in As Samawah had also led to less situational 
awareness.91 In previous months, it had mostly been personnel from these 
units who had kept abreast of local feeling on behalf of the battle group.
During the period of cpa administration there had been “relatively in-
depth insight into governmental developments”. The newly independent Iraqi 
authorities were less open in this respect.92 This was a disadvantage because 
“below the surface there are intelligence-related developments which I do not 
believe to be new but which do deserve attention,” Matthijssen stated on 25 
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July. From the moment the Iraqis took charge, there were perceived ‘winners 
and losers’ with respect to the spoils of power and this created considerable 
tensions. Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen observed signs of friction between 
administrators, the police and the tribes, and dissatisfaction among locals 
with the “poor transparency of [the] government organisation”, which led to 
“a	perception	of	corruption”.	There	were	also	“signs	of	Iranian	influence,	the	
presence of unknown foreigners, new political parties, indications of terror-
related	organisations	and	trafficking”.93
In the meantime, the crisis with Muqtada al Sadr and his movement, 
although temporarily on hold, was far from resolved. In June, Al Sadr 
made it clear that he rejected the national interim government in Baghdad. 
It had been “put in place by the occupier” and in his view was therefore 
illegitimate. That summer, all eyes turned towards Najaf, where the Mahdi 
Army challenged the new Iraqi authorities and the traditional Shiite 
leadership by bringing in large numbers of arms – provided by Iran – and 
taking over whole districts. The Sadrists dug themselves in around the 
Imam Ali mosque and occupied what was known as the Valley of Peace, a 
large	cemetery	of	religious	significance	on	the	edge	of	the	town.
This renewal of the power struggle slowly escalated into a new uprising, 
which spread across the whole of Southern Iraq. At the start of August, the 




killed, as were personnel from the Iraqi security forces, innocent civilians 
and military personnel from the mnf.94
In Al Muthanna, these developments led more or less to a repetition 
of the events that had occurred in April and May. Dutch intelligence 
personnel observed that powerful stakeholders, such as tribal leaders, 
put pressure on local Sadrists to keep them in order.95 This was only 
partially successful, however. Attacks occurred again. It was noticeable 
that the Iraqi police and National Guard were now being targeted more 
frequently than the Dutch troops. In order to keep an eye on the Mahdi 
Army throughout the province, 4 nlbg concentrated its patrols on the major 
highways towards Najaf and supported the local authorities by jointly 
manning police and National Guard checkpoints.96 One such post near Al 
Khidr	came	under	mortar	fire	on	the	night	of	6	August.	A	policeman	was	




Next was the capital As Samawah. In the early hours of Sunday 8 August, 
shots could be heard over a period of three hours. It all started at about 
1am,	when	various	Iraqi	security	forces’	buildings	were	fired	upon	using	
small arms and rpgs. A policeman was injured when three police cars 
were also ambushed. One of the vehicles was hit by an rpg. Three mortar 
grenades	landed	near	the	television	masts	during	the	fighting,	but	caused	
no damage or casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen reported that 
the Iraqi police tackled the issue “decisively”. Seventeen people were 
arrested.98
The nlbg commander also reported that the incidents surprised him 
somewhat.	In	the	days	prior	to	the	fighting,	everything	had	pointed	to	the	
Iraqis in Al Muthanna being appalled by the Sadrists’ conduct in Najaf. 
Mathijssen speculated that one possible reason for the sudden outburst of 
violence could be “the fact that they [the Sadr followers in Al Muthanna] 
had been called upon to contribute to the current campaign [by the Mahdi 
Army throughout Southern Iraq]”. Within the wider picture, it was thought 
possible	that	the	leader	of	the	local	Sadr	movement,	Sheik	Ghazi	al	Zargani,	
had given the more radical section of his party a free rein. It could also “not 
be ruled out that the majority [of the perpetrators] came from outside”.99 
Police Chief Kareem let it be known that his information pointed to most 
of those arrested being from As Zubayah, near Basra.100 This moving about 
of	Sadr	militia	was	common.	Many	fighters	from	Al	Muthanna	had	in	turn	
been	deployed	in	the	major	conflict	against	the	mnf near Najaf, which the 
Mahdi Army viewed as the centre of gravity of its campaign. The Sadrists 
used reinforcements from elsewhere for operations in As Samawah or Ar 
Rumaythah.
The decisive operations by Iraqi police which so impressed Lieutenant 
Colonel Matthijssen continued throughout the next day and night. nlbg’s 
Alpha Company provided support during a police operation in As Samawah, 
in which “a number of districts” were combed, houses were searched and 
suspects arrested. The total number of detained troublemakers was 26. 
The operation continued until dawn on Monday 9 August. A large number 
of Dutch troops were also operating off-base and Apaches conducted 
flights	over	the	area,	as	there	were	indications	of	planned	mortar	attacks.	
It stayed calm that night, possibly due to the security measures of the 
nlbg.101 Yet there was an attack the next night. Three mortar grenades were 
fired	at	the	Japanese	base	camp.102 Just over 24 hours later, two mortar 
rounds landed close to Camp Smitty.103
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Ambush in Ar Rumaythah
Gunfights	 between	 the	 Sadrists	 and	 the	 Iraqi	 security	 forces	 continued	
over the next few days.104 In Al Khidr, too, the atmosphere was tense. On 
Friday 13 August, triggered by the crisis in Najaf, a large and emotionally-
charged demonstration took place against the Iraqi interim government and 
Coalition Forces. An aggressive crowd threw stones at passing Dutch units, 
and elsewhere people displayed the soles of their feet (an insult) and some 
made cut-throat motions.105 Similar demonstrations were also held in Ar 
Rumaythah. The leader of the Sadr movement in that town, Fadhil Ashaara, 
again played a crucial role.
On the evening of Tuesday 10 August, a Bravo Company patrol reported 
being	under	fire	in	the	centre	of	Ar	Rumaythah.	In	the	darkness,	the	Dutch	
soldiers thought the shots had come from a slow-moving truck, which later 
proved to have broken down and was being pushed by a few armed guards 
from the law courts (including three policemen) who had come to the aid of 
the	driver.	The	return	fire	from	the	Dutch	unit	wounded	the	truck	driver	in	
his cabin. The incident incurred the wrath of the local police commander, who 
accused	the	Dutch	infantry	of	having	fired	first	and	without	reason.106 This 
rapid passing of judgement was illustrative of the bad working relationship 
between the leadership of the Iraqi police and the Dutch, in particular 
the detachment of ‘green mps’ and the commander responsible for Bravo 
Company.	The	Dutch	commanding	officer	in	Ar	Rumaythah,	for	his	part,	was	
furious with the police commissioner for the rapid, public denouncement of 
his troops and decided to sort things out at the police station. Harsh words 
were said during that confrontation.107
Shortly afterwards, the ‘blue mps’, as was usual, investigated the incident. 
On 11 and 12 August they discovered evidence (“traces of ricocheted bullets” 
in	a	wall)	that	the	Dutch	patrol	had	indeed	been	fired	at,	but	from	a	different	
direction than it had thought.108 A witness, the nightwatchman at a nearby 
school, was to be questioned on Saturday 14 August. The man’s name and 
address were unknown to the mps, which led to a decision on Saturday afternoon 
to pay a spontaneous visit to the school that evening, on the assumption that 
the man would then be at work.109 Late that evening the Dutch military police 
drove from Camp Smitty to Ar Rumaythah in three jeeps (containing six mps 
and an interpreter). In doing so, the team drove into an ambush, the most 
serious attack directed against Dutch troops in their twenty months in Iraq.
The assault took place at about 11.30 pm when the military police team 
set out to return to As Samawah, after having held several conversations 
186
A Gentle Occupation
at the school in the centre of Ar Rumaythah. They did not get to talk to the 
nightwatchman, as he was not on duty. In order to return to the highway 
towards As Samawah (Route Jackson), which ran more or less through 
the south-westerly part of the town, the three Dutch vehicles had to drive 
through the town and cross a river and railway line. Once they had crossed 
the bridge over the river, the team noticed that the streets were suddenly 
empty	of	people.	The	unit	came	under	fire	shortly	afterwards.	The	vehicles	
were shot at over a distance of several hundred metres from buildings 
on both sides of the road, until they reached the highway. The drivers of 
the vehicles, two of whom had almost immediately been hit by bullets, 
continued to drive at full speed in line with standard operating procedure 
until they were about two kilometres outside the town, where they 
stopped.	The	driver	of	the	first	vehicle	had	a	bullet	in	his	side,	the	other	
a	graze	wound	in	his	leg.	The	passenger	in	the	second	vehicle,	a	29-year-
old Sergeant, showed no signs of life. The team members assumed he had 
been hit right at the start of the ambush and killed instantly.110
The	 fight	 was	 not	 yet	 over.	 Bravo	 Company	 sent	 two	 Quick	 Reaction	
Force teams to the aid of the military police personnel. At that time, company 
command still assumed that it had been an opportunist shooting, a rather 
common occurrence, and not a wide-scale, planned ambush.111 However, the 
two qrf	teams	also	came	under	heavy	fire	from	rooftops	and	from	between	
houses in the same part of town. Two soldiers were injured in the second qrf 
team’s second vehicle, an open all-terrain jeep. The unit also lost one of its 
vehicles completely. Two anti-tank grenades hit it and brought it to a standstill. 
The four occupants, three of whom were injured, hid in a nearby garden. They 
spent over 45 minutes in ‘enemy territory’, until they were rescued and taken 
to safety by another unit with two Patria armoured vehicles, sent especially by 
the	Bravo	Company	command	post	to	find	them.112 Twenty minutes before – it 
was by now 1am and over 90 minutes since the start of the battle – two alerted 
Apaches had appeared above the town. This was the moment at which the 
insurgents gave up. A medical evacuation helicopter, a us Blackhawk, picked 
up those who had been wounded from the meeting point outside town and 
took them to Camp Smitty. The remaining troops drove to Bravo Company’s 
camp via a detour.113
nlbg commander Matthijssen evaluated the actions of the rebels the 
next day as “well-organised ambushes”.114 4 nlbg concluded that it must 
have	been	a	planned	attack.	This	was	due	to	the	size	of	the	enemy	forces	(a	
few	dozen)	and	the	fact	that	they	had	positioned	themselves	around	the	few	
unavoidable thoroughfares to the highway (chokepoints in military jargon). 
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Moreover, the enemy’s equipment (small-calibre weapons, machine guns 
and rpgs) was well placed along the length of the routes and on both sides.
The nlbg had been caught by surprise. Sections of the population in 
Ar Rumaythah must have known about the attack and its precise location 
and preparations. The same applied to the local authorities, including 
the security services, with whom the Dutch thought they maintained 
good relations.115 In the wake of the ambush, two questions needed to 
be answered. Firstly, why had 4 nlbg failed to see such a major attack 
coming	and	specifically	failed	to	translate	known	intelligence	–	including	
the arrival of an armed group in Ar Rumaythah in the preceding days 
and warnings by a tribal leader – into preventive security measures? In 
the Netherlands, media reports alleged that the Dutch had been naive 
to allow the military police team to go to Ar Rumaythah in unarmoured 
vehicles, without infantry protection and in the dark, at the time of such 
a widespread and violent crisis in the Shiite south.116 
Secondly, how had a small, radical minority been able to play such a 
dominant role? For months, Iraqi self-regulation had kept Al Muthanna 
the safest province in the whole of Iraq. During the provincial security 
council’s meeting on 16 August, governor Al Hassani reported that the 
police forces had been threatened and intimidated. He claimed that the 
instigator of the violence came from Nasiriyah. The Iraqi authorities had 
by this point lost the decisiveness that nlbg commander Matthijssen had 
admired earlier. Fear and indecision all of a sudden pervaded both the 
security service ranks and the civilian authorities.
Some light was shed on the incident by the company commander in Al 
Khidr. In the days following it, he maintained that “hardliners” in particular 
made use of a widespread sense of dissatisfaction among the population, 
arising “from a lack of job opportunities and the primary necessities of 
life”.117 In Al Khidr, there had for months been major problems with the water 
supply and the Iraqis viewed the local council as corrupt and incompetent.118 
The entire province was also still struggling to cope with erratic fuel supplies. 
This had consequences for the Dutch military who, after all, were there to 
provide support for the distrusted Iraqi interim authorities. The people had 
lost faith in their government. As Charlie Company reported, in Al Khidr the 
Dutch were not quite (or not yet) equated with the Americans, but the town 
had	definitely	become	“anti-sfir”.119	 In	the	week	before	the	fighting,	there	
had been signs of an armed operation against Dutch military personnel in Al 
Khidr also and Charlie Company personnel had been warned not to go into 
the town any more.120
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In addition to dissatisfaction with the authorities and high unemployment, 
combined	 with	 a	 tradition	 of	 resistance,	 the	 specific	 position	 of	 Ar	
Rumaythah close to the troubled provinces of Najaf and Al Qadisiyah also 
played a part. The Mahdi Army enjoyed the support of fellow radicals 
from Diwaniyah, north of Ar Rumaythah.121 At the same time, it quickly 
became clear that the Iraqi authorities badly wanted to believe that the 
violence came from outside the province122, but disguised the fact that 
the Sadrists in Ar Rumaythah did in fact possess solid local support. This 
support arose from a mixture of ideology, dissatisfaction and the pursuit 
of	financial	 gain.	 Sadrist	 leader	Fadhil	Ashaara	had	gathered	 a	 core	of	
radicals. He paid unemployed men as well as opportunist petty criminals 
400 dollars a month to act as foot soldiers for his movement. Many of 
these men also worked in the fps. Furthermore, Ashaara had almost all 
of the town’s cops on his ‘payroll’. The money for this corruption came 
from Iran.123
In response to the ambush, Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen decided 
temporarily to reduce the number of Dutch patrols in the towns.124 He 
did so partly at the request of the governor, who seemed to have lost 
control of Ar Rumaythah (his own tribal homeland) and of the southern 
districts of As Samawah (formerly controlled by his ‘own’ police forces).125 
Prior to this decision, the staff of 4 nlbg held urgent discussions on how 
to	respond	to	the	challenges.	A	number	of	key	officials	argued	in	favour	
of more robust action in order to get the situation under control. To 
this end, local authorities such as the police chief of Ar Rumaythah and 
provincial governor Al Hassani would expressly be held to account, and 
daytime	and	nighttime	patrols	in	the	towns	ought	to	be	intensified.	Tough	
countermeasures such as cordon and search operations would have to be 
considered. The nlbg had to act tough and make it clear to the Iraqis that 
the Dutch were not ‘white chickens’ (local parlance for cowards).126 To 
achieve this, the staff wanted additional forces from the Netherlands. 
The main question was whether to show restraint or to surge forward. 
In the end, the former option was chosen, mainly because Lieutenant 
Colonel Matthijssen thought that “adopting a dominant role in the towns 
was contrary to the post-28 June mnf strategy”. At this stage, the 4 nlbg 
commander	 had	 insufficient	 intelligence	 for	 targeting	 operations.127 
Moreover, as it was “painfully obvious that the intelligence capacity was 
unsatisfactory”, the battle group staff introduced measures to improve 
information collection and analysis. One lesson learned from the Ar 
Rumaythah ambush was that the nlbg had indeed received snippets of 
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intelligence, but that these had been too vague for them to be able to be 
acted upon. 4 nlbg felt as if it had been more or less blind.128
The intent was to conduct operations in Al Muthanna using improved 
intelligence. To this end, 4 nlbg was allocated additional support from the 
Netherlands: from the military intelligence service mivd, the Army Special 
Forces Regiment and the tactical intelligence unit 103 istar Battalion. 
Commandos and recon personnel were deployed more frequently at night 
in particular in order to maintain situational awareness. In consultation 
with the Defence Staff, the battle group was also reinforced by two extra 
infantry platoons.129 From the start, 4 nlbg had had less combat power than 
3 nlbg, as an air assault battalion typically is smaller than an armoured 
infantry battalion. This was now ‘put right’.
Ceasefire
The security situation remained precarious for several weeks. During this 
period, the town of Ar Rumaythah and also a number of southern districts 
in	As	Samawah	were	very	much	under	the	influence	of	the	Sadr	militias.130 
The Dutch, by choice of their commander, stayed well away from these 
areas. Yet they could not entirely avoid the enemy and occasionally ended 
up	in	gunfights.	On	the	evening	of	Monday	16	August,	for	instance,	a	Bravo	
Company	patrol	came	across	two	men	preparing	a	firing	position	outside	
Ar	 Rumaythah.	 The	 Dutch	 briefly	 exchanged	 fire	 with	 the	 insurgents,	
after which the latter succeeded in escaping. A couple of hours later, the 
company base camp near the town came under mortar attack. That same 
night,	two	severe	firefights	erupted	in	As	Samawah	near	the	pjcc and three 
heavy explosions were heard as well, probably from mortar strikes.131
Two days later, an Alpha Company patrol was involved in a peculiar 
incident near Camp Smitty. While personnel in two stationary Dutch jeeps 
were observing the area, a white Toyota approached them from the front. 
The	driver	stopped	and	flashed	his	headlights,	then	switched	on	the	hazard	
lights and sounded his horn. He did so next to the two Dutch vehicles. He 
then drove off and stopped at a nearby Iraqi police checkpoint. After a few 
minutes, the vehicle turned and drove towards the Dutch patrol at high 
speed	with	the	headlights	on	full.	Shots	were	fired.	In	line	with	the	Rules	
of	Engagement,	the	Dutch	soldiers	opened	fire.	Both	the	car’s	occupants	
were killed. An investigation by the Iraqi authorities and Dutch military 
police showed that the two had been drinking alcohol, which possibly 




from the Iraqi police checkpoint.132
In general, provocations by the Mahdi Army at this time were limited 
to	firing	at	the	international	troops’	base	camps.	On	the	night	of	Monday	
23	August,	 the	 Sadrist	militia	 fired	 five	mortar	 rounds	 at	 the	 Japanese	
compound. Another attack followed the next night. On the evening of 27 
August, Bravo Company’s camp near Ar Rumaythah was again targeted. 
Three mortar rounds landed one hundred metres south of the base.133 
Enemy operations were otherwise mainly aimed at the Iraqi security forces. 
Among the incidents were a gun battle at the ing battalion’s barracks in As 
Samawah on 24 August and an ambush of an Iraqi police patrol in which 
three cops were injured, two of them seriously, on 28 August.134 In general, 
de Sadrists controlled large parts of the towns, and thus the population.
Only when the crisis in Najaf had been resolved did calm return to Al 
Muthanna. Following an absence of several weeks due to a heart operation 
in the uk, Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani used his authority to bring about a 
compromise between the Iraqi interim government and Muqtada al Sadr. 
He	orchestrated	a	ceasefire,	starting	on	the	evening	of	26	August,	and	took	
over the disputed holy sites in Najaf from the Mahdi Army. All the parties 
– the Iraqi government, the mnf and the Sadrists – withdrew their troops. 
For the time being, Al Sadr opted for a political solution and called on 
his	followers	outside	Najaf	to	observe	the	ceasefire	too.	The	crisis	passed,	
but the underlying power struggle continued. Whether it would be settled 
non-violently would have to become clear in the run-up to the general 
elections over the coming months.
In any case, the situation in Al Muthanna stabilised to such an extent 
that 4 nlbg resumed normal framework operations from the end of August. 
The Dutch forces also renewed their efforts in support of the Iraqi security 
services,	 with	 courses	 for	 trainers	 and	 officers,	 joint	 patrols,	 intensive	
coaching, the creation of a police training centre and joint exercises. 
The Sadr uprising had demonstrated that the Iraqi security forces were 
still unable to operate independently.135 This process would be most 
troublesome in Ar Rumaythah. Relations with the local police there had 
become	severely	disrupted.	The	police	corps	had	obviously	been	infiltrated.	
There were suspicions that policemen had been involved in the ambush 
against the Dutch, or had at least been guilty of serious negligence. “It is 
really essential that a large section of the I[raqi] P[olice] in Ar Rumaythah 
be replaced,” Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen concluded.136
As a breeding ground for guerrilla activity, Ar Rumaythah remained 
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the province’s ‘problem child’. The truce with the Mahdi Army had positive 
effects, but there were still plenty of radicals and criminals who intended 
to undermine the authorities and drive out the Dutch troops. 4 nlbg 
therefore remained on the alert. There were certain areas where the Dutch 
infantry were still not conducting patrols.137 An additional complicating 
factor was the power struggle within the local Albu Hassan tribe, to which 
governor Al Hassani belonged and which back in April had proved to be 
a	useful	instrument	in	suppressing	the	unrest.	A	fight	for	control	between	
two of the sheikhs for the ‘top job’ caused part of the tribe to side with 
the Sadrists and there were even plans to assassinate fellow tribesman Al 
Hassani.138 The situation weakened the governor’s position to the extent 
that he adopted a passive stance, and in doing so he alienated the severely 
beleaguered provincial police force (and in particular Police Chief Kareem) 
which sought Al Hassani’s support in its time of need.
On Sunday 5 September, the nlbg hit back with a major cordon and search 
operation. Codenamed Kyodo, its aim was to arrest suspected insurgents in 
Ar Rumaythah. On the basis of apparently reliable information from the 
governor and a few dissident tribe members, Dutch military personnel 
targeted two locations and rounded up eight people suspected of involvement 
in the ambush of 14 and 15 August. A British Chinook helicopter dropped the 
Dutch Special Forces’ arrest team close to the two locations. It arrested three 
men	at	the	first	house,	and	another	five	at	the	second	ten	minutes	later.	The	
operators	 found	firearms	and	ammunition	and	 confiscated	documents.139 
As always, the British took over the suspects and initiated an investigation 
together with the Iraqi judiciary.140 Unfortunately for the Dutch, who were 
quite certain they had captured the culprits, the allies had to release all eight 
men a few weeks later due to a lack of evidence.141
The enemy was quick to respond. On the evening of 11 September, 
a Field Liaison Team of Special Forces narrowly escaped an attack in 
As Samawah. As they were leaving a meeting with representatives of a 
political party, a hand grenade was thrown through an open window of 
their vehicle, but it failed to explode. Subsequent examination by experts 
from the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service showed that the grenade 
had not detonated because the safety pin had broken off. If the grenade 
had exploded in the vehicle – containing four Dutch soldiers and an Iraqi 
interpreter – there would certainly have been casualties.142
In October, in the area around Ar Rumaythah, there was a short-lived 
ied threat as well, which died down as quickly as it had arisen. Dutch 
military personnel experienced two close calls. At about midday on 
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Saturday 2 October, a roadside bomb exploded near a Dutch jeep which 
was driving in the direction of As Samawah together with two other 
vehicles.	The	location	was	about	five	kilometres	south	of	Ar	Rumaythah,	
where two other ieds had been discovered and disarmed by the Iraqi 
police the day before.143 Five days later, on 7 October, an ied exploded 
as a logistics convoy returned to As Samawah after bringing supplies 
to the Bravo Company. It went off next to a tanker truck. The vehicle 
was “perforated in multiple places by a large number of steel bullets”. 
A Sergeant who had been manning the roof-top machine gun sustained 
injuries to his left arm and leg.144 As the ied attacks were not repeated, 
they were interpreted by 4 nlbg as warnings from the perpetrators of the 
ambush of 14-15 August to stay away, as a response to the cordon and 
search Operation Kyodo.
Complex crisis response operations
In the course of 2004, the nlbg in Al Muthanna was twice confronted 
with the sideshow of a full-blown insurgency. Armed resistance against 
the Coalition went hand in hand with a violent internal power struggle 
within the Shiite community that was subject to a high level of interference 
from criminal organisations. The resistance against Coalition Forces was 
strongly	 linked	 to	 a	 conflict	 of	 interests	 among	 several	 armed	 political	
groups, in which tribal relations also played a part. In this respect, for 
all his inciting nationalist and anti-American rhetoric, Muqtada al Sadr 
was above all leading an inwardly-focused, revolutionary movement of 
the young, impoverished Shiite urban proletariat. In order to overthrow 
the established power bases within the Shia community, his party twice 
entered	 into	 conflict	 with	 the	 international	 forces	 which	 protected	 his	
opponents. By attacking the international troops, Al Sadr hoped to mobilise 
the disgruntled masses. He was only partly successful. Moreover, it was a 
battle that he could not win militarily. At the cost of hundreds of lives, the 
insurgent leader was ultimately forced to adopt different strategies.
Only after much hesitation was the hybrid, violent situation of 
guerrilla, terror and political violence recognised by the Coalition for what 
it was: an armed uprising, or insurgency.145 The Coalition’s military leaders 
and planners gradually came to accept that operations to counter it should 
therefore ideally be in line with the principles of a counter-insurgency 
campaign. In spite of the relative calm in the ‘atypical’ province of Al 
Muthanna, where the armed uprising barely got off the ground due to 
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specific	local	conditions,	Dutch	troops	also	encountered	irregular	attacks	
aimed at themselves and at the authorities that they supported (initially 
the cpa, later the Iraqi security forces and government institutions). Never, 
though, did the Dutch need to adopt a deliberate counter-insurgency 
strategy. The situation in Al Muthanna hardly required one.
The Dutch armed forces’ fairly broad experience in peace support 
operations	did,	however,	result	in	tactical	reflexes	that	matched	quite	well	
with some of the central tenets of counter-insurgency, such as a population-
centric approach. Dutch military personnel came to realise that they could 
benefit	from	the	guidelines	and	principles	on	countering	irregular	warfare.	
By chance, a new Army manual on this subject had just been published 
the previous year.146 Thus there seemed to be a mix of peace support and 
counter-insurgency tactics being adopted by improvisation. The main 
priority was to obtain and retain the support of the local population, for 
instance by showing restraint in the use of force and by demonstrating 
an ‘open attitude’. Another priority tactic was to put Iraqi security forces 
in the lead. The Dutch nevertheless realised that they held a precarious 
grip over a wary and suspicious population, and therefore lost situational 
awareness very rapidly after the change-over to Iraqi self-governance. The 
Coalition strategy of standing down and pulling back did not help either. 
In the type of complex operational environment the Dutch experienced, 
actions were steered by intelligence. The gathering, processing and 
analysis of large amounts of information were therefore of immense 
importance, even more so than during previous military operations.147 This 
was	initially	insufficiently	acknowledged	and	the	nlbg particularly lacked 
proper analytical capability and satisfactory internal communications on 
intelligence. This had in fact been the case since 2 nlbg, not least due to an 
increasingly passive stance from the Iraqis themselves, both the authorities 
and the population. This process was exacerbated by the transition to Iraqi 
self-governance in June 2004. Only after a restructuring of internal nlbg 
intelligence processes in September did matters improve.
Over the course of 2004, these developments and shifts in emphasis 
led to operations by the nlbgs acquiring some characteristics of a counter-
insurgency,	 or	 what	 in	 colonial	 times	 used	 to	 be	 called	 a	 ‘pacification	
campaign’.	The	specific	conditions	in	Al	Muthanna	made	this	less	dramatic	
than it sounds. It was and remained remarkably peaceful in the Dutch 
sector compared to the rest of Iraq.148 But the operations could clearly 
no longer be considered as a peace operation. Until 28 June 2004, the 
Dutch battle group was in fact part of an occupation army, which met with 
robust armed resistance. After that date, it was part of a multinational 
stabilisation force supporting the government of a country taken to the 
brink of civil war by a violent, internal power struggle and sectarian strife.
6 
Reconstruction
The faltering ‘project machine’
The ambush in Ar Rumaythah in which one Dutchman was killed and 
six colleagues were wounded came as shock to the Netherlands’ forces 
in Iraq. “Even we, the Dutch, could be targeted in spite of our ‘Dutch 
approach’,” Army chaplain Major René Heinrichs contemplated. “Once 
again we started to ask ourselves what we were really doing in Iraq: wasn’t 
this supposed to be a peacekeeping operation?”1 Back in the Netherlands, 
the response was even more emotional. Above all there was surprise, with 
a vocal homefront that did not shy away from making pointed remarks 
in the media and on internet forums.2 “The Dutch were never part of the 
occupying force, but in view of the attacks and the lack of warnings from 
the locals, they are now indeed seen as the enemy,” journalist Joeri Boom 
wrote. A year before, he had experienced a completely different, positive 
mood during patrols with the Marines.3 Boom’s analysis may have painted 
a	somewhat	simplified	picture,	but	he	did	have	a	point	when	he	claimed	
that the attack highlighted the distance between the Dutch military and a 
significant	part	of	Al	Muthanna’s	population.
One factor which seemed to contribute to the growing gap between 
the Dutch and the Iraqis was the reduction in funds which the nlbg could 
spend to improve the living conditions of the local population. This decline 
had been going on for several months. The ‘project machine’, which at the 
start of 2004 had been operating at full capacity using many millions of 






was no longer able to cut ribbons every week for the local media’s cameras. 
This prospect greatly concerned Lieutenant Colonel Van Harskamp of 3 nlbg 
when he took up his post in March 2004. In addition to intelligence gathering 
and normal framework (security) operations, his predecessors had stressed 
that cimic was one of the pillars of Dutch military success in Al Muthanna.
The	dwindling	flow	of	 funds	was	 linked	 to	 the	 imminent	end	of	 the	
occupation and the transfer to Iraqi self-governance, which meant the 
end of the highly-successful Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
(cerp). This fund, placed under military control, was used by the nlbg to pay 
for the majority of its projects. Lieutenant Colonel Van Harskamp foresaw 
major problems in particular for his successors and therefore deliberately 
raised the matter with the Defence Staff. His analysis: the people of Al 
Muthanna linked the legitimacy of the Dutch presence directly with the 
tangible results of the aid projects. The shortfall therefore needed to be 
compensated for. This could be achieved by substantially increasing the 
Dutch cimic fund from the ‘paltry’ 50,000 euros per four-monthly rotation 
to the equivalent of 500,000 to 750,000 us dollars per month. As long 
as Dutch troops continued to achieve civil reconstruction projects, the 
Iraqis would remain positive about their presence, the Lieutenant Colonel 
reasoned. He warned that this stance could change if the aid ceased.4
The Defence Staff did not agree. The difference in insight between the 
Dutch strategic level in The Hague and the tactical command in Iraq raised 
a number of important questions on the nature of the Dutch operation. To 
what extent was the relative success of the Dutch in Al Muthanna based 
on reconstruction and development projects, what position did this task 
occupy in the operation as a whole and what was the actual scale of this 
effort? Did cimic serve purely to ensure the security of the Dutch troops, as 
Van Harskamp – in line with the doctrine – stressed in his appeal to the 
Defence Staff, or were more structural reconstruction and support of the 
government also taking place? What was the relationship between cimic 
and the other reconstruction task, that of reconstructing and reforming 
the Iraqi security sector?
The cost of the Dutch operation in Iraq was approaching 100 million 
euros and no big fuss had been made about deploying additional resources 
such as the Special Forces company in December 2003 or the Apache 
attack helicopters in May 2004 – all presented to the Dutch Parliament 
as necessary means of self-protection.5 If cimic projects were indeed that 




Civil-Military Cooperation in theory
“Toward Iraq with troops and cash” was the front page headline in nrc 
Handelsblad on 28 July 2003. The article was about a press conference 
a	 few	days	before	 the	first	Dutch	battle	group	became	operational	 in	Al	
Muthanna. Iraqi journalists had had just one question for Lieutenant 
Colonel Swijgman: “Will the Dutch be implementing projects in the 
province?” The commander replied that he had brought money. After 
the press conference, however, he confessed to Dutch journalists that 
the budget was only 50,000 euros. The real money for reconstruction 
was held by the cpa and not by him.6	 In	saying	so,	 the	first	battle	group	
commander	was	publicly	citing	the	official	Dutch	government	stance,	that,	
from the arrival of the Dutch and the cpa’s new provincial administrator 
(Bulmer), civil and military (security) tasks were to be kept strictly 
separate. Swijgman personally felt that he had been sent to Iraq with an 
empty	wallet,	however.	He	saw	little	benefit	in	the	intention	of	the	senior	
leadership to separate security tasks and administrative and construction 
tasks for political reasons. He wished to do more than just Quick Impact 
Projects (qips), short-term initiatives aimed merely at creating goodwill.7
The cimic budget for Al Muthanna was small compared to previous 
international operations. It was therefore logical that the tactical 
commanders in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 should wonder why The Hague 
was keeping a tight rein on the purse strings.8 There were two basic 
assumptions affecting Dutch parsimony in Al Muthanna. The newly-
appointed cpa Governorate Coordinator and his staff were supposed 
to take on the package of civilian tasks, and under these circumstances 
cimic	 could	 and	 would	 be	 conducted	 ‘according	 to	 the	 rules’.	 The	 first	
assumption was connected to the political desire to distance the Dutch 
military contribution from the occupation. The second was dogmatic. 
In order to prevent too great an overlap between the civil and military 
dimensions in peace support operations, the Netherlands – in line with 
nato’s doctrine – approached interaction between military personnel and 
their civilian environment mainly as an instrument to serve a military 
objective: to create security. This was about force acceptance, the chief 
objective being force protection. Where possible, military personnel were 
to coordinate their activities with local civilian authorities and igos and 
ngos. Reconstruction or state building was to be avoided.
This stance was not held just by Defence, but was also encouraged 
by the Department of Development Cooperation, part of the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs. It was the latter department which provided the funds 
for the Dutch cimic budget. Traditionally, it had major policy-driven 
reservations regarding the role of military personnel in humanitarian 
aid and reconstruction. This stance was reinforced by the protectionist 
attitude of the ngo community – the department’s largest group of partner 
organisations – which opposed military involvement in the “humanitarian 
space”.9	The	result	was	a	compromise,	officially	summarised	in	what	was	
known as the 2003 cimic policy framework under the motto “as civil as 
possible and as military as necessary”.10	 In	 spite	 of	 the	 flexibility	 this	
phrase seemed to offer, the Netherlands aimed to keep its military role 
in the civil domain to the absolute minimum. This was demonstrated 
once again at the end of August 2003 when, following critical questions 
in Parliament about the paltry cimic budget for Al Muthanna, Ministers De 
Hoop Scheffer and Kamp stressed repeatedly “that military personnel are 
not aid workers”. Therefore, no substantial budget increase was granted.11
It was well-known at the time that international civilian organisations 
were barely operational in Iraq – and certainly not in the peripheral 
province of Al Muthanna – and that both the cpa and the local authorities 
were dysfunctional. The Dutch battle group was nevertheless explicitly 
requested by the Defence Staff in The Hague not to become too involved 
in supporting cimic activities.12 The Dutch military cimic personnel who 
trained for Iraq from the late summer of 2003 had it impressed upon them 
that cimic was not to be a ‘project machine’. cimic staff received no training 
in tendering out and supervising projects, because military personnel 
ought not to be “Santa Claus in fatigues”.13
Civil-Military Cooperation in practice
The	financial	shortfall	anticipated	by	Lieutenant	Colonel	Swijgman	did	not	
occur during his period of command. On 6 August, the Dutch representative 
at cpa-South, Major Kortenhoeven, was pleased to announce that – just 
like the British and Italian brigades – nlbg could collect 200,000 us dollars 
of cerp funds from the British divisional headquarters, as the Americans 
had decided to open up the fund to its Coalition allies.14 The cerp fund 
was known as “Saddam’s shoebox”, as until September 2003 it was made 
up	entirely	of	funds	confiscated	from	the	Baath	party	and	the	liquidated	
assets of the toppled dictator himself.15	There	was	a	second	major	financial	
fund for the nlbg: the reconstruction fund which the central occupation 
authority made available under the control of cpa-South for funding 
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longer-term projects. These cpa funds were allocated to the Dutch cimic 
team in its capacity as Government Support Team.16 The Dutch did not 
hesitate to make use of this opportunity. At British headquarters, they 
were shown a number of shipping containers full of dollar bills packed in 
plastic, out of which they received their share. A couple of weeks later, the 
Dutch were again able to collect a further 200,000 us dollars in cash. The 
safe	at	Camp	Smitty	was	now	literally	overflowing.17 
Within a few weeks, the Dutch Government Support Team, on behalf 
of the cpa,	 was	 actively	 working	 in	 public	 fields	 such	 as	 fuel	 supplies,	
public security, irrigation, bridges and roads, education, healthcare, 
agriculture, industry, water and electricity supplies and sewage. The 
team had no personnel or materials, and little expertise, to run projects 
itself, but it conducted inventory surveys and initiated, coordinated and 
supervised. Once cpa-South had approved a project, a local company 
took on its implementation.18 Initiatives were developed as much as 
possible in conjunction with the new administrative councils and the 
provincial departments of Iraqi ministries. This was not always easy. 
After three decades of a centralist and tyrannical regime, the Dutch had 
the impression that there was little energy or initiative left in the Iraqis. 
The nlbg also had to learn to deal with the tribal culture, which often 
made it impossible for a – possibly cheaper – contractor from one tribe 
to work in another tribe’s area.19
At the start of the operation in Al Muthanna, the scale of cimic 
initiatives was limited. Dutch funds were negligible and there was a 
10,000 us dollar ceiling per cerp project. The focus was therefore initially 
on Quick Impact Projects such as a new playroom at the children’s 
hospital in As Samawah and the renovation of school buildings. After 
years of neglect, many school buildings had fallen into disrepair and 
were subsequently plundered. Anything of any value had been removed: 
teaching	materials,	window	frames,	taps,	light	fittings,	electrical	sockets	
and even the electrical wiring. Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman understood 
from prominent Al Muthanna residents that they attached a great deal 
of value to their children being able to return to school at the start of the 
new school year in mid-September. So the Marines initially tackled this 
issue “Iraqi-style” under the motto “adequate is good enough”. According 
to	 Major	 Rudolf	 Keijzer	 of	 the	 cimic section this meant “rubbish out 
and windows in”. Later, the section initiated further renovations.20 By 
involving the local media – who were also operating partly on Coalition 
project funds – they obtained maximum visibility.
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For the time being the main priority of the Dutch cimic team, the largest yet 
unofficial	executive	service	for	cpa	tasks	in	Al	Muthanna,	was	to	influence	
the perception of the Iraqis by ‘winning over the hearts and minds’. To 
this end, larger cerp projects were divided into sub-projects of 10,000 us 
dollars, so that the nlbg commander could sign for them himself without 
getting	bogged	down	 in	bureaucracy.	Major	Keijzer,	 responsible	 for	 the	
‘industry’ sub-area, initiated the renovation of the cement factory near As 
Samawah, which paved the way for cpa investment worth millions a few 
months	later.	By	having	the	newly-elected	governor	Al	Hassani	officially	
reopen the factory on 18 October 2003, the Dutch ensured that the results 
of	 their	 efforts	 reflected	 credit	 on	 the	 new	 Iraqi	 administrators,	 who	
themselves had virtually no budget for doing anything.21 Partly due to the 
intensive cooperation with political adviser Michel Rentenaar at the cpa 
building in As Samawah, the cimic / Government Support Team became 
the main pillar for support for the occupation authority as well. In spite of 
the burgeoning budget controlled by the battle group, almost no direction 
was provided by the cpa or mnd South-East and no additional guidelines 
were issued from The Hague.
cimic and Security Sector Reform (ssr) were closely related. In addition 
to the purchase of materials and improving the facilities of the police, 
the paramilitary Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (later National Guard) and 
the Facility Protection Service, the cimic team even paid the operational 
budgets and salaries of the latter two organisations out of cerp funds. 
One	 major,	 Dutch-financed	 ssr initiative came from political adviser 
Rentenaar. He used his knowledge of procedures and jargon at the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to write a model project proposal to request a 
large sum from what was known as the ‘Peace Fund’, a Dutch ssr budget.22 
The political adviser noted that military personnel were barely conversant 
with drawing up project proposals like this, which detailed issues such as 
local requirements, feasibility and Dutch policy criteria.23 The Peace Fund 
allocated the nlbg 873,000 us dollars to spend on an emergency package 
of communications equipment, weapons and other police material (see 
chapter 4) in order to allow the police force to function to some extent at 
the end of 2003.24
The	Dutch	paid	all	the	other	projects	out	of	non-Dutch	funds.	The	flow	
of cerp slowed in the autumn of 2003 but, as a de facto sub-contractor 
of	 the	 occupation	 authority,	 the	 first	nlbg’s Government Support Team 
subsequently achieved most of its projects using funds from cpa-South.25 
Drinking water supplies in Al Khidr were improved by purchasing a 
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reverse osmosis unit for converting salt water into drinking water. The 
Dutch also provided twenty new water tankers, which were to supply clean 
drinking water to a large number of desert villages not connected up to the 
mains.26 One crucial and time-consuming task for 1 nlbg continued to be 
securing fuel supplies to the province, for which cimic personnel arranged 
the	logistics	from	the	refinery	in	Shaibah	right	up	to	the	petrol	pumps	in	
Al Muthanna.
Following four months of Dutch presence in Iraq, almost all public 
facilities were still in a deplorable state. Yet the Iraqis were very grateful for 
everything the nlbg had done, something which would change over time as 
disappointment with the international presence in general grew. Whereas 
the Dutch Marines had initially been rather jealous of the funds available 
to 2/5 Marines and the large us Government Support Team, 1 nlbg 
ultimately succeeded in spending more money than the Americans. This 
was the result of the battle group’s efforts to fully integrate operations 
with the cpa and to make creative and enthusiastic use of cerp and cpa 
budgets as well as the Dutch government Peace Fund. In total, 1 nlbg 
spent nearly 3.5 million us dollars on projects.27
“Spend the money!”
Due to his organisation’s faltering reconstruction efforts, cpa chief Paul 
Bremer decided to boost the cerp funds under military control at the end 
of 2003. To do so, he used Iraqi oil revenues.28 This was good news for 
the Dutch in Al Muthanna. “We got to push the money out quickly for 
the next seven months,” the senior us administrator in Baghdad stated 
at a meeting of cpa and divisional commanders at the end of November 
2003. In addition to ssr, Bremer allocated priority to essential services 
and job creation schemes and stressed the difference between “short 
and long dollars”. The sums for long-term budgets, paid out of the 18.6 
billion dollar budget allocated to Iraq by us Congress in December, seemed 
astronomical. Al Muthanna was earmarked to receive 246 million us 
dollars. However, there had been no coordination with the cpa or the cimic 
organisation in the province about these funds, and the cpa in As Samawah 
expected that only a very small portion of this money would actually be 
spent before the end of the occupation.29 Yet even the short-term budgets 
were impressive. For the period from December 2003 to April 2004, the 
cpa made a total of 30 million us dollars available to mnd South-East.30 
As	 long	 as	 the	 expenditure	 could	be	 justified	 and	 tendering	procedures	
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were transparent, the motto within the British-led division was: “Spend 
the money!”31
During the second rotation, the cimic organisation of the nlbg changed 
with the arrival of an organic cimic Support Element (cse).	This	unit	of	fifteen	
personnel from the different services was commanded by Major Michiel 
Posthumus.	 Together	 with	 a	 further	 five	 officials	 in	 staff	 section	 9	 (cimic) 
of 2 nlbg, a total of 21 military personnel worked full-time on civil-military 
matters. The nlbg’s infantry companies each had its own cimic representatives 
too, who focused on initiating smaller-scale projects costing several thousand 
us dollars.32 These qips continued to be important and varied from the 
distribution of gas bottles among locals to the “Ramadan snack-attack”, an 
initiative in which the units donated iftar, the celebratory meal which Muslims 
eat after sundown during Ramadan, to the less well-off.33
Lieutenant Colonel Oppelaar of 2 nlbg stressed in his correspondence 
with the Defence Staff that the mission in Iraq was totally different from 
other international operations (before) and “adhering dogmatically to 
doctrines will therefore not help Iraq, and certainly not Al Muthanna, to 
progress”.34 Of all the rotations, 2 nlbg would prove the most generous when 
it came to spending on cimic tasks. At the end of 2003, the battle group and 
cimic in particular entered a “golden age”. The monthly cerp budget shot up 
to 400,000 us dollars, temporarily peaking at 1.5 million just before New 
Year.35 On one occasion, Major Posthumus returned from the weekly cimic 
meeting in Basra with 684,000 us dollars in his rucksack.36
The maximum sum for which a brigade or battalion commander could 
personally sign rose at this time from 10,000 to 50,000 us dollars. From 15 
January 2004, the battle group commander could even approve initiatives 
up to 100,000 us dollars.37 Lieutenant Colonel Oppelaar delegated some of 
this responsibility to his company commanders, who were now permitted 
to approve projects of up to 10,000 us dollars. By now, the list of completed 
small	 and	medium-sized	projects	was	 impressive.	Thanks	 to	 the	Dutch,	
for instance, sixteen kilometres of the road through As Samawah were 
illuminated – when there was power – and large medical storage depots 
had been constructed for the hospitals 1 nlbg had renovated in Al Khidr and 
Ar Rumaythah. The television station had also been thoroughly renovated. 
The	various	provincial	and	urban	government	services	received	dozens	of	
water tankers, fuel tankers and school buses. With respect to fuel supplies, 
2 nlbg arrived just in time to see the opening of the new strategic storage 
capacity for six million litres of petrol.38 In Al Khidr, a bridge was rebuilt 
and the cement factory opened a second production line. Of the total of 4.4 
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million us dollars spent by 2 nlbg’s cimic team on nearly 300 projects, over 
86 per cent was funded from the cerp budget, about 11 per cent from cpa 
funds and slightly over 2 per cent from the Dutch cimic reserve.39
2 nlbg distinguished itself not only through the millions of us dollars 
under its control but also by successfully appealing to the recently much-
increased funds of ‘long dollars’ held by cpa-Central in Baghdad. In doing 
so,	the	Dutch	clearly	entered	into	the	field	of	structural	reconstruction	and	
local government, by submitting proposals in conjunction with the local 
Iraqi authorities. The objective was to ensure that the millions of us dollars 
promised to Al Muthanna would indeed reach the province in good time. 
2 nlbg had major ambitions in this respect, as in early December 2003 the 
unit set itself the target of committing 100 million us dollars to the region’s 
reconstruction.40
With this objective in mind, from January 2004 the cimic section 
worked on the construction of a power station to supply forty to sixty 
megawatts of electricity. The idea was that it would improve the power 
supply not just to the cement factory – which since the opening of the 
second production line required about thirty megawatts per day – but 
also to the local population. The 23 million us dollar plan, which Baghdad 
ultimately	approved,	signified	major	progress	 in	energy	supplies	 for	 the	
province. At that time, the power supply capacity in Al Muthanna, supplied 
from	power	 stations	outside	 the	province,	fluctuated	between	 forty	 and	
fifty	megawatts,	while	 the	daily	 requirement	was	nearly	 four	 times	 that	
amount.41 The power supply project was initially to start in March 2004 
and be completed in August of that year, but was delayed.42 Other large-
scale initiatives by 2 nlbg	included	a	ring	road,	which	was	to	divert	traffic	
on the Route Jackson highway from the centre of As Samawah to the edge 
of	the	town,	and	a	water	purification	plant	to	the	north	of	Ar	Rumaythah	
worth 65 million us dollars. The latter was to provide clean drinking 
water for the entire province. These projects more than met the target of 
100 million us dollars, and 2 nlbg	thus	made	the	first	push	for	the	proper	
reconstruction of Al Muthanna.43
One major driver behind the proliferation of the cimic process was the 
availability of large sums of money from Coalition sources. This seemingly 
positive development was also the result of cpa weakness and the absence 
of civilian development organisations.44 While the military operation 
continued apace, at the start of 2004 the Coalition devoted far too little 
attention and resources to equally important civilian efforts. This meant 
that the Dutch military had to step up its efforts in the civilian sphere on 
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its own initiative. The positive effect was that the enormous expenditures 
reflected	a	great	deal	of	credit	on	the	Dutch	battle	group.45 “Army fatigues” 
were	always	visible	at	official	presentations	of	materials,	finished	projects	
or openings of new facilities, and the nlbg commander would always 
accompany cpa administrator Jim Soriano at the start or completion of 
major infrastructural or industrial projects.
During the winter of 2003-2004, Dutch cimic personnel in the cpa 
building in As Samawah spent more money more quickly than the military 
budget	holders	could	keep	up	with.	The	unusually	large	flows	of	money	in	
the area of operations therefore started to raise questions. At the Dutch 
Naval Staff there were rumours of millions of us dollars lying around the 
cpa building. Alarm bells sounded at the Netherlands Ministry of Defence 
when, at the end of its tour, 2 nlbg	proved	to	have	a	cash	deficit	of	124,000	
us dollars and accusations surfaced in the Dutch media about bribes 
allegedly paid to Dutch military personnel for the allocation of contracts. 
A subsequent investigation at mnd South-East	 showed	 that	 the	 deficit	
on the balance sheet could be accounted for: a number of projects by 1 
and 2 nlbg turned out initially not to have been included in the division’s 
administration.
That just left the much more serious accusation of corruption. 
This was in fact levelled only at a number of interpreters hired locally. 
These Iraqis made an initial selection when translating quotes and 
gave preference to paying contractors.46 This episode did set the tone, 
however. cimic operations on such a large scale were starting to be seen as 
a liability for the mission. The suspicions from the Netherlands came at a 
bad time for the nlbg. Now that the Netherlands was preparing to restrict 
the cimic effort, serious problems in Iraq were just beginning. In the eyes 
of	the	Iraqis,	the	Coalition	was	not	fulfilling	its	promise	of	a	prosperous	
new Iraq. The growing lack of security triggered by the burgeoning 
rebellion and by sectarian violence was undermining the credibility of 
the international presence even more. A questionnaire in the autumn of 
2003	indicated	that	47	per	cent	of	Iraqis	had	confidence	in	the	cpa. A few 
months later, in March 2004, this had dropped to 14 per cent.47
The key role of reconstruction funds
The failing civilian reconstruction effort and the occupation’s crisis of 
legitimacy caused military controlled development funds to be assigned 
greater importance. The administrative chaos in Al Muthanna during 
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the early spring of 2004 underlined this and made it plain that the cimic 
task encompassed more than just winning over the hearts and minds of the 
Iraqis with a view to force protection. The essence of the mission was at stake 
as, according to Lieutenant Colonel Oppelaar shortly before his departure, 
“the bottom [was threatening to fall out] of the new Iraqi governance 
model”.	 There	 was	 still	 insufficient	 clarity	 on	 the	 tasks,	 authorities	 and	
responsibilities of the local administrative councils, as Paul Bremer’s Order 
on Local Governance had spent months awaiting signature. 
Even more harmful to the new Iraqi authorities was the lack of 
financial	resources	for	actually	implementing	their	policies.48 Virtually no 
funds had been received from Baghdad for the purpose of investment and 
the provincial Governate Council was not yet permitted to levy taxes. This 
forced nlbg	to	haphazardly	plug	the	gap	with	projects	financed	by	cerp and 
cpa funds. During a visit to Iraq by Defence Minister Kamp and Foreign 
Minister Bot, the new British cpa-South chief Patrick Nixon pointed 
out the importance of the Dutch-led cimic projects. In his view, they 
contributed fundamentally to the visibility of the occupation authorities 
and to stability as a whole.49 The Dutch cimic team was even paying minor 
operational budgets of Iraqi government bodies and in doing so helped to 
keep public administration functioning. According to diplomat Robbert 
van Lanschot, the new political adviser who had taken up his post at the 
end of February, these military efforts provided only temporary solace by 
treating the symptoms instead of the cause.50 
with a spending limit of 100,000 us dollars per cerp project, 
Lieutenant Colonel Van Harskamp of 3 nlbg could still afford to spend 
generously. Small projects, such as providing blackboards for primary 
schools, continued to be implemented.51 The cimic team also provided 
emergency aid in the shape of thousands of sandbags to the irrigation 
department in Al Khidr when the river dyke in town threatened to give 
way. Dutch and Japanese engineers subsequently reinforced the water 
defences.	Medium-sized	projects	 such	 as	 road	 and	bridge	 construction	
were also conducted by 3 nlbg. However, the fragility of the cimic effort 
without Dutch funds was demonstrated when cpa-Central temporarily 
froze	the	cerp fund in June 2004 in order to get its books in order.52 With 
the civil cpa fund already closed, this suddenly left 3 nlbg empty-handed. 
The cerp fund was to be continued using us tax revenue, but the extent to 
which	the	Dutch	battle	group	would	benefit	from	it	was	unclear.53
By the time of the change of command to 4 nlbg, Dutch military 
personnel had spent about 11 million us dollars on cimic and ssr projects, 
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1.2 million of which came from Dutch national funds.54 In addition, over 
100 million us dollars in long-term project proposals had been approved 
by the cpa in Baghdad in early 2004. In spite of this enormous effort and 
the substantial sums involved, cimic personnel felt that their work had 
little effect on actual progress in Al Muthanna. And although they had 
successfully created support, the ‘gratitude’ of the locals had a limited 
shelf-life.55	 A	 Dutch	 project	 officer	 for	 water	 and	 irrigation	 noticed	 that	
the Iraqis were quickly becoming more demanding. When he arrived at the 
provincial	water	department	with	a	brand-new	digger,	the	Iraqi	official	bluntly	
asked: “only one?”56
The infrastructure and facilities in the Shiite south were in such poor 
condition after years of neglect that such criticism was understandable. 
The authorities faced an enormous challenge. During the visit to Iraq by 
the Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence at the end of February 
2004, governor Al Hassani called the 236 million us dollars provided to his 
province by the cpa “far too little”.57 When he asked whether the Netherlands 
could not do more with respect to construction tasks, Minister Kamp again 
explained the Dutch government’s stance: the Netherlands was there 
mainly to provide security and 125 million euros had already been spent 
on this military operation. The money for rebuilding Al Muthanna had to 
come from the Americans and the Japanese.58
The arrival of the Japanese humanitarian aid battalion had been eagerly 
awaited by both the Iraqis and the Dutch. The promise of 1.5 billion us 
dollars in funds had prompted the Netherlands to provide extensive military 
support for the Japanese deployment. A large portion of this sum was 
destined for Al Muthanna and the Japanese battalion was to concentrate on 
important areas such as water supplies, healthcare and infrastructure. The 
Dutch battle group was initially impressed with the massive Japanese effort, 
but disappointment soon followed when it became clear that results would 
take months.59 After its deployment in March 2004, the main Japanese 
force, a unit of 535 military personnel and 5 diplomats, devoted its time 
almost exclusively to setting itself up in the new camp near As Samawah, 
not far from Camp Smitty. The Japanese depended heavily on the Dutch for 
temporary accommodation, support in building activities, introductions to 
local bodies and force protection in general.
The cimic team of 2 nlbg attempted to get a few major infrastructural 
projects on the Japanese agenda and 3 nlbg	initiated	five	joint	medium-term	
projects with them relating to electricity, water, agriculture and livestock.60 
All hope of rapid implementation evaporated among the Dutch, however, 
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when they learned of the slow bureaucratic processes for obtaining the 
required money from Japan. The effectiveness of the Japanese was also 
undermined by the extreme political sensitivity of the mission in Japan 
and their “unaccustomed and immature” way of conducting operations, 
which the Dutch military ascribed to a lack of experience.61 
Exaggerated	force	protection	measures	made	contact	with	Iraqis	difficult	
and the restrictive instructions on the use of force created uncertainty. In 
particular after the mortar attack on the Japanese camp on 7 April, the 
battalion seemed to leave it only occasionally. The diplomats, who dealt 
with spending the funds, never set foot outside the camp.62 The Japanese 
tended to make many promises, but were hardly able to keep them. This 
undermined their credibility and security. Al Muthanna’s people knew that 
a great deal could be gained from the Japanese, yet there were few visible 
results	during	the	first	six	months.	This	led	to	demonstrations	outside	the	
entrance to the Japanese camp. In mid-April 2004 a couple of Japanese 
were taken hostage and not released until a few days later.63
There was great disappointment, not just among the locals but also at 
3 nlbg. At a practical level, cooperation with the Japanese was hard. Culture 
and	language	barriers	proved	difficult	to	break	down.	Both	the	nlbg and the 
cpa were scathing in their assessment of the willingness of the Japanese to 
coordinate their efforts. This led to the duplication of projects, as well as 
abuse, as some Iraqis were not shy of demanding duplicate payments for 
services rendered.64	In	the	meantime,	the	initial	five	joint	projects	did	not	
get off the ground. Friction increased between the Dutch and Japanese due 
to the massive media attention the Japanese obtained, often at the expense 
of Dutch cimic efforts. In June, they even copied – with great precision – 
a nlbg information campaign, using stickers and billboards trumpeting 
their own achievements. They also lured local Iraqi interpreters away from 
the Dutch by doubling their salaries.65 Complaints by 3 nlbg about such 
practices mounted steadily. At the Ministry of Defence in The Hague, these 
were added up in what became known as “the Dutch-Japanese cooperation 
‘Black Book’”.66 In June, the battle group threatened to throw in the towel. 
Conciliation by mnd South-East and pressure from The Hague kept the 
working relationship with the Japanese aid battalion going, however.67
Two million euros for the ‘Beggar’s Army’




and starts. Lieutenant Colonel Van Harskamp therefore started to press 
for additional Dutch funds for his successors. When, at the end of May, he 
understood	that	his	request	had	been	“ruthlessly”	shoved	aside,	he	flew	
off the handle. In his daily report he accused colleagues in The Hague, 
who had turned down his proposal “sitting at desks, apparently without 
any background knowledge”, of narrow-mindedness.68 The reply from the 
Defence (Staff) Crisis Management Centre, by now renamed the Defence 
Operations Centre (doc), was that they were lobbying up to ministerial 
level	to	get	the	flow	of	structural	development	funds	from	Baghdad	going	
again. Yet the Netherlands itself did not want “to provide a budget at 
national level to compensate for the drying-up of cerp funds”.69
Van Harskamp refused to give up. Just before the change of command 
to 4 nlbg, he backed up his arguments with a warning: “I hope that if there 
are	any	casualties	as	a	result	of	violence	by	dissatisfied	citizens,	officials	
in The Hague will recall this discussion and accept the consequences.”70 
This was too much for the Defence Staff. The Director of Operations, 
Air Commodore Cobelens, replied to the commander of 3 nlbg that his 
suggestions were deemed improper. He pointed out that The Hague and 
the battle group were not separate entities with opposing objectives, but 
working together to make the deployment a success. Cobelens thought 
it	unfitting	for	the	nlbg commander to suggest a causal link between the 
absence of a larger Dutch cimic budget and potential future casualties.71
Yet Lieutenant Colonel Van Harskamp was supported in his general 
view by the Dutch contingent commander in Shaibah, Colonel Aart Kuil, 
and by the political adviser at mnd South-East, diplomat Marc Bentinck, as 
well as later by his successor Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen.72 From Basra, 
Bentinck predicted that 4 nlbg would have a considerably tougher time in 
military and political terms than its predecessors. He therefore urged the 
Ministry	of	Defence	to	provide	the	new	commander	with	sufficient	funds.73 
After he took up his post, Colonel Matthijssen also requested additional 
cimic funds. His appeal was refused, however.74 
Within mnd South-East, the Dutch were by now known as the “Beggar’s 
Army”, because the cimic section of 4 nlbg was working hard to prise money 
out of headquarters.75 The other partner countries within the division were 
much better funded by their own national governments. The British troops 
had uk government budgets during the winter that amounted to 31 million 
us dollars.76 Towards the end of the occupation, the uk government added 
another £10 million (about 17 million us dollars). The Italian government 
made available 4 million euros in cimic funds to its brigade in Dhi Qar.77
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In August 2004, 4 nlbg’s cimic Support Element initiated an ambitious long-
term project to set up a cooperative agricultural organisation in which the 
farmers’ unions and the Department of Agriculture of Al Muthanna were 
represented. At this time, 4 nlbg was becoming increasingly frustrated 
at the lack of decisiveness among local administrators, who no longer 
seemed to treat the penniless Dutch as a useful partner. cimic personnel 
therefore increasingly turned to the tribal leaders with project proposals.78 
The main international partners continued to be military, such as the us 
Army Corps of Engineers, which from October worked on constructing the 
power station that had been initiated by 2 nlbg.79 The relationship with 
the Japanese battalion was also given fresh impetus by the lack of money. 
Cooperation with the Japanese continued to be viewed as “an ordeal” 
according to cimic	officials,	but	4 nlbg nevertheless attempted to integrate 
a growing number of projects with the Japanese: “we built a road, they 
built a bridge; we built a road, they asphalted it”.80
A	 temporary	 solution	 for	 the	 battle	 group’s	 financial	 problems	 was	
provided – once again – by the Americans. In July, they deposited another 
large sum into the cerp fund after all. The Dutch in Al Muthanna were told 
that they had been allocated 750,000 us dollars that had to be spent by mid-
September 2004.81 This cerp money at least enabled 4 nlbg to make a tangible 
difference for a couple of months. Yet compared to previous rotations, its 
cimic	Support	Element	–	paradoxically	the	largest	so	far	at	thirty	officials	–	
had to spend carefully. It also remained unclear which budget 5 nlbg would 
be able to use to make a credible cimic contribution later that year.
Lack of money was certainly not the only reason for the gradual 
estrangement between the Dutch battle group and the Iraqis. Support for 
the authorities – the core of the Dutch military mission – had become 
more complex. Due to the ending of the occupation and the start of Iraqi 
self-governance, 4 nlbg had far less insight into and control over political 
and administrative developments than its predecessors. Moreover, the 
dismantling of the cpa building-cum-cimic centre in As Samawah meant 
the loss of the physical Dutch (military) presence as a major hub in civil-
military relations between the provincial administration, the cimic team, 




of the operation, dwindled. Michel Rentenaar’s successor Robbert van 
Lanschot	still	had	his	office	next	to	that	of	provincial	cpa head Soriano until 
210
A Gentle Occupation
the end of June, but no longer served as his adviser due to the appointment 
of a separate American cpa ‘Polad’. The executive role of the Dutch political 
adviser in the administrative build-up task had therefore ceased.
None	of	 the	 four	diplomats	 from	Foreign	Affairs	who	filled	the	post	
after January 2004 was able to build up the same position as Rentenaar. 
The new rotational system of two alternating advisers implemented from 
the late summer of 2004 meant that each diplomat spent no more than 
six	weeks	 ‘in	 the	field’	 at	 a	 time.82 There were sometimes gaps between 
their postings, leaving the seat temporarily vacant. The effectiveness of 
the advisers also incidentally decreased due to the limitations on the use 
of dedicated bodyguards from the Marechaussee. This meant that the 
diplomats could go out less frequently for a number of months.83
The Dutch political advisers’ tasks had therefore been watered down 
in the course of 2004 to the formal job description which had been given 
at the start of the mission: advising the military commander on political 
matters and reporting on the local situation. This development displayed 
an interesting parallel with the changing role of the battle group. After the 
end of the occupation, the tasks of the Dutch military contingent had in 
practice been reduced to their formal proportions: support for the civilian 
authorities largely by playing a background security role. Police operations 
and interfering in administration were no longer a part of the mission and 
also cimic, a task which had gone far beyond its formal framework during 
the	first	year,	had	to	go	back	in	its	box.	A	year	after	the	start	of	the	Iraq	
mission, from June 2004, the assignment and caveats with which the 
Dutch	government	had	sent	its	troops	to	Southern	Iraq	in	July	2003	finally	
corresponded to the actual situation on the ground, although by then the 
political constellation and threat level in Iraq had changed fundamentally.
It was during this phase, with a new battle group adjusting the mission 
to the radically altered circumstances, that the second Sadr revolt broke out. 
Even though Al Muthanna was a sideshow, the ambush in Ar Rumaythah 
was the low point for the Dutch deployment as a whole. When, in addition 
to extra armoured vehicles, infantry platoons and intelligence capacity, 
the	Dutch	government	made	available	2	million	euros	just	five	days	after	
the incident, the military on the ground in Al Muthanna were relieved and 
somewhat irritated at the same time.84 Following many resolute refusals to 
add Dutch money to the cimic budget, this sudden generosity in the wake 
of a major attack on the Dutch forces seemed like a form of incident-driven 
hyper-correction. Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen had in fact requested 
only 1 million euros, half of what was now provided.85
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Security assistance and reform
After the Sadr uprisings, the ssr task was also given an additional boost. 
For 4 nlbg, this meant really just a shift in emphasis, as support for the 
Iraqi Security Forces was already one of the unit’s main tasks at the start 
of its deployment. The operational concept of security assistance ‘in the 
background’ entailed providing concrete support for the Iraqi authorities 
when requested, while constantly working on the further build-up and 
improvement of the Iraqi security forces. The second Sadr uprising had 
made it clear that the police force and National Guard were still incapable of 
acting adequately against serious disruptions to public order and security. 
The leadership and quality of personnel in these bodies were sub-standard, 
their	management	and	planning	poor,	the	influence	of	the	tribes	and	political	
parties too great as well as disruptive. The Dutch did not believe that simply 
monitoring and mentoring these organisations, as initiated during 3 nlbg’s 
stint, would bring them up to the required ‘higher plan’.86
In the summer of 2004, the Iraqi police force in Al Muthanna had 
grown to over 1,400 members.87	 The	 force	 had	 quickly	 been	 filled	
through nepotism and tribalism. The quality of its personnel therefore 
left something to be desired. The best functioning security force was the 
special unit set up in 2003 as the Police Support Unit, now called Tactical 
Support Unit (tsu). It provided both detachments of riot police, who were 
stationed in the different towns, and special arrest teams for entering and 
searching compounds. In September 2004, a tsu Emergency Battalion was 
added to provide rapid general support. As its name suggests, this reaction 
force was a militarily inspired unit with many former soldiers in its ranks. 
It	comprised	five	companies.	Of	the	750	posts	in	this	battalion,	about	650	
were	quickly	filled.88 There were also less well-staffed, specialised police 
services in Al Muthanna, such as the Highway Police and the railway 
police.89 The border police remained unchanged at about 200 members, 
still far too few for a province with such an extensive border area. At 530 
men, the National Guard unit (603 Iraqi National Guard Battalion) also 
remained understaffed, but reinforcements were on their way in the short 
term.90 Overall, the security services in Al Muthanna seemed adequately 
set up by the autumn of 2004. 
The shortcomings in Iraqi security structures had on the other hand 
been	 identified	 several	 times	by	 anyone	dealing	with	 them,	 such	 as	 the	
personnel at the Provincial Joint Coordination Center91 and Dutch police 




meeting of the Provincial Security Committee that the heads of the Al 
Muthanna security organisations did not make policy and instead only 
discussed incidents. They blocked solutions for structural shortcomings by 
constantly	citing	their	financial	and	material	problems	and	their	shortages	
in personnel. Although these certainly existed, the cause was at least to 
a degree also poor planning on the part of the security organisation’s 
management itself, resulting in relatively high numbers of personnel being 
used for static security tasks at police stations, permanent roadblocks and 
government buildings. The police and National Guard conducted too few 
vehicle and foot patrols.93
Of all the security services, the regular police force received the worst 
assessment. In August, 4 nlbg’s ‘ssr Plan’ painted a gloomy picture of the state 
of affairs: “The average policeman does not possess the required knowledge 
and skills to do his job properly.” The Dutch concluded that the emphasis was 
“on	quantity	rather	than	quality”.	The	police	themselves	had	little	confidence	
about their abilities. They also lacked the correct equipment and most of 
their premises were in poor condition. In spite of many police being deployed 
on guard duties, many stations were unlikely to be able to repel external 
threats. The Dutch feared that without their help the police could become “‘a 
plaything’ for the different resistance movements”. The ssr report proposed 
that any effort to make improvements should start at the top.94
A great deal of criticism could be levelled at the style of leadership of 
senior	police	officers,	particularly	the	acting	Chief	of	Police	of	the	province,	
Kareem Halaibet Menaher al Zayadi, and some of his local commanders. 
For instance, in Colonel Veltman’s opinion the performance of the 
district commander of Al Khidr was “mediocre”, as was shown during an 
inspection in June. The policeman “demonstrated little involvement in 
practical policing”.95 His colleague in Ar Rumaythah was not much better. 
On the one hand, he was very skilfull in giving the impression of being 
highly capable, yet on the other he led the most unreliable police force in 
the province.
2 and 3 nlbg had frequently pressed for the dismissal of the provincial 
Chief of Police, Kareem, as the Dutch had plenty of evidence of corruption 
on his part. The former soldier, with a Republican Guard past under 
Saddam Hussein, was known systematically to cream off funds destined 
for his organisation for his own personal use and that of his tribe.96 Since 
December 2003, Kareem had formally been interim provincial police 
chief. He landed the job after his boss had lost a power struggle with 
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governor Al Hassani. The Dutch suspected that his appointment arose 
from	an	agreement	to	split	power	between	the	influential	Al	Zayadi	tribe	
(to which Kareem belonged) and Hassani’s own clan, the Albu Hassan. 
An attempt in March 2004 by the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior to dismiss 
Kareem was blocked by Hassani with the argument that the Lieutenant 
Colonel was only interim and that formally therefore there already was a 
vacancy.97 After the transfer of sovereignty at the end of June, Hassani’s 
position had become unassailable and his conduct exceedingly elusive. 
None	of	the	Dutch	officials	could	exercise	any	influence	any	longer	to	have	
Kareem removed.
In the wake of the major ambush in Ar Rumaythah in August, the 
Dutch no longer concealed their anger at the bad situation within the Al 
Muthanna security services. On the contrary, even the Minister of Defence 
expressed direct and open criticism. During a working visit in October, 
Minister Kamp publicly challenged the way in which the authorities in the 
province had dealt with and responded to the various threats and insurgent 
activities. The Dutch argued that the Al Muthanna security services had 
just stood back and retreated, and that was unacceptable.
Kamp	specifically	denounced	the	fact	 that	 the	rebels	 in	Ar	Rumaythah	
had been able to conduct their ambush unhindered and considered it part of a 
wider problem. In the minister’s opinion, the police forces were unprofessional 
and, perhaps worse, unwilling. The latter was seen by the Dutch as a kind 
of betrayal. During a meeting with governor Al Hassani, Kamp indignantly 
hinted	at	a	breach	of	confidence,	which	more	or	less	led	to	a	public	clash	with	
the	 Iraqi	 official.	 Journalists	 present	 described	 how	 a	 “visibly	 irritated	 Al	
Hassani” took the reprimands of the Dutch minister as a warning to withdraw 
the battle group. “You must not make threats like that,” the governor reacted, 
“especially not with the local media nearby. It will encourage terrorists.”98
In order to turn the tide, 4 nlbg set itself a number of targets with 
respect to ssr. Firstly, the Dutch unit resumed mentoring and monitoring 
of the security services, as well as conducting joint patrols and improving 
infrastructure, such as police stations, checkpoints and prisons. There 
was steady progress on training the National Guard too, the objective 
being to bring its battalion up to proper strength. There were also efforts 
to equip the Guard better. However, there was no short-term solution to 
problems such as the desperate shortage of accommodation and high-
quality vehicles, and these persisted for many months.99 In October, the 
National Guard battalion was reinforced with two hundred new recruits. 
In November, a second round of recruit training started, resulting in the 
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unit being fully staffed a short time later.100 The Guard soldiers were also 
given heavier weapons, such as machine guns and rpgs.101 The border 
police, another undermanned organisation, had to wait longer for its 
expansion but, here too, efforts by 4 nlbg led to permission from Baghdad 
to recruit hundreds of new personnel. Via their cimic funds, the Dutch also 
facilitated the construction of additional border posts.102
A provincial police training school was also set up and the pjcc, 
initially created during 2 nlbg’s deployment, was transformed into a 
fully-fledged	 provincial	 emergency	 command	 centre	 or	 Provincial	 Joint	
Operations Center (pjoc). Following the October visit by Minister Kamp, 
4 nlbg also made proposals which were aimed at providing “an additional 
boost” to improving the Iraqi security structures, and in particular their 
management. This ‘Matthijssen Plan’ – as it quickly became known in The 
Hague – provided for the further physical improvement of police stations 
and teaching of specialist courses, leadership courses and management 
training to “the more senior police cadres” and members of the National 
Guard. In early 2005, twenty “high potentials” from the Iraqi police and 
eight from the National Guard received training in the Netherlands.103
Finally, the nlbg	 focused	 specifically	 on	 the	 police	 force	 in	 Ar	
Rumaythah, the organisation which since the second Sadr uprising and 
due to its aloof or even hostile attitude had been earmarked as “suspect”. 
nlbg commander Matthijssen asserted that in his view “a large part” of 
this force needed to be replaced.104 The initiative to do so lay with the 
Iraqi authorities. Governor Al Hassani appeared to be cooperating. He 
indicated that he wanted to “give the police force a good clean-up”. It was 
unclear, however, whether he really dared to act in his hometown. He 
may well have been paying lip service to the indignation of the Dutch in 
order to avoid openly clashing with them. Al Hassani’s position had often 
been unclear since the latest crisis and he displayed a seemingly unwilling 
attitude. Moreover, as Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen reported, it was 
doubtful whether the governor was even capable of achieving such a large-
scale clean-up.105
The Dutch commander therefore preferred to connect his efforts to 
a national Iraqi ‘Quality Improvement Plan’ for the police and use this 
programme to identify and replace “unsuitable ip personnel” top-down.106 
To this end, in September the Dutch military police started to “map out” 
all personnel in the police force in Ar Rumaythah in order to prepare 
recommendations for “possible replacement procedures”.107 Although 
Matthijssen thought that something needed to be done in the short term, 
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this strategy meant that he was dependent on higher echelons and it 
therefore took time. As he reported to The Hague, he was told that the 
Iraqi authorities’ improvement programme had been delayed and would 
not kick off in the southern provinces until November. This was a set-back 
for the commander, as he estimated that the actual dismissal of policemen 
could then commence only after the general elections in January 2005. 
The Iraqi government and its American sponsor apparently wanted at all 
costs	to	keep	the	police	force	at	full	strength	in	order	for	the	country’s	first	
democratic elections to be a success.108
By this time, a provincial Police Training School had been kicked off, 
thanks	to	the	renovation	and	fitting	out	of	a	building	in	As	Samawah.	Staff	
for the school had already been arranged. In September 2004, 4 nlbg’s mp 
platoon	started	the	first	courses,	the	very	first	being	on	firearms.109 This 
was followed by a refresher course for the riot police, a course for existing 
and	 new	 prison	 officers,	 police	 officer	 training	 and	 basic	 training	 for	
personnel of the new tsu Emergency Battalion.110 
When the security situation appeared to have normalised in September 
and the Sadrists and other troublemakers – with the exception of a small 
group of radicals in Ar Rumaythah – were acting less militantly, 4 nlbg 
conducted two ssr-inspired operations along the border with Saudi Arabia, 
which had been prepared earlier but postponed due to the Sadr uprising. 
The October operations took place in different parts of the border area 
and	were	a	 renewed	attempt	 to	 intercept	possible	enemy	 infiltrators	on	
their way to Sunni-dominated areas in Central Iraq and to support the 
Iraqi border police, who were still short-staffed. Operations Knock Out 
and	Buzzard	were	planned	to	take	place	shortly	one	after	the	other,	to	be	
conducted together with British, Italian and us troops in both Al Muthanna 
and the neighbouring province of Najaf.111
In	Operation	Buzzard,	which	started	on	10	October,	a	multinational	
detachment of Dutch, British, us and Italian troops set up a Forward 
Operating Base near the border with Saudi-Arabia and the neighbouring 
province of Najaf. The fob served as a command post and logistics and 
medical support facility, including two us Blackhawk helicopters for medevac. 
The base was used for operations along the border lasting a week, in which 
Dutch platoons took on the southern section in Al Muthanna and British 
Marines	 the	 area	 to	 the	 north,	 in	 what	 was	 officially	 Najaf	 territory.	 The	
allied troops conducted joint patrols with the Iraqi border police and manned 
temporary checkpoints, stopping and searching vehicles.112 At the same time, 
the international forces visited the permanent border posts in order to set up 
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communications by installing hf radios at the posts and in vehicles. Signals 
specialists taught the Iraqis how to use the new equipment. The operation 
was mainly aimed at the future expansion of the border police by four to six 
hundred men and at constructing eight more permanent strongpoints.113
4 nlbg thus completed its tour with an emphasis on ssr. The direct 
support and coaching gave the Iraqi security services a new sense of self-
confidence,	after	morale	had	plummeted	in	the	wake	of	the	violence	of	the	
Sadr rebellion. In Ar Rumaythah, too, Bravo Company again tentatively 
started to support the police and the National Guard. The transition from 
the pjcc to pjoc was supported with discussions on objectives and methods 
of the future command post, and with exercises using scale models. The 
infrastructural changes for the pjoc were completed at the end of October, 
a	major	milestone.	In	his	final	report	on	14	November,	Lieutenant	Colonel	
Matthijssen looked back with satisfaction on the ssr tasks, which he viewed 
as the “focus” of his operation. He emphasised the “modus operandi” of 
the Dutch, “with respect for the culture and people”, which in his view led 
to the battle group’s initiatives having been easily accepted by the Iraqis.114
The fifth contingent
The next Dutch contingent in Al Muthanna, 5 nlbg, took over responsibility 
for the province from 4 nlbg on 15 November 2004. The new battle group 
was built up around 11 Air Assault Infantry Battalion (Grenadiers and 
Rifles	Guards	Regiment)	from	Schaarsbergen,	commanded	by	Lieutenant	
Colonel Frits van Dooren. His battalion task group had the same air assault 
background as 4 nlbg and operated using more or less the same structure, 
with the Staff and Heavy Weapons Company and Alpha Company in As 
Samawah, Bravo Company in Ar Rumaythah and Charlie Company in Al 
Khidr. One difference was that the last unit was originally a mechanised 
infantry unit from 17 Armoured Infantry Battalion (Prinses Irene Fuselier 
Guards Regiment). Infantry platoons from 11 Battalion’s own third 
company were spread across all units, as were two additional platoons 
from the ranks of sister unit 12 Infantry Battalion.115 In addition to 
normal framework operations relating to security in the province, the new 
contingent’s focal points were the impending general election in January 
2005 and the completion of as many cimic and ssr projects as possible.116
During	 his	 first	 day	 as	 nlbg commander, Lieutenant Colonel Van 
Dooren	 noted	 that	 the	 Dutch	 area	 of	 operations	 was	 still	 “significantly	
quieter” than other parts of Iraq, where tensions were in fact rising due 
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to the us offensive against the rebel stronghold of Fallujah that month. 
The Iraqi government had even declared a national state of emergency as 
a result of this crisis. Initial preparations for the ballots in January were 
also causing more violence elsewhere. The Dutch battle group commander 
cemented his wish to preserve the peace in his sector by intensifying 
contacts with the local population – in particular in the larger towns of As 
Samawah and Ar Rumaythah – and increasing the number of foot patrols 
and social patrols. His troops’ basic attitude towards the Iraqis should be 
one of “correct and respectful” conduct.117 
Instead of the more ‘distant’ operational concept applied by 4 nlbg, 
the new battle group again sought more contact with the local population 
by stepping up its patrols in the residential areas. It therefore returned 
to	 the	 operational	 philosopy	 of	 the	 first	 three	 contingents.	 The	 normal	
framework operations of 4 nlbg ‘in the background’ outside the towns, as 
had been decided was suitable after the leap towards Iraqi self-governance 
in June, were seen in retrospect to have caused a distancing from ordinary 
Iraqis. Lieutenant Colonel Van Dooren attempted to reverse this trend and 
increase his battle group’s seriously reduced situational awareness.
With respect to ssr, 5 nlbg got off to a positive start. The new cimic 
team’s	first	report	confirmed	that	the	Dutch	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	had	
approved the planned new buildings for the Police Training School in As 
Samawah. Via the local media the battle group invited Iraqi contractors to 
bid for the contract. The deadline for tenders was 22 November, after which 
a contractor was selected as quickly as possible to commence construction 
of the new 700,000-euro facilities in early December.118 The haste was due 
to the ending of the nlbg’s deployment four months later. Although no 
formal decision had as yet been taken to end the Dutch deployment, it was 
increasingly likely that 5 nlbg would be the last Dutch battle group in Al 
Muthanna. On his most recent visit to Iraq in October, Minister Kamp had 
already indicated that as far as he was concerned, the mission would not be 
extended after March 2005.119 In early November, a Dutch parliamentary 
majority seemed in favour of terminating the deployment too.120
With this deadline looming, the amount of work to be done increased. 
In the autumn of 2004, in the wake of the incidents of August, not only 
the Netherlands provided extra ssr funds for building up the Al Muthanna 
security services in the short term. mnd South-East also provided an 
additional 1.8 million us dollars for renovating or rebuilding twelve police 
stations.	The	Japanese	aid	battalion	took	it	upon	itself	to	fit	out	the	stations	
and provide them with furniture.121
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In the last few months of 2004, it also became clear that the National 
Guard in Al Muthanna was to be expanded by adding a battalion and a 
brigade staff. It was a remarkably ambitious step in a province where 
until that point the only battalion had been understaffed, still did not 
function properly and in fact comprised separately-operating infantry 
companies.122 The new brigade commander arrived on 13 December. His 
task was to oversee and direct the expansion process along with a number 
of	staff	officers.	Due	to	the	lack	of	elementary	infrastructure,	5 nlbg offered 
the Iraqi Guardsmen temporary accommodation at Camp Smitty. The 
officers	were	also	given	workspace.123 Like all National Guard units, the 
two-battalion brigade would eventually be incorporated into the new 
regular Iraqi army.124
In early 2005, on the eve of the general election, the Dutch thought 
that overall the main Iraqi security forces in Al Muthanna were functioning 
“reasonably well”. In the analysis of the nlbg’s political adviser, one major 
advantage of the province’s tribal nature still was the fact that “outsiders” 
stood out immediately. On the other hand, the intertwining of interests of 
those responsible for maintaining public order and certain tribes was seen 
as a disadvantage. Personal interests also played too great a part. Chief of 
Police	Kareem,	 for	 instance,	had	 expanded	his	 influence	 substantially	 by	
setting up the new tsu Emergency Battalion as “a kind of privately-run unit”, 
a	personal	militia.	In	spite	of	these	flaws,	5 nlbg viewed the creation of the 
pjoc	and	its	functioning	so	far	as	one	of	the	most	significant	steps	forward.	
During the elections on 30 January 2005, the pjoc was to act “as the focus 
for joint operations by the security organisations” and in doing so allow the 
elections to proceed safely.125
The run-up to elections
During	the	first	few	weeks	of	5 nlbg’s tour, there was little of note to report 
with respect to maintaining law and order. Its infantry companies had 
quickly got into their stride and were operating ever more closely with 
the Iraqi police and National Guard. Apart from a couple of incidents, 
there were many false alarms, which seemed to be aimed at testing the 
new battle group. During the hours of darkness, for example, there were 
suspicious movements by civilian vehicles close to Camp Smitty, which 
appeared to be either reconnaissance or provocation. 
On the evening of 19 November 2004, in a ‘problem area’ of As 
Samawah, a man threw a hand grenade at the last vehicle in a Dutch 
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patrol. There were no injuries.126 A few days later, in the early evening of 24 
November,	unknown	assailants	near	As	Samawah	fired	a	projectile	which	
passed close to Camp Smitty. It was unclear whether the target was the 
Dutch or nearby Japanese camp or the town itself. In line with standard 
operating procedures, military personnel took shelter in the bunkers and 
infantry	troops	left	the	camp	by	the	light	of	flares.	Their	search	led	to	the	
arrest of two armed men in a car, who were handed over to the Iraqi police. 
It	later	turned	out	that	two	flares	fired	by	the	battle	group	had	damaged	
homes in the town. With a view to keeping on good terms with the locals, 5 
nlbg paid compensation for this unintended collateral damage.127
The tensions that gripped the rest of Iraq due to the events in Fallujah 
also caused a few ripples in Al Muthanna. A great deal of the intelligence 
on suspected or actual threats in this period was linked to the fact that 
insurgents from the besieged rebel town had sought shelter in other parts 
of	the	country.	In	the	south,	these	fighters	were	helped	by	radical	groups	
such as the Sadrists, Baathist former regime loyalists or criminal tribes. 
For instance, members of the Sunni underground movement Ansar al 
Sunna joined the criminal Zuwaid tribe in the north of Al Muthanna. 
Sadrist leader Fadhil Ashaara at the same time was suspected of 
recruiting	fugitive	foreign	fighters	in	Nasiriyah	with	the	aim	of	attacking	the	
Dutch camp near Ar Rumaythah. 5 nlbg took the threats very seriously.128 
Lieutenant Colonel Van Dooren even stationed two Apaches and a medical 
helicopter at Camp Smitty for a while in order to cut their reaction time. 
Yet for the insurgents Al Muthanna remained mainly a logistics support 
location and a place to go underground and recuperate, and less of a 
target in its own right. This was again proven when Iraqi police discovered 
a storage site containing nineteen advanced ieds	 in	 the	open	fields	near	
the hamlet of Al Warka, close to Route Tampa, on 6 December. No-one 
saw this as an increased threat against 5 nlbg in Al Muthanna itself. It was 
viewed as the accidental discovery of explosives to be used elsewhere.129
The absence of attacks or other trouble meant that the last Dutch 
contingent’s operations quickly became dominated by the run-up to the 
national elections in January.130 Preparations for the big day had been 
going on for a couple of months by this point. The provincial delegation 
from the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (ieci) arrived at the 
end	 of	 October	 2004.	 This	 organisation’s	 first	 act	 was	 to	 register	 the	
electorate in November and December. With some help from the nlbg’s 
cimic section, the ieci	set	up	seventeen	registration	offices	throughout	the	
province, where heads of families could register the names of all potential 
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voters in their households. Political parties and individual candidates for 
public	offices	could	also	register	here.131 In contrast to elsewhere in Iraq, 
this process was conducted peacefully and in an orderly fashion.132
What made the elections so complicated was the large number of 
registered parties and candidates and the fact that four different levels of 
government were to be voted for. Over two hundred parties had registered 
for the general election alone. There were 32 parties on the list for the 
provincial elections. As newly-arrived political adviser Gerard Steeghs 
reported to The Hague, these could be divided into three categories: “local 
branches of national parties, religiously-inspired parties and provincial 
parties”.133 The tribes attempted to have frontmen elected in each party in 
order to retain their hold on provincial politics. The new Governate Council 
would also have to appoint a new governor afterwards. The intentions of 
incumbent governor Al Hassani were still unclear. He himself reported that 
his party, the sciri,	might	call	on	him	to	fill	a	ministerial	post	at	the	national	
level.134 He seemed to view this as an appealing way out, as he had lost a 
great deal of his popularity due to the inability of the provincial authorities 
to	solve	the	major	problems	faced	in	the	everyday	lives	of	ordinary	citizens.	
The population seemed to hold him responsible for the high unemployment, 
water, fuel and electricity shortages, and corruption.135
The ieci tried to remedy the Iraqis’ lack of experience in a free ballot by 
holding a wide-scale information campaign via the media, loudspeakers 
mounted	 on	 vehicles,	 the	 distribution	 of	 leaflets,	 and	 information	
sessions. The organisation appeared to be run professionally. However, 
the issue of security on the election day itself was a different matter. 
When	 the	 Dutch	 observed	 that	 there	 was	 insufficient	 initiative	 from	
the Iraqis in this respect, they took it upon themselves to act.136 From 
December, at the instigation of 5 nlbg, there were weekly meetings of 
an elections “security committee”, which included governor Al Hassani, 
chief of police Kareem, ing commander Awad Salman and Lieutenant 
Colonel Van Dooren.137 Even before Christmas, 5 nlbg organised a series 
of disaster response exercises to test the readiness of the Iraqi Security 
Forces. Various failings came to light, but, as the Dutch ssr instructors 
reported, “in terms of local criteria the exercise was a success”.138 
Subsequent exercises were also assessed positively.139
Once the ieci had decided on the locations for the 152 polling 
stations	 at	 the	 end	of	December,	 staff	 officers	 from	 the	 Iraqi	National	
Guard reconnoitred these locations in order to draw up a comprehensive 
provincial security plan. 5 nlbg conducted its own inventory in order to 
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monitor this planning process. The ieci recruited about four thousand 
volunteers to staff the polling stations, the senior members of which 
were given training organised by the un	 in	 Jordan.	 The	 first	 visible	
signs that the election campaign had kicked off were around New Year, 
when banners containing political slogans started to appear all around 
the towns. It was doubtful, however, whether these would be effective. 
It was generally assumed that the electorate’s votes would not be won 
over	by	conviction	but	could	be	obtained	financially	from	tribal	leaders.	
“Representatives of various parties” informed the Dutch political adviser 
Steeghs that negotiations were underway “with the leaders of certain 
crucial tribes” and that some deals had even already been made.140
Three candidates had already put themselves forward for the post of 
governor. Incumbent governor Al Hassani, head of the local sciri party, 
was available after all, although he also continued to “play with the idea 
of a national political career, or even retirement”. In so doing, Al Hassani 
presented himself as a relative outsider, even though this did not tally 
with his responsibilities for ensuring a safe and fair electoral process. 
The Dutch suspected that this pointed to cunning tactics to regain some 
of his popularity by distancing himself from “elections which, as many 
Iraqis believed, had been imposed by foreigners”.141
The	second	candidate	was	also	a	familiar	figure:	Hakem	Khazal	Hashaan,	
leader of the Union of Middle Euphrates tribal network and the man who had 
come second in the previous elections in October 2003. The third candidate 
was Mohammed al Zayadi, a rather controversial but nevertheless charismatic 
former exile (he had spent a long time in the us) who had worked as an adviser 
to the cpa during the year of occupation. At that time, he had been known for 
his sinister machinations behind the scenes and was nicknamed “Bremer al 
Zayadi”.142 Together with two fellow tribesmen, chief of police Kareem and 
tribe leader Sheikh Raysaan Muthaser al Zayadi, he formed a mighty ‘triangle 
of power’ in Al Muthanna province. As a leading member of the large Zayadi 
clan	and	head	of	the	influential	tribal	coalition	he	had	himself	created	(called	
the Al Muthanna Union) Mohammed al Zayadi hoped to obtain a prominent 
role on the province’s political stage.143
A carnival-like atmosphere
The	final	 few	weeks	prior	 to	 the	elections	were	 relatively	quiet.	The	nlbg 
spent its time vigilantly conducting patrols and checks and preparing 
and mentoring Iraqi institutions. There was some anxiety as to what was 
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in store, but at the same time the situation was calm and there were few 
incidents.	The	Coalition	camps	near	As	Samawah	had	been	fired	at	on	only	
two occasions during these weeks. On 11 January, a 107mm rocket landed 
within the perimeter fence of the Japanese base but failed to go off.144 On 13 
January, the mortar tracking radar again detected the launch of a projectile, 
but once more no damage was caused.145 These minor incidents had little to 
do with the approaching elections, nlbg commander Van Dooren reported, 
but were linked to ongoing negotiations on suitable rental charges with the 
owners of the land on which the international camps stood. The shots were 
apparently meant to exert some pressure on the negotiation process.146
On the morning of Wednesday 19 January, a fatal shooting incident 
took place at a temporary roadblock set up along Route Milwaukee (As 
Samawah – As Salman) by the Dutch reconnaissance platoon as part of 
a division’s interception operation, which lasted several days (Operation 
Andalucia). It appeared to be a repetition of some previous incidents: in 
the dark a small truck drove towards a Dutch roadblock at high speed, 
ignored warnings via light signals and, when it came too close, one of the 
Dutch	soldiers	fired	directly	at	the	truck.	One	passenger	died,	the	driver	
was unharmed and was arrested. He explained that he had seen the 
military roadblock too late and had had problems with his brakes.147
The	 day	 before,	 as	 a	 final	 test	 before	 the	 elections	 and	 directed	 by	
the pjoc, a large-scale exercise had been held, with scenarios in all three 
towns. The simulated incidents all mimicked possible events on election 
day, such as bomb threats, demonstrations, ied attacks near polling 
stations and attacks on joint police and National Guard checkpoints.148 
nlbg’s Information Operations section also distributed 20,000 pamphlets 
in order to remind people of the 115 emergency telephone number 
which anyone could use to contact the pjoc. Posters and a newspaper 
advertisement also brought this number to the attention of the local 
population.149 Divisional headquarters sent the nlbg reinforcements in 
the shape of a British infantry company comprising 80 Royal Highland 
Fusiliers. The unit arrived a couple of days before the elections.
The election day itself, Sunday 30 January, passed without incident. 
According to Lieutenant Colonel Van Dooren there was a “carnival-like 
atmosphere.” There were lots of people on the streets, who were excited 
and in high spirits. The nlbg commander was very impressed by the 
performance of the Iraqi Security Forces, which were out in force on this 
“day of truth”.150 As reported by political adviser Steeghs, who had criss-
crossed the province that day and witnessed “a festive spirit” everywhere, 
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as well as a high turnout, security was very tight, “intense” even. At the 
polling stations, the diplomat had encountered “a kind of village square 
atmosphere: many people hung around after voting to talk and smoke 
together”. The electoral process seemed to have been conducted properly 
and fairly. Other than a few minor “technical” problems, there had been no 
intentional manipulation or electoral fraud. The ieci drew up result charts 
from the contents of the ballot boxes, which they then sent to Baghdad. 
The	official	results	would	be	announced	in	two	weeks.151
Violence on the election day itself remained limited thoughout Iraq, 
but overall the democratic elections were less successful than the positive 
events in the Shiite south and Kurdish north seemed to suggest. Draconian 
security measures had curbed resistance throughout the country, but the 
election results ran largely along sectarian lines. The turnout was very 
high	 in	Kurdish	and	Shiite	areas,	but	virtually	 zero	 in	Sunni	areas.	The	
boycott by Sunni voters and the fact that most Iraqis voted for parties 
allied to their own sectarian group led to renewed debate on the unity of 
Iraq and how representative the government really was. It was out of the 
question for Sunni President Al Yawar to remain in power. The secular 
party of interim Prime Minister Allawi was also consigned to the margins. 
The Kurds and Shiites divided power between them. Kurdish leader Jalal 
Talabani became the new president of Iraq, while Shiite Prime Minister 
Ibrahim al Jafaari led a coalition government of Kurdish and Shiite parties.
The results did contain a few surprises at the provincial level in Al 
Muthanna though. For instance, support for the sciri – governor Al 
Hassani’s party – was smaller than anticipated. With eight seats, the party 
was the largest in the Governate Council, but the Union of Middle Euphrates 
tribal coalition and the moderate Fadhila party gained a respectable second 
place	with	six	seats	each.	There	was	also	a	religious	party	with	five	seats	and	
many smaller alliances with a couple of seats each. The Al Muthanna Union, 
the party to which candidate for governor Mohammed al Zayadi belonged, 
gained only a disappointing four seats, while he had counted on receiving 
half of the total (i.e. about twenty seats or even more).
All in all, the 41-seat Governate Council showed a fragmented political 
playing	field.	It	offered	plenty	of	opportunity	for	forming	coalitions,	which	
meant that the process of electing the council chair and a new governor 
was anything but clear-cut. To complicate matters, two new candidates 
put themselves forward for the post of governor in addition to the three 
already	announced.	Karim	Abid	Sajed	of	Fadhila	and	Ahmed	Marzuk	of	
Dawa	were	now	also	running	for	office.152 This was not necessarily because 
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they thought they stood a good chance, but rather because they hoped to 
be able to ask a higher price of the more likely candidates, such as current 
governor Al Hassani, during the coalition negotiations.
Reconstruction or force protection?
In addition to the elections and ssr, 5 nlbg had its hands full with completing 
the many cimic projects initiated by its predecessors and spending an extra 
2 million euros in Dutch reconstruction funds. In identifying projects and 
allocating contracts, 5 nlbg adopted the same criteria as its predecessors: 
visibility,	maximum	job	creation,	having	as	many	Iraqis	benefit	as	possible,	
suitability for media campaigns and creation of a long-term boost to the 
local economy. Encouraging agriculture and improving food hygiene were 
given priority at this time, as the agricultural sector was by far the most 
important economic pillar for Al Muthanna.153 In addition to the massive 
inoculation of livestock and the construction of a central abattoir, the 
nlbg’s cimic team also put a great deal of money into maintaining and 
improving the infrastructure and fuel supplies.154
In	the	final	six	months	of	Dutch	operations	in	Al	Muthanna,	the	cimic 
teams of 4 and 5 nlbg put a large portion of the additional funds into 
improving secondary roads, which were in a terrible state in particular 
during the winter. Also, the nlbg’s	engineer	company	laid	five	bridges	to	
open up remote and disadvantaged parts of the province. This was made 
possible partly thanks to the donation of 850 metres of Bailey bridge by 
the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. 
In	November	2004,	the	battle	group	was	also	finally	able	to	complete	the	
ring road around As Samawah started by 2 nlbg.155
cimic	 efforts	 in	 Iraq	 may	 not	 have	 entirely	 matched	 the	 definition	
of reconstruction, with its long-term implications, but it was clear that 
there was more than just force protection involved. In fact, the twenty-
month cimic efforts in Al Muthanna were impressive. As with ssr, the 
Dutch involvement in cimic in Iraq was on a scale never seen before in 
Dutch international military operations. Exact data were unavailable, but 
between July 2003 and March 2005 the nlbgs completed between 600 and 
1,000 projects. To do so, the Dutch forces spent over 16 million us dollars 
from Dutch and allied funds156, of which the Dutch share can be exactly 
ascertained: about 2.7 million us dollars in cimic funds and over 1.8 million 
us dollars from the so-called Peace Fund (later called Stability Fund).157 In 
meeting the ‘reconstruction demand’, a further 100 million or so in ‘long 
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dollars’ for cpa project proposals (in particular from 2 nlbg) were added, as 
well	as	the	(non-financial)	contribution	of	the	battle	group	–	whether	or	
not included under cimic – to institutional reconstruction projects such as 
administrative reforms and the elections.
The Dutch Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs later admitted 
that they had incorrectly estimated the scale of the cimic task at the start 
of the operation.158 Yet they persisted in underestimating the importance 
of cimic for far too long, in spite of the many warnings from several nlbg 
commanders, those of 3 and 4 nlbg in particular. There may not have been 
a direct causal link between the casualties of the night of 14 August 2004 
and the ministries’ refusal to provide additional Dutch funds to 4 nlbg, but 
what is clear is that the Dutch battle group had to curb its successful hearts 
and minds campaign at a crucial moment in the deployment due to a lack 
of support and funds. This also occurred at a time when many changes 
were shaking the parameters of the mission.
The material Dutch cimic contribution only grew again structurally from 
September 2004. In particular 5 nlbg	 benefited	 from	 this	 financial	 surge,	
but it was too little too late. In his capacity as cimic	staff	officer	in	the	final	
contingent, Major Jacob Lussenburg maintained that the Netherlands was a 
minor	player	in	this	field	and	that	the	2	million	euros	provided	by	the	Ministry	
of	Foreign	Affairs	had	quickly	been	spent.	 It	was	his	firm	belief	 that	 “they	
could have spent 20 million euros”.159 The neglect of the region by the former 
regime throughout a long period of war and sanctions was always painfully 
visible, and although the Japanese mission gradually provided more concrete 
results in the course of 2005, civilian aid organisations conducted very few 
projects in Al Muthanna.160 The relative importance of military construction 
efforts under the cimic	flag	therefore	remained	undiminished.
cerp	 continued	 to	 fulfil	 a	key	 function	 for	 the	nlbg in the same way 
as	it	did	for	its	allies.	Despite	its	many	flaws,	later	analyses	identified	the	
programme as one of the main success stories in Iraq – and certainly not 
just due to its effect on troop security. According to those on the ground, 
cerp funds were more effective in convincing the Iraqis that the Coalition 
aimed to improve their lives than the cpa’s red tape-ridden ‘long dollars’.161 
Major General David Petraeus, who in mid-2003 played a major role in 
setting up the cerp fund in his capacity as divisional commander in Mosul 
in Northern Iraq, summarised it succinctly: “Money is ammunition.”162 It 
was therefore mainly the non-Dutch project funds which enabled the nlbg 






In spite of Defence Minister Kamp’s resolve on the subject, a Dutch 
withdrawal from Al Muthanna was certainly not a foregone conclusion 
in the autumn of 2004. The British were exerting great pressure on the 
Dutch to stay and the arguments in favour of a withdrawal were rather 
unconvincing. The Dutch Ministry of Defence stressed that the Iraqis would 
be well able to guarantee their own secure environment from March 2005 
onwards. But was that indeed the case? The British argued that achieving 
‘regional/Iraqi control’ throughout Southern Iraq was further off than The 
Hague claimed, and that the creation of independently-operating Iraqi 
security services had gone less smoothly than predicted. Senior British 
politicians and military personnel were in fact afraid that too premature 
a withdrawal from Al Muthanna could upset the situation. They asked the 
Netherlands to reconsider its decision via several channels.1
In the Netherlands itself, journalists in particular were doing their best 
to pick holes in the government’s reasoning as part of the public debate 
on the issue. Surely, the Sadr uprising in August and the Ar Rumaythah 
ambush had demonstrated that the Iraqi security bodies were far from 
able to stand on their own two feet? “Withdrawing if the mission – the 
promotion of security and stability – has not yet succeeded, is that an 
option?,” national newspaper de Volkskrant asked.2 nrc Handelsblad 
reported that some Dutch military personnel also thought that Dutch 
troops were withdrawing from Iraq too soon. At the end of December 
2004, the newspaper quoted former nlbg commander Matthijssen: “Iraqi 




area of deployment in October, Matthijssen had reported that he believed 
the Iraqis were not yet fully capable of taking responsibility for security in 
Al Muthanna. But Kamp had apparently already made up his mind about 
withdrawing	 by	 that	 point,	 officially	 mainly	 for	 reasons	 regarding	 the	
planning of Dutch contributions to other allied international operations, 
including a possible deployment of Special Forces to Operation Enduring 
Freedom and heading a new Provincial Reconstruction Team in southern 
Afghanistan.3
The	fifth	battle	group	and	the	Defence	Staff	shared	the	opinion	of	the	
commander of 4 nlbg. It was no coincidence that additional Security Sector 
Reform	efforts	were	being	made	during	 the	final	 few	months.	This	was	
because things were not going particularly well. Military personnel were 
unhappy with the government’s stance in a letter to the Second Chamber 
of Parliament in November which suggested that the security services 
in Al Muthanna would achieve regional control status in March 2005. 
They thought this prognosis was far too optimistic and too convenient 
with	regard	to	the	withdrawal.	The	identified	issues	in	the	Iraqi	security	
bodies were not yet resolved and problems with changing loyalties and 
corruption could not be expected to dissipate within a few months either. 
Material bottlenecks also persisted. Many ssr objectives would only be 
achieved in the course of 2005. Minister Kamp was therefore advised to 
be less positive about the results so far and to emphasise other arguments 
in favour of his decision to withdraw.
In the meantime, what 5 nlbg wanted above all was clarity. Preparations 
for	 a	 redeployment	 had	 been	well	 under	way	 since	December.	No	 firm	
decision had been made at the politico-strategic level, but already before 
the New Year the nlbg and mnd South-East made concrete arrangements 
for a possible change of command. The Dutch would start packing up 
from early February 2005 – shortly after the general elections. Lieutenant 
Colonel Van Dooren would hand over area responsibility to a British 
successor on 7 March. One week thereafter, no later than 15 March, the 
Dutch units would cease their operational tasks and concentrate fully 
on their departure.4 Although the process could be halted by a possible 
delay to the Iraqi elections, a substantial deterioration in the security 
situation or political events in the Netherlands, planning was nevertheless 
begun.5 
The	 long	 awaited	 political	 decision	 on	 troop	withdrawal	was	 finally	
taken	in	January,	but	not	until	after	one	final	hitch.	On	Monday	17	January	
Prime Minister Balkenende and Ministers Bot and Kamp decided that 
229
Dutch approach?
the Netherlands would end operations in Al Muthanna. In doing so, the 
government went against the wishes of the vvd government coalition party 
– Kamp’s own party, which reiterated that “in contrast to what Kamp had 
written in his latest Letter to Parliament, it is not at all certain that the Iraqis 
are themselves in a position to maintain public order in the province”.6 cda, 
the largest partner in the coalition and the party of Balkenende and Bot, 
had also long entertained doubts and had shown itself to be susceptible to 
American and British pressure to stay in Iraq. In December, it argued in 
favour of a longer nlbg deployment, a view prompted by the main British 
argument	that	the	Iraqis	were	still	insufficiently	equipped	on	the	security	
front for independence.7
Ultimately, British pressure had the opposite effect. Minister Kamp 
was annoyed by the fact that the British were openly questioning the 
Dutch Ministry of Defence’s claims, and by the fact that they were directly 
interfering in Dutch parliamentary deliberations. He therefore made 
short shrift of the opinions of some of his government colleagues, who 
under	the	influence	of	the	British	lobbying	seemed	to	be	attracted	to	the	
option of a delayed redeployment up to and including June 2005. A sixth 
battle	 group	 containing	 about	 650	 personnel	 and,	 in	 the	 final	 phase,	 a	
reinforced infantry company of about 200 troops would then be required. 
Kamp resented the notion and brought the majority of the council of 
ministers round to his way of thinking. The vvd and d66 ministers were 
immediately persuaded by his resolute refusal to give the extended option 
a fair hearing during the cabinet meeting on 14 January. Kamp merely 
promised to investigate whether the option was feasible in ‘military-
technical’ terms, but had in fact already consigned the idea to the dustbin. 
His cda colleagues wanted to consider the matter over the weekend, which 
meant	that	the	definitive	decision	would	not	be	taken	that	day	but	on	the	
following Monday. This delay did not alter the outcome, however. Kamp 
got his way and the decision was taken to withdraw from Iraq.8
Game over
Thanks to the successful elections in January 2005, the Netherlands was 
able to start withdrawing its troops from Iraq with its head held high. A 
major milestone had been reached. The new transitional Iraqi government, 





democratically-elected Iraqi government at the end of 2005 or early 2006. 
The political advisers at mnd South-East thought that, in spite of the major 
gains by fundamentalist parties, the outcome of the elections in Shiite 
Southern Iraq was satisfactory.9 In Al Muthanna, as in the other seventeen 
provinces, the elected members of the Governate Council set to work on 
the next step in the process: the election of a new governor and council 
chair.
Former political adviser Michel Rentenaar continued to follow events 
in	 Al	 Muthanna	 from	 the	 Dutch	 embassy	 in	 Beirut.	 He	 was	 satisfied.	
When former cpa chief Jim Soriano – with whom he was still in touch – 
asked about the elections in ‘their’ province from his new post in India, 
the ex-Polad replied: “We were not far wide off the mark.” In his opinion, 
the council members who had been elected via the caucus procedure in 
October 2003 had done quite well. Rentenaar concluded that the imposed 
allocation of seats among the tribes, political parties and technocrats had 
been similar to the new allocation after the elections. Even without foreign 
pressure, the people of Al Muthanna had elected three women to the 
provincial parliament. The predicted shift towards religious parties had 
occurred, but the Dutch diplomat thought that this was largely in name. 
He	saw	continuity	and	wagered	that,	 in	spite	of	fierce	competition	from	
former cpa adviser Mohammed al Zayadi, current governor Al Hassani 
would be given a second term, especially since his sciri party dominated 
the new national government in Baghdad.10
The governor’s re-election was far from a given, however. sciri did 
indeed hold the largest number of seats in Al Muthanna, but only eight out 
of a total of 41. Party discipline was almost non-existent, so the candidates 
primarily spent the weeks prior to the governorship elections on 15 March 
2005 canvassing for individual votes and tribal support. In spite of the 
disappointing result of the council elections, Mohammed al Zayadi had the 
best chance of winning the governorship, according to Dutch estimates.11 It 
was therefore a great surprise when the outcome turned out to be in favour 
of Al Hassani nevertheless. As a consolation, his opponent Al Zayadi was 
given the post of council chair. Much would remain the same, albeit that 
the balance of power had shifted slightly towards the Al Zayadi tribe.12
After the elections, 5 nlbg’s operations were dominated by the 
impending redeployment of troops. In early February, a 300-strong 
Redeployment Support Detachment arrived in As Samawah to partially 
dismantle the Dutch camps and to transport material back to the 
Netherlands.13 The Dutch handed over the bases in Ar Rumaythah and 
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Al Khidr to the local Iraqi security services. On 7 March, Lieutenant 
Colonel Van Dooren transferred responsibility for security in Al Muthanna 
to Lieutenant Colonel Tim Wilson, battalion commander of the 1st The 
Queen’s Dragoon Guards, the unit which formed the core of the new 
British Task Force Eagle (later Task Force Muthanna).
The formal end to the twenty-month Dutch deployment to Iraq, in 
which about 7,500 military personnel had participated and which cost 
about	 146	million	euros,	was	 signalled	by	 the	 striking	of	 the	Dutch	flag	
and	the	raising	of	the	Union	flag.14 The ceremony at Camp Smitty received 
a great deal of attention from Dutch, international and Iraqi media, and 
those present included the Dutch Chief of Defence Staff General Dick 
Berlijn, British Minister of State for the Armed Forces Adam Ingram, the 
commander of mnd South-East, Major General Jonathon Riley, Colonel 
Kiyohiko Ota of the Japanese contingent, and the main Iraqi authorities. 
The most notable absence was that of governor Al Hassani. The cooling 
in his relationship with the Dutch over the preceding year could not have 
been expressed more clearly.
In his farewell speech, General Berlijn remembered the Dutch soldiers 
killed in action. He said that he considered the mission a success and he 
was full of praise for his troops who, in the wake of several setbacks, had 
not taken “the wrong path” and had continued to operate in the same de-
escalating and open spirit, in spite of having been “the strongest tribe” in 
Al Muthanna.15 They had been well aware that “continuously displaying” 
their power would not have been to their advantage, he claimed. Berlijn 
also praised the Dutch people for not having clamoured for the return of 
the troops in the wake of the Sadr uprisings. In the view of the country’s 
most senior military leader, the Dutch had done well to resist calls from 
some quarters to conduct their patrols ‘under armour’, as this would have 
negated “the philosophy behind the Dutch presence”.16
After the change of command, the remaining Dutch forces continued 
to be operational for another week in order to support the British and show 
them the ropes.17 On 3 April 2005, Lieutenant Colonel Van Dooren was the 
last Dutch soldier to leave Iraqi territory. The redeployment was four weeks 
ahead of schedule. The British replaced the 1,400 Dutch in Al Muthanna 
with 600 troops. British Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon told the House 
of Commons at the end of January 2005 that this sharp reduction was 
possible thanks to the progress made by the Dutch with respect to stability 
and ssr. In reality, the reduction was driven by need.18 The commander of 
mnd South-East, General Riley, had to furnish the troops for Al Muthanna 
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almost entirely out of his already over-burdened British brigade and was 
eagerly awaiting the arrival of allied reinforcements. There was great relief 
therefore when the Australian government decided to deploy 450 troops 
to Al Muthanna at the end of February. The Australian unit, comprising 
an infantry company, a cavalry squadron and a support company, was to 
be operational in May.19 Lieutenant Colonel Van Dooren and his British 
successor were both aware that, at less than half the Dutch capacity, the 
British would be severely understaffed until the arrival of the Australians. 
Until the ‘Diggers’ arrived, Lieutenant Colonel Wilson expected to make 
no progress.20 
‘Dutch approach’
The civilian population of Al Muthanna was apparently suspicious of 
the British newcomers. Around the time of the change of command, 
journalists from national newspapers nrc Handelsblad and de Volkskrant 
painted a very negative picture of the reception of the successors, who gave 
the impression of being tense. According to the Dutch media, the British 
stayed	in	their	vehicles	during	their	first	patrols	and	although	there	had	
been no mortar or rocket attacks on the base camp for many months they 
constantly wore their protective vests, even inside Camp Smitty.21 
The negative response of the people of Al Muthanna to the British 
takeover of their province was no surprise. Local representatives had 
already informed the nlbg four months previously that they wanted 
nothing to do with the former colonial power. They pointed to the violent 
suppression by the British of the 1920 Shia uprising, a historical trauma 
which remained etched in their collective memory.22 Following the 
elections in January, the nlbg received further reports of concerns in this 
respect. The Iraqis had heard how the British in Basra operated “and it is 
clearly differently from how we do things,” nlbg commander Van Dooren 
mentioned. The Lieutenant Colonel had witnessed the Royal Highland 
Fusiliers at work during the election campaign. His assessment was that 
“they were a rather edgy lot”. He based this on their driving behaviour, the 
fact	that	they	always	wore	their	helmets,	“kept	their	fingers	on	the	trigger”	
and	 “immediately	 adopted	 a	 firing	 position	 on	 arrival	 at	 a	 location”.23 
However, Van Dooren did note that the British infantry company had 
quickly adapted to local conditions and to the Dutch modus operandi.24
The Dutch newspapers’ descriptions of the contrasting styles of the 
Dutch soldiers and their British counterparts meant that the nlbg was 
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seen in a positive light back home. By now it was common knowledge that 
there was an even greater contrast between the nlbg’s modus operandi 
and that of the Americans. This was underlined in the New York Times of 
24 October 2004. The article, reprinted in the internationally-distributed 
International Herald Tribune	 under	 the	 heading	 ‘Dutch	 soldiers	 find	
smiles protect as well as armor’, stated that the Dutch on patrol in As 
Samawah were constantly greeted by adults and children alike. The 
infantry personnel replied with “salaam aleikum” (peace be upon you).25 
The article explained that the Dutch soldiers deliberately opted to drive 
around in open vehicles rather than armoured vehicles, that they did not 
wear	 their	 helmets	 during	 patrols	 and	 that	 reflective	 sunglasses	 were	
prohibited as they impeded eye contact.
Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen of 4 nlbg expressly bore this narrative 
out during his interview with journalist Norimitsu Onishi.26 According to 
the article, which was also published in the Dutch nrc Handelsblad and 
translated in a few Arabic newspapers, the Lieutenant Colonel maintained 
that his troops adhered to their “soft approach” even after two fatal 
attacks in order to improve interaction with the locals.27 The support and 
endorsement of the Iraqis was presented as a form of protection, because 
it helped to keep in touch with the sentiments among the population 
and made people willing to share information. Matthijssen’s narrative 
resembled the message given by Lieutenant Colonel Oppelaar of 2 nlbg in 
December 2003 in his interview with the Christian Science Monitor. He 
asserted that the Dutch approach contributed to the restricted number of 
casualties. “If we have a higher threat, we get closer to the people.”28
Norimitsu Onishi reported that the Dutch called this modus operandi 
“the Dutch approach to patrolling”. She characterised it as somewhere 
between the work of policemen on the beat and that of a social worker. 
The	unspecified	term	‘Dutch	approach’	therefore	derived	from	the	Dutch	
forces themselves. What British journalist Nicholas Blanford had subtly 
called “the Dutch touch” during his visit to Al Muthanna at the end of 
2003 had in Dutch Defence circles since then been upgraded to a more 
pretentious term.29 The self-importance was mostly contained in the word 
‘approach’,	 which	 in	 contrast	 to	 ‘touch’	 suggested	 a	 deliberate,	 specific	
strategy. Quite apart from the question whether or not such an approach 
existed, the image of a typically-Dutch military modus operandi in Al 
Muthanna	fitted	 in	well	with	 the	distinction	 the	Dutch	government	had	
liked to make since the spring of 2003 between the Coalition’s invasion 
and occupation forces on the one hand and the – supposedly separate – 
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stabilisation forces (including the Dutch) on the other. The message was 
that things were done differently in what Minister Kamp and General 
Berlijn consistently called “our” province of Al Muthanna, and that partly 
as a result of this the situation compared positively to other parts of Iraq, 
where a state of war existed.30
The positive assessment in the foreign press caused the Dutch media 
to pick up on the narrative of the supposedly typical ‘Dutch approach’ 
more widely than before. After reading the article in the New York 
Times, popular historian Geert Mak wrote in nrc Handelsblad with some 
pride about the Dutch military who had maintained law and order in Al 
Muthanna in open vehicles, without wearing helmets, greeting locals in 
a friendly fashion, with their weapons pointing downwards. In Mak’s 
opinion, it had been an extraordinarily successful and “typically Dutch 
method	of	pacification”,	in	which	the	commander	“even	had	a	budget	for	
minor aid projects”.31	Columnist	Henk	Hofland,	who	had	spent	over	two	
years criticising Dutch policy on and in Iraq, also ascribed the persisting 
calm “in our province” Al Muthanna to a ‘Dutch approach’. In doing so, 
as he understood from a Colonel on television, the troops successfully 
combined “social patrols” with reconstruction work on schools and bridges 
and training programmes for the police.32
Cor Lammers, professor emeritus in organisational sociology, went 
one step further. In his book Vreemde Overheersing (Foreign Rule), 
he distinguished a typically Dutch occupation style dating back to 
the seventeenth century. The sociologist took the ‘Dutch approach’ in 
Iraq as presented in the New York Times as an example of the Dutch 
method of what he called “benevolent occupations”.33 He used this 
apparently contradictory term to describe operations such as those in 
Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, which in his view were very similar 
to occupations in many prominent aspects, but which at the same time 
distinguished themselves positively from more authoritarian ‘colonial 
occupations’ or from aggressive ‘annexation occupations’. The objective 
with the new ‘stabilisation’ operations was decreasing rather than 
increasing the presence in the occupied area. The main priority was to 
improve	 the	 fate	 of	 the	 inhabitants,	 chiefly	 by	 controlling	 and	 settling	
conflicts	and	(facilitating)	reconstruction.	Incidentally,	in	his	very	broad	
– non-legal – interpretation of the term, Lammers ignored the question 
whether the local population perceived such a type of occupation as being 
as ‘benevolent’ as he himself did.
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Ar Rumaythah as a litmus test
A number of prominent commentators thus adopted the notion of an 
effective ‘Dutch approach’ with remarkable ease. This is especially notable 
in view of the Sadr uprising of Summer 2004 and the subsequent events in 
Ar Rumaythah in August, where apparently no Iraqi had taken the trouble 
to warn the Dutch of the planned ambush. Many Iraqi civilians must have 
been aware of the attack at some point, yet no-one came forward. The 
assertion that the Dutch had calmly stayed their course after the major 
gunfight	by	continuing	to	conduct	patrols	“on	foot	or	in	open	vehicles	in	
the usual manner” also continued to be made in the years following the 
Dutch exit from Iraq.34 Army lecturer Robert Gooren claimed in an article 
in the us Army’s Military Review that the ‘Dutch approach’, with the 
emphasis on winning ‘hearts and minds’ and respect for local culture, was 
not relinquished in the wake of the Sadrist attacks. According to Gooren, 
even under the threat of violence, the nlbgs had not given priority to force 
protection at the expense of good relations with the local population.35
Yet did the Dutch troops indeed continue operating in the same ‘open’ 
manner even in the face of the increased threat of the Sadr uprisings, as 
chief of the armed forces General Berlijn also suggested during his speech 
at the change of command in March 2005? There was no unequivocal 
answer to this question. On two occasions in 2004, the ‘province of 
peace’	 briefly	 threatened	 to	 be	 sucked	 into	 the	 spiral	 of	 violence	which	
permanently disrupted other parts of Iraq.36 It was true that Dutch forces 
did not generally use armoured vehicles, but there was a tendency to do 
so among 3 nlbg infantry personnel following a series of incidents and 
gunfights	with	the	Mahdi	Army	in	the	spring	of	2004.	Lieutenant	Colonel	
Van Harskamp of 3 nlbg	specifically	requested	reinforcements	in	the	shape	
of Leopard tanks and ypr	armoured	infantry	fighting	vehicles	in	order	to	
operate under improved protection – just like the British occasionally did 
under heavy threat. 
The Dutch Defence Staff rejected his request to try to keep with the 
chosen strategy. The headquarters in The Hague argued that the operation 
had been set up as a light infantry deployment and any deviation from this 
concept would send the wrong signals to the Iraqis. It would also mean 
the failure of the modus operandi which until then had proven to be a 
success	and	which	fitted	in	with	what	came	to	be	presented	over	the	course	
of	the	operation	as	a	 ‘Dutch	approach’.	The	commander	in	the	field	was	
allocated Apache helicopters instead, which, in spite of their overwhelming 
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firepower,	 were	 mainly	 used	 as	 information	 gathering	 platforms	 and	
therefore better matched the open approach. 
The main test for whether or not there was such a thing as a ‘Dutch 
approach’ was provided by the events in Ar Rumaythah in the second half 
of 2004, after the ambush. Nowhere was the estrangement between the 
Dutch and the local population as great as in that rebellious town.37 While 
Dutch units were gradually able to pick up where they left off in most of 
the	capital	and	in	Al	Khidr	after	the	ceasefire	ending	the	Sadr	uprising	had	
been declared, the presence in Ar Rumaythah was strongly reduced. The 
Dutch battle group restricted the number of movements in the town to 
what was absolutely necessary and Bravo Company no longer conducted 
any foot patrols. The mp platoon operated almost exclusively at the police 
posts outside the town and elsewhere in the province. The monitoring 
and mentoring of the town police was cut back.38 The decision to cease 
foot patrols in Ar Rumaythah with a view to de-escalation as well as the 
reduction of the general military presence seemed to run counter to the 
line propagated by 4 nlbg’s predecessors: in the case of an increased threat, 
increase the frequency of patrols precisely in order to frighten off those who 
mean to cause harm.39
4 nlbg therefore did the opposite of what Lieutenant Colonel Oppelaar 
of 2 nlbg had previously presented as the Dutch modus operandi. The 
battle group in fact backed off. The conditions under which Dutch troops 
had worked in the second half of 2003 and those of 4 nlbg one year on 
were totally different, however. The occupation had formally ended and 
Iraqi self-governance went hand-in-hand with an expressly support-based 
modus operandi on the part of the nlbg, in line with the strategy laid down 
nationally by the mnf. This more detached method of operating did not 
help	 relations	 between	 the	 Iraqis	 and	 the	 Dutch	 troops	 in	 the	 specific	
situation in Ar Rumaythah. For example, Captain Dennis Klein had served 
as	 commander	 of	 the	first	military	 police	 detachment	 in	 2003	 and	had	
often been in Ar Rumaythah. Yet he hardly recognised the place when he 
returned a year later. Where mps mentoring the Iraqi police in 2003 had 
been able to “eat a kebab on the streetcorner” among the Iraqis in a relaxed 
fashion, the Captain now saw hostile and fearful glances.40 Ar Rumaythah, 
like other parts of Iraq, seemed to have reached the point where the 
presence of Coalition troops on the streets no longer meant protection, 
but rather acted as a magnet to violence and confrontation. Both the local 




the complete breakdown of trust between its Bravo Company and the local 
authorities as a fait accompli, 4 nlbg’s commander Matthijssen complied.41
In doing so the Dutch forces allowed a wedge to be driven between 
them and the local population. They did not resume foot patrols in Ar 
Rumaythah for another three months. By then the town had been handed 
over to another infantry company and the new commander of 5 nlbg, 
Lieutenant Colonel Van Dooren, announced on his own initiative that 
his troops would display a more visible presence – especially on foot. He 
found a willing participant in this operational concept in Major Olaf Lagas, 
commander of the successor Bravo Company. During reconnaissance 
several	months	earlier,	 the	two	officers	had	witnessed	the	estrangement	
between their predecessors and the Iraqis. They intended to improve 
the contact with the locals and their own information position again.42 
Both in the problem areas of the provincial capital As Samawah and in 
Ar Rumaythah, “the areas which had previously been out of bounds”, 5 
nlbg again started conducting intensive and widespread patrols, regularly 
supported by the Apaches.43
The last Dutch battle group also frequently received requests from the 
local community to stay away from certain areas, but as far as Lieutenant 
Colonel Van Dooren was concerned, complete freedom of movement was 
the “bottom line” for his troops. His company commanders therefore 
deliberately chose to ignore such “hints”.44 When, at the end of November 
2004, infantry troops from Bravo Company again entered the town of Ar 
Rumaythah on foot, they were surprised at the relatively relaxed situation 
they encountered. When the residents of the suburbs responded in a 
predominantly positive manner to their presence, the Dutch forces carried 
on into the busy and lively town centre.45 The locals openly approached 
the troops and the Dutch also started conducting more patrols at night. 
A newly-arrived mp platoon improved the working relationship with the 
local police force again by regularly being present at police stations and 
intensifying joint patrols.46
The remarkable turn-round in Ar Rumaythah was made possible by a 
number of factors, not just the change of personnel and a ‘new strategy’ on 
the part of the Dutch. Firstly, the appointment of a new city chief of police 
in	December	2004	eased	the	still	difficult	relationship.	Secondly,	intensive	
cooperation with a company from the new police Emergency Battalion 
worked in 5 nlbg’s favour. According to Bravo Company’s Major Lagas, 
the new local paramilitary unit depended greatly on Dutch support and 
consequently acted “as a kind of second company” under his command.47 
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Lagas also had at his disposal an additional platoon and a generous cimic 
budget.
Nevertheless, things would never be quite the same again. A small group 
of Sadrists had set themselves up in Ar Rumaythah during 2004 and the 
(irregular) threat level remained high. Both after the arrival and just before the 
departure of 5 nlbg, intelligence sources reported that attacks on the Dutch in 
the area were being prepared.48 Major Lagas realised how fragile the success 
of 5 nlbg in Ar Rumaythah was when shortly after the January elections 
“trouble started brewing again.” Contacts with the local authorities became 
more	difficult	due	to	the	loss	of	a	common	goal	(peaceful	elections)	and	the	
departure of the cooperative new police commander to the Netherlands to 
participate in the ssr training programme.49 The imminent and well-known 
departure of the nlbg also removed a major motive for the Iraqis to cooperate. 
Shortly before the departure of Bravo Company, the threat in Ar Rumaythah 
therefore increased again. The base was to be handed over to the local 
authorities on 14 March 2005. Local sources reported that there were plans to 
give the Dutch a ‘good kick in the backside’ before they left, by attacking the 
base with mortars or laying an ambush.50 As the nlbg’s intelligence section 
considered the attack highly likely, commander Van Dooren decided to vacate 
the	camp	five	days	early	in	the	utmost	secrecy.51
A second attack in Ar Rumaythah would have placed the entire Dutch 
operation in a negative light in one fell swoop, and for this reason the 
Dutch contingent adopted the same trick used by the cpa at the end of 
June 2004, when Paul Bremer had secretly brought forward the handover 
of sovereignty to the Iraqi interim government by a few days. nlbg also 
opted to apply this practical surprise tactic. On 9 March, the personnel of 
Bravo Company, who had been kept in the dark, were told to quickly pack 
their	bags.	Local	officials	were	brought	to	the	camp	under	the	pretext	of	a	
meeting and were hastily given ‘the key’ to the base. Soon afterwards, the 
Dutch unit headed for the logistics base at Shaibah.52 Within the context of 
the relatively successful ending of the Dutch operation in Al Muthanna as 
a whole, this abrupt departure from Ar Rumaythah was illustrative of the 
different situation in that town.
Critical allies 
The question to what extent stability in Al Muthanna should be ascribed 
to the Dutch way of operating can only be answered by putting the nlbg’s 
experience in its proper context. Treating the Dutch actions against the 
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background of events elsewhere in Iraq allows us to comment on whether 
a	 specific	 Dutch	 approach	 actually	 existed.	 Events	 in	 Ar	 Rumaythah	
demonstrated	the	difficulty	of	maintaining	an	open	attitude	and	staying	
close to the local population in a situation of growing threat. And Ar 
Rumaythah was a calm backwater compared to insurgent hotbeds such as 
Amarah, Najaf, Ramadi, Fallujah and large sections of Baghdad.
The question not dealt with in the enthusiastic Dutch commentaries 
therefore, but which American journalist Norimitsu Onishi indeed did 
put to Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen of 4 nlbg, was whether an open 
Dutch approach might work in a place like the Iraqi capital. “It might have 
helped” the Dutch commander suggested. It was a highly speculative claim 
by	an	officer	who	even	before	his	deployment	to	Iraq	had	publicly	stated	
that, partly thanks to their experience with peace support operations, the 
Dutch were better able to win the trust of the Iraqis.53 As an illustration, 
he referred, as was done before, to the loutish driving and aggressive 
behaviour of the American allies during convoy operations which, 
according to provincial chief of police Kareem, posed “the greatest insult 
to Iraqi dignity”. Matthijssen advised the allies to display greater respect 
and understanding for the locals in general.
The suggestion of a more effective ‘Dutch approach’ thus seemed to 
exist by the grace of the comparison between the Netherlands’ operations and 
the us modus operandi.54 Yet was this comparison, in particular between the 
130,000-plus us troops and the operation conducted by 1,300 Dutch forces 
in	Al	Muthanna,	actually	valid?	The	specific	example	of	convoy	operations	
was certainly not representative. These were conducted by poorly-informed 
troops	–	often	from	private	security	firms	–	who	were	passing	through	and	
bore no responsibility for the area of operations itself. They had a single 
goal: to get their cargo to Central Iraq without being hit by an ied or car 
bomb. A comparison of Dutch operations with the actions of us units who 
did bear responsibility for a geographical area would have made more sense, 
but would also have fallen short in so many respects as to become invalid – 
in particular when involving operations in the ‘Sunni Triangle’.
Much more telling was the contrast that Dutch forces described 
between their own method of operating and that of the British in the 
same southern sector. For a long time, Basra, Iraq’s second largest city, 
was an oasis of calm and stability too, compared to the turbulent capital 
Baghdad and the other areas under us command. The Blair government 
therefore also liked to present the British approach as a model.55 Initially, 
the relative stability in the south was largely due to the positive attitude of the 
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Shiites towards Coalition troops in general, but it was also attributed to the 
de-escalating British military approach.56 Using language similar to that of 
Dutch commanders, military historian and counter-insurgency specialist Rod 
Thornton claimed during a hearing in the House of Commons that “the British 
philosophy has always been that physical barriers prevent soldiers from 
picking up ‘on the street’ intelligence that can protect them from attack”.57 
The priority was winning ‘hearts and minds’, the classic term derived from the 
successful counter-insurgency campaign in Malaysia in the 1950s.
During his initial reconnaissance of Southern Iraq in May 2003, 
Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman of 1 nlbg did indeed note that the British 
conducted patrols in a relaxed manner and in small groups. They carried 
their weapons on their backs and had exchanged their helmets for berets. 
At this time, they even patrolled without bulletproof vests. It was an 
inspiration for the Dutch deployment too. By contrast, the us Marines in 
Al Muthanna often operated in large groups, always wore helmets and full 
combat gear, and often carried their weapons pointing forward.58
Nevertheless, the British ultimately had trouble retaining their ‘light 
touch’. When the number of casualties among their troops started to 
rise, they tried not to distance themselves from the locals. But under the 
circumstances, British forces did not escape stricter protective measures, 
such as movements in heavily-armoured Warrior tracked vehicles and 
the occasional deployment of Challenger tanks. In November 2003, a 
battalion commander travelled from Basra to the province of Maysan to 
reconnoitre his area of operations in a Land Rover. Less than a year later, 
his unit could only travel the same route in a heavily-armed convoy and 
his men encountered nine roadside bombs in the space of twelve hours.59 
In order to retain and partly also regain their position, in the spring and 
summer	of	2004	British	forces	became	involved	in	heavy	fighting	that	was	
more intensive than the battle to take Basra during the original invasion.
Great regional differences were to be found in the southern division’s 
sector. In As Zubayah, shortly after the second Sadr uprising in August 
2004, the Iraqis still regularly greeted British soldiers with waves and 
thumbs-up gestures.60 It was a different case in Maysan, where the 
influence	 of	Mahdi	 Army	 fighters	was	 the	 greatest	 and	where	 even	 the	
heavily-infiltrated	Iraqi	police	forces	occasionally	fired	at	British	troops.61 
The	British	had	largely	regained	their	positions	and	inflicted	severe	losses	
on the violent wing of the Sadr movement by about September 2004. 
Yet	they	were	unable	to	repair	the	damage	inflicted	on	their	reputation.	
Hearing about these circumstances from various colleagues at divisional 
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headquarters led to 4 nlbg’s Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen calling the 
situation in Al Muthanna, including Ar Rumaythah, “quite reasonable”.62
The Sadr revolts had also affected military and civilian authorities in 
the Italian area of operations of Dhi Qar much more than they had in Al 
Muthanna. The Italian contingent, at 3,000 military personnel the third 
largest within the multinational force, also came in for some criticism. 
“The Dutch did good patrolling, on foot,” an American cpa employee said, 
simultaneously complaining about the Italians, who apparently only 
drove around in vehicles.63 A British civilian colleague, Rory Stewart, saw 
no Italian military presence at all in large parts of Dhi Qar province. The 
number of cimic projects in the area was also negligible compared to those 
in the provinces of Maysan and Al Muthanna.64
The	British	reserved	their	fiercest	criticism	for	their	us allies though.65 
Of this, the most notable comment came from Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-
Foster, who had spent most of 2004 serving at the us-dominated mnf 
headquarters in Baghdad. In a scathing article, ‘Changing the Army 
for counterinsurgency operations’, published in late 2005, he singled 
out the fundamental attitude and organisational culture of the us Army 
as the main obstacles to a successful campaign against the uprisings in 
Iraq.66 According to Aylwin-Foster, the conventionally-minded us Army 
was	weighed	down	by	“a	stiflingly	hierarchical	outlook,	a	pre-disposition	
to offensive operations, and a sense of duty that required all issues to be 
confronted head-on”.
In	his	 view,	 the	 armed	 forces	were	 inflexible	 and	us troops isolated 
themselves from the locals by concentrating in large bases, in “mini-
Americas” where they lived in relative luxury. If they did go outside the 
wire, they applied very little cultural sensitivity. The emphasis was far 
too much on intelligence gathering using technological resources. They 
neglected to gather information via regular foot patrols, and almost all 
major us operations were reactive, with a strong preference for major 
search operations (‘sweeps’) aimed at killing or capturing rebels. The 
Americans supposedly also neglected to create a secure environment for 
inhabitants – the central theme in classic counter-insurgency doctrines. In 
the opinion of Aylwin-Foster the us’s  ‘direct approach’, which focused on 
identifying,	fixing	and	destroying	the	enemy,	derived	from	the	American	
preference for quick and measurable results.
The British on the other hand traditionally preferred the ‘indirect 
approach’, with a strong predilection for non-military resources and tasks, 
such as policing, administrative measures and political compromises. 
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It	 was	 the	 difference	 between	 fighting	 the	 rebels	 and	 countering	 the	
rebellion. This criticism corresponded with that of many counter-
insurgency specialists. In the period after 2005, this group started to make 
more of a mark on military operations in Iraq. With his claim that – just 
as during the Vietnam war – the us armed forces lacked the capacity to 
adapt to the enemy, Aylwin-Foster nevertheless underestimated the us’s 
ability to learn. He was not the only one.67 The inclusion of his bitingly 
critical	article	 in	 the	 influential	us Army’s Military Review	was	 the	first	
contraindication of what he argued. So was the moderate and even 
assenting	 response	 from	some	 influential	Army	officers	 in	 Iraq	and	 the	
United States.68 There was apparently room for criticism in the us armed 
forces. The organisation proved its critics wrong by displaying increasing 
flexibility	and	understanding	for	irregular	warfare	and	counter-insurgency	
principles from 2006 onwards.
British self-criticism and exit
Aylwin-Foster’s remarks caused most irritation in creating the impression 
that	his	country	was	doing	better	in	Iraq,	while	omitting	to	stress	sufficiently	
the	much	more	difficult	operational	conditions	in	the	us sector in Central 
and Northern Iraq. Yet by this time, 2005, the British ‘model’ too had 
largely lost its sheen due to pressure from the Shiite power struggle in the 
south and the rise of increasingly violent militias. The basic attitude and 
tactical	reflexes	of	the	British	troops,	to	some	extent	conditioned	by	their	
experiences in Northern Ireland and during peace support operations in 
the 1990s, ought to have made them better suited to stabilising occupied 
Iraq than many of their us colleagues. Many specialists outside the uk 
agreed on this.69	Yet	the	overall	British	effort	in	Iraq	had	major	flaws.	A	
more population-centred approach, relative self-restraint and the ability 
to improvise compensated for the structural shortfall in personnel. But 
the situation was ultimately exacerbated by the lack of a coherent strategy 
and a defective civil contribution, according to an evaluation by the British 
Army’s Land Warfare Centre, which appraised uk operations in Southern 
Iraq from May 2003 up to the general elections in January 2005.70
The British self-criticism was harsh. Like the us, the uk had formally 
accepted the status of occupying power, but had subsequently acted 
insufficiently	according	to	the	spirit	of	the	Law	of	Occupation.	The	British	
government took military responsibility for the four Southern provinces, 
but with a lack of clarity on non-military tasks. Occupation policy was left 
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almost entirely to the Americans. For a long time the British government 
also hoped, in vain, for a major role for the un or other individual allies in 
the interim government and in the reconstruction of its Southern sector. 
This resulted in tardy and inadequate preparations for the occupation and 
long delays in rebuilding administration and essential facilities.
The British government also paid little more than lip service to the so-
called ‘comprehensive approach’, which was supposed to integrate the four 
lines of operation of security, administration, the economy and facilities. 
It invested many hundreds of millions pounds in the military effort with 
respect to security, but (initially) spent only a fraction on the economic 
line of operation, on which security depended to a large extent. In terms 
of personnel, the uk’s contribution to the cpa remained below target until 
the end of 2003.71 In the early stages, a minor Coalition partner such as 
Denmark contributed pro rata more civilian personnel and funds to the 
interim administration and reconstruction than the British themselves.72 
Moreover,	insufficient	compensation	for	the	shortfall	in	civilian	capacity	
was provided in the form of cimic-personnel and funds.
Criticism of the defective planning and implementation of the Iraq 
policy did not come just from the military. Hilary Synnott, the British 
civilian cpa representative in Southern Iraq, thought that his country 
had embarked on a state-building adventure of colonial proportions for 
which it was completely unprepared. To his dismay, the Blair government 
continued to leave administrative responsibility to Washington, even after 
cpa chief Paul Bremer had repeatedly let it be known that he allocated a 
low priority to the ‘peaceful’ south.73 During an inquiry into developments 
in Iraq, the British House of Commons also singled out short-term vision 
and indecision on reconstruction and reform of the security services as a 
“key failing of the British effort”. As elsewhere in Iraq, recruitment of high 
numbers of Iraqis for the security services was given priority over quality.74
While at the end of 2003 the Americans were again talking of ‘the 
war in Iraq’, both the British government and its armed forces were 
experiencing	difficulties	in	categorising	the	operation.	In	the	first	year	of	
occupation, Operation Telic had been viewed as a peace support operation 
and was certainly not approached as a type of temporary military rule. 
The British often used the term stability operation, which also found its 
way into Dutch usage in 2003.75	They	adhered	to	this	classification	even	
when violence against the Iraqi authorities and the Coalition increased 
sharply from 2004 onwards. The British faced armed rebellion, but in 
spite of their extensive historical experience with this phenomenon they 
244
A Gentle Occupation
were remarkably slow in openly acknowledging that they were caught up 
in a complex counter-insurgency campaign.76
In the course of 2004, the uk-us effort in Iraq was increasingly 
labelled as counter-insurgency. Yet the complexity and diversity of the 
Iraqi insurgency, the constant shortage of personnel and the high level of 
violence meant that the uk	seemed	unable	to	benefit	from	past	experience.	
The British reputation for being successful counterinsurgents was due 
to their effective strategy in Malaysia in the course of the 1950s and in 
Northern Ireland since the mid-1970s, where they were known to have 
eventually balanced military and civilian efforts. They were generally 
praised for intermittently applying force to curb uprisings or – as 
eventually	 in	Northern	 Ireland	–	 for	 creating	 the	flexibility	and	 time	 to	
solve	a	conflict	via	political	means	by	maintaining	“an	acceptable	level	of	
violence”. Historians and counter-insurgency experts often contrasted 
this British method of operating with the failed us strategy in Vietnam 
in the 1960s, which allegedly focused primarily on killing the enemy. 
In the colonial context, however, counter-insurgency usually involved 
fighting	a	single,	more	or	 less	centrally-led	rebel	movement	which	used	
guerrilla tactics, terror and subversion to create a new (often communist 
or nationalist) order. The British Army doctrine for counter-insurgency, as 
distributed to units in Iraq in 2004, dated from 1995 and was largely based 
on	theories	and	principles	 learned	from	such	past	conflicts	 in	Malaysia,	
Vietnam, Aden and Northern Ireland.
There seemed nothing inherently wrong with the basic principles laid 
down in this doctrine – such as having a clear and attainable political 
objective, the use of proportional force, an integrated civil-military 
implementation mechanism for a comprehensive plan, separating the 
insurgents from the local population, the key role of intelligence gathering 
and a gradual, patient approach. Yet the parameters for operations against 
an irregular opponent were fundamentally different in modern times. Here, 
too, the enemy was largely invisible and urban areas of operations provided 
interesting parallels with operations in Belfast, but in Iraq international 
troops had to operate as outsiders without ‘reliable’ civilian partners and 
with a minimum knowledge of the language and culture. In this respect, a 
comparison with the us intervention in Vietnam was more relevant than the 
formative British experiences in Malaysia and Northern Ireland.
In addition, there was not just a single enemy, but a diffuse urban 
guerrilla mix with religiously-inspired, nationalist and criminal elements, 
in which several groups with varying motives had a stake in striving both 
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to create a new order and preserve the chaotic status quo.77 What hindered 
the application of the ever so relevant counter-insurgency principles in 
Iraq was the key question of how ‘foreign’ military personnel could provide 
effective support to weak, dysfunctional and corrupt local administrators 
and police forces. State-building and counter-insurgency went hand-in-
hand in Iraq, but the two leading Coalition partners performed poorly in 
both these disciplines and were never able to solve their main strategic 
dilemma of supporting a host nation regime which lacked legitimacy.
Like other Coalition partners, the British hoped that the violence in 
Iraq would decrease in the wake of the January 2005 elections. Since the 
start of the invasion they had faced 86 fatalities and the Blair government 
was coming under increasing domestic pressure to bring the troops 
home.78 The elections had no lasting positive effect on stability, however. 
After a brief lull, the Sadr movement in fact gained in strength and the 
number of British casualties rose due to a growing number of attacks using 
improved ied technology, often developed with help from Iran.79 Troop 
reductions seemed premature at that point, because it was precisely due to 
a constant shortage of personnel that the British allowed the Shiite militias 
room to display their authority. The hasty ssr efforts which had focused on 
quantity	rather	than	quality	had	also	enabled	militia	members	to	infiltrate	
the	official	security	services	en	masse.80
In October 2005, a referendum of the Iraqi people approved a new 
constitution,	 after	 which	 the	 first	 constitutional	 elections	 were	 held	 on	
15 December. This time, Sunnis participated massively. As many Iraqis 
again voted along religious and ethnic lines, the Shiite alliance dominated 
by sciri and Dawa won a convincing victory. The Shiites and Kurds again 
formed a government, although internal disagreements meant that it took 
months to form a new cabinet. The candidate supported by the Sadrists, 
Prime Minister Al Jafaari, ultimately ceded to the new Dawa leader, Nouri 
al	 Maliki.	 Under	 his	 leadership,	 the	 first	 permanent	 Iraqi	 government	
was installed in the midst of growing violence in May 2006. The power 
struggle	 intensified	 between	 Shiite	 parties.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 violence	
between Shiites and Sunnis also increased, following an attack on the 
Golden Mosque in Samarra in February 2006. This act of terror against 
an important Shiite shrine led to a new round of sectarian violence, which 
now began to take on the unmistakable characteristics of a civil war.
The downward spiral of violence caused the number of troop-
contributing nations within the Coalition to diminish rapidly. As early 
as mid-2004, the Spanish had withdrawn their 1,500-strong force, and 
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after the Dutch announcement that it was leaving a number of other small 
countries within mnd South-East decided to withdraw too. In March 2005, 
Italy announced it would gradually start reducing its brigade in Dhi Qar 
later that year.81 After the British-Australian contingent had handed over 
responsibility for security in Al Muthanna to Iraqi security forces in the 
following year, the Japanese withdrew their humanitarian aid battalion 
as well.
By now, British troops were barely in control of the south and were 
facing	 increasingly	 severe	 set-backs.	 During	 the	 first	 two	 weeks	 of	 its	
deployment in the spring of 2006, 20 Armoured Brigade suffered seven 
fatalities in a total of 41 attacks. Partly due to less-frequent patrols, there was 
a sharp increase in mortar and rocket attacks on the bases.82 Lawlessness 
increased in spite of determined attempts by the British, in conjunction 
with the Iraqi authorities, to cleanse the Iraqi security services in Basra in 
subsequent months. In October 2006, the British Chief of the General Staff, 
General Sir Richard Dannatt, shocked the British government by publicly 
pleading for a rapid withdrawal. He claimed that the British military presence 
only worsened the security situation.83 Instead, the British commenced a 
gradual reduction of their forces. Even though they spent more and more 
time under armour and within their bases in the year 2007, they suffered 
a higher number of casualties than ever before. mnd South-East left its last 
base in the city of Basra in September of that year. From that time, almost all 
the remaining 5,500 British troops operated from the main camp situated 
at Basra airport.
After Al Muthanna, Dhi Qar and Maysan, Basra was the last of the four 
southern provinces in which the British handed responsibility for security 
over to the Iraqis. That autumn, us strategic analyst Anthony Cordesman 
provokingly asserted that the British had essentially been defeated. What 
followed	in	the	United	States	was	a	flood	of	criticism	of	what	was	perceived	
to be an overly detached and lenient attitude on the part of the British.84 
In the spring of 2008, they played a modest supporting role in the bold 
and large-scale offensive in which the Iraqi authorities, aided by us forces, 
succeeded in ousting the Mahdi Army from the streets of Basra, to the great 
relief of most of its residents.85 In late May 2009, the British armed forces 





Al Muthanna after the departure of the Dutch 
The situation in Al Muthanna presented a much brighter picture, also after 
the Dutch departed. In contrast to the situation in neighbouring provinces 
the British could return to their favourite modus operandi. “It’s not war, 
it’s peacekeeping,” a Captain of the Light Dragoons said, while his men 
conducted peaceful patrols in the busy As Samawah market in August 2005 
and politely drank the cups of sweet tea they were offered. Thanks to the 
arrival of the Australian Al Muthanna Task Group (amtg) in May 2005, the 
1,000-strong British-led Task Force Eagle was now almost as large as the 
nlbgs had been. The British and Australians modestly ascribed the calm 
in the province to the population and to the main tribal leaders. Taskforce 
commander Colonel Hugh Blackman asserted that about thirteen sheikhs 
had control over almost everything going on in the province. He therefore 
recognised the importance of devoting attention to the tribal leaders and 
treating them with respect. The formal government and the tribal rule and 
law system continued to operate in parallel and the British – just like the 
Dutch before them – did not intend to challenge or change that. Governor 
Al	Hassani	ruled	with	an	iron	fist.	This	was	just	as	well,	Blackman	noted,	
because “this place is like herding cats”.86
Former cpa administrator for Al Muthanna Colonel Maurice Bulmer 
returned for a second tour in Iraq two years after he had left. From mnd 
South-East headquarters he witnessed how the Al Muthanna police 
performed better and acted in a less intimidating fashion than their Basra 
counterparts.87 The relative stability in ‘his’ former province did not mean, 
however, that things were always peaceful or that the security services 
had	matured.	Things	still	went	wrong.	Nervous	policemen	opened	fire	on	
agitated demonstrators during demonstrations in June and August 2005, 
for	example.	Three	people	were	killed	and	several	dozen	injured,	including	
a considerable number of policemen. Governor Al Hassani dismissed Chief 
of Police Kareem and replaced him with another member of the Al Zayadi 
tribe. After all, it would be unwise to disturb the cherished tribal balance. 
The British suspected that a second shooting incident after this had been 
provoked by Kareem’s followers. Others blamed the Sadrists. Following an 
incident in July 2006, in which a violent group of 300 recently-dismissed 
policemen stormed the Governate Council building, the new chief of police 
resigned and Al Hassani came under severe pressure to step down.88
In	 spite	 of	 these	 difficulties,	 at	 this	 time	 the	 ‘province	 of	 peace’	




in Iraq where, in the presence of Prime Minister Al Maliki, the security 
services took full responsibility for internal security. The British political 
adviser to Task Force Eagle stressed that this was possible because As 
Samawah was “Sleepy Hollow” compared to the other provincial capitals, 
although it had taken a great deal of work to keep it that way.89 There had 
been no casualties among Coalition forces since August 2004. After the 
handover, the Australians continued operations as Overwatch Battle Group 
(West), a rapid reaction force which could provide support on request from 
outside Al Muthanna, at Tallil Airbase in Dhi Qar. An Australian Army 
Training Team continued the ssr programme on a smaller scale.
Immediately following the withdrawal of the foreign troops, the 
security	 situation	 in	 the	 towns	 of	 Al	 Muthanna	 deteriorated	 briefly.	
Ar Rumaythah stayed true to its reputation as a rebel hotbed, as the 
Australians were attacked during a visit to the Iraqi army base (the former 
Dutch	base)	 on	26	September	2006.	During	a	 gunfight	 lasting	nearly	 an	
hour, a few of the attackers were probably killed but there were no Australian 
casualties.	The	Diggers	eventually	had	to	retreat	under	fire.90 An illustration 
of the gradual improvement in quality of the Iraqi security forces was the 
fact that Overwatch Battle Group (West) never deployed. Yet Al Muthanna 
was not immune to the violent power struggle raging in the country either. 
On 20 August 2007, governor Al Hassani was killed by a powerful roadside 
bomb	while	travelling	from	Ar	Rumaythah,	where	he	lived,	to	his	office	in	
As Samawah. His death, just like a similar attack on the sciri governor of 
neighbouring province Al Qadisiyah in the same month, was attributed to 
the Sadrists.91
In March 2007, looking back on the almost four years since the 
invasion, a number of Al Muthanna residents quoted in a local newspaper 
showed little regret at the departure of the foreign troops. They certainly 
did not bear a grudge, but Iraqi responsibility for security came as a 
relief to many. However, they did regret the departure of the Japanese, 
whose	reconstruction	tasks	and	financial	injections,	in	spite	of	the	often	
cumbersome implementation, were sorely missed due to the employment 
they provided.92	After	the	initial	start-up	difficulties	in	2004,	the	Japanese	
had eventually spent hundreds of millions of us dollars with increasing 
effectiveness on healthcare and water and electricity supply. Like the Dutch, 
however,	the	Japanese	did	little	to	fulfil	promises	of	remaining	involved	in	
the desert province’s development after their departure. Nevertheless, the 
provincial authorities managed to attract foreign investment in the cement 
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industry and the electricity network. With unemployment at 60 per cent 
and half the population living below the poverty line, such investment was 
sorely needed.93
The us in Iraq, 2003-2011
When Dutch troops left Iraq exactly two years after the start of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, the initial euphoria at the simple overthrow of the Baath 
regime had evaporated. Little also remained of the most prominent 
justifications	for	the	war.94 The allies had discovered no weapons of mass 
destruction and the alleged link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaida 
had never existed.95 In the us, the Bush administration would probably 
have been forgiven this had the stabilisation of Iraq gone more smoothly, 
or at least followed the pattern seen in Al Muthanna. However, due to 
the lack of progress, the growing violence, the rising number of us troops 
killed and – to a much lesser extent – the large number of Iraqi casualties, 
us president George W. Bush sustained severe political damage after his 
re-election at the end of 2004. The violence reached an absolute nadir in 
2006. At that point, the us was close to losing the war in Iraq. However, 
the catastrophic events concealed the fact that the Americans had started 
to adapt to the enemy. The us military learned from its mistakes and 
was progressively applying historical counter-insurgency lessons in its 
operations by now.96 At the end of 2005, Brigadier Aylwin-Foster admitted 
that little of his previous severe criticism was still valid.
From a us perspective, the years following the capture of Baghdad 
could roughly be divided into three episodes. It was not entirely 
coincidental that these corresponded to the periods of overall command by 
Lieutenant	General	Ricardo	Sanchez,	General	George	Casey	and	General	
David	Petraeus.	The	first	period	was	characterised	by	a	fickle	occupation	
policy and a tendency, born out of haste and lack of forces, to focus on 
the destruction of the insurgents. In spite of major initiatives such as cerp 
and at times deviating operational concepts applied by units such as the 
101st Airborne Division and the us Marine Corps – and of course smaller 
contingents such as the British and the Dutch – most population-centric 
initiatives remained random and disjointed.
In the second period, shortly after his appointment in the summer of 
2004, General Casey, in conjunction with the Iraqi government, drew up 
a	campaign	plan	 that	finally	 linked	security,	democratisation,	 economic	
development and communication together as lines of operation. It was 
250
A Gentle Occupation
the	 first	 comprehensive	 campaign	 plan	 drawn	 up	 by	 the	 Coalition.97 
Also,	 the	 highest	 military	 official	 in	 Iraq	 surrounded	 himself	 with	 an	
independent-minded	advisery	team	of	highly-educated	(former)	officers,	
often specialists in countering insurgencies, and in the course of 2005 
improved the operational mentoring of the army and the police. In 
order to stimulate civil-military cooperation, the us State Department 
introduced Provincial Reconstruction Teams (prts), a concept which had 
been tried out in Afghanistan with some success. The deployment of these 
mixed civil-military reconstruction and advisery teams meant that for the 
first	time	since	the	departure	of	the	cpa there was again a substantial civil 
representation of diplomats and usaid employees in the provinces.98 In 
2007 Al Muthanna was also allocated its own prt, which operated out of 
Tallil Airbase and from an us Army Combat Outpost along Route Tampa.
In spite of the innovations under General Casey, there were two 
dominant and constant factors which hindered progress. Firstly, the 
140,000 us troops continued to operate from large Forward Operating 
Bases outside the towns (even more and more so) and they almost always 
displayed a presence in populated areas in armoured vehicles. Secondly, 
the Iraqis were to take over security tasks as quickly as possible, ready 
or not. The Coalition’s emphasis on ssr remained valid, but its primary 
motives – troop reductions, minimising its own losses, shrinking its 
network of bases and as fast an exit as possible – prevented the transition 
from being properly implemented.99
After four years of disastrous policy, President Bush announced a 
radical	new	pacification	strategy	on	10	January	2007.	It	was	a	case	of	do	or	
die for the us in Iraq.100 The most controversial was the temporary injection 
of an additional 28,500 combat troops and a greater civilian component, 
which led to the new us strategy being nicknamed ‘the Surge’. The new 
commander in Iraq, General Petraeus and his civilian counterpart, 
ambassador Ryan Crocker, had to prove that the measures were bearing 
fruit within six months. The Surge’s second element was just as important: 
the widespread introduction of counter-insurgency tactics, which focused 
on securing the Iraqi people rather than merely the destruction of the 
enemy. This was done by better integrating us operations with those of the 
Iraqi	security	forces	and	by	having	units	operate	out	of	dozens	of	smaller	
bases in the towns. Instead of just ‘clearing’ residential districts, they also 
focussed on ‘holding’ population centres by stabilising them in order to 
consolidate local successes by engaging in reconstruction (‘building’).101
The quite successful application of what became known as the Clear-
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Hold-Build concept would have been impossible without the third and 
most controversial element of the new strategy. The us invested heavily 
in alliances with previously openly-hostile Sunni tribe leaders, which had 
already been entered into in 2006 on a smaller scale. ‘Turning’ Sunni 
tribes against Al Qaeda in Iraq, and involving urban civilian militias in 
clearing and holding areas, facilitated the success of 2007. But it also made 
it fragile. The violent excesses of the predominantly foreign-led Al Qaeda 
in Iraq drove tribal leaders and urban militias to forge an improbable 
alliance with the us. Yet the cornered Sunnis still lacked faith in the Shiite 
and Kurd-dominated Iraqi government. Also, the truce between the 
Americans and the Mahdi Army, which after the attack on the Golden 
Mosque had committed many sectarian murders, remained controversial, 
although it was one of the main reasons for the drop in violence in 2007.
The daring Coalition strategy seemed to have passed the litmus test 
when the number of us and Iraqi casualties dropped sharply in mid-2007. 
The spiral of violence of the past few years had been broken. The Iraqi 
authorities were able to establish themselves in this relative lull and even 
acquire	 enough	 self-confidence	 to	 tackle	 Al	 Sadr	 and	 his	militia	 in	 the	
spring of 2008. The new us government under President Barack Obama 
continued the policy. In spite of an immeasurable number of unsolved 
problems, a large section of the us armed forces was able to leave Iraq in 
2010,	followed	by	a	definite	withdrawel	in	2011.
The ‘Dutch touch’
The British and American experiences in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 
underlined in retrospect how much had gone well during the twenty 
months that Al Muthanna had been under Dutch rule in 2003-2005. At 
the same time, the complex political dynamics and explosion of sectarian, 
criminal and religious violence elsewhere in Iraq should have tempered 
triumphant claims with respect to the extent to which the Netherlands 
had	 been	 able	 to	 influence	 the	 positive	 developments	 in	 the	 peripheral	
province. The embracing of the term ‘Dutch approach’ in the Netherlands 
smacked of a lack of modesty. It surely could not have been the main 
explanation for what seemed a remarkable tactical success in the context 
of a great allied strategic failure?
Trumpeting a ‘Dutch approach’ seemed to be an example of what is 
known in social psychology as attribution theory. Extensive statistical 
study has shown that – unsurprisingly – people have a strong tendency to 
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attribute success to themselves, while they prefer to attribute their failures 
to circumstances. They tend to do the exact opposite when it comes to 
other people. If someone else succeeds, ‘then that must be due to positive 
circumstances’, but if that person fails, then it must be their own fault. 
Instant self-evaluation would therefore appear to be unreliable – also in 
the case of the Dutch deployment to Iraq, where the attribution theory 
crossed over to the domain of public relations.102
The As Samawah resident who in December 2003 had told a Dutch tv 
reporter that the Netherlands had chosen the region because it was calm, 
and that it would remain so after their departure, was proven right.103 
Borrowing the analogy used by 2 nlbg’s commander Lieutenant Colonel 
Oppelaar, the province was certainly no island in rough seas, but it did 
seem a bit like a peninsula. With 2 per cent of the national electorate in a 
peripheral region without mineral resources, it hardly made for a magnet 
for extremists and terrorists. “The stars were favourably aligned in Al 
Muthanna,” had been the consensus at the cpa	office	as	far	back	as	2003-
2004.104 The desert province was very poor, but blessed with a homogenous 
population,	 a	 geographical	 position	which	minimised	 Iranian	 influence	
and	it	fell	under	the	tempering	influence	of	traditional	tribal	ties.
“The ‘Dutch approach’ in a broader sense could never have worked as 
well in As Zubayah as it did in Al Muthanna,” former political adviser Michel 
Rentenaar said in retrospect in relation to the combination of administrative 
reforms and the open attitude towards the locals. The large industrial suburb 
of Basra, where Dutch troops could also have settled in the summer of 2003, 
had	a	more	heterogeneous	population	and	the	undermining	influence	of	Iran	
and of radical Shiite groups was much greater.105 Former cpa administrator 
Colonel Bulmer also attributed the calm in Al Muthanna to a combination 
of favourable local conditions and Dutch operations, which incidentally 
reminded him very much of the original British approach.106
If the calm conditions in Al Muthanna could at least be partly ascribed 
to the Dutch effort, to what extent could this modus operandi be traced to 
a deliberate national approach? Patrols and the open posture towards the 
population were after all only part of this. The full range of Dutch tasks in 
Al Muthanna comprised a mix of executive and support tasks for the police 
and	 local	 government,	 reform	 of	 the	 security	 services,	 fighting	 irregular	
opponents, and reconstruction activities. There was a shift in accent over 
time for each of these elements. To what extent did this broad set of tasks 
correspond to the operational instructions formulated in The Hague at the 
outset of the operation? And to what extent did the subsequent government 
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policy and direction of the units match up with the evolution of the actual 
operation ‘on the ground’? In short, was there a plan, or did the ability to 
improvise at the tactical level form the basis for the achievements in Iraq?
What was certain was that The Hague insisted on strict compliance 
with the instructions on the use of force. In addition to proportional 
force, an open attitude to the Iraqi people was applauded, monitored and 
occasionally encouraged throughout the operation. However, this modus 
operandi differed substantially from the formal assignment issued to 1 
nlbg at the start. The cabinet’s letter to Parliament of 6 June 2003 in fact 
emphasised a detached modus operandi, in which patrols and checkpoints 
would be kept to a minimum, and as far away from the population as 
possible. The Dutch Parliament was told that too emphatic a military 
presence was to be avoided in the towns.107 The idea behind this was to 
avoid at all times the impression that the Dutch were participating in the 
occupation. This operational concept proved to be unworkable during the 
occupation phase until the summer of 2004 however, and was dropped 
by the tactical commanders. Lieutenant Colonel Swijgman of 1 nlbg in fact 
adhered to the opposite line of his British division commander in Basra and 
displayed a maximum instead of minimum presence. He did all he could 
to increase the visibility of his infantry when the local community made an 
urgent appeal to have more troops patrol the streets and asked him to tackle 
serious crime.
In fact, the modus operandi that the cabinet in its letter to Parliament 
emphasised	as	an	important	course	of	action	also	conflicted	with	what	was	
later presented (and boasted) as the ‘Dutch approach’. A detached method 
of operating would after all never have provided the human intelligence to 
be able to conduct effective operations. Military personnel only obtained 
information by constantly moving among the Iraqis and by making public 
security a priority. ‘Intel-driven operations’ would have been nothing more 
than a hollow phrase if military personnel had stayed out of the towns and 
isolated themselves on distant operating bases.
This was made even clearer after the transfer of sovereignty at the end 
of June 2004, when 4 nlbg indeed switched, in accordance with mnf-i policy, 
to a more detached modus operandi – an approach which corresponded 
to the one formulated over a year earlier for 1 nlbg. Even in peaceful Al 
Muthanna	it	turned	out	to	be	too	soon	for	the	international	troops	to	fulfil	
such	a	role	of	‘distant	fire	brigade’.	The	local	security	services	were	far	too	




2004. The Dutch intelligence position deteriorated further when 4 nlbg 
reduced its presence in the towns. This gap was recognised in the allocation 
from the Netherlands of a great deal of extra intelligence capacity in the 
wake of the Sadr uprising in August.
Also	with	respect	to	administration,	crime-fighting	and	civil-military	
cooperation, the assignment and policy deviated greatly from the reality 
on the ground. In order to ensure broad political support, the Netherlands 
was more emphatic in its adoption of a status of non-occupying power 
than	other	Coalition	partners	 such	 as	Denmark	 and	 Italy.	 The	 artificial	
distinction was made in spite of warnings from experts that it was both 
legally untenable and practically irrelevant. The list of Dutch caveats 
– the longest of all the partners within mnd South-East – proved to be 
unworkable. In particular by insisting on excluding civil administrative 
and police tasks, the Dutch government put its deployed personnel in a 
tough position. The military forces and the political adviser were forced to 
be highly creative in conducting their assignments. Policymakers neglected 
to go back to the drawing board even after the realisation dawned in The 
Hague	that	the	mission	design	was	indeed	flawed.
In	 addition	 to	 adequate	 tactical	 reflexes	 and	 the	 relatively	 calm	
situation in the province, the predominantly successful operations by the 
successive Dutch battle groups in occupied Iraq can be ascribed to their 
very	flexible	interpretation	of	the	defective	national	mandate.	The	Dutch	
in Al Muthanna operated on the edge of and beyond what was permitted 
– albeit always in the spirit of what their British divisional commander 
intended.	 In	particular	 the	first	 contingent	 had	 to	work	 its	way	 around	
several restrictions, most of all with respect to executive police tasks. In 
the occupation phase until June 2004, Dutch military personnel tended 
to	package	crime-fighting	measures,	in	particular	the	large-scale	targeting	
operations, as force protection.
The ban on involvement in civil administrative matters and the 
explicit rejection of the British request to provide civilian personnel for 
the cpa also forced the Dutch armed forces to improvise. In doing so, they 
often exceeded the limits of the mandate. Whether they liked it or not, 
as the most powerful party in a power vacuum the military commanders 
in provinces such as Al Muthanna effectively became the local ‘rulers’. 
Unlike the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, the Iraqis 
barely distinguished between civil and military authority, occupier or 
stabilisation force. Although the administrative role gradually decreased 
from 1 nlbg to 2 nlbg, commanders Swijgman and Oppelaar were both very 
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generous in their support for governance, as they understood that a more 
or less representative and stable local government would play a key role in 
securing the province. They were able to restrict their own executive role 
by	 leaving	 this	 task	 to	 the	first	political	adviser,	Michel	Rentenaar,	who	
played a key part in building the local administration. The rapid succession 
of provincial cpa administrators and poor performance of one of them at 
a crucial stage meant that Rentenaar’s role became even more decisive.
Irrespective of the Dutch government’s tendency to distance itself 
from	 the	 occupying	 authorities,	 the	 first	 Dutch	 rotations	 provided	 a	
relatively successful example of how an integrated, civil-military approach 
to crisis response operations ought to function. In the years following the 
Dutch departure from Iraq, this ‘comprehensive approach’ would become 
a focal point of Dutch foreign and security policy and military doctrine, 
but	in	Al	Muthanna	the	priority	was,	for	specific	political	reasons,	still	the	
opposite,	by	artificially	demarcating	and	separating	the	military	and	civil	
dimensions. The Netherlands only wanted to take responsibility for the 
security aspects of the mission, in order to facilitate other organisations 
in reconstruction activities. Any involvement with the civil domain had 
to directly serve the security operation rather than – and herein lies the 
paradox – serve the strategic end objective: the rebuilding of Iraq.
This	 official	 Dutch	 approach	 to	 the	mission	 also	 restricted	 the	 cimic 
instrument. The Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs underestimated 
the importance of cimic in Iraq.108 The key was the belief in progress and 
the good intentions of the foreign occupiers. The short and medium-term 
projects conducted by Dutch troops were the only concrete results at a time 
when the cpa was hardly leaving a trace. As a result doubts about the good 
intentions of ‘the foreigners’ grew sharply. In the meantime, the Dutch 
made themselves popular by spending many millions of dollars from (non-
Dutch) cerp and cpa budgets. The results were credited to the nlbg. It was no 
coincidence that these ‘Dutch’ projects featured prominently in the Letter to 
Parliament and in speeches on the Netherlands’ achievements in Iraq.
In	 spite	 of	 various	 large-scale	 projects,	 the	 inflated	 cimic effort 
obviously failed to compensate for the lack of structural development 
aid. The Ministry of Defence did send some extra cimic personnel, but the 
lack of a suitable national policy as well as a lack of strategy and planning 
which transcended the four-monthly rotations, meant that Dutch efforts 
remained ad hoc. This was particularly obvious in the most vulnerable 





to increase its cimic budget in order to guarantee continuity. Only after the 
crisis in Ar Rumaythah did part of the required construction funds become 
available.	In	general,	the	Netherlands	was	not	yet	sufficiently	focused	on	
an integrated and balanced civil-military approach. A striking aspect was 
the much greater willingness to give additional funds and personnel for 
the building of new Iraqi security services as part of the Security Sector 
Reform effort, on account of this being viewed as part of the exit strategy.
Therefore, when it came to the Dutch modus operandi, the most 
crucial	success	factors	in	Al	Muthanna	were	not	the	result	of	a	specific	and	
deliberate national approach at all. Success was made possible by creative 
and ad hoc solutions at the tactical level within the general guidelines and 
plans of the allied higher echelons in Basra and Baghdad, despite national 
regulations. Like their colleagues in Washington and London, politicians and 
policymakers in The Hague seemed ill-prepared for the largely predictable 
challenges in the power vacuum created in the wake of the 2003 invasion. 
The Netherlands equally had no ready answer to the power struggle in the 
Shiite south and the unexpectedly vehement Sadrist uprisings in 2004. The 
restrained	reflexes	of	the	Dutch	fitted	the	situation	reasonably	well	as,	thanks	
to the tribal regime, these revolts passed Al Muthanna by almost completely, 
and neither the fragile peace in the ‘Dutch province’ nor the relatively subtle 
Dutch operational style was ever really put to the test. Therefore, the success 
of the subsequent nlbgs was conditions-driven rather than the result of a 
deliberate strategy or brilliantly improvised method on the part of the Dutch.
A gentle occupation
The question remains how to categorise Dutch operations in Al Muthanna 
in retrospect. Confusion continued to reign about the nature of the military 
deployment even several years afterwards. The suggestion at the start of the 
operation in 2003 that it was a deployment in the tradition of peacekeeping 
persisted stubbornly even after the Dutch troops had left Al Muthanna 
in 2005. Newspaper de Volkskrant spoke of the British taking over a 
“peacekeeping task” from the Dutch and of a near perfect “peace operation” 
right up to the end.109 In the context of the Iraq War, this seemed almost 
cynical.
General terms such as ‘peace operation’ and ‘peace support operation’, 
as	well	as	the	more	specific	categories	of	peace	enforcement, peacekeeping 
and peace building which the un has used since the 1990s in an attempt 
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to create clarity in the instrument kit of international crisis response 
management,	clearly	did	not	fit	 the	bill	 in	Iraq.	They	could	not	be	used	as	
the operation did not involve international crisis resolution but rather an 
intervention and subsequent occupation by a coalition of nations. The fact that 
these terms were nevertheless often used in the Netherlands demonstrates 
that the conceptual framework for international crisis response operations 
had been stretched for public relations purposes to such an extent that the 
non-forceful participation in an occupation and the role in a struggle against 
armed insurgents apparently also fell into these categories. It is revealing in 
this respect that the deployed Dutch military personnel were awarded the 
Commemorative Medal for Peace Operations on their return.
Official	 documents	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Defence	 consistently	 used	
the neutral term ‘crisis response operation’. The descriptions ‘stability 
operation’ and ‘stabilisation force’ did catch on to some extent because 
they	described	a	significant	part	of	the	Dutch	troops’	tasks.	Nevertheless,	
the mission in Al Muthanna encompassed a great deal more. During 
‘sfir’ – a name exclusively used in the Netherlands – the Dutch armed 
forces became acquainted with a new generation of complex and 
multidimensional international operations, characterised by many inter-
connected, overlapping and mutually-reinforcing military and non-
military elements. The mission in Al Muthanna was a ‘light’ version of 
what military scholars a few years before had started to call “three-block 
warfare”, “mosaic wars”, “hybrid wars”, “war amongst the people” or, in 
this	specific	case	returning	to	the	existing	concept	which	seems	to	describe	
it best, “complex counter-insurgency” or “counter-insurgency plus”.110
The	historic	parallels	with	colonial	pacification,	foreign	(military)	rule,	
occupation and the post-Second World War decolonisation era were rife, 
but	no	single	case	seemed	to	fit.	David	Kilcullen,	an	Australian	counter-
insurgency adviser to General Petraeus, therefore suggested the following 
to support his ‘hybrid warfare’ theory in historical terms:
“If we were to draw historical analogies, we might say that operations 
in Iraq are like trying to defeat the Viet Cong (insurgency) while 
simultaneously rebuilding Germany (nation building following war 
and dictatorship), keeping the peace in the Balkans (communal and 
sectarian	conflict)	and	defeating	the	ira (domestic terrorism).”111
The Dutch in Al Muthanna were spared such an explosive cocktail. While 
historical analogies are usually risky, the military mission in their part of 
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Iraq at best resembled Kilcullen’s elements of ‘Germany post-1945’ with 
a touch of ‘Northern Ireland’s Troubles’. The ‘Dutch’ province required 
a stabilisation operation with a mix of administrative development, 
large-scale reconstruction efforts with – from a Dutch perspective – an 
unprecedented budget, Security Sector Reform on an equally exceptional 
scale, executive police operations with occasional large-scale cordon, 
search and arrest operations and, where necessary, direct action against 
irregular opponents. This mix was largely the result of what the different 
nlbgs encountered during their tours and the way they adapted to the 
standards set within the Coalition.
The Dutch nevertheless gave the operation certain national accents. In 
Al Muthanna, they were afforded the luxury of treading relatively softly. 
Therefore, the overall result of the mission can best be characterised by 
echoing the title from the semi-autobiographical debut novel by actor-
author	Dirk	Bogarde.	As	an	officer	in	the	British	Indian	Army	that	occupied	
key parts of the Netherlands East Indies after the Japanese surrender in 
1945, Bogarde (also) experienced a dynamic mix of military governance, 
peacekeeping, reconstruction and counter-insurgency after the fall of 
a despotic regime. It was an experience that he referred to as “a gentle 
occupation.”112 The Netherlands armed forces’ mission in Al Muthanna 
could not be described more accurately.
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